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Introduction 
1. State of Nature - Philosophy or History? 
In one of the most famous quotations from the history of political philosophy, 
Thomas Hobbes described the life of human beings in the state of nature as 
`solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. ' In this natural condition human beings 
lived alone, in a state of: equality, constant fear of death, war, and general 
insecurity. It was a state in which there was no dominion, no law, and no 
property. If human beings were reasonable, they would soon conclude that it was 
a state which was incompatible with their ultimate aim to avoid death, and then 
they would wish to leave it. For Hobbes, the state of nature was a logical account 
of the origins of society, but it was also a constantly recurring possibility, because 
it was any period of time in which a society lacked a common power to keep 
order. As Edwin Curley has pointed out, this was a description of England during 
the 1640s. 2 But for many of Hobbes' contemporaries, the state of nature was 
understood to be a description of the pre-historic origin of society. 3 The problem 
for Hobbes' seventeenth century readers was how to reconcile his description of 
the condition of human beings before civil society came into existence, with the 
Biblical account of the original, perfect condition of human beings at the 
creation? As Sir Robert Filmer put it, Hobbes' state of nature simply contradicted 
`the truth of the history of the creation', 4 while Leibniz pointed out that since 
Hobbes did not deny the existence of God as the ruler of the world, there could 
1 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, edited with an 
introduction and notes by Edwin Curley (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis & 
Cambridge, 1994), chapter XIII, section 9, p. 76. All references to Leviathan will be to this 
edition. 
2 See Edwin Curley's introduction to Leviathan, p. xxi. 
3 See R. E. Ewin, Virtues and Rights - The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (\Vestview Press, 
Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1991), pp. 94 & 96. 
4 Sir Robert Filmer, Observations concerning the Originall of Government, upon Mr Hobs 
Leviathan, Mr Milton against Salntasius and H. Grotius De Jure Belli (1652), reproduced in 
Patriarcha and Other Writings, edited by J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991), pp. 184-234, p. 188. 
I 
never have been such a time as the state of nature, i. e. there could never have 
been a time when human beings had lived without a common powers 
In both the Elements of Law Natural and Politic, and De Give Hobbes did 
not claim that his state of nature had existed at a specific point in history, only 
that there were both past and present people who had lived, and were now living, 
in that condition. 6 In Leviathan Hobbes admitted that the state of nature was 
never generally so, although again there were some people who were living in 
that awful state now - i. e. native Americans. 
7 But in the Latin edition of 
Leviathan, published in 1668, this claim was replaced by Hobbes' citation of the 
example of Cain's murder of Abel in defence of his war of all against all. 8 Here 
for the first time, Hobbes finally associated his state of nature with a specific 
moment in Biblical history. But as we will see below, most of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics appear to have been unaware of his use of Cain and Abel. 9 
In this dissertation I want to try to explain how Hobbes' state of nature 
could have been understood by a contemporary readership, whose most important 
reference point for such a condition was the original, perfect condition of 
mankind, and their subsequent Fall, as set out in Genesis. As we will see 
throughout this dissertation many of Hobbes' contemporary critics used the 
account of Genesis to demonstrate that Hobbes' state of nature was both an 
impossibility, and also that it contradicted scripture. But this dissertation will 
show that it was possible for Hobbes' seventeenth century readers to see parallels 
between his account and Reformed interpretations of Genesis, a tradition which 
Hobbes appears to have been closer to than his contemporary critics. Having said 
5 See Thomas Hobbes - The Correspondence, edited by Noel Malcolm (2 volumes, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1994), Volume II, p. 717. Hereafter cited as Hobbes' Correspondence. 
6 See Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Lativ Natural and Politic, edited with an introduction by 
J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 1994), chapter XIV, section 12, p. 
80. Hereafter cited as Elements. See also Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, or On The Citizen, edited and 
translated by R. Tuck & M. Silverthome (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), chapter 
I, section 13, p. 30. All references to the Elements and De Cive will be to these editions. 
7 See Leviathan, XIII, 11, p. 77. 
8 See Leviathan, XIII, 11, p. 77, footnote 7. Hobbes' use of the account of Cain and Abel will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter three on the war of all against all; and in chapter five on the 
creation of society. There has been some debate over whether the Latin version of Leviathan, 
although published after the English version, was, at least in part, written before it - see Curley's 
note on this in his edition of Leviathan, pp. lxxiii-lxxiv. 
9 Though Richard Cumberland had read the Latin Leviathan, and referred to it at various points 
throughout his De Legibus Naturae - see for example Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Lays 
of Nature... Made English fron: the Latin by John Maiwell (London, 1727), p. 173. 
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that, I am not claiming that the Biblical context is the only context within which 
to place Hobbes' state of nature: Richard Ashcraft has written about possible New 
World sources for Hobbes' natural condition; David Wootton has shown how 
Hobbes' state of nature may have been based on his study of history, particularly 
Machiavelli; while George Klosko and Daryl Rice think that the account of the 
state of nature was influenced by Thucydides' account of the earliest people of 
Greece. 1° But given the time and place in which Hobbes was read, the Biblical 
context must be important. Recently, both Christopher Hill and Philip Almond 
have demonstrated the centrality of the Bible, and particularly the account of the 
Fall, in seventeenth century thought, debate, and life. The Bible was the ultimate 
authority on every aspect of life, including politics, religion, morality and 
economics. 11 The `reading of the Bible provided a model for all reading', 12 and 
scripture was read differently by Catholics and Protestants (including Lutherans 
and Calvinists), read in different editions, and `alongside and through the medium 
of commentaries'. 13 
In an extensive study of the reading habits of the Buckinghamshire 
gentleman, Sir William Drake, from the 1620s to the 1660s, Kevin Sharpe has 
demonstrated that readers brought their own experiences, and particularly their 
reading of other texts, to any reading. Readers could also read things differently at 
different points in their lives. 14 Readers took what made sense to them from what 
10 See Richard Ashcraft, `Hobbes' Natural Man: A Study in Ideology Formation', Journal of 
Politics, 33 (1971), pp. 1076-117; David Wootton, `Thomas Hobbes' Machiavellian Moments', in 
The Historical Imagination in Early Modern Britain - History, Rhetoric and Fiction, 1500-1800, 
edited by D. R. Kelley & D. H. Sacks (Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp. 210-42, p. 231; and George Klosko & Daryl Rice, `Thucydides and 
Hobbes's State of Nature', History ofPolitica177iought, 6 (1985), pp. 405-10. 
11 See Christopher Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution (The Penguin 
Press, London, 1993); and Philip C. Almond, Adam and Eve in Seventeenth-Century Thought 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999). John Morrill has shown how Oliver Cromwell 
used Biblical allusions in his speeches and letters to demonstrate the parallels between the civil 
war in England (as well as his own role in that struggle), and various Old Testament accounts - see 
John Morrill, `Cromwell and the Word of God', paper read to the History department research 
seminar at the University of Hull, October 27th, 2000, and as yet unpublished. 
12 R. Chartier, The Cultural Uses of Print in Early Modern France, translated by Lydia G. 
Cochrane (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987), p. 224. 
13 Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions - The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (Yale 
University Press, New Haven & London, 2000), pp. 225-6 & 331, where Sharpe has also noted 
that for Sir William Drake, scripture reinforced arguments drawn from secular works, and that 
Drake `read his Bible almost as a treatise of a new politics of interest rather than as a text of 
Christian commonweal'. 
14 See Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, pp. 34-6. 
they read, and this was different under different circumstances, e. g. during peace 
as opposed to during war. Thus readers constructed their own meanings of texts. 
15 
Alternatively, Stanley Fish has argued that it is not the text or readers themselves 
which produce meanings, but `interpretive communities'. Both readers and 
writers are part of an `interpretive community', which determines what people 
read; and who also share `interpretive strategies'. 16 Authors themselves `always 
imagine the reader', and `writing is conditioned by the readers expectations and 
desires'. 17 By the end of the sixteenth century, the awareness of writers that their 
works were open to different interpretations, led to a change in writing. 18 Authors 
developed various strategies for limiting the interpretations that readers could 
bring to their works. These included not only language and content, but also 
typography, marginal notes, and a layout of the page, which did or did not allow 
the space for readers to write their own notes. 19 The frontispiece, dedication and 
preface could all be used to direct the reader to a particular interpretation of the 
text. 20 Even before the reader began to read, he might be influenced by the title, 
the size of the book, typography and layout, number of chapters, how it was 
bound, its price, and how (and what) he had heard about it. ' 
This dissertation will assess how Hobbes was read by his contemporaries, 
and will argue that Hobbes' seventeenth century readers brought their own 
reading of both the Bible, and scriptural commentaries, to their reading of 
Hobbes' political theory. Thus, it was their own views on the account of the 
creation and Fall, which determined their response to Hobbes' description of the 
state of nature, and that these views were in turn determined by the particular 
interpretations of Genesis, which the individual reader subscribed to. Tom Sorell 
has argued that Hobbes seems to have assumed `as common ground between him 
22 and his readers the Biblical story of the Fall', but as we will see throughout this 
15 See Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, pp. 304 & 40. 
16 S. Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980), p. 14. 
17 Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, p. 59. 
18 See T. Cave, The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979), p. 327. 
19 See Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, pp. 44-51. 
21) See Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, pp. 50-55. 
2! See Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, pp. 44-6. 
22 Tom Sorell, Hobbes (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1986), p. 34. 
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dissertation, the account of the Fall, and its consequences, was interpreted in a 
variety of ways. The dissertation will also compare Hobbes and his contemporary 
critics as readers of scripture, and will argue that Hobbes' political theory was 
closer to the Reformed understanding of Genesis. The majority of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics were either, or both Aristotelians and Arminians, who 
recognised that the Fall had corrupted human beings, although not to the extent 
implied by Hobbes' description of the natural condition. Since the Fall mankind 
retained sufficient knowledge of the requirements of natural law, and all human 
beings had the ability to attain salvation through God's universal grace. The 
critics wanted to look at human beings as they should have been, or as they ought 
to be; whereas Hobbes wanted to look at human nature as it was. As we will see 
throughout this dissertation, Hobbes' contemporary critics understanding of the 
natural condition was completely at odds with Hobbes' understanding. For the 
critics, the natural condition was the condition in which human beings had been 
created in Eden. Thus, their horror at Hobbes' description of a condition of war. 
Indeed, Hobbes' description seems to bear more resemblance to the fallen 
condition, as has been noted by a number of twentieth century Hobbes' scholars. 
2. Hobbes' State of Nature as an account of the Fall? 
Forty years ago Sheldon Wolin called Hobbes' state of nature `a kind of political 
version of Genesis, without sacral overtones and without sin, but a fall 
nevertheless, from the highest level of human achievement, life in a civilised 
society'. According to Wolin, Hobbes' political order was a condition we once 
enjoyed, but have lost and must now attempt to recapture. 23 On Wolin's account, 
Hobbes' state of nature was a description of the disintegration of an already 
established society - this could have been England during the civil war. But if we 
understand the condition we once enjoyed to mean the original condition in Eden, 
then Hobbes' state of nature could be interpreted as Eden after the Fall, or a 
description of the Fall; and his civil society would then be a close approximation 
23 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision - Continuity and Innovation in TVestern Political Thought 
(Little, Brown & Co. Inc., Boston, 1960), p. 264. Wolin, p. 274, has also noted that Hobbes' idea 
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of God's original intentions for human beings, bearing in mind their fallen nature. 
This seems to be an unlikely aim for Hobbes. More recently, Leo Rauch has 
described Hobbes' political theory as `amounting to a secular re-telling of a 
religious myth: the Fall of Man... stripping it of its mythic elements... [but 
adding] some mythic elements of his own'. 4 Rauch claims there were no moral 
values in Eden before the Fall - God commanded Adam not to eat from the tree of 
knowledge, but did not tell him that it was wrong to do so, simply that in doing so 
Adam would die. In this way Eden before the Fall was similar to Hobbes' state of 
nature, where right and wrong had no place. Rauch sees further evidence that 
Hobbes was `consciously presenting a secular version of the Fall in his use of the 
covenant'. 25 
Many other Hobbes' scholars have commented on the resemblance 
between Hobbes' account, and that of the scriptural account of the Fall. 
According to Norberto Bobbio, Hobbes was in agreement with the Augustinian 
and Lutheran idea of the state as a remedy for the Fall, although for Bobbio, 
Hobbes' account was a secular version, in the sense that the state was `not a 
remedy for sin, but a means of disciplining the passions'. 26 Johann Sommerville, 
although admitting that Hobbes said very little about the Fall, has noted that in 
some ways Hobbes' state of nature resembled the traditional view that since the 
Fall human nature had become corrupted, leading human beings to follow their 
passions, rather than reason. This had made the coercive power of the state 
necessary. Sommerville thinks that Hobbes might have been influenced by 
Augustine and Calvin, although he also notes the differences between these two 
thinkers and Hobbes; as well as noting that it was partly Hobbes' account of 
`corrupted' (although Hobbes never called it that) human nature that provoked 
much of the criticism he received from his contemporaries. 27 Garrath Williams 
that belief cannot be compelled by the sovereign was similar to the Lutheran idea of `Christian 
Liberty'. 
24 Leo Rauch, `Secular Fall and Redemption in Hobbes' Leviathan', in Praise Disjoined: 
Changing Patterns of Salvation in 17th Century English Literature, edited by W. P. Shaw (Peter 
Lang, New York, 1991), pp. 89-102, p. 99. 
25 Rauch, `Secular Fall', pp. 100-1. 
26 Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, translated by Daniela 
Gobetti (University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1993), p. 68. 
27 See J. P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context (MacMillan Press 
Ltd, Basingstoke & London, 1992), pp. 41-2. 
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has argued that the consequences of the Fall were central for Hobbes' own moral 
and political system, 28 while Cameron Wybrow claims that, for Hobbes, the Fall 
was `a paradigm for good political theory'. 29 Francis Hood thinks that in 
disobeying the sovereign, human beings repeated Adam's sin, 30 and A. P. 
Martinich has noted that the connection Hobbes made between Christianity and 
political loyalty was derived from traditional accounts of the Fall, in which the 
first sin was disobedience, and its source was pride. 31 For Michael Oakeshott, 
Hobbes created a new myth of the Fall and salvation of mankind. Oakeshott has 
described Hobbes as an ally of both Augustine and Aquinas, and claims his 
description of the war of all against all was indebted to Augustine, who used the 
example of Cain and Abel to prove the idea of universal hostility. 32 Even such a 
secular interpreter of Hobbes as Quentin Skinner, while noting the connection 
between Hobbes and the patriarchalists, has commented on the `curious parallel' 
between fallen man and Hobbes' `assumption of innate wickedness as a political 
28 See Garrath Williams, `Normatively Demanding Creatures - Hobbes, the Fall and Individual 
Responsibility', Res Publica, 6 (2000), pp. 301-19, p. 303. See also G. Manenschijn, "`Jesus is the 
Christ'- The Political Theology of Leviathan', Journal of Religious Ethics, 25 (1997), pp. 35-64, 
p. 42, who thinks Hobbes related the limitations of human rationality to Adam's Fall. 
29 Cameron Wybrow, `Hobbes as an Interpreter of Biblical Political Thought', in Liberal 
Democracy and the Bible, edited by Kim Ian Parker (Edwin Mellon Press, Lewiston, Queenston 
& Lampeter, 1992), pp. 39-71, p. 56. 
30 See F. C. Hood, The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964), pp. 175-6. See also R. J. Halliday, Timothy Kenyon & Andrew 
Reeve, `Hobbes' Belief in God', Political Studies, 31 (1983), pp. 418-33, p. 427, who claim that 
Hobbes presented Adam as the first rebel; and Miriam M. Reik, The Golden Lands of Thomas 
Hobbes (Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1977), p. 150, who has argued that for Hobbes the 
English Civil War was a re-enactment of the Fall. 
31 See A. P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992), p. 307. But see also John W. Seaman, `Hobbes 
and the Liberalization of Christianity', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 32 (1999), pp. 227- 
46, p. 235 who claims that Hobbes `treats pride simply as a sin against other people', and in doing 
so `ignores a critical dimension of the biblical understanding of pride', namely that pride towards 
others is a re-enactment of Adam and Eve's attempt to becomes as gods, by taking the knowledge 
of good and evil for themselves. As will become clear throughout this dissertation, I disagree with 
this view. 
32 See Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975), pp. 56, 
58 & 82-3. Oakeshott appears to have been unaware of Hobbes' use of Cain and Abel. For 
Hobbes' similarity to Augustine see also: W. B. Glover, `Human Nature and the State in Hobbes', 
in Thomas Hobbes - Critical Assessments, edited by Preston King (4 Volumes, Routledge, 
London, 1993), Volume IV, pp. 50-72, p. 52; H. A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of Saint 
Augustine (Columbia University Press, New York, 1963), pp. 46-50; M. J. Wilks, `Saint Augustine 
and the General Will', in Studia Patristica IX, edited by F. L. Cross (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 
1966), pp. 487-506; and my own unpublished B. A. dissertation, `The Concepts of Peace in Saint 
Augustine and Thomas Hobbes' (History Department, King's College London, 1993). 
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premise', although Skinner would no doubt agree that Hobbes did not think 
human beings were evil by nature. 33 
Other scholars have denied that Hobbes' account was an accurate reading 
of the Fall. Leo Strauss has noted that although it could be argued that Hobbes 
had `not yet completely freed himself from the influence of the Christian Biblical 
tradition', nonetheless between writing the Elements and Leviathan, Hobbes 
moved further and further away from that tradition. 34 The Straussian 
interpretation of Hobbes has been continued by a number of scholars, including 
Paul Cooke. Cooke has noted the state of nature's similarity to Genesis, but 
claims that Hobbes' state of nature was `a counter beginning' to the Biblical 
account of the human condition. 35 For Cooke, Hobbes failed to take into account 
`the existential unquiet that is traceable to the story of the Fall', and this is what 
Christianity is all about. 36 Similarly, Pat Moloney has charged Hobbes with 're- 
reading the story of Genesis', so that `Adam had no need of divine instruction, 
and Hobbes had no need of the story of Paradise'. 37 Moloney understands the 
criticisms of Hobbes' contemporaries as a clash between two seventeenth century 
discourses of political origins: commentaries on Genesis and the state of nature 
argument. He claims that eventually one replaced the other, that Hobbes was a 
33 Quentin Skinner, `The Ideological Context of Hobbes's Political Thought', Historical Journal, 
9 (1966), pp. 286-317, p. 300. 
34 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes - Its Basis and Genesis, translated by 
Elsa M. Sinclair (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936), pp. 28 & 74. See also Richard Ashcraft, 
`Leviathan Triumphant: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Wild Men', in The Wild Man Within - 
An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism, edited by E. Dudley & M. E. 
Novak (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1972), pp. 141-81, p. 171, note 24, who 
comments on Sheldon Wolin's claim that Hobbes' state of nature was a political version of 
Genesis. For Ashcraft this is true in the metaphorical sense, but he claims that although `historical 
treatments of Genesis from a political viewpoint were commonplace in seventeenth century 
literature... Leviathan is not, on the whole, a contribution to this genre'. 
35 Paul D. Cooke, Hobbes and Christianity - Reassessing the Bible in Leviathan (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, Boulder, New York & London, 1996), pp. 8& 86. See also 
Thomas L. Pangle, `A Critique of Hobbes's Critique of Biblical and Natural Religion in 
Leviathan', Jewish Political Studies Review, 4 (1992), pp. 25-57, p. 35, who thinks Hobbes' 
account is in opposition to the Christian account of the Fall. 
36 Cooke, Hobbes and Christianity, p. 108. 
37 Pat Moloney, `Leaving the Garden of Eden: Linguistic and Political Authority in Thomas 
Hobbes', History of Political Thought, 18 (1997), pp. 242-66, p. 266. Moloney has concentrated 
on Adam's language and knowledge. See also Joshua Mitchell, Not by Reason Alone - Religion, 
History, and Identity in Early Modern Political Thought (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1993), p. 81, who has argued that Hobbes did not rely on Adam to articulate his positive theory of 
governmental conflict. 
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stage in this transition, and that in doing so Hobbes subverted traditional 
interpretations of Genesis. 38 
3. Hobbes' own belief or unbelief. 
So was Hobbes' state of nature a counter-beginning to the scriptural account, was 
it a subversion of that account? Or was the state of nature the pre- or the post- 
lapsarian condition? How was Hobbes' state of nature understood by his 
contemporary readers? Related to these questions is the matter of Hobbes' own 
beliefs, or lack of them. This has been the subject of much debate, both by 
Hobbes' contemporaries and scholars since. The following paragraphs provide a 
brief survey of the variety of views expressed by current scholars on Hobbes' 
personal religious beliefs, or lack of them. 
Many Hobbes' commentators have seen the influence of Calvinism in his 
work. According to A. P. Martinich, Hobbes was Calvinist in theology, while 
favouring episcopacy in church government. In other words, Hobbes favoured the 
pre-Laudian order of the early seventeenth century English church. 39 For Phyllis 
Doyle, the conclusions on human nature arrived at by Calvinists were set out later 
by Hobbes in his political philosophy. 40 Mark Goldie informs us that Hobbes was 
often linked with Calvin, Luther and Ockham by such contemporary critics as 
Richard Baxter, Thomas Pierce and Ralph Cudworth . 
41 A letter written to Hobbes 
38 See Moloney, `Leaving the Garden of Eden', p. 243. See also Ashcraft, `Hobbes' Natural Man', 
p. 1098, who thinks that Hobbes and his contemporary critics held two opposing world views. 
39 See Martinich, Two Gods, pp. 33 & 45. For a review and criticism of Martinich's ideas, 
particularly his central thesis that Hobbes was a Calvinist, see H. Caton, `Is Leviathan a Unicorn? 
Varieties of Hobbes Interpretations', Review of Politics, 56 (1994), pp. 101-25, especially pp. 
108-13. 
ao See Phyllis Doyle, `The Contemporary Background of Hobbes' "State of Nature"', Economica, 
7 (1927), pp. 336-55, p. 342. Also on Hobbes' Calvinism see: Ronald Hepburn, `Hobbes on the 
Knowledge of God', in Hobbes and Rousseau -A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by M. 
Cranston & R. S. Peters (Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, New York, 1972), pp. 85-108, p. 
85, who also comments on echoes of Tertullian and Aquinas in Hobbes. On Aquinas and Hobbes 
see: Timothy Fuller, `Compatabilities on the Idea of Law in Thomas Aquinas and Thomas 
Hobbes', Hobbes Studies, 3 (1990), pp. 112-34; and J. K. Ryan, `The Reputation of St. Thomas 
Aquinas among English Protestant Thinkers of the 17th Century', New Scholasticism, 22 (1948), 
pp. 126-208, pp. 146-59 on the debate between Bramhall and Hobbes; and pp. 159-66 on Hobbes' 
attitude to the Schoolmen. 
41 See Mark Goldie, `The Reception of Hobbes', in The Cambridge History of Political Thought 
1450 - 1700, edited by J. H. Burns & M. Goldie (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991), 
pp. 589-615, p. 593. See also Noel Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology (University of 
Cambridge Ph. D. thesis, 1982), p. 208, who notes Thomas Pierce's view of Hobbes as a Calvinist. 
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by the Calvinist Edward Bagshaw, describing Hobbes as an ally in the defence of 
Calvinist theology, supports this view 42 According to Stephen State, the dispute 
between Hobbes and Bramhall on the freedom of the will was a standard issue of 
contention between Calvinists and Arminians, and State has even compared their 
debate to the dispute between Luther and Erasmus. 3 Noel Malcolm has argued 
that Hobbes' thought was `governed by [voluntarist] theological assumptions', 
and that it was ethical voluntarism which was the issue between Hobbes and 
many of his critics. Malcolm, like State, sees Bramhall's attack on Hobbes as an 
attack on some of the main ideas of Calvinism, although Malcolm admits that this 
does not mean that Hobbes himself was a Calvinist 44 
Other scholars have denied Hobbes' Calvinism. Richard Ashcraft 
acknowledges that although Hobbes' views on human beings shared similarities 
with Calvinism, he did not accept its most important part - that human beings 
`were saved from their `brutish' condition solely through the grace of 
Christianity'. 5 Patricia Springborg has pointed out that Leviathan was banned by 
the Calvinist synod of Utrecht, although Richard Tuck has demonstrated that 
Lambert Velthuysen, a member of the Utrecht city council, was one of a number 
of Dutch writers to support and use some of Hobbes' ideas. 46 In another work 
42 See Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol. 1, pp. 497-8. In this letter Bagshaw was referring to 
Hobbes' Of Liberty and Necessity, which can be found in English Works, edited by Sir William 
Molesworth (11 volumes, London, 1839-45), Volume IV, pp. 229-78. Bagshaw was a colleague 
of John Locke at Christ Church - see Jon Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration 
England - Richard Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae (The Royal Historical Society, The 
Boydell Press, Boydell & Brewer Ltd, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1999), pp. 23-4. 
43 See Stephen A. State, Thomas Hobbes and the Debate over Natural Law and Religion (Garland 
Publishing, Inc., New York & London, 1991), p. 90. State, p. 223, has also noted Hobbes' 
similarities to Hooker. See also his `Hobbes and Hooker; Politics and Religion: A Note on the 
Structuring of Leviathan', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 20 (1987), pp. 79-96. On the 
debate between Hobbes and Bramhall see: L. Damrosch, `Hobbes as Reformation Theologian: 
Implications of the Free-Will Controversy', Journal of the History of Ideas, 40 (1979), pp. 339- 
52; and Jürgen Overhoff, Hobbes's Theory of Volition. Scientific Premisses and Ethical 
Consequences (University of Cambridge Ph. D. dissertation, 1998), chapter 3. This has since been 
published as Hobbes' Theory of the Mill: Ideological Reasons and Historical Circumstances 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham, Boulder, New York & London, 2000). 
44 Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, abstract & pp. 203-4. 
45 Ashcraft, `Leviathan Triumphant', p. 146. Ashcraft, p. 170, note 20, also comments that Hobbes 
would have become familiar with the language of Calvinism during his time at Magdalen Hall, the 
centre of puritanism at Oxford. On Hobbes' departure from the Augustinian-Calvinist tradition see 
Richard Sherlock, `The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on Religion', Interpretation, 10 (1982), 
pp. 43-60, pp. 57-8. 
46 See Patricia Springborg, `Hobbes on Religion', in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, 
edited by Tom Sorell (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), pp. 346-80, p. 370-1, note 
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Tuck notes that `Hobbes feared the moral and intellectual disciplines' of one 
particular type of Calvinism, that of Presbyterian Calvinism. 7 
Other scholars have seen the influence of Luther, rather than Calvin, in 
Hobbes' work. George Wright has noted three main parallels between Hobbes 
and Luther: their views on the mortality of the soul; their attitudes towards 
atheism, idolatry and superstition; and their description of Christ as promise. 
48 
Joshua Mitchell has shown that Luther and Hobbes were drawn to the same 
question of the meaning of Christ's fulfillment, although they gave different 
answers to this question. 9 Patricia Springborg has commented on the similarity 
of Hobbes' and Luther's ideas on the artificial state. 50 According to Noel 
Malcolm, Hobbes' views on the authorship of the Pentateuch corresponded to 
those of Luther . 
51 And more recently, Jürgen Overhoff has demonstrated Hobbes' 
`allegiance to Lutheran and Calvinist doctrines' in his Questions Concerning 
Liberty, Necessity and Chance. 52 
Another group of scholars have commented on Hobbes' Anglicanism. 53 
According to Richard Tuck, Hobbes' religious ideas were close to orthodox 
Anglicanism by 1642, but this all changed with Leviathan where Hobbes put 
forward a new theology -a version of Christianity devoid of the religion of the 
12; and Richard Tuck, Natural Rights T7zeories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1979), p. 139. See also Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 292. 
47 Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 1989), p. 30. See also 
various remarks by Hobbes against presbyterianism in Leviathan, especially XLVII, 4, p. 478 & 
19-20, pp. 481-2. 
48 See George Wright, `Thomas Hobbes' 1668 Appendix to Leviathan, Translation and Notes', 
Interpretation, 18 (1991), pp. 323-413, pp. 331ff. See also George H. Wright, The Protestant 
Hobbes (University of California, Berkeley, Ph. D. thesis, 1985), pp. 118 & 244; & on p. 123, 
Wright has also noted Hobbes' similarity to Ockham. 
49 See Joshua Mitchell, `Luther and Hobbes on the Question: Who was Moses, Who was Christ? ', 
in Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), pp. 676-700, p. 698. 
50 See Springborg, `Hobbes on Religion', p. 356. 
51 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, p. 261. Isaac La Peyr&e, the controversial 
Biblical commentator, and friend of Hobbes, also denied Moses' authorship of the pentateuch - 
see Richard H. Popkin, Isaac La Peyrere (1596-1676) His Life, Mork and Influence (E. J. Brill, 
Leiden, 1987), p. 69. On the other hand, Pangle, `A Critique', p. 34, has noted that Hobbes' 
approach to scripture was `anti-Lutheran'. 
52 Jürgen Overhoff, `The Lutheranism of Thomas Hobbes', History of Political Thought, 18 
(1997), pp. 604-23, p. 607; and Hobbes's Theory of Volition, chapter 3. On Hobbes and Luther 
see also: Willis B. Glover, `God and Thomas Hobbes', in Hobbes Studies, edited by K. C. Brown 
(Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965), pp. 141-68, p. 143, who also notes Hobbes' affinity to Calvin; 
and Shirley Robin Letwin, `Hobbes and Christianity', Daedalus, 105 (1976), pp. 1-21, p. 3. 
53 This term has become problematic in recent times, but here it refers to a supporter of the 
structures and practices of the Church of England, and in this sense an Anglican might or might 
not also be a Calvinist. 
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gentiles. 54 For Tuck, this explains why many of Hobbes' clerical friends were not 
hostile to the Elements or De Cive, but were hostile to Leviathan. 55 Tuck has 
further argued, in complete contrast to Martinich, that the Anglicanism Hobbes 
favoured in the period 1640-43 was `of a rather. Laudian type', 56 and has also 
noted the similarity of Hobbes' ideas on God's grace, and hell, to those of a 
group of English Catholics, including Thomas White, Henry Holden and John 
Sargeant. 57 Hobbes demonstrated his anti-Catholicism with Leviathan's diatribe 
against Cardinal Bellarmine, and the Church of Rome, and in 1654 both De Cive, 
and Leviathan were put on the Papal Index. 58 One of Hobbes' contemporary 
critics, Roger Coke, was later to accuse Hobbes of being part of a Papist 
conspiracy to overthrow Charles 11.59 Other scholars have noted the similarities 
between Hobbes' ideas on hell and those of the Socinians, 60 as well as his interest 
in Hebraism. 61 
54 See Richard Tuck, `The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes', in Political Discourse in Early 
Modern Britain, edited by N. Phillipson & Q. Skinner (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1993), pp. 120-38, pp. 130 & 133. See also Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes, pp. 118 & 124, where 
Sommerville explains Hobbes' attack on Anglicans in Leviathan as a result of Hobbes' belief that 
certain Anglicans had undermined his favour with Charles II. 
ss See Tuck, Hobbes, pp. 85-6. 
56 Tuck, `Civil Religion', p. 124. Also on Hobbes' Anglicanism see: Paul J. Johnson, `Hobbes' 
Anglican Doctrine of Salvation', in Thomas Hobbes in his Time, edited by R. Ross, H. W. 
Schneider & T. Waldman (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1974), pp. 102-28; 
Herbert W. Schneider, `The Piety of Hobbes', in Thomas Hobbes in his Time, pp. 84-101, p. 92, 
who sees Hobbes as an Anglican with congregationalist sympathies, confirmed by Hobbes' 
support for Independency in Leviathan, XLVII, 20, p. 482; and H. G. Reventlow, The Authority of 
the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World, translated by J. Bowden (SCM Press Ltd, London, 
1984), p. 204. 
57 See Tuck, `Civil Religion', pp. 133-7. Malcolm, Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol. 1, p. xxxiv, has 
pointed out that most of Hobbes' closest friends were either Catholic priests, or presbyterians. 
58 See Reik, Golden Lands, p. 128. See also State, Thomas Hobbes, p. 1, who notes that De Cive 
was banned in Holland in 1674. 
59 See A. P. Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999), pp. 
312-3. 
60 See for example: Tuck, `Civil Religion', p. 131; C. A. J. Coady, `The Socinian Connection - 
Further Thoughts on the Religion of Thomas Hobbes', Religious Studies, 22 (1986), pp. 277-80; 
Peter Geach, `The Religion of Thomas Hobbes', Religious Studies, 17 (1981), pp. 549-58; and 
Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, p. 76. 
61 See Ronald Beiner, `Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau on Civil Religion', Review of Politics, 
55 (1993), pp. 617-38, especially pp. 624-31; Daniel J. Elazar, `Hobbes confronts Scripture', 
Jewish Political Studies Review, 4 (1992), pp. 3-24, p. 11; Harold Fisch, `Authority and 
Interpretation: Leviathan and the `Covenantal Community", Comparative Criticism, 15 (1993), 
pp. 103-23, p. 111; Robert P. Kraynak, `The Idea of the Messiah in the Theology of Thomas 
Hobbes', Jewish Political Studies Review, 4 (1992), pp. 115-37; and M. RoshwaId, `The Judeo- 
Christian Elements in Hobbes's Leviathan', Hobbes Studies, 7 (1994), pp. 95-124. While Joel 
Schwartz claims Hobbes favoured the Christian kingdom of God over the ancient Jewish kingdom 
- see his `Hobbes and the Two Kingdoms of God', Polity, 18 (1985), pp. 7-24, p. 10 
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As we will see throughout this dissertation, many of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics thought that his views implied atheism. Robert South, for 
instance, referred to `the great prevalence of that Atheistical Doctrine of the 
Leviathan', 62 and in October 1666 Leviathan was named in a bill introduced in 
parliament against atheism and profanity. 63 Of recent Hobbes' scholars, Leo 
Strauss' attempt to uncover hidden meaning in Hobbes' work has apparently 
revealed his atheism. 64 Another Straussian, Paul Cooke, has described Leviathan 
as `a conspiracy against Christianity', and that in it Hobbes' `antipathy to Biblical 
religion is disguised to appear as genuinely religious'. Further, Hobbes was 
apparently addressing two different sets of readers - `the sincerely religious', and 
`the philosophically enlightened', the latter of which was capable of detecting 
Hobbes' intended, but hidden meaning. 65 Edwin Curley has seen irony in many of 
Hobbes' religious views, and has been involved in a dispute with Martinich over 
Hobbes' supposed Calvinism, but Curley thinks that any similarities between 
Hobbes and Calvin are superficial. 66 David Wootton has stated that he finds it 
`impossible to understand why anyone would have written Leviathan... if their 
intention was not to deal a blow to religion'. 67 And for Quentin Skinner, Hobbes' 
use of particular rhetorical techniques in Leviathan was intended to ridicule both 
religion, and his opponents. 68 
62 Robert South, `A Sermon preached at Westminster Abbey April 30,1676 on I Cor. 111.19. For 
the Wisdom of the World, is Foolishness with God', in Twelve Sermons preached upon several 
occasions, the second volume (London, 1694), pp. 425-74, p. 438. 
63 See Martinich, Hobbes: ,4 Biography, p. 320. 64 See for example Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (The Free Press, Glencoe, 
Illinois, 1952), p. 34; Natural Right and History (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1953), pp. 198-9; and `On the Basis of Hobbes' Political Philosophy', in Iirhat is Political 
Philosophy? And Other Studies (The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), pp. 170-96. 
65 Cooke, Hobbes and Christianity, pp. 15 & 18. 
66 See Edwin Curley, `Calvin and Hobbes, or Hobbes as an orthodox Christian', Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 34 (1996), pp. 257-71; "1 Durst Not Write So Boldly' or, How to read 
Hobbes' theological-political treatise', in Hobbes e Spinoza: Scienza e Politics, edited by Daniela 
Bostrenghi, introduction by Emilia Giancotti (Bibliopolis, Naples, 1992), pp. 497-593; and 
footnotes throughout Curley's edition of Hobbes' Leviathan. For the debate between Curley and 
Martinich see also A. P. Martinich, `On the Proper Interpretation of Hobbes' Philosophy', Journal 
of the History ofPhilosophy, 34 (1996), pp. 273-83; and Edwin Curley's `Reply to Martinich', pp. 
285-7. 
67 David Wootton, `Unbelief in Early Modem Europe', History Workshop Journal, 20 (1985), pp. 
82-100, p. 97. 
68 See Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996), especially pp. 394-425. 
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For the purpose of this dissertation, which is an attempt to explain how 
Hobbes was read and understood by his contemporaries, Hobbes' own personal 
beliefs or unbelief are in many ways irrelevant. But as will become increasingly 
clear throughout this work, my own view on this matter is that Hobbes' political 
theory indicates his knowledge of Augustinian, Calvinist, and particularly 
Lutheran doctrines. I remain unconvinced by the Straussian argument that 
Hobbes' use of scripture in the second half of Leviathan was a ploy to hide his 
atheism. 69 As Sharon Lloyd has pointed out, this cannot be what Hobbes was 
trying to do because his religious views were so unorthodox. 70 Stephen State has 
also made this point, and has noted that there were many ways for an author to 
publish unorthodox ideas, without fearing the consequences. Hobbes could have 
published anonymously, or under a pseudonym, or used the dialogue form. 7' 
Alternatively, he could have decided not to publish at all. I am also unconvinced 
by the Straussian attempt to reveal hidden meaning in Hobbes' work, because 
how do we know that the hidden meaning we have revealed is the hidden 
meaning which Hobbes intended us to reveal? If the hidden meaning in Hobbes' 
works implied atheism, then the contemporary reaction to Leviathan 
demonstrated that his attempts to hide his atheism were unsuccessful. It seems 
more likely that Hobbes held certain religious beliefs, and that he was attempting 
to reconcile these with the findings of his political philosophy. Is it possible to 
take Hobbes seriously when he claimed, `Do you think I can be an atheist and not 
know it? Or, knowing it, durst have offered my atheism to the press? '72 Can we 
also take him at his word when he said that he interrupted his plans to go back to 
work on De Corpore to begin Leviathan, which he tells us was a defence of 
God's laws against claims that the civil war in England was commanded by 
God? 73 
69 See also J. G. A. Pocock, `Time, History and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes', in 
his Politics, Language and Time (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1972), pp. 148-201, p. 162. 
70 See Sharon A. Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in Hobbes' Leviathan: The Power of Mind over Matter 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992), p. 17. For Lloyd, in the second half of 
Leviathan, Hobbes was attempting `to reconcile competing religious interests' by redescription. 
" See State, Yhomas Hobbes, pp. 92-3 & 7-8. 
72 Thomas Hobbes, `Lessons to the Savilian Professors of the Mathematics', in English Works VII, 
pp. 181-356, p. 350, cited in Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, p. 264. 
73 See Thomas Hobbes, `The Life of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury', translated by J. E. Parsons, 
Jr., and Whitney Blair, Interpretation, 10 (1982), pp. 1-7, p. 4. Hereafter cited as Hobbes' Prose 
Autobiography. 
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Rather than speculate on Hobbes' own religious beliefs, or lack of them, I 
want to look at how Hobbes' state of nature was understood by a seventeenth 
century readership, which approached his political philosophy with certain 
theological assumptions, namely those of voluntarist protestantism. 74 I intend to 
examine all three versions of Hobbes' political theory: The Elements of Law 
Natural and Politic, De Cive, and Leviathan. 75 My method will entail an 
examination of the state of nature, noting significant changes in each of these 
works, 76 along with the criticisms of his contemporaries, and an examination of 
the views of protestant commentators on the first four chapters of Genesis, which 
describe the original condition of human beings, their Fall, and their life 
immediately after the Fall. In doing this, I want to point out the scriptural 
parallels between and divergences from Hobbes' account of the state of nature. 
4. The Contemporary Reaction to Leviathan. 
It is generally the case that human beings are more vociferous in criticism than 
praise, and the response to Hobbes is no exception to this. If we take a very quick 
look at Samuel Mintz's list of anti-Hobbes publications, in his book The Hunting 
of Leviathan, we might come to the conclusion that Hobbes had no supporters 
whatsoever. 77 But on closer examination, the list of works criticising Hobbes is 
not all it seems. Mintz himself has pointed out that the majority of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics were more worried by the atheistic implications of his 
74 Lloyd, Ideals as Interests, p. 19, claims the majority of Hobbes' readers were Calvinist 
predestinarians. 
75 The Elements was completed in May 1640 and circulated in manuscript form. It was published 
in two separate unauthorised parts, Hunian Nature, and De Corpore Politico, in 1650. De Cive 
was written between 1637 and 1640. It was first published in Paris in April 1642; an enlarged 
edition in 1647; and finally an English translation, which was probably not by Hobbes, in 1651. 
Leviathan was begun in 1646 in Paris, and published in London in April 1651. The Latin version 
of Leviathan was published in 1668. 
76 See Francois Tricaud, 'Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640 to 1651: 
Evolution and Ambiguities', in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, edited by G. A. J. Rogers & A. 
Ryan (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988), pp. 107-23, for a detailed account of the changes in 
Hobbes' various presentations of the state of nature. 
77 See Samuel I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan - Seventeenth Century Reactions to the 
Materialism and Moral Philosophy of 77ionias Hobbes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1962), pp. 157-60. On the contemporary reaction to Hobbes, see also John Bowle, Hobbes and his 
Critics -A Study in Seventeenth Century Constitutionalism (Frank Cass & Co Ltd, London, 1969) 
new edition with corrections, first edition published in 1951; and Goldie, `The Reception of 
Hobbes'. 
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determinism, than by his political theory itself. 78 Quentin Skinner has shown that 
Hobbes had a number of supporters in both France and England; and has also 
demonstrated that of the works on Mintz's list, there are only twelve tracts which 
were entirely directed at Hobbes up until his death in 1679; and of these twelve, 
only six were mainly concerned with his political views. 79 Secondly, the list of 
anti-Hobbes publications stretches over the second half of the seventeenth 
century. It took up to fifty years for many of Hobbes' so-called contemporary 
critics to respond to his views. Hobbes' works kept their relevance throughout the 
second half of the seventeenth century, because the issues he had addressed in 
Leviathan remained relevant to debates on religious toleration, exclusion, popery 
and arbitrary government. When Hobbes died in 1679, during a lapse in the 
licensing laws, many of his works were reprinted, and because of their continuing 
relevance to contemporary debates, they provoked new responses. 80 But it is 
important to stress that Leviathan was not universally condemned. Hobbes had 
some supporters in England, for example John Webster, John Davies, and Philip 
Tanny (Tandy). 81 Jon Parkin has also noted that Hobbes was received well 
amongst some groups, particularly students; and that his dispute with the 
Presbyterian Wallis, along with his anti-clericalism, brought him allies from the 
group of Independents at Oxford. 82 
It is also important to stress that it was Leviathan, and not Hobbes' earlier 
works, that generally caused the hostile response from some of his 
contemporaries. Hobbes himself referred to the fact that De Cive was well 
received by educated men, whereas `Leviathan had made all the clergy my foe. 
Each nest of theologians was hostile'. But for Hobbes, their response to 
Leviathan actually had a beneficial effect - Leviathan was read even more as a 
result. 83 Royalist Anglicans appear to have had few problems with Hobbes' 
78 Mintz, The Hunting ofLeviathan, p. vii. 
79 See Skinner, `Ideological Context', p. 297. See also Quentin Skinner, `Thomas Hobbes and his 
Disciples in France and England', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 8 (1966), pp. 153- 
67. Hobbes' Correspondence contains a number of letters from his French admirers. My own 
examination of the works on Mintz's list has shown that many of them were directed against 
`Hobbism' and its supporters, rather than Hobbes' work itself. 
80 See Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, pp. 224 & 213. 
81 See Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography, pp. 257-268. 
82 Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, pp. 163-4. 
83 Hobbes' Prose Autobiography, pp. 4-5; and Hobbes' Verse Autobiography, reprinted in 
Curley's edition of Leviathan, pp. liv-lxiv, p. lvii & lx. See also Skinner, `Ideological Context', p. 
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earlier works. 84 Seth Ward wrote a `glowing' preface to Hobbes' Human Nature 
in 1650, but went on to become one of his fiercest critics. 85 Samuel Parker 
approved of De Cive, and used it against Leviathan. 86 William Lucy cited 
Hobbes' views in the Elemnents, when they appeared to make more sense than the 
views Hobbes had expressed in Leviathan. 87 James Tyrrell cited De Honiine to 
disprove Hobbes' ideas on good and evil in Leviathan. 88 Of the contemporary 
critics whose works I have examined, Roger Coke alone specifically directed his 
attack against De Cive. In Coke's case, given that he also accused Hobbes of 
being part of a Catholic conspiracy to overthrow Charles II, it seems likely that he 
had completely misunderstood Hobbes' theory. Sir Robert Filmer's critique was 
partly directed at De Cive, although Filmer approved of Hobbes' `building', but 
disliked his `foundation', 89 while Thomas Tenison's work was directed against all 
three versions of Hobbes' political philosophy. 90 
Why then was Leviathan received less well than De Cive? There seem to 
be two main reasons for this, the first of which was Hobbes' religious opinions. 
Richard Tuck has cited Hobbes' defence of independency, his views on the 
sovereign as sole interpreter of scripture, and his ideas on the Trinity and the 
soul's mortality in Leviathan as the chief causes of offence to both Anglicans and 
Presbyterians. 91 The Anglican divine Robert Payne's references to Hobbes, in his 
correspondence with Gilbert Sheldon, demonstrate that it was the forty-second 
294, who notes that according to a list of `the most vendible books in England' of 1658, Hobbes' 
various works on political theory were best sellers. 
s' See Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography, p. 257. But see M. Dzelzainis, `Edward Hyde and 
Thomas Hobbes's Elements ofLanv, Natural and Politic', Historical Journal, 32 (1989), pp. 303- 
17, p. 316, who claims that Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon `found Hobbes unsound on the 
nature of political obligation from the start... ' 
85 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, p. 261. See also Parkin, Science, Religion and 
Politics, p. 155. 
86 See Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, p. 38. 
87 See for example William Lucy, Observations, Censures and Confutations of Divers Errors in 
the 12,13, and 14 chap. of Mr. Hobs His Leviathan (London, 1657), p. 138. Hereafter cited as 
Lucy, Observations 1657, as distinct from Lucy's work of a very similar title, which examined all 
chapters of Leviathan. 
88 See for example James Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature, according to the 
principles and method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (noiv Lord Bishop of 
Peterborough's) Latin treatise on that subject. As also his conf utations of Mr. Hobbs's principles 
put into another method, with the Right Reverend Author's approbation (London, 1692), p. 336. 
89 Filmer, Observations, pp. 184-5. 
90 See Thomas Tenison, The creed of Mr. Hobbes examined, in a feigned conference between him 
and a student in divinity (London, 1670), Epistle Dedicatory. 
91 See Richard Tuck's introduction to his edition of Leviathan (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991), pp. xxiii-xxiv, and also Tuck, Hobbes, p. 28. 
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chapter of Leviathan, on ecclesiastical power, that Payne objected to. 92 A recently 
discovered letter from Payne to Hobbes confirms the view that it was Hobbes' 
anticlericalism and Erastianism that caused the hostile response. 93 Jon Parkin has 
argued that the main reason De Cive was more. acceptable to Anglicans than 
Leviathan, was that in Leviathan Hobbes questioned the authority of scripture, 
and diminished God's involvement in giving the laws of nature their obligatory 
force. 94 Johann Sommerville thinks Hobbes' religious opinions were not so 
different in De Cive and Leviathan, but in Leviathan they were less guarded. 95 
According to Quentin Skinner, it was Leviathan, rather than the earlier works that 
provoked so much hostility because of the change of polemical style. 96 The 
second reason for the hostile response to Leviathan was that a number of Hobbes' 
royalist readers thought that he had changed sides, and now supported Oliver 
Cromwell. 97 Extracts from Hobbes' political theory were even published, as 
propaganda for the new Republic, in Mercurius Politicus. 98 
In this dissertation I hope to show that there were a number of other areas 
of disagreement between Hobbes and his contemporary critics, the first of which 
was voluntarism. Noel Malcolm has demonstrated that Hobbes' contemporary 
critics were mainly Arminians, Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians, and 
what united them against Hobbes was their anti-voluntarism. On many other 
doctrinal issues these groups of writers did not necessarily agree amongst 
themselves. 99 Jon Parkin has recently qualified Malcolm's argument by showing 
that it was not so much the critics' anti-voluntarism that united them against 
92 See Anon., `Illustrations of the State of the Church during the Great Rebellion', Theologian and 
Ecclesiastic, 7 (1848), pp. 169-75,219 & 223-4. 
93 See Jeffrey R. Collins, `Christian Ecclesiology and the Composition of Leviathan: A newly 
discovered letter to Thomas Hobbes', Historical Journal, 43 (2000), pp. 217-31, p. 230. This is a 
letter from Robert Payne to Hobbes, dated to the final months of 1649. 
9; See Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, pp. 68-70. 
95 See Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes, p. 127. 
96 See Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 394. It is noticeable that the amount of space given over 
to theological argument in each of Hobbes' works increased from the Elements to Leviathan - see 
Pangle, `A Critique', p. 27. 
97 See Glenn Burgess, `Contexts for the Writing and Publication of Hobbes's Leviathan', History 
of Political Thought, 11 (1990), pp. 675-702; Collins, `Christian Ecclesiology', pp. 218,222 & 
227-8; Goldie, `The Reception of Hobbes', pp. 603-4; and Quentin Skinner, `Conquest and 
Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement Controversy', in The Interregnum: The Quest for 
Settlement 1646-1660, edited by G. E. Aylmer (Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1972), pp. 79-98. 
98 See Skinner, `Ideological Context', p. 311. 
99 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, pp. 62,209 & 260. See also Martinich, Two 
Gods, especially pp. 32-9, where Martinich also claims that Hobbes Evas a Calvinist. 
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Hobbes, but rather their rejection of Hobbes' extreme voluntarism, which 
amounted to a denial that it was possible to find evidence of God's will in 
nature. 1°° Further, Hobbes' contemporary critics did not represent orthodoxy, but 
in fact were forced to criticise Hobbes because of the unorthodoxy of their own 
views. 101 But in doing so, many of Hobbes' contemporaries actually incorporated 
some of his ideas. 102 As Jon Parkin has put it, Hobbes' contemporary critics 
found many of his ideas `too useful to be completely abandoned', thus Leviathan 
had `to be tamed not killed'. 103 Secondly, Hobbes' critics were interested in 
arguments concerning origins, whereas Hobbes was much more concerned with 
how authority was to be maintained, and less concerned with how it originated. 
Thirdly, as Mark Goldie has noted, the attacks on Hobbes can be described as `the 
last gasp of scholastic Aristotelianism'. 104 Hobbes' critics subscribed to the 
Aristotelian view that nature was the end and perfection of human existence. 
Hobbes denied this, and appears to have been closer to the Augustinian, Calvinist 
and Lutheran views that nature had been corrupted, or inverted by the Fall, 
although admittedly he never made this explicit. 
The main argument of this thesis is that what determined how Hobbes' 
seventeenth century readers responded to his state of nature were their own views 
on the creation and Fall. Those of Hobbes' contemporaries who went into print 
against him were mainly Aristotelians, and Arminians, who thought that nature 
should be judged by her intention or perfection. Although they recognised that the 
Fall had corrupted human nature, it had not done so to the extent implied by 
Hobbes' description of the state of nature. Natural sociability and hierarchy were 
retained after the Fall. Further, the critics understood the natural condition as the 
original, perfect condition. Although human nature had been corrupted by the 
Fall, human beings still had the capacity to discover the basic requirements of 
10° See Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, pp. 7,92 & 171. 
101 See Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, pp. 6& 163, acknowledging his debt to Noel 
Malcolm. See also Skinner, `Ideological Context', p. 292, who notes that Hobbes' critics were not 
representative of contemporary political theory. 
102 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, p. 254. See also Martinich, Hobbes: A 
Biography, p. 259; and Conal Condren, `Confronting the Monster: George Lawson's Reaction to 
Hobbes' Leviathan', Political Science, 40 (1988), pp. 67-83, p. 67, who notes that Lawson's 
Politica Sacra et Civilis had much in common with Leviathan, despite Lawson's earlier criticisms 
of Hobbes. 
103 Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, p. 11. 
104 Goldie, `The Reception of Hobbes', p. 594. 
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natural law. Thus, reason and the laws of nature were sufficient to maintain peace 
amongst human beings in the natural condition. 105 Hobbes' views on human 
nature appear to have been closer to Augustinian, and Reformed interpretations, 
which argued that since the Fall nature had been inverted. Human beings had lost 
their dominion as a result of Adam's disobedience. Reason and the laws of nature 
were no longer sufficient to keep human beings in peace, without a human, 
coercive authority. Hobbes might well have thought that these things never had 
been enough - why else did Adam and Eve disobey God? 
5. Hobbes and commentaries on Genesis. 
This dissertation is an attempt to assess whether it was possible for Hobbes' 
seventeenth century readers to see similarities between Hobbes' description of the 
state of nature, and the scriptural account of the Fall. A number of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics understood the natural condition to mean the original, 
perfect condition of human beings at the creation, and as a result thought that 
Hobbes' war-like description contradicted scripture. In order to assess whether 
this would have been the view of all of Hobbes' seventeenth century readers, I 
will also examine a number of sixteenth and seventeenth century protestant 
commentaries on the first four chapters of Genesis, which described the condition 
of human beings at the creation, their subsequent fall, and their life immediately 
after the Fall. Hobbes himself was very dismissive of commentaries, he thought 
that they simply begot even more commentaries, because even commentaries 
required interpretation. '06 We do not know for sure that Hobbes had read any 
Biblical commentaries, although in the Latin version of Leviathan he claimed that 
there was nothing in it contrary to scripture, but admitted that in many places he 
los Hobbes' contemporary critics also thought that human laws were ultimately dependent on 
rational principles; whereas Hobbes thought they were dependent on power and command. 
106 See De Cive, XVII, 18, p. 219; and also Leviathan, XXVI, 25, p. 182, where Hobbes was 
referring to commentaries on law. See also the following articles on Hobbes' Biblical 
interpretation: J. Fan, `Atomes of Scripture: Hobbes and the Politics of Biblical Interpretation', in 
Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, edited by M. G. Dietz (University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 
1990), pp. 172-96; G. Shapiro, `Reading and Writing in the Text of Thomas Hobbes', Journal of 
the History of Philosophy, 18 (1980), pp. 147-57; and T. B. Strong, `How to write Scripture - 
Words, Authority and Politics in Thomas Hobbes', Critical Inquiry, 20 (1993), pp. 128-59, with 
Victoria Silver's response `A Matter of Interpretation', pp. 160-70, and Strong's reply to Silver, 
`When is a Text not a Pretext? A Rejoinder to Victoria Silver', pp. 172-8. 
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had `departed from the opinions of individual theologians'. 107 This implied that 
he at least knew what those opinions were. Hobbes also had access to a number of 
commentaries, and other theological books, in the Earl of Devonshire's library at 
Hardwick Hall. 108 W. H. Greenleaf, and Richard Talaska have argued that Hobbes 
himself was responsible for ordering books for the Hardwick Library. 109 1 am not 
sure what the evidence for this claim is - Greenleaf does not support his statement 
with evidence, and Talaska's book has not been published yet. I presume their 
evidence comes from Aubrey, who states that he had heard Hobbes say, `that at 
his lord's house in the countrey there was a good library, and bookes enough for 
him, and that his lordship stored the library with what bookes he thought fitt to be 
107 Leviathan, XLVII (chapter in Latin version), 28, p. 487. Reik, Golden Lands, p. 75, has 
suggested that it was probably during his association with the Great Tew Circle that Hobbes was 
encouraged to study the influence of the Bible and theology on politics. 
108 See J. J. Hamilton, `Hobbes' Study and the Hardwick Library', Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 16 (1978), pp. 445-53, for a selection of the books Hobbes had access to at Hardwick 
Hall. I have visited Chatsworth to look at the catalogue of books compiled by Hobbes and his 
amanuensis, James Wheldon (Early Catalogue of the Library, Hobbes MSS E. I. A., dated by 
Hamilton as late 1620s, but dated by Skinner as 1630s - see Quentin Skinner, `Thomas Hobbes: 
Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', in Proceedings of the British Academy, 76 (1990), pp. 
1-61, p. 37). There are roughly 500 theological books which were in the library at Hardwick at the 
time. This catalogue will be published in Richard Talaska, The Hardwick Library and Hobbes' 
Early Intellectual Development (Philosophy Documentation Centre, Bowling Green, Ohio, 
forthcoming in 2002). I would like to thank His Grace the Duke of Devonshire, the Trustees of the 
Chatsworth Settlement and the archivist at Chatsworth, Peter Day, for allowing me to consult the 
above mentioned catalogue. Also of interest is Chatsworth MS. E. 2. This is a shopping list or an 
ideal library of books, which has been dated by Arrigo Pacchi as 1629-30, when Hobbes returned 
from his trip to the continent with Clifton, and is apparently in Hobbes' hand. According to 
Pacchi, Hobbes searched for the information on these books in the catalogue of the Bodleian 
Library of 1620 and even copied the mistakes from that catalogue. It contains 889 works divided 
into sections: science, grammar and languages, arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, astrology, 
optics, miscellaneous philosophical tracts, military matters, and politics. Of particular interest for 
scholars of Hobbes' religious views are a number of books on witchcraft, the immortality of the 
soul, and treatises on state and religion - see Arrigo Pacchi, `Una "Biblioteca Ideale" di Thomas 
Hobbes: 11 MS E2 Dell'archivo di Chatsworth', in Acme Annali Di Lettere e Filosofia dell 
Universita degli Studi di Milano, XXI (1968), pp. 5-42 (Thanks to Alessandra Polidori for 
providing me with a translation of this article). But see also Hamilton, `Hobbes' Study', p. 447, 
for a slightly later dating of this catalogue as 1631; and Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 874, 
where Noel Malcolm has argued that the list MS. E. 2. was compiled by Robert Payne, possibly in 
1631 as an aid to Hobbes' tuition of the Earl of Devonshire, and that it may only have come into 
Hobbes' possession after Payne's death. 
109 See W. H. Greenleaf, `A Note on Hobbes and the Book of Job', Annales de la Catedra 
Francisco Suarez, 14 (1974), pp. 9-34, p. 16. See also Talaska, The Hardwick Library. My 
information for the contents of this book has been provided by a letter written by Professor 
Talaska to Peter Day, Keeper of Collections at Chatsworth. Mr. Day let me have a copy of the 
letter in which Talaska claims MSS E. I. A. is in Hobbes' handwriting, and that Hobbes himself 
ordered most of the books listed, for his own use, at the expense of the Earl of Devonshire. 
Unfortunately Professor Talaska died in 1998, and will never see the publication of the book 
which he had worked on for the last ten years. 
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bought... ', but whether `he' refers to Hobbes or the Earl of Devonshire seems 
unclear. ' 10 
On Hobbes' general reading, we have further evidence from Aubrey, who 
has commented that Hobbes `had very few bookes', and that he `never sawe... 
above halfe a dozen about him in his chamber', and these included a Greek 
Testament. Aubrey has also noted that Hobbes must have read a lot, considering 
how old he was, but that Hobbes `was wont to say that if he had read as much as 
other men, he should have knowne no more than other men'. 111 As Richard Peters 
has pointed out, because of the reference to Hobbes' age, this must refer to his 
later life, and therefore cannot be used as evidence for his earlier reading, and 
possible influences. 112 Hobbes himself tells us that when he began his 
employment with the Earl of Devonshire, the Earl `offered [him] leisure as well 
as every sort of book for [his] studies', and that he read Greek and Latin histories 
and classical poets. 113 He went on to say that when he returned to England from a 
trip to the continent in 1636, and was contemplating writing his three part 
philosophy (body, man and citizen), he gathered materials for this purpose, but 
what these materials were is unknown! 14 There are further references to Hobbes' 
reading in his correspondence. In letters from Hobbes to various correspondents, 
he mentioned: Galileo's dialogues; ' 15 books on the Sabbath; ' 16 John Selden's 
Mare Clausum (1635); Sir Edward Herbert's De Veritate (1624); 117 and the 
110 John Aubrey, Brief Lives, Chiefly of Contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey, between the 
years 1669 and 1696, edited from the author's mss., by Andrew Clark, 2 volumes (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1988), Volume 1, pp. 321-403, pp. 337-8. See also Hobbes' Verse Autobiography, 
p. lv. 
111 Aubrey, Brief Lives, p. 349. See also pp. 332,338 & 357 for references to Hobbes' discovery 
of Euclid's Elements, Cluverius' Historia Universalis, and Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico- 
Politicus. 
112 See Richard Peters, Hobbes (Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1956), p. 18, who claims that at least 
until Hobbes was 40, he read copiously in the Hardwick Library. Martinich, Hobbes: A 
Biography, p. 27, thinks that Hobbes did not make much use of the library. 
113 Hobbes' Prose Autobiography, p. 2. See also Hobbes' Verse Autobiography, p. lv. 
114 See Hobbes' Prose Autobiography, p. 3. 
115 This is Dialogi dove si discorre i due sopra massimi sistemi del mondo (Florence, 1632) - see 
Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol 1, p. 19. 
116 See Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol 1, pp. 30-1. Noel Malcolm claims he is referring 
specifically to Peter Heylyn's The History of the Sabbath in Two Bookes (1636), although he 
accepts that there were many books published on this topic after the Declaration of Sports of 
1633, which Hobbes may also have been referring to. 
117 See Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol 1, p. 32. 
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petition against Bishops. ' 18 Also in a letter from Henry Stubbe to Hobbes, Stubbe 
mentioned that he had sent Hobbes Wallis' book against Independents. ' 19 A 
manuscript at Chatsworth demonstrates that Hobbes also read and summarised 
Scaliger's De Subtilitate (1557), probably between 1630 and 1635; and 
Aristotle's Rhetoric and Ethics. 120 And in Behemoth Hobbes recommended The 
Whole Duty of Man as a good system of morality. 121 
Hobbes may well have been hostile to scriptural commentaries, but this 
did not stop him from quoting at length from the Bible itself. Not only did 
Hobbes use many verses from the Bible throughout his works, but parts of his 
own prose were constructed in such a way so as to resemble certain verses of 
scripture. 122 This of course, may or may not have been deliberate. Hobbes himself 
echoed the words of God to Adam regarding his nakedness in De Cive, 123 and in 
the introduction to Leviathan Hobbes claimed that the covenant which created the 
commonwealth resembled God's pronouncement of `let us make man'. 124 Hobbes 
also alluded to Genesis in the Elements, when he asked his readers to `consider 
118 A petition presented to the Parliament from the Countie of Nottingham. Complaining of 
Grievances under the Ecclesiasticall Government by Archbishops, Bishops, etc (1641) - see 
Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol 1, p. 120. 
119 John Wallis, Mens sobria serio commendata (1657) - see Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol 1, p. 
333, and Malcolm's note p. 311. 
120 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, p. 70. The relevant manuscript is Chatsworth 
MS A. 8. 
121 See Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament, edited by F. Tonnies, with an 
introduction by S. Holmes (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1990), p. 47. 
First published unauthorised in late 1670s, and authorised in 1682. The JVhole Ditty of Man refers 
to [Richard Allestree], The Whole Duty of Man Laid Down in a Plain Familiar Way (London, 
1658). Allestree was not so complimentary about Hobbes, whom he accused of `demolishing the 
whole frame of virtue', in `A Sermon Preached before the King', November 17,1667, London, I, 
6-7, cited in Ashcraft, `Hobbes' Natural Man', p. 1081. 
122 See Benjamin Milner, `Hobbes on Religion', Political Theory, 16 (1988), pp. 400-25, p. 412 
who points out the similarity of Hobbes' language in Leviathan, XXIX, 8, p. 212: `Faith comes by 
hearing... ' to the language of Romans X. 14-17. Edwin Curley also notes this in his footnote to the 
text of Leviathan. See also David Johnston, the Rhetoric of Leviathan - Thomas Hobbes and the 
Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1986), 
pp. 209 & 212 for the similarities between Leviathan, XLVII, 34, p. 484 and Matthew XII. 43-5; 
and Leviathan, Review & Conclusion, 14, p. 495 and Matthew IX. 17. Johnston has argued that 
Hobbes' aim was a cultural transformation of his readers, and it was this aim which necessitated a 
reinterpretation of scripture. 
123 See De Cive, XII, 3, p. 133. 
124 See Leviathan, Introduction, 1, pp. 3-4. See also Martinich, Two Gods, p. 48; Charles 
Cantalupo, "By Art Is Created That Great... State": Milton's Paradise Lost and Hobbes's 
Leviathan', in Heirs of Fame - Milton and Writers of the English Renaissance, edited by M. Swiss 
& D. A. Kent (Bucknell University Press, Lewisburg & London, 1995), pp. 184-207, p. 188; 
Roshwald, `The Judeo-Christian Elements', p. 98; and Ted H. Miller, `Thomas Hobbes and the 
Constraints that Enable the Imitation of God', Inquiry, 42 (1999), pp. 149-76. 
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men... without covenants or subjection, one to another, as if they were but even 
now all at once created male and female'. 125 It is well known that the title of 
Leviathan itself is taken from the forty first chapter of the book of Job, and the 
title of Hobbes' account of the civil war, Behemoth, comes from the fortieth 
chapter of Job. 126 
A number of scholars have commented on Hobbes' use of scripture, 
particularly in the second half of Leviathan. The predominant view is that 
Hobbes' use of scripture was rhetorical. On one view Hobbes used scripture 
simply because it was expected of a seventeenth century writer, and in this way it 
hid his apparent atheism. 127 But given Hobbes' unorthodox religious views, and 
the response of his contemporaries, his use of scripture certainly did not have this 
particular desired effect. In the Letter Dedicatory of Leviathan Hobbes actually 
drew the attention of his readers to his unusual scriptural interpretation, with the 
following statement: `That which perhaps may most offend are certain texts of 
Holy Scripture, alleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by 
others. But I have done it with due submission, and also (in order to my subject) 
necessarily; for they are the outworks of the enemy, from whence they impugn the 
civil power'. 128 Is this the action of a covert atheist? Quentin Skinner has argued 
that Hobbes used scripture to ridicule religion and his opponents, 129 while both 
Sharon Lloyd and David Johnston think that Hobbes used scripture as part of a 
process of re-educating his readers. 130 According to Johnston, Hobbes' aim was 
to `expose the superstitious and magical elements in Christianity so that these 
could be expelled from Christian doctrine'. 131 My own view is that Hobbes' use 
of scripture was by no means essential to the argument of the first half of 
Leviathan, or what we might call the specifically political part. Hobbes used 
scriptural examples as rhetoric to illustrate or support his political arguments, as 
125 Elements, XXII, 2, p. 126. 
126 See Curley's note to Leviathan, Introduction, p. 3; and Greenleaf, `A Note on Hobbes', pp. 21- 
6, who discusses the various meanings of the word Leviathan. See also Patricia Springborg, 
`Hobbes' Biblical Beasts: Leviathan and Behemoth', Political Theory, 23 (1995), pp. 353-75; and 
Cantalupo, `By Art is Created', pp. 198-9. 
127 This view of Hobbes as atheist is taken by Leo Strauss and his followers - see section 3 on 
Hobbes' own belief or unbelief. 
128 Leviathan, Letter Dedicatory, p. 2. 
129 S ee Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 405. 
130 See Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in Hobbes' Leviathan, p. 20. 
131 Johnston, The Rhetoric ofLeviathan, p. 130. 
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did many other seventeenth century theorists. But scriptural reinterpretation was 
essential for the second half of Leviathan, because Hobbes wanted to show the 
absurdities caused by the introduction of the philosophy of Aristotle into 
Christian doctrine, and particularly the separation of spiritual and secular powers 
which he believed had been partly responsible for causing men to disobey their 
rightful sovereign. 132 And in this sense, Hobbes' ideas in the second half of 
Leviathan complement his criticisms of Aristotle, and his argument for obedience 
to civil sovereigns, in the first half of Leviathan. 
Hobbes demonstrated his formidable knowledge of scripture in the trilogy 
which forms his political philosophy, and especially in Leviathan. Greenleaf's 
article is a useful place to start for references to specific Biblical commentators in 
Hobbes' works. These include: St. Jerome, Cardinal Bellarmine, the Anglican 
scholar Joseph Mede (or Mead), Calvin, Luther, Melanchthon, and William 
Perkins, 133 although Greenleaf neglected to mention Hobbes' references to Arius, 
Athanasius, Augustine, Beza, Eusebius, John of Damascus, Justinian, and 
Tertullian amongst others in Leviatlzan. 134 Greenleaf also notes that the preface to 
Hobbes' Of Liberty and Necessity, although admittedly not written by Hobbes 
himself, was a `diatribe against scriptural commentators'. 135 I have selected 
commentaries on Genesis which Hobbes' seventeenth century readers would have 
132 See Leviathan, XLVI, 18, p. 460. 
133 St. Jerome in Leviathan XXXIII, 1, p. 251, & 12, p. 254; Cardinal Bellarmine in numerous 
places in Leviathan XLII & XLIV; the Anglican scholar Joseph Mede (or Mead) in `An Answer to 
Bishop Bramhall's Book, called the Catching of the Leviathan', in English Works, edited by Sir 
William Molesworth (11 volumes, London, 1839-45), Volume IV, pp. 281-384, p. 327; 
Augustine, Calvin, Luther, Melanchthon, and Perkins, in `The Questions concerning Liberty, 
Necessity and Chance', in English Works V, pp. 64,266,298-9 - see Greenleaf, `A Note on 
Hobbes', p. 17. Hobbes also referred to Luther approvingly in his Historia Ecclesiastica, or A 
True Ecclesiastical History from Moses to the time of Martin Luther, translated into English from 
the Latin original (London, 1722), pp. 130-1 & 181, where as far as Hobbes was concerned 
Ecclesiastical History stopped with Martin Luther. For Hobbes and Bellarmine, see Patricia 
Springborg, `Thomas Hobbes and Cardinal Bellarmine: Leviathan and the Ghost of the Holy 
Roman Empire', History of Political 77iought, 16 (1995), pp. 503-31. For Hobbes and 
Reformation thinkers see M. Whitaker, `Hobbes' view of the Reformation', History of Political 
Thought, 9 (1988), pp. 45-58. Whitaker, p. 49, has described Leviathan as a commentary on the 
Reformation. 
134 See Index of proper names in Richard Tuck's edition of Leviathan, pp. 503-7, which is more 
comprehensive than Curley's index to his edition of Leviathan, although Curley does print a very 
useful index of Biblical citations. Also see Hobbes' English Works XI, which is the index for the 
other ten volumes, for exact references. Hamilton's article `Hobbes' Study' also has some useful 
references to Hobbes' citations of particular works by other authors. 
Huld 
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had access to. These were found through keyword and date searches on the online 
version of the English Short Title Catalogue, as well as from the catalogues of the 
British Library, and Dr Williams's Library in London. Many of these works also 
appear on a list of theological books which were in the library at Hardwick Hall 
during the late 1620s, and 1630s. 136 Apart from the works of Augustine, Aquinas, 
Bellarmine, Beza, Bullinger, Calvin, Erasmus, Luther, and many other Church 
fathers, the Hardwick Library contained Biblical commentaries, and other 
theological works, by such widely read English writers as: Henry Ainsworth, 
Gervase Babington, Henoch Clapham, John Donne, John Downame, Joseph Hall, 
John Salkeld, and Andrew Willet. Having said that I want to stress that my aim is 
not to demonstrate that Hobbes read and was influenced by these books, but 
simply that the theological holdings of the Hardwick library could be seen as 
representative of those commentaries which were widely read in England in the 
first half of the seventeenth century. 
6. State of Nature or Eden? 
The aim of this dissertation then, is to explain how Hobbes' state of nature was 
understood by his contemporary readers, who approached his political philosophy 
with particular theological assumptions, and who had the scriptural version of the 
natural condition uppermost in their minds. Did Hobbes' description contradict, 
confirm, or subvert the scriptural account? As we will see throughout this 
dissertation, those of Hobbes' contemporary critics who went into print against 
Leviathan found it impossible to reconcile Hobbes' description with scripture. 
But this was not necessarily the case for all of Hobbes' seventeenth century 
readers. What determined how Hobbes' contemporary readers reacted to his 
description of the state of nature were their views on the effects of the Fall. 
Hobbes was loath to admit any reliance on authorities, and he wrote about 
commentaries in derogatory terms, but we cannot definitively conclude from this 
135 Greenleaf, `A Note on Hobbes', p. 16. The preface was written by John Davies of Kidwelly, 
who published Hobbes' dispute with Bramhall without Hobbes' consent - see Martinich, Hobbes: 
A Biography, p. 267. 
136 See Chatsworth MSS E. 1. A. 
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that he had not read any scriptural commentaries. 137 In fact his citation of various 
commentators, along with his claim that he had departed from some of their 
opinions, seems to indicate exactly the opposite view. What we can say, is that 
for those of Hobbes' readers who subscribed to Augustinian, Calvinist, and most 
importantly Lutheran interpretations of Genesis, there were parallels to be seen 
between Hobbes' account of the state of nature, and the scriptural account of the 
creation and Fall, although on some points Hobbes could have been understood to 
have subverted that account. It is this I hope to demonstrate in this dissertation. 
My research also indicates that Hobbes himself had knowledge of Augustinian 
and Reformed interpretations of Genesis. 
I would also like to state in advance that throughout this dissertation I will 
generally be using Hobbes' terms `man' and `men'. There has been much debate 
about the status of women in Hobbes' political theory. Hobbes himself was not 
particularly concerned with the relationship between men and women as 
individuals, but was more concerned with their role as parents, or more 
particularly their role as governors over families. His omission of specific 
references to women, especially in the commonwealth, has been taken by some 
current scholars as evidence of his patriarchal leanings. 138 I disagree with this 
view - when Hobbes used the term man, he used it as a universal name, and for 
137 Skinner, `Ideological Context', p. 304, has argued that Hobbes' non-reliance on authorities was 
not unusual in political writing of the time. 
138 A number of Hobbes' commentators, although noting that in the state of nature women and 
men were equal, deny that Hobbesian equality also applied to women in civil society - see: Carole 
Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Polity Press, Cambridge & Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988); `God 
Hath Ordained to Man a Helper: Hobbes, Patriarchy and Conjugal Right', British Journal of 
Political Science, 19 (1989), pp. 445-63; Teresa Brennan & Carole Pateman, `Mere Auxiliaries to 
the Commonwealth: Women and the Origins of Liberalism', Political Studies, 27 (1979), pp. 183- 
200; Susan Moller Okin, 'Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 11 (1982), pp. 65-88; and Christine Di Stephano, `Masculinity as Ideology in 
Political Theory: Hobbesian Man Considered', Women's Studies International Forum, 6 (1983), 
pp. 633-44. Other scholars note that Hobbes made patriarchalist assumptions, but that these were 
either accidental to his theory, or did not necessarily imply that his theory was flawed - see: P. 
Abbott, `The Three Families of Thomas Hobbes', Review of Politics, 42 (1981), pp. 242-58; K. 
Green, `Christine de Pisan and Thomas Hobbes', Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (1994), pp. 456-75; 
Gordon J. Schochet, The Authoritarian Family and Political Attitudes in I7th-Century England - 
Patriarchalism in Political Thought, with a new introduction by the author (Transaction Books, 
New Brunswick & London, 1988), chapter XII; and Gabriella Slomp, `Hobbes and the Equality 
of Women', Political Studies, 42 (1994), pp. 441-52. Another group of scholars think that Hobbes 
either subverted patriarchalism or destroyed it - see: R. A. Chapman, `Leviathan Writ Small: 
Thomas Hobbes on the Family', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 76- 90; and 
Preston King, The Ideology of Order: A Comparative Analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes 
(Barnes & Noble, New York, 1974), especially chapter 15. 
27 
this reason we can take it to include both genders. 139 In fact, as we will see in 
chapters two and five, the Fall may explain some of the problems which have 
been raised by current Hobbes' scholars, about what appear to be Hobbes' rather 
contradictory views on women. 
Finally, a note on the order of chapters. Each chapter in this dissertation 
examines a particular aspect, or aspects, of Hobbes' description of the state of 
nature, and assesses that description against both the criticisms of his 
contemporaries, and the scriptural account. The order of chapters mostly follows 
Hobbes' ordering of the various themes which make up his description of the 
state of nature in Leviathan. As a result, the chapter order does not exactly 
correspond with the scriptural account. As we will see throughout this 
dissertation, Hobbes' state of nature appears to contain elements of both the pre- 
lapsarian and post-lapsarian conditions. 
139 See Slomp, `Hobbes and the Equality of Women', pp. 441-44; and also chapter two on equality 
and unsociability. 
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Chapter One: Good and Evil. 
`For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be 
opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil'. (Genesis ILLS) 
Hobbes' De Cive and Leviathan were among a number of books condemned and 
burnt by the University of Oxford in 1683. In the university's published decree, 
the eleventh proposition, `repugnant to the Holy Scriptures, decrees of councils, 
writings of the fathers, the faith and profession of the primitive church, and also 
destructive of the kingly government, the safety of His Majesty's person, the 
public peace, the laws of nature and bonds of human society' was that in `the 
state of nature there is no difference between good and evil, right and wrong... ' I 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the substance of this accusation. Many of 
Hobbes' contemporary critics found his state of nature offensive, because they 
understood the natural condition as the original, perfect and peaceful condition of 
human beings at the creation. Thus Hobbes' description of an original war-like 
condition contradicted the scriptural account. George Lawson, the puritan rector 
of More in Shropshire, criticised his state of nature for this very reason. For 
Lawson, the original condition of human beings should have been a condition of 
peace, not war. But Lawson also thought that if by nature Hobbes actually meant 
the `corruption of Nature, and the same not only original and native, but also 
acquired by perpetual acts, so far as to quench the light of Nature, and suppress 
the vigour of those Principles which God left as reliques of his image, then his 
Position maybe true'. 2 
So was it possible for Hobbes' seventeenth century readers to understand 
his state of nature as a description of the corruption of human beings, in other 
words either as an account of the Fall, or the fallen condition? And if so, did 
1 `The Judgement and Decree of the University of Oxford, Passed in Their Convocation, July 21, 
1683, against Certain Pernicious Books and Damnable Doctrines, Destructive to the Sacred 
Persons of Princes, Their State and Government, and of All Humane Society', reproduced in 
Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England, edited by D. 
Wootton (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1986), pp. 120-26, p. 123. 
2 George Lawson, An Examination of the Political Part of Mr. Hobbs His Leviathan (1657), 
reproduced in Leviathan - Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, 
edited and introduced by G. A. J. Rogers (Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1995), pp. 15-114, p. 17. On 
Lawson see Conal Condren, George Lawson's Politica and the English Revolution (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989); and Condren, `Confronting the Monster'. 
29 
Hobbes' views on good and evil contradict protestant ideas on the ability of fallen 
human beings to judge good and evil? Hobbes' state of nature can be understood 
in a number of ways. It was an original condition from which individuals created 
a commonwealth, and for a number of his contemporary critics this meant that it 
should have been the condition of human beings at the creation. The state of 
nature was also an imagined condition from which Hobbes was able to draw 
consequences about human behaviour. 3 But crucially, the state of nature was also 
a constantly threatening possibility -a condition into which a weakened 
commonwealth had the potential to dissolve. In other words, it was a condition 
into which human beings living in civil society had the potential to fall, if they 
arrogated to themselves the judgement of good and evil, and in doing so 
disobeyed (or in extreme cases murdered) their rightful sovereign. If Hobbes' 
account was understood in this way, then it begins to look rather like the 
description of Adam and Eve's attempt to attain the knowledge of good and evil, 
contrary to God's command, which resulted in their Fall and subsequent 
expulsion from paradise. In the same way the Hobbesian individual's attempt to 
exercise private judgement, against the command of his civil sovereign, resulted 
in the disintegration of the commonwealth, and his fall into a state of nature. 5 
The problem for Hobbes' seventeenth century readers was that he did not 
specify whether he was describing the lives of fallen human beings, or human 
beings in their original perfect condition, although he had hinted that he was 
referring to fallen human beings when he claimed that he was interested in human 
beings as they were, not as they should have been. For Hobbes, if human beings 
were as they should have been, in other words if they could rule themselves, then 
there would have been no need for a common coercive power. 6 But it was not 
until the Latin version of Leviathan, published in 1668, that Hobbes finally 
associated his state of nature with the example of Cain and Abel, and thus with 
3 See A. P. Martinich, A Hobbes Dictionary (Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1995), pp. 292-3. 
4 Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes, p. 42, has argued that this understanding of the state of nature was the 
one which Hobbes was most interested in. 
5 In the introduction, it was noted that a number of Hobbes' scholars have commented on the 
similarity between Hobbes' account of the disintegration of the commonwealth, and the account of 
the Fall - see for example, Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 264; Rauch, `Secular Fall', p. 99; Hood, 
The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes, pp. 175-6 ; and Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, 
pp. 56,58 & 82-3. 
6 See De Cive, VI, 13, footnote, p. 84 & XVI, 15, p. 198; and Leviathan, XVII, 4, p. 107. 
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the post-lapsarian condition. 7 Many of Hobbes' contemporary critics, even those 
who published after 1668, appear to have been unaware of Hobbes' own citation 
of Cain and Abel. 8 
But if Hobbes was describing the condition of fallen human beings, then 
his ideas were not that far removed from those of the moderate puritan, patriarch 
of Dorchester, and member of the Westminster Assembly, John White. While 
commenting on Genesis 111.17, in prose that could have come directly from the 
pen of Hobbes himself, White described the life of fallen human beings as `a life 
of pain and sorrow'. 9 He went on to describe the apparently `selfish' individuals 
familiar to readers of Hobbes. White claimed that a `man, in this state of 
corruption, respects none but himself, and cares not on whom he layes the 
burthen, so he may ease himself', and that `every man in his natural condition, is 
a self-lover, that is, a lover of himself only, without respect, either to God or 
community, both which therefore he must needs neglect for his own private 
interest'. 10 Further, a `man cannot naturally desire any thing, but under a shew 
and appearance of good' and yet man `is an ill chooser of his own good'. I' White 
also noted that the nature of man `by the Art and Policy of Satan, is apt to be 
carried against all restraint and subjection'. 12 He went on to echo many of 
Hobbes' ideas on human desire for present good, while ignoring future evil: `Men 
are easily to believe, and hope any thing of that which they affect and desire', and 
even the `terrours of wrath to come cannot prevaile against strong and violent 
affections to things that are present'. 13 For White, law was essential, and even the 
7 Hobbes' own citation of Cain and Abel may have been in response to the criticism that his state 
of nature contradicted scripture. Cain and Abel will be discussed in more detail in chapter three on 
the war of all against all. 
8 Richard Cumberland appears to have been the exception, by specifically referring to the English 
and Latin editions of Leviathan - see for example Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 
pp. 173 & 357, although I have not found any references to Cumberland discussing Hobbes' use 
of Cain and Abel. 
9 John White, A Commentary upon the three first chapters of the first book of Moses called 
Genesis (London, 1656), Book III, p. 212. White's commentary was published posthumously, and 
has separate pagination for each chapter of Genesis. References will therefore be made to chapter, 
as well as page number. 
10 White, A Commentary, III, p. 148. But for White, 1, p. 44, God had created human beings in a 
condition in which the good of the community was to come before the good of the individual. 
11 White, A Commentary, III, pp. 90-1. 
12 White, A Commentary, III, p. 43. 
13 White, A Commentary, III, pp. 87-8. 
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`most righteous amongst the Sons of men, Must and Needs to live under a law'. 14 
If God thought it necessary to give a law to Adam in his `state of perfection', it 
was even more necessary for fallen human beings, because `besides all 
temptations from without, we have within us such a fountain of Corruption 
breathing out continually Inordinate lusts, that need the strongest bridle to keep 
them in and suppresse them... ' 15 White cited two reasons for the necessity of law. 
Firstly, men could not distinguish between good and evil - only God knew what 
was good and it was God's will which was the measure of goodness. Secondly, 
when we obeyed God's law, we demonstrated our subjection to him, and also that 
we took his will (which was goodness) as the rule of our actions. 16 Was it 
possible for Hobbes' seventeenth century readers, who had similar views to those 
of John White, to see parallels between Hobbes' ideas on good and evil, and the 
account of the Fall? 
1. Hobbes on Good and Evil. 
Hobbes thought that good and evil did not exist as concrete realities in nature. 
They were simply names which individuals applied to their own and other 
people's actions. For Hobbes' natural man, good was simply whatever pleased 
him, and evil whatever displeased him. And because `every man differeth from 
other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common 
distinction of good and evil'. 17 The actions which human beings called good and 
evil were different in different places and ages; and 
divers men differ not only in their judgement on the senses (of what is 
pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight), but 
also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of 
common life. Nay, the same man in divers times differs from himself, and 
one time praiseth (that is, calleth good) what another time he dispraiseth 
(and calleth evil); from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last 
war. 18 
14 White, A Commentary, II, p. 70. 
15 White, A Commentary, II, p. 75 
16 See White, A Commentary, II, p. 70. 
'7 Elements, VII, 3, p. 44. See also Leviathan, VI, 8, p. 29. 
18 Leviathan, XV, 40, p. 100. 
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There was nothing `simply good. For even the goodness that we attribute to God 
Almighty is his goodness to us'. 19 Good was always `relative to person, place and 
time', and `the nature of good and evil follows from the nature of circumstances'. 
There 
can be a common good, and it can rightly be said of something, it is 
commonly a good, that is, useful to many, or good for the state. At times 
one can also talk of a good for everyone, like health: but this way of 
speaking is relative; therefore one cannot speak of something as being 
simply good; since whatsoever is good, is good for someone or other. 
Even when God created the world, and saw that his works were good, he did so 
because his works pleased him. 20 
So Hobbes thought that there was nothing simply good or evil, but that 
good and evil were relative to person, time and place. Human beings named an 
action good or evil according to their passions, and because different men had 
different passions, and these were constantly changing, this meant that they also 
had different ideas about what was good and what was evil. Because the state of 
nature was a condition where good and evil were judged according to the 
passions, or the private appetite, of each individual, and these were different in 
each, there was no agreement on good and evil. As a result, the natural condition 
was a state of war. But according to Hobbes, once individuals found themselves 
in this condition, they `easily recognize that this state is evil... and consequently 
that peace is good. Thus though they cannot agree on a present good, they do 
agree on a future good. And that is the work of reason; for things present are 
perceived by the senses, things fixture only by reason'. 21 
Hobbes' natural individuals could not agree on present goods, because of 
the variety of their passions, but they could agree on a future good demonstrated 
by reason. The problem was that men had an `irrational desire' which made them 
19 Elements, VII, 3, p. 44. 
20 Thomas Hobbes, De Homine, translated by Charles T. Wood, T. S. K. Scott-Craig, and Bernard 
Gert, in Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, edited with an introduction by Bernard Gert (Hackett 
Publishing Company, Indianapolis & Cambridge, 1991), chapter X, section 4, p. 47. First 
published in 1658. 
21 De Cive, III, 31, p. 55. This statement was omitted from the corresponding argument in 
Leviathan, XV, 40, p. 100, where Hobbes moved swiftly on from a description of a state of nature 
where private appetite was the measure of good and evil, to the claim that `all men agree on this, 
that peace is good; and therefore also the way or means of peace... are good... and their contrary 
vices, evil'. 
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`reject future goods for the sake of present goods (which inevitably entail 
unexpected evils)'22 In De Homine Hobbes discussed the idea of apparent good 
and evil. Hobbes thought that when human beings deliberated over which course 
of action to take, they imagined the consequences of their actions. This meant that 
the good and evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain 
of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. 
But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater 
than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or 
seeming good. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the 
whole is apparent or seeming evil ... 
23 
As a result, `inexperienced men that do not look closely at the long-term 
consequences of things, accept what appears to be good, not seeing the evil 
annexed to it; afterwards they experience damage. And this is what is meant by 
those who distinguish good and evil as real and apparent'. 4 Hobbes also thought 
that there were three kinds of good: `good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good 
in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucaundum, delightful; and good as the 
means, which is called utile, profitable'. Correspondingly, there were three kinds 
of evil: `evil in promise is that they call turpe; evil in effect and end is molestum, 
unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means inutile, unprofitable, hurtful'. 25 
As we will see throughout this dissertation, Hobbes was most interested in good 
and evil in effect. 
For Hobbes, the lack of knowledge of good and evil was the main reason 
irrational creatures, such as bees and ants, could live together `in such good order 
and government, for their common benefit... free from sedition and war amongst 
themselves'; whereas human beings could not. 26 The common good of irrational 
creatures (peace and food) did not differ from their private good, whereas men's 
private goods (property and dominion) were different in every man, and could not 
be common because of two passions: the desire to be superior to others; and the 
desire to have what seemed good immediately. Bees and ants lacked reason, and 
thus learning, which meant that they were content with their government, unlike 
22 De Cive, III, 32, pp. 55-6. 
23 Leviathan, VI, 57, p. 34. See also Elements, VII, 8, p. 45. 
24 De Homine, X, 5, p. 48. 
25 Leviathan, VI, 8, p. 29. See also the similar discussion in De Hontine, X, 5, p. 47. 
26 Elements, XIX, 5, p. 105. See also the corresponding accounts in Leviathan, XVII, 6- 12, pp. 
108-9; and De Cive, V, 5, pp. 71-2. 
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men, and some particular men, who criticised and desired change. Bees and ants 
were directed only by pleasure and pain. They did not have any conception of 
right and wrong, and thus as long as they were comfortable, they were not 
offended by others. But men made themselves judges of right and wrong in other 
men, and when they were most comfortable, that was when they were most 
troublesome. 27 These 
creatures, though they have some use of voice (in making known to one 
another their desires and other affections), yet they want that art of words 
by which some men can represent to others that which is good in the 
likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good, and augment or diminish 
the apparent greatness of good and evil, discontenting men, and troubling 
their peace at their pleasure. 28 
In the state of nature it was possible for human beings to get to the stage 
where they all agreed on a future good, i. e. peace. They could even get to the 
stage where they agreed on the virtues which led to peace. But they could not 
agree `on their nature, that is, on what each one of them consists in'. In other 
words, human beings could agree on the end, but not on the means to that end. If 
an individual disliked another individual's good action, he simply called it a vice. 
Or an individual could redescribe a wicked action, which pleased him, as a 
virtue. 29 Quentin Skinner has demonstrated that Hobbes was concerned with a 
rhetorical technique called paradiastolic redescription, which enabled the 
redescribing of virtue as vice, or vice as virtue. 30 According to Skinner, there 
were two problems with words for Hobbes. Firstly, there were many words, 
which had more than one meaning, especially when used in different contexts. 
Secondly, the problem was further exacerbated by the diversity of men's 
passions, which led to different men describing the same action in different ways 
- as either virtue or vice. Even if individuals agreed on the meaning of words 
which signified virtues and vices, they might not agree on the actions which fell 
into the category of virtue and vice. 31 It was speech, and more particularly the art 
27 See Elements, XIX, 5, p. 106. 
28 Leviathan, XVII, 10, p. 108. 
29 De Cive, III, 32, pp. 55-6. 
30 See Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 279ff.; and `Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', 
especially pp. 31-38, and on p. 29, where Skinner notes Thucydides' attack on paradiastolic 
speech, although he admits it was not referred to by name. 
31 See Skinner, `Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', pp. 32-3. 
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of rhetoric, which caused the problems. In De Cive Hobbes described man's 
tongue as the `trumpet to war and sedition'. It had the ability to `make the Good 
appear Better, and the Bad Worse, than they really are'. 32 
2. The `seditious doctrines' of the Schoolmen. 
Hobbes criticised those philosophers who had not dealt with the lack of 
agreement about which actions did, or did not, constitute the virtues. He claimed 
that these philosophers did not realise that whatever action led to peace was good, 
and whatever action led to war was evil. Hobbes accused them of constructing a 
moral philosophy, `which is alien to the moral law... for they have taken the view 
that the nature of the virtues lies in a certain mean between two extremes, and 
vices in the extremes themselves, and this is patently false'. 33 Hobbes' target was 
the moral philosophy of the followers of Aristotle - the Schoolmen. Hobbes was 
critical of their moral philosophy because he thought it created a state of nature, 
or a state of war, within civil society, where private appetite replaced the civil 
laws (which included the laws of nature) as the measure of good and evil. Hobbes 
even went so far as to say that it was the political philosophy of Aristotle, and 
those Romans who had followed him, which was the cause of the civil wars 
concerning religion in Germany, France and England. According to Hobbes, 
Aristotle `did not define virtue and vice by laws, but by praise and blame among 
the citizens'. 34 
Hobbes thought that human beings constructed rules of good and evil 
according to their own passions, and he believed that the Schoolmen were an 
example of this practice. Because human beings had different passions, it 
followed that there could be no common rules of good and evil, and each 
individual would do whatever he considered good, even if that led to the 
dissolution of the commonwealth. 35 For Hobbes, the measure of good and evil 
`without civil government, was the law of nature; and in it, the law civil, that 
32 De Cive, V, 5, p. 71. 
33 De Cive, III, 32, p. 56. 
34 Leviathan, XLVI Latin edition, 23, p. 476. 
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determineth what is honest and dishonest, what is just and unjust, and generally 
what is good and evil' . 
36 The laws of nature must be from reason, not passion, 
because reason was the same in all men, whereas passion was not. 37 Hobbes 
wanted to establish a moral philosophy which was based on unchanging reason, 
rather than constantly changing passions. His account of the laws of nature, which 
will be discussed in chapter four, was designed to achieve this aim. 
In the chapter of Leviathan entitled `Of those things that Weaken a 
Commonwealth', Hobbes described a number of `seditious doctrines', which he 
thought had a tendency to incite rebellion. And in the English edition, although 
not in the Latin version, he claimed that three of these doctrines which were 
pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of the world 
proceeded chiefly from the tongues and pens of unlearned divines who, 
joining the words of Holy Scripture together otherwise than is agreeable to 
reason, do what they can to make men think that sanctity and natural 
reason cannot stand together. 38 
The first of these opinions was the doctrine that `every private man is judge of 
good and evil actions'. According to Hobbes, this doctrine would be true in a 
state of nature where there were no civil laws, and also in civil society in those 
areas of life not legislatively determined, and where each individual was his own 
judge of good and evil. But in all other cases within civil society, the civil law 
was `the measure of good and evil actions', and the representative of the 
commonwealth, in other words the sovereign, was judge. `From this false 
doctrine men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands 
of the commonwealth, and afterwards to obey or disobey them, as in their private 
judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the commonwealth is distracted and 
weakened'. 39 As we will see in chapter four, in the state of nature, by right of 
nature, every individual was judge of what conduced to his own preservation - 
35 In De Honzine, X, 4, p. 47, Hobbes stated that `Aristotle hath well defined good as that which all 
men desire', but then went on to note the problems this caused because different men desired 
different things. 
36 Leviathan, XLVI, 11, pp. 456-7. 
37 See Elements, XV, 1, p. 82. 
38 Leviathan, XXIX, 8, p. 213. Hobbes' omission of this accusation from the Latin edition of 
Leviathan might have been an attempt to make his political theory less offensive. 
39 Leviathan, XXIX, 6, p. 212. This seditious doctrine was missing from the corresponding 
passage in the Elements, XXVII, 5, pp. 165-6, where Hobbes only referred to the doctrine that an 
individual cannot act against his conscience. 
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this meant that he was judge of good and evil, and his own interpreter of natural 
law. But this was not the case in the commonwealth, where the civil law was the 
measure of good and evil, and individuals had appointed a sovereign to arbitrate 
in disputes between them. 
Another seditious doctrine, `that whatsoever a man does against 
his 
conscience is sin' was a direct result of individuals making themselves judges of 
good and evil. For Hobbes, judgement and conscience were the same thing, and 
both could be erroneous. The man who was not subject to law sinned in 
everything he did against his conscience, because he had no other rule to follow 
but his own reason. But this was not the case in a commonwealth, where the law 
was the public conscience. If this were not so, the diversity of private opinions 
and private consciences would cause chaos - men would obey the sovereign only 
if it seemed good to them. 0 Earlier in Leviathan Hobbes had argued that the word 
`conscience' was used by individuals `for the knowledge of their own secret facts 
and secret thoughts', and also to refer to their own new opinions, which he 
claimed they only thought, but did not know, to be true. 41 In De Cive Hobbes 
noted that sometimes an individual could regard an action performed by another 
individual as a sin, and yet if he himself performed the same action, he did not 
think he committed a sin. This was because whatever seemed good to any man, 
he therefore considered to be right. He used the example of a sovereign 
commanding a citizen to fight in a war, which the citizen believed to be unjust. 
The citizen must obey his sovereign and go to war, otherwise he would be taking 
upon himself the judgement of what was just and unjust, and this power belonged 
to the commonwealth. 2 
A third seditious doctrine, which yet again was a result of individuals 
becoming judges of good and evil, was that `faith and sanctity are not to be 
attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion... ' If this 
were the case, then any Christian could claim his own inspiration as the rule of 
40 Leviathan, XXIX, 7, p. 212; and also Elements, XXVII, 5, pp. 165-6. 
41 Leviathan, VII, 4, p. 36. See also Elements, VI, 8, p. 42, where conscience was simply `opinion 
of evidence', or an individual's opinion of his own knowledge of something. As Edwin Curley has 
pointed out, this was not the traditional Christian view of conscience. For instance Calvin thought 
that conscience was a sense of morality which had been implanted in human beings by God - see 
Curley's footnote to Leviathan, VII, 4, p. 36. But see the discussion of both Calvin's and Hobbes' 
views of conscience in chapter four on the laws of nature. 
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his action. In Leviathan Hobbes chose what may or may not have been a 
significant phrase to describe the result of this seditious doctrine: `And thus we 
fall again into the fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil, or to make 
judges of it such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the 
dissolution of all civil government'. 3 Interestingly, as if checking himself, in the 
Latin edition of Leviathan this sentence was replaced with: `This, again, is to 
arrogate to oneself the judgement of good and evil, and disregarding the laws of 
the commonwealth, to offer oneself to be governed either by one's own discretion 
or by that of private men who fraudulently claim to have been supernaturally 
inspired'. 4 
But what Hobbes took to be the Schoolmen's rules of good and evil were 
not in fact that dissimilar to his own definitions of good and evil, which in a state 
of nature were simply what an individual judged would cause him pleasure or 
pain. Hobbes accused the Schoolmen of defining good and evil in exactly the 
same way, according to passion or private appetite, and thus creating a state of 
nature within civil society. For Hobbes, if we considered individuals `governed 
every one by his own law [then]... in the condition of men that have no other law 
but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good and evil actions'. 45 
But he also argued that it was the law of nature, which was the measure of good 
and evil outside civil government, or in a state of nature. The problem was, as we 
will see in chapter four, the law of nature did not in itself preserve peace without 
a common power to enforce it. Even if individuals in the state of nature had laws 
of nature, or common rules of good and evil, dictated by reason, their passions 
overpowered their reason, and they would `willingly break the law, whenever it 
seems that greater good or lesser evil will come to themselves from breaking it' 46 
In Leviathan Hobbes claimed that the laws of nature, `without the terror of some 
power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that 
carry us to partiality, pride, revenge and the like'. 7 If members of a 
42 See De Cive, XII, 2, pp. 132-3. 
43 Leviathan, XXIX, 8, p. 212. 
44 Leviathan (Latin version), XXIX, 8, p. 212. See also De Cive, XII, 6, pp. 135-6. This seditious 
doctrine was not mentioned in the Elements. 
45 Leviathan, XLVI, 32, p. 464. 
46 De Cive, V, 1, p. 69. 
47 Leviathan, XVII, 2, p. 106; and Elements, XIX, 1, p. 103. 
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commonwealth applied the moral philosophy of the Schoolmen, and judged good 
and evil according to passions, the state of nature would be the result. This was 
the reason human beings had left the natural condition, and created 
commonwealths. Judgement made according to the diversity of passions resulted 
in a condition which was contrary to the one passion all human beings shared - 
the desire for life, or the fear of death. Hobbes seems to have thought that there 
was both agreement and disagreement on good and evil in the state of nature. 
Human beings were always in a condition in which there were objective rules of 
good and evil, but as we will see in chapter four, on the laws of nature, this did 
not mean that they would necessarily follow these rules. 
So the authors of the University of Oxford decree were correct in their 
assessment of Hobbes' ideas on good and evil in the state of nature. For Hobbes, 
in the natural condition good and evil were judged according to each individual's 
passions, which were different in every individual, and also constantly changing. 
Thus there could be no agreement on good and evil - they were relative to person, 
time and place. But this type of good, according to private appetite, was present 
good. There was another good, which Hobbes thought that it was possible for 
individuals to agree on. That was future good, which was demonstrated by reason. 
But there were a number of problems to be overcome in arriving at agreement on 
this future good. Firstly, individuals might well have come to an agreement on a 
future good, and even on the virtues which led to that future good, but they 
disagreed on which actions constituted those virtues. Secondly, human beings had 
an irrational desire to have whatever seemed good to them immediately, and they 
also desired to be superior to others. But the University of Oxford's valuation of 
the natural condition was different from that of Hobbes. As we will see 
throughout this dissertation, nature, for Hobbes, was not an ideal condition. 
3. The Contemporary Reaction. 
As we have seen above, Quentin Skinner has shown that Hobbes was concerned 
with a rhetorical device called paradiastolic redescription, or the redescribing of 
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virtue as vice, and vice as virtue. 8 Robert South, chaplain to the Earl of 
Clarendon, and one of Hobbes' contemporary critics, also commented on the 
`Similitude, Neighbourhood, and Affinity, which is between Vice and Vertue, 
Good and Evil... ', and the difficulty most men had in discerning between good 
and evil 49 In a sermon on Isaiah V. 20, entitled `The Fatal Imposture and Force of 
Words', directed against Hobbes amongst others, South informed his listeners 
that: 
From the beginning of the World, to this day, there was never any great 
Villainy acted by Men, but it was in the strength of some great Fallacy put 
upon their Minds by a false representation of Evil for Good, or Good for 
Evil. In the day, that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die, says God to 
Adam; and so long as Adam believed this, he did not eat. But, says the 
Devil, In the Day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt be so far from surely 
dying, that thou shalt be Immortal, and from a Man, grow into an Angel; 
and upon this different account of the thing, he presently took the Fruit, 
and ate Mortality, Misery and Destruction to himself, and his whole 
Posterity... God commanded, and told Man what was Good, but the Devil 
sur-named it Evil, and thereby baffled the Command, turned the World 
topsy turvy and brought a new Chaos upon the whole Creation. 5° 
Here South implied, and I think Hobbes and Quentin Skinner would agree, that 
the devil was guilty of paradiastolic redescription - the devil redescribed God's 
command to Adam and Eve, and in doing so good became evil. Thus since the 
Fall, human beings had imperfect knowledge of good and evil. 
South went on to accuse Hobbes of two false opinions: that good and evil 
were not to be found in things themselves, but only in men's opinions; and that 
good and evil were originally found in the laws and commands of the civil 
sovereign. 51 For South, this implied that morality changed as the opinions and 
laws of men changed. South thought that an action was morally good or evil 
according to whether it was agreeable, or disagreeable, to right reason, and 
48 See Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 279ff.; and `Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', 
especially pp. 31-38. 
49 Robert South, `The Fatal Imposture, and Force of Words set forth in a sermon preached on 
Isaiah V. 20, May the 9th 1686', in Twelve Sermons preached upon several occasions, first volume 
(London, 1692), pp. 427-81, pp. 466 & 468. On South see: G. Reedy, Robert South, 1634-1716. - 
An Introduction to His Life and Sermons (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992); and I. 
Simon, Three Restoration Divines: Barstow, South, and Tillotson (Paris, 1967). 
50 South, `The Fatal Imposture', pp. 431-2. 
51 See South, `The Fatal Imposture', pp. 437-9. The latter was the implication of Hobbes' claim 
that in the commonwealth the sovereign was the measure of good and evil. Thus before 
commonwealths, there was no measure of good and evil. 
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because reason was unchanging, then so was morality. If we considered actions 
generally, then their morality depended on circumstances, but a particular action 
came with a particular set of circumstances which defined it as good or evil. 52 
According to South, natural law came before all human and divine positive law. It 
was natural law which informed us of our duty to God and our neighbours. This 
duty to our neighbour `is comprized in that great Rule, of doing, as a Man would 
be done by. ' This 
is as old as Adam, and bears date with humane Nature itself; as springing 
from that Primitive Relation of Equality, which all men as fellow 
Creatures and fellow Subjects to the same Supreme Lord, bear to one 
another, in respect of that common Right, which every man has equally to 
his life, and to the proper Comforts of life; and consequently, to all things 
actually necessary to the support of both. 53 
In this sermon South attacked Hobbes, but it is worth noting that they shared 
some similar opinions on: natural equality; the right of self-preservation; the 
difficulty of discerning between good and evil; and the existence of laws of nature 
found out by right reason and encapsulated in the Golden Rule `Do unto others as 
you would be done to'. 54 Jon Parkin has recently suggested that some of Hobbes' 
seventeenth century commentators, although apparently criticising Hobbes, 
actually appropriated some of his ideas. 55 South might be a good example of this. 
Alternatively, his ideas might have been derived independently of any reading of 
Hobbes. It might have been the case that both men simply shared a common 
intellectual heritage. 
South's sermon is a good summary of contemporary reaction to Hobbes' 
account of good and evil. Hobbes' ideas were criticised by his contemporaries for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, his claim that in the commonwealth the civil law, or 
the command of the civil sovereign, was the measure of good and evil implied 
for many of his contemporary critics, that before commonwealths came into 
52 See South, `The Fatal Imposture', pp. 434-6. 
53 South, `The Fatal Imposture', pp. 448-9. 
54 Admittedly Hobbes used a negative formulation of this rule, and his version of natural law 
concerned relations between human beings, and not relations between human beings and God. I 
will discuss Hobbes' laws of nature in chapter four. 
ss See Jon Parkin, `Hobbism in the Later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker', Historical 
Journal, 42 (1999), pp. 85-108; and Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics. See also Malcolm, 
Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, p. 254, who first suggested this idea with reference to Richard 
Cumberland. 
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existence, there was no such thing as good and evil. More importantly, this 
implied that God did not give the laws of nature to his creation. For John 
Bramhall, the Arminian Bishop of Armagh, this was quite simply an insult to 
God. There had always been empires in the world, and Adam had the laws of 
nature written in his heart before there was such a thing as civil law. It was 
unbelievable that `God should create man and leave him presently without any 
rules to his own ordering of himself, as the Ostridg leaveth his eggs in the sand'. 56 
The lawyer John Whitehall made a similar point, but put it more crudely with his 
rhetorical question, if `Cain had lain with his Mother, there being no positive Law 
to prohibit it at that time, that we know of, had it been no sin? '57 James Lowde 
thought that Hobbes' opinion supposed either `no God at all, or such an one, as 
doth not much concern himself in the Government of the World, but, leaves all to 
his Viceregent here below; obey the King, and you can scarce, according to him, 
disobey God'. Hobbes had made a God out of his Leviathan by granting him this 
power. 58 Similarly, John Eachard, vice-chancellor of Cambridge University, 
charged Hobbes' sovereign with being `the maker of all good and evil'. 59 
If the command of the civil sovereign was the measure of good and evil in 
the commonwealth, then this also implied that the laws of nature were 
changeable, as civil sovereigns changed. For James Tyrrell, critic of Filmer and 
friend of Locke, 
those general, and universal Causes, which procure the preservation, or 
mischief of Mankind, do depend upon such fixt Principles in Nature, as 
are not to be altered by the judgment of any Judge, whether he be a single 
56 John Bramhall, Castigation of Mr. Hobbes. His last animadversions, in the case concerning 
Liberty, and Universal Necessity, Wherein all his Exceptions about that Controversie are filly 
satisfied (1658), reproduced in Leviathan - Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of 
Thomas Hobbes, edited and introduced by G. A. J. Rogers (Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1995), pp. 
115-79, p. 135. See also John Dowel, The Leviathan Heretical: or the charge exhibited in 
parliament against M. Hobbs, justified by the refutation on a book of his, entitled The Historical 
Narration ofHeresie and the Punishments thereof (Oxford, 1683), p. 82. 
57 John Whitehall, The Leviathan Found Out: or the answer to Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan, in that 
which my Lord Clarendon hath past over (London, 1679), p. 23. 
58 James Lowde, A Discourse concerning the Nature of Man, both in his Natural and Political 
Capacity. Born as he is a Rational Creature and Member of Civil Society. With an examination of 
some of Mr. Hobbs's Opinions relating hereunto (London, 1694), p. 163. I have been unable to 
find any biographical information on James Lowde. 
59 John Eachard, Some Opinions of Mr Hobbs considered in a Second dialogue between Philautus 
and Timothy (London, 1673), p. 241. 
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man in the state of Nature, or the Supream Powers in the 
Commonwealth. 60 
John Shafte asked if there were no rules of good and evil prior to the existence of 
commonwealths, then how could commonwealths be founded on those 
principles? For Shafte, 
without Natural Justice, Charity and Temperance, it is vain to think any 
Civil Government can subsist, the designe of all Civil Government being 
the execution of these Laws, in order to Self-preservation; there being no 
need of any Civil Magistrate, if these Laws could be made to be observed 
without their help 61 ... 
For similar reasons, Hobbes' contemporary critics also objected to his 
argument that justice and injustice only related to men in society, and not in 
solitude, because this also implied that before commonwealths came into 
existence, there was no such thing as justice or injustice. William Lucy, the 
Arminian Bishop of St. David's, admitted that justice and injustice were acquired, 
and not innate habits, but Lucy thought that even solitary individuals could 
acquire the virtue of justice, although he admitted that `to act accordingly requires 
a present Object... i62 For Lucy, the virtues `are those things which perfect the 
soule, which make the work and worker good, but no force doth that, neither doth 
it assist in doing but it is indifferent to good or bad... 63 It was not possible for 
Hobbes' civil sovereign to compel justice, if there was no such thing as justice in 
the state of nature. 
Hobbes' argument that the common good of human beings was different 
from individual private goods also came in for criticism from some of his 
contemporaries. For James Tyrrell, the private good of human beings did not 
differ from their common good, or at least it was not a sufficient reason for men 
to fall out. 64 Tyrrell admitted that there had been different ideas of some goods at 
different times, but there were goods which remained constant. These included: 
60 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 285. On Tyrrell see J. W. Gough, `James Tyrrell, Whig 
Historian and Friend of John Locke', The Historical Journal, 19 (1973), pp. 581-610. 
61 John Shafte, The Great Law of Nature, or Self Preservation Examined, Asserted and Vindicated 
from Mr. Hobbes his Abuses. In a small discourse; part Moral, part Political, and part Religious 
(London, 1673), p. 19. I have been unable to find any biographical information on John Shafte. 
62 Lucy, Observations 1657, p. 128. 
63 Lucy, Observations 1657, p. 126. 
64 See Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 336. 
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loving and obeying God; duties to parents, friends and neighbours; the 
preservation of the lives, liberties and estates of innocent parties; and fidelity in 
marriage. These all had the common good of human beings as their aim. Tyrrell 
thought that it was 
a matter of great moment to have a fixed and constant notion of Good; 
because as long as this is fluctuating and uncertain, all knowledge of our 
true Felicity (which is the greater Good of every man) as also of the Laws 
of Nature, and of all particular Vertues (which are nothing but the means 
and causes of obtaining this Good) will be likewise various, wandring and 
uncertain. 65 
Quite simply, human beings needed a common good, otherwise good and evil 
would always be relative to individual men. 66 
Tyrrell claimed that Hobbes himself acknowledged that private good and 
common good existed even outside civil society, and he cited Hobbes' De 
Homine, chapter ten: `But we supposed the knowledge of the Common Good, to 
be a fit means to bring men both to Peace, and Vertue; because it is both amiable 
in its own Nature, and the surest defence of each man's private Good'. 67 Further, 
Hobbes admitted that it was a greater good which benefited many people, rather 
than fewer. 68 Tyrrell thought that Hobbes' error in his views on good and evil was 
caused by his lack of differentiation between natural and moral goods. A good 
was `that which preserves, encreases, or perfects the Faculties and Powers of one 
or more things... '69 A moral good was defined as: 
those voluntary Actions and Habits which are conformable to the Law of 
Nature, or Reason, considered as given by God, as a Lawgiver, for a Rule 
of all our Humane, or voluntary Actions: For there are many natural 
Goods that conduce to a man's happiness, which are not morally good, 
nor are commanded by any Law. 
65 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 304. 
66 See Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 314. 
67 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 336. Tyrrell claimed he was citing `the very last words' from 
chapter 10 of De Homine, but I have been unable to locate this quotation in either Hobbes' Latin 
Works, or the translation of De Honzine which I have been using. Either Tyrrell was quoting from 
something else, possibly Cumberland, or Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, or he 
had access to a different version of De Homine. 
68 See Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 313. Tyrrell here cited Hobbes' De Homine, XI, 14, p. 53. 
69 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 306. 
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According to Tyrrell, all moral goods, i. e. commands of God, `conduce to the 
happiness of mankind'. 70 
Richard Cumberland, Bishop of Peterborough, admitted that there were 
private goods, separate from the common good, but Cumberland thought that 
human beings were aware of the difference when they acted. As Cumberland put 
it, there were: 
certain Motions, Powers, and Actions of all Things whatsoever, and 
consequently also of Men, whence we perceive that something is done 
tending to the Preservation or more flourishing Condition of others, do 
naturally imprint upon us the notion of a Good common to nzany; and 
because the Nature of Things will not permit us, to think all kinds of 
Motions or Actions equally conducive to this End, that therefore Nature 
does sufficiently instruct us, That there is a difference between Things 
good and evil, whether they relate to many, or to Individuals. 7' 
Cumberland also disagreed with Hobbes' claim that human beings pursued only 
their own private good, and that good was simply what the individual desired. 72 
For Cumberland, 
things are first judg'd to be Good, and that they are afterwards desir'd, 
only so far as they seen Good: That any thing is therefore truly judg'd 
Good, because its Effect or Force truly helps Nature: That a Private Good 
is that which profits One; Publick, which is of advantage to Many; not 
because it is desir'd from Opinion, whether true or false; or delights, for 
this or that Moment of time. 73 
James Lowde thought that private good and common good had been linked 
together by God, who 
in the wise and benign disposals of his Providence, has twisted our duty 
and our interest together: Goodness and Vertue have a natural tendency to 
make us as perfectly happy, as 'tis possible even in our civil and political 
Capacities; but then they are not therefore only Vertues, because 
profitable to the publick, but upon some other higher grounds and reasons 
being Vertues, they thus also, as parts of Godliness, become profitable to 
all things; having the promise of the Life that now is, and of that which is 
to come. 74 
70 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 312. 
71 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 61. On Cumberland see: Linda Kirk, Richard Cumberland and 
Natural Law, Secularisation of Thought in 17th century England (James Clark, Cambridge, 
1987); and Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics. 
72 See Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 171. 
73 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 168. 
74 Lowde, A Discourse, pp. 161-2. 
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As we have seen, Hobbes' contemporary critics had a number of 
objections to his ideas on good and evil, but it appears to have been the 
implications of his views which they found most worrying. For instance, they 
were concerned by his claim that in commonwealths the sovereign was the 
measure of good and evil, for the simple reason that this implied that there was no 
such thing as good and evil before commonwealths came into existence. It also 
implied that either God did not exist, or was unconcerned for his creation; or that 
the laws of nature were not engraved on men's hearts by God, and that these laws 
were changeable. Hobbes' contemporary critics also denied his view that human 
beings sought their own private good; and that private good and common good 
were separate, and conflicted with each other. 
The main area for disagreement between Hobbes and his contemporary 
critics, as Noel Malcolm has demonstrated, was voluntarism. Those seventeenth 
century writers who criticised Hobbes were either Arminians, Cambridge 
Platonists or Latitudinarians, and all of them were anti-voluntarist, whereas 
Hobbes was a voluntarist, nominalist or Ockhamist. 75 For voluntarists, things 
only existed as an effect of God's will, and this included moral values. 76 This 
meant that everything God wills was good, and `nothing is willed by him because 
it is good in any prior, independent or absolute way'. This view was grounded in 
the Old Testament, and in Augustinian and Ockhamist theology, and it was a 
view which became a major part of protestant theology - Luther, Zwingli and 
Calvin were all voluntarists. 77 Francis Oakley has also described Hobbes as a 
voluntarist, and has shown that voluntarists also thought that there was a stable 
moral order, independent of God. Ockham, for instance, used the distinction 
between the absolute and ordained powers of God to ground the content of 
morality in God's will, while at the same time arguing that there was a natural 
morality, which all human beings knew through natural law, and which in turn 
75 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, pp. 209 & preface. A number of other 
Hobbes' scholars have also noted Hobbes' voluntarism, and similarity to Ockham - see 
Sommerville, 71tomas Hobbes, p. 47; and Wright, The Protestant Hobbes, p. 123. 
76 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, pp. 82 & 133. 
77 Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, p. 133. See also A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law - 
An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Hutchinson & Co (Publishers) Ltd, London, second (revised 
edition), 1970, first published 1951), pp. 69-70. 
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was known by right reason. 78 Thus, God's will as the measure of good and evil, 
did not necessarily mean that there was no such thing as good and evil 
independent of God. As we have seen, it could be argued that Hobbes shared this 
view, as he seems to have thought that human beings were always in a condition 
in which there were objective rules of good and evil, or laws of nature. The 
problem was, as we will see in chapter four, human beings had difficulty 
discovering these rules, and then interpreting and applying them. 
Opposed to the voluntarist view of morality was that of essentialism, or 
rationalism. 79 A number of Hobbes' contemporary critics, such as South, Shafte, 
Tyrrell, Bramhall and Lucy appear to have subscribed, if only in part, to 
rationalist arguments. On this view God commanded something because it was 
good in itself. Good and evil existed in nature, independently of God, or human 
sovereigns. Good and evil were found in the things themselves, and not in the 
opinions of men, or in the names applied by human beings to whatever they 
desired or feared. But not all of Hobbes' contemporary critics were rationalists or 
essentialists. Jon Parkin has recently qualified Noel Malcolm's argument by 
showing that a number of Hobbes' critics, such as Richard Cumberland and 
Samuel Parker, began from the same voluntarist premises as Hobbes, but went on 
to draw very different conclusions. Parkin argues that it was not the critics' anti- 
voluntarism that was the issue, but rather their rejection of Hobbes' extreme 
version of voluntarism. Thus Malcolm's argument fails to recognise the 
complexity of the issue, which divided Hobbes from his contemporary critics. 
Richard Cumberland, for instance, could agree with Hobbes that good was a 
product of God's will, but he denied Hobbes' claim that natural reason was 
incapable of telling us anything certain about God's will. For Cumberland, 
enough evidence of God's will could be found in nature, to provide us with a high 
degree of probability. This evidence was demonstrated by natural rewards and 
78 See Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenants and Order - An Excursion in the History of Ideas 
from Abelard to Leibniz (Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1984), pp. 81-2, where 
Oakley also wonders if Hobbes `really meant it'. See also Oakley's `The Absolute and Ordained 
Power of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Theology', Journal of the History of Ideas, 
59 (1998), pp. 437-61; and `The Absolute and Ordained Power of God and King in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries: Philosophy, Science, Politics, and Law, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 59 (1998), pp. 669-90. 
79 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology, p. 27. 
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punishments. 80 Hobbes, on the other hand, thought that such probable, rather than 
certain, evidence of God's will was simply not good enough. Parkin has further 
argued that Cumberland wanted to reconcile protestant theology with scholastic 
natural law theory. 8' Thus to lump the contemporary critics into two such distinct, 
and apparently opposing categories, as voluntarism and rationalism, is to simplify 
the issue. The example of Cumberland demonstrates that the distinction between 
the two groups is not necessarily a clear one. 
Another difference between Hobbes and his contemporary critics was 
their method of argument. Hobbes' critics were interested in origins, and 
interpreted his state of nature as an original condition, a condition before actual 
historical commonwealths came into existence. In this way, it was also 
understood as the original, perfect condition of human beings at the creation. Due 
to their own understanding of `nature' as perfection, or a description of how 
human beings ought to behave, the critics, as Samuel Mintz has argued, thought 
that Hobbes too was describing `what human conduct ought to be'. As a result 
they believed that Hobbes' state of nature described `a programme of libertinism', 
where `unbridled lust, greed, stealth, and force were... entirely "justifiable", and 
limited only by the need for self-preservation'. 82 But as Mintz has also pointed 
out the critics misunderstood Hobbes. They failed to realise that his state of 
nature was not intended to be a description of how human beings ought to 
behave, but rather how human beings actually behaved, or at least had the 
potential to behave. In fact, Hobbes' state of nature appears to bear a greater 
resemblance to the fallen condition But his critics were unable to see this 
resemblance, because of their interpretation of the meaning of the term `by 
nature', and also because of their valuation of this term. 
For the critics nature was both the end and perfection of human existence; 
but it was also the beginning. It was the condition in which human beings had 
been created by God in Eden. Bishop Bramhall, for instance, thought that the 
`primigenious and most natural state of mankind, was in Adam before his fall, 
80 See Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, pp. 7,92 & 171 
81 See Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, pp. 8,56 & 72. 
82 Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, p. 32. 
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that is, the state of innocence'. 83 Similarly for Samuel Parker, the Bishop of 
Oxford, because God began the creation of human beings in `a Single Person, by 
whom the Community of Men was to be Propagated, that must be the State of 
Nature in which it was first founded'. 84 Even if Hobbes' state of nature was a 
description of the lives of fallen human beings, the Fall had not corrupted 
individuals to the extent described by Hobbes. The knowledge of good and evil 
had been corrupted, but not completely obliterated by the Fall. Due to their 
understanding of nature as perfection, and a description of how human beings 
ought to behave, the critics assumed that Hobbes' state of nature also described 
how he thought human beings ought to behave. They assumed that Hobbes 
thought disagreement on good and evil was a good. They failed to understand that 
the state of nature was not a description of what human beings ought to be. It was 
not an ideal condition for Hobbes, but was intended to be an horrific condition, in 
which no rational human being would want to live, or ever return to. It was 
almost as if Hobbes were saying, if nature was so perfect why did human beings 
ever leave it? 85 
Hobbes' state of nature could be understood as a description of the 
consequences of the Fall, or in other words the consequences for human beings 
who judged good and evil according to their passions. As we will see in chapter 
four, on natural law, there were laws of nature in Hobbes' state of nature, but 
human beings had difficulty discovering them, interpreting them, and applying 
them in particular circumstances. They also had a tendency to reject future goods 
for more immediate goods, which were dictated by their passions. For Hobbes, 
the laws of nature themselves were unchangeable, but the actions they prescribed 
83 Bramhall, Castigation, p. 155. 
84 Samuel Parker, A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie: wherein the Authority of the Civil 
Magistrate over the Consciences of Subjects in Matters of External Religion is Asserted, - The 
Mischiefs and Inconveniences of Toleration are Represented, And all pretenses pleaded in behalf 
of Liberty of Conscience are Fully Answered (London, 1670), p. 124. On Parker see: Parkin, 
`Hobbism in the Later 1660s'; and Gordon J. Schochet, `Between Lambeth and Leviathan: Samuel 
Parker on the Church of England and Political Order', in Political Discourse in Early Modern 
Britain, edited by N. Phillipson & Q. Skinner (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993), 
pp. 189-208. 
85 Rousseau thought that God had removed men from the state of nature immediately after the 
creation, but Rousseau still wanted to ask what would have happened to human beings if they had 
been left to themselves - see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, `A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', in 
The Social Contract and Discourses, translation and introduction by G. D. H. Cole (J. M. Dent Ltd., 
London, 1973), pp. 31-126, p. 51. 
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in particular circumstances changed as those circumstances changed. This was 
why individuals created a commonwealth with a civil sovereign, who laid down 
one interpretation of natural law, and how it was to be applied in particular 
circumstances, thus turning natural law into civil law. Hobbes agreed with the 
Schoolmen that human beings judged good and evil according to their passions, 
but he thought that this could not form the basis for a moral philosophy, because 
the diversity of passions led to disagreement. Such a philosophy also allowed 
virtue to be redescribed as vice, and vice as virtue. Hobbes criticised the 
Schoolmen because they had failed to consider the problem of the lack of 
agreement on which actions did or did not constitute the virtues. They had failed 
to realise that whatever action led to peace was good, and whatever action led to 
war was evil. Hobbes thought that reason by itself was not enough to keep men in 
peace. If it had been, human beings would have been able to rule themselves, and 
would not have needed the state. 
As we will see throughout this dissertation, what determined whether or 
not Hobbes' seventeenth century readers found his description of the state of 
nature convincing were their views on the effects of the Fall. Many of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics were Aristotelians and Arminians, 86 who believed that 
although the Fall had corrupted human beings, it had not done so to the extent 
implied by Hobbes' description. Natural sociability and hierarchy remained. 
Further, nature should be judged from her intention or perfection - reason and the 
laws of nature were sufficient to prevent men from committing violent actions in 
the natural condition. Hobbes' protestant voluntarism put his understanding of 
nature closer to the views of those commentators, like Jean Calvin, for whom `the 
whole order of nature was subverted by the sin of man', 87 or Martin Luther who 
argued that since the Fall, natural endowments had become corrupted by sin, and 
86 See Martinich, Two Gods, especially pp. 32-9, where Martinich also claims Hobbes was a 
Calvinist. Arminian and Calvinists held differing views on who exactly would attain salvation 
and how best to achieve this aim. For Calvinists God had foreordained those who would be saved 
and those who would be damned, and there was no way of knowing who were among the elect, 
and who were among the reprobate. Armimans believed in the free will of all individuals to attain 
salvation through God's universal grace, and the sacraments of the Church. 
87 Jean Calvin, Coninientaries on the First Book of Moses called Genesis, translated by the Rev. J. 
King, 2 volumes (W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1948), Volume 
I, p. 177. See also p. 129, where Calvin also claimed that through the disobedience `the order of 
nature, which God has appointed, has been inverted by us'. 
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man desired to be without God. Further, after the sin no law was put upon 
Adam. 88 As we will see in chapter four, on the laws of nature, Hobbes' own 
views were in agreement with a number of aspects of Reformed views on the 
problems with natural law since the Fall. Although not commenting on the Fall, 
Norberto Bobbio has described Hobbes' state as a `machine produced by human 
beings in order to compensate for the shortcomings of nature, and to replace the 
deficient products of nature with a product of human ingenuity, that is, an 
artifzchan'. 89 For Hobbes' seventeenth century readers, the crucial aspect of such 
a statement would have been whether or not the shortcomings of nature were a 
result of the Fall, and thus the corruption of nature; and also the extent to which 
Adam and Eve's disobedience had in fact corrupted human nature. 
4. The Scriptural Account. 
In both De Cive and Leviathan Hobbes used Genesis IL 16-17 & 111.5 & 11 to 
support his theory that subjects should not make themselves judges of good and 
evil, and thus question or disobey the commands of their sovereign. 90 The 
following passage appeared in De Cive: 
When private men claim for themselves a knowledge of good and evil, 
they are aspiring to be as Kings... The oldest of God's commands is... Do 
not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and the oldest of the 
devil's temptations is... You will be as gods knowing good and evil. The 
first reproach God made to men is... Who told you that you were naked, 
unless you have eaten of the tree of which I told you not to eat? as if he 
were saying, how did you decide that the nakedness in which it seemed 
88 See Martin Luther, Works, Volume I, Lectures on Genesis Chapters 1-5, edited by J. Pelikan 
(Concordia Publishing House, Saint Louis, Missouri, 1958), pp. 165 & 183. See also Henoch 
Clapham, A Briefe of the Bible, drawne first into English Poesy, and then illustrated by apte 
annotations; together with some other necessary appendices (Edinburgh, 1596), p. 21, who noted 
that after the Fall `Nature finallie is overthrowne'. 
89 Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes, p. 36. 
90 Hobbes did not mention Adam and Eve by name in the Elements, although there were some 
references to the creation and Fall. In Elements, XIX, 11, p. 102, Hobbes claimed that punishment 
was instituted before sin, which must refer to God's threat of death to Adam and Eve. In Elements, 
XXII, 9, p. 129, the dominion of human beings over animals was from the law of nature, not 
God's positive law, otherwise those men living before scripture would not have had this right. In 
Elements, XXVIII, 3, p. 173, because God created male and female and told them to multiply, 
sovereigns were bound by the laws of nature to make civil laws which would increase mankind. In 
Elements, XXIV, 3, p. 138, monarchy was instituted by God at the creation. This patriarchal 
argument will be discussed in further detail in chapter five, on the creation of society. 
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good to me to create you, was dishonourable, except by usurping for 
yourselves a knowledge of good and evil? 91 
Hobbes again echoed Genesis in his discussion of the seditious doctrine of the 
legality of tyrannicide. According to Hobbes, if the tyrant held power rightfully, 
`the divine question applies: Who told you that he was a Tyrant, unless you have 
eaten of the tree of which I told you not to eat? For why do you call him a Tyrant 
whom God made a King, unless you, a private person, are claiming for yourself a 
knowledge of good and evil? '92 
Philip Almond has demonstrated that the account of the Fall was the focus 
for seventeenth century debates on such diverse subjects as vegetarianism, the 
status of women, and the ideal structure of society and government. 93 Many of 
Hobbes' seventeenth century readers would have been familiar with protestant 
interpretations of the sixteenth and seventeenth verses of the second chapter of 
Genesis, which referred to God's command to Adam to abstain from the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil. One of a number of questions asked by various 
commentators on these verses, was why was the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil so named? Following Augustine, most protestant commentators thought 
that the tree got its name from the event. 94 Andrew Willet, the Calvinist rector of 
Barley in Hertfordshire and prolific Biblical commentator, agreed with 
Augustine, and thought that those opinions which argued the tree of knowledge 
took its name because it either gave reason and understanding, or sharpness of 
wit, were false. So were the opinions that claimed it was named because Adam 
and Eve were led to eat from it by the same natural extinct that all animals had, or 
because of Satan's false promise that they would become as gods knowing good 
and evil. For Hobbes' future critic, Alexander Ross, the tree of knowledge was 95 
91 De Cive, XII, 1, p. 132. 
92 De Cive, XII, 3, p. 133. As far as Hobbes was concerned this was exactly what Englishmen did 
when they executed Charles I. The seditious doctrine that tyrannicide is lawful was missing from 
Leviathan, but appeared in both the Elements and De Cive. Presumably this can be explained by 
the fact that Leviathan was published after the death of Charles I, and Hobbes may not have 
wanted to anger the new regime in England, who had committed regicide / tyrannicide. 
93 See Almond, Adam and Eve, p. 2. 
9; See Saint Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, translated by H. 
Bettenson (Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1984), Book XIV, chapter 18, p. 
578. 
95 See Andrew Willet, Hexapla upon Genesis (Cambridge, 1605), p. 28. See also John Salkeld, A 
Treatise of Paradise (London, 1617), pp. 75-81, where Salkeld denied that the tree had the power 
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not named `because it had power either to beget knowledge in Adam, or to 
augment his knowledge... for Adam was created with perfect knowledge... but it 
was so named from the event: for man knew now what was good and evill by 
experience, having transgressed in eating of this tree'. 96 Similarly John Trapp, the 
parliamentarian minister of Weston-on-Avon in Gloucestershire, thought that 
God's command forewarned Adam and Eve `that they should know by woefull 
experience, unlesse they abstained, what was the worth of good, by the want of it; 
and what the presence of evill, by the sence of it'. 97 
For most protestant commentators, Adam and Eve were created in God's 
image, and therefore had perfect knowledge, but in eating the forbidden fruit they 
gained experience of good and evil. 98 For Alexander Ross, Adam was created the 
ruler, father, and teacher of all mankind, and thus had knowledge of everything as 
soon as he was created. 99 Ross interpreted the serpent's promise as a further 
degree of knowledge, because `the eyes of the body were opened already, and 
good and evill is not the object of bodily eyes, but of the minde, which is the eye 
of the soule'. loo Once they had eaten the fruit their eyes were opened, but this 
should not be interpreted as meaning they were 
blinde before, nor had they now more libertie of will than they had, or 
greater knowledge: but now they know evill by experience, which before 
they knew by science; and their eyes are said to bee opened, because they 
perceive, their nakedness is ignominious, and their affections inordinate, 
which before were decent and holy. '°' 
to give knowledge, and thought it was either an ironic reminder of Satan's deception of Adam and 
Eve, or it was named because of the event. 
96 Alexander Ross, An Exposition on the Fourteene first Chapters of Genesis, by way of Questions 
and Anstivere. Collected out of Ancient and Recent writers: Both briefely and subtilly propounded 
and expounded. (London, 1626), p. 43. See also Theodore Haak, The Dutch Annotations upon the 
whole Bible... ordered and appointed by the Synod of Dort, 1618 and published by Authority, 
1637 (London, 1657), Genesis 11.9. This book has no pagination, references will be made to 
chapter and verse of Genesis. Alexander Ross' critique of Hobbes' Leviathan was entitled 
Leviathan drawn out with a hook, or Animadversions upon Mr Hobbs his Leviathan (London, 
1653), and it was mainly an attack on Hobbes' specifically religious views. 
97 John Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, or a new Comment upon the Pentateuch (London, 1650), p. 
23. 
9S See for example Sir Walter Raleigh, A History of the World (London, 1614), pp. 69-70. This 
allowed commentators to explain why Adam and Eve were tempted by the serpent's promise that 
they would become as gods, knowing good and evil. 
99 See Ross, An Exposition, p. 50. 
loo Ross, An Exposition, p. 60. See also Haak, Dutch Annotations, Genesis 111.7. 
101 Ross, An Exposition, p. 64. See also Raleigh, A History of the World, pp. 69-70. 
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A number of commentators also described Adam and Eve's knowledge 
before the Fall, as theoretical, scientific or speculative. It was only after their 
disobedience that they attained experience, or experimental knowledge, of good 
and evil. Andrew Willet compared Adam and Eve's knowledge, before the Fall, 
to the knowledge a rich man had of poverty - this knowledge was purely 
theoretical, as the rich man had no actual experience of being poor, he could only 
imagine what it might be like. According to Willet, through their disobedience, 
Adam and Eve acquired `an experimental knowledge... [of] what good they had 
lost, and what evil they were fallen into'. Before their fall, they only had `a 
speculative knowledge of good and evil... ' 102 After the Fall, Adam and Eve had 
an `experimental knowledge of evil', but this was `not the wisdom of a happy 
man, but the experience of a miserable man'. 103 Joseph Hall, successively Bishop 
of Exeter and Norwich, put it slightly differently - man `looked for speculative 
knowledge, when he should have looked for experimental: he thought it had been 
good to know evil,. 104 For John Salkeld, the royalist, former jesuit, and protestant 
convert, God gave this command so that Adam `might know by wofull 
experience... the difference between good and evill; so that whereas before hee 
knew it onely by contemplation, now he should find it by a lamentable 
experience'. 105 Hobbes' argument that individuals only realised the natural 
condition was an evil, once they had fallen into it; and that it was reason which 
demonstrated the future good of peace in civil society, could be understood to be 
in agreement with these views. 
Adam and Eve attained experience of good and evil through their 
disobedience, but for many commentators, since the Fall man's reasoning faculty 
had become corrupted. 106 For Henry Holland, the Calvinist vicar of St. Bride in 
102 Willet, Hexapla upon Genesis, p. 28. 
103 Willet, Hexapla upon Genesis, p. 41. 
104 Joseph Hall, Contemplations upon the Principal Passages of the Holy Storie, in Works 
(London, 1634), p. 778. 
105 Salkeld, A Treatise of Paradise, p. 152. 
i06 See for example, John Greene, The First Man, or A Short Discourse ofAdam's State (London, 
1643), p. 9. The ESTC describes Greene as a feltmaker. Almond, Adam and Eve, pp. 12-13, has 
noted that for Saint Augustine, the image of God in man (that is memory, will, and understanding) 
was destroyed by the Fall. Luther also subscribed to this view; and Almond also thinks this was 
true of Calvin, although he also admits this has been debated. Almond also notes that for Catholic 
thinkers supernatural gifts such as grace and virtue were lost, but natural gifts such as reason and 
domination over animals were retained. 
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London, those who ate from the tree of knowledge, contrary to God's command, 
lost `their excellent libertie and bee possest with extreme and present miserie'. 107 
Since the Fall, the reasoning faculty `has become so vaine, that in spiritual things 
it cannot discern between truth and errour, evill and goodnesse'. 108 Alexander 
Ross thought that after the Fall, Adam's posterity would have attained knowledge 
by sense and experience, but before the Fall this would have happened sooner and 
with more ease. 109 For Thomas Cooper, the Bishop of Winchester, although the 
serpent promised them they would become as gods by knowing good and evil, 
they were `made almost equal to beasts', and `became more mad and foolish, than 
other common creatures'. 110 Christopher Hampton, the Archbishop of Armagh, 
noted that Adam was `not absolutely deprived of naturall faculties, and 
endowments of reason... but they are depraved and decayed... ' 111 Similarly for 
John Downame, puritan divine and member of the Westminster Assembly, after 
the Fall God left `some relics of our dignity and first condition' in both men's 
minds and bodies. Firstly, in our minds are `Common principles of good and 
evil... both for knowledge of God, and of our duties to our brethren... And from 
this light that every one carryeth about him... commeth the Law of nature, that 
nature which now wee have since the Fall of Adam'. 112 Secondly, we have a 
`conscience when we doe amisse, whereof naturally some seeds are left in every 
one, the better to represse the unbridled course of our affections... '. But for 
Downame, both the light of nature and conscience, although not corrupt in 
themselves, were corrupt in men because they were `defiled with sinne'. 113 Law 
had now become necessary, according to John White, because of men's inability 
to distinguish between good and evil. ' 14 
107 Henry Holland, The Historie of Adam, or the foure-fold state of Man, Well formed in his 
Creation, Deformed in his Corruption, Reformed in Grace, and Perfected in Glory (London, 
1606), p. 9. 
108 Holland, The Historie ofAdam, p. 6. 
109 See Ross, An Exposition, p. 50. 
110 Thomas Cooper, A Brief Exposition of such chapters of the Old Testament as usually are read 
in Church (London, 1573), p. 101. 
111 Christopher Hampton, The Threefold State of Man upon Earth (Dublin, 1620), p. 32. 
112 John Downame, The Summe of Sacred Divinitie. Briefly and Methodically Propounded: More 
largly & cleerelly handled and explaned (London, ca 1628? ), pp. 249-50. 
113 Downame, The Summe of Sacred Divinitie, p. 250. 
114 See White, A Commentary, II, p. 70. 
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Hobbes also thought that since the Fall human beings could not correctly 
distinguish between good and evil. The following passage appeared in the chapter 
of Leviathan entitled `Of Dominion Paternal and Despotical': 
For the cognisance or judicature of good and evil, being forbidden by the 
name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience, 
the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already 
seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it they should be as gods, 
knowing good and evil. Whereupon, having both eaten they did indeed 
take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good and evil, but 
acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas 
it is said that, having eaten, they saw they were naked, no man hath so 
interpreted that place as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their 
own skins; the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their 
nakedness (wherein it was God's will to create them) to be uncomely, and 
by being ashamed did tacitly censure God himself. "5 And thereupon God 
saith Hast thou eaten, etc. as if he should say, doest thou that owest me 
obedience, take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is 
clearly (though allegorically) signified that the commands of them, that 
have the right to command are not by their subjects to be censured, nor 
disputed! 16 
Quentin Skinner has described this discussion in Leviathan as an example 
of a rhetorical technique called apodioxis, or `the figure we invoke when we 
repudiate an imagined objection that it would have been ludicrous to put 
forward'. Skinner claims that Hobbes' discussion of God's words, 'who told you, 
you were naked? ', was `reduced to absurdity' in Leviathan, with his comment 
that no one had interpreted this as meaning Adam and Eve were blind before, 
whereas in a similar discussion in De Cive Hobbes had `contented himself with 
observation `in plain terms'. 117 But Skinner's view is simply incorrect, because as 
we have seen above Alexander Ross also commented that this should not be 
interpreted as meaning they were blind before. 118 Skinner is correct in the sense 
that this particular interpretation of God's words was generally dismissed by 
commentators, but it was not considered too ridiculous to mention. Ross himself 
was probably following Saint Augustine, who had similarly commented that it 
115 The Latin edition has `God's work', rather than `God himself'. This appears to be an example 
of Hobbes' attempt, in the Latin Leviathan, either to clarify his position, or to make it less 
offensive. 
116 Leviathan, XX, 17, pp. 134-5. See also De Homine, X, 2, p. 38, where Hobbes claimed that 
Adam must have understood God's command in a `supernatural manner'. 
117 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 420-1. 
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was not the case `that the first human beings had been created blind, as is 
commonly believed among the uneducated... ' 119 Were both Augustine and Ross 
also using ridicule? If anything, Hobbes indicated his own knowledge of 
scriptural commentary here, to the point where he appears to have been 
paraphrasing the commentaries. 
Edwin Curley has found Hobbes' account of the Fall `puzzling'. Firstly, 
Hobbes denied that Adam and Eve acquired any new ability to distinguish 
between good and evil. And secondly, he believed that it was only after they had 
eaten from the tree that they judged their nakedness to be shameful. If, as Hobbes 
claimed, they acquired judicature of good and evil, but even so were unable 
correctly to distinguish between them, then why did they judge their nakedness to 
be shameful? Curley thinks this would only have been possible if it was the case 
that nakedness was not by nature shameful, but only if it was a violation of God's 
command. 120 This seems to be the correct interpretation. The nakedness in which 
God created them was not shameful, but Adam and Eve judged it to be so, 
because they were unable correctly to distinguish between good and evil. Garrath 
Williams has also addressed Curley's objection, and has commented that Hobbes 
treated `their new judgement, about their nakedness, as an act of reb ; llion'. 
According to Williams, Hobbes dismissed the possibility that Adam and Eve 
judged correctly. All Hobbes was concerned with was `their decision to judge the 
matter at all'. 121 
Similarly for a number of protestant commentators, God's command not 
to eat from the tree of knowledge showed man the knowledge he should not 
desire to have. According to Jean Calvin, the knowledge of good and evil was the 
cause of such `great misery', when man `tried to ascend higher than was 
lawful'. 122 Because this knowledge was `sought in preference to the favour of 
God', after the Fall this `knowledge was therefore accursed'. 123 For Thomas 
Cooper, God's command should be understood as `a type or figure of perfect 
knowledge of good and evil, which becometh the wisdom of God alone... 
118 See Ross, An Exposition, p. 64. 
119 Augustine, City of God, XIV, 18, p. 578. 
120 See Curley's note to Leviathan, XX, 17, pp, 134-5. 
121 Williams, `Normatively Demanding Creatures', pp. 303 & 306. 
122 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 183. 
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whereunto God would not have Man arrogantly to aspire, as a thing farre above 
his condition'. 124 Adam and Eve understood good by the loss of the goodness 
they had before, and `they knew by experience in sin what was evil'. But as 
Cooper pointed out, they paid a huge price - not only the loss of immortality, but 
`the loss of eternal felicitie and love of God'. 125 Unfortunately, as Joseph Hall 
noted, God did not realise how attractive knowledge was to mankind, so `who 
can hope to avoid error, when even man's perfection is mistaken? ' 126 
For protestant commentators, God's command was the measure of good 
and evil in Eden. According to Martin Luther, the tree itself `was not deadly by 
nature', in fact the tree was good and produced good fruit. 127 But the tree of 
knowledge `was poison for man', because of God's command which forbade 
them to eat from it. 128 Similarly for John Salkeld, `God gave not this law in any 
object of itselfe otherwise evill, or of its own nature good: to the end that the 
vertue of his obedience might be the more illustrious; because it deriveth not his 
excellencie, from the materiall object, but from the formall, the sole subjection to 
Almighty God'. 129 Henoch Clapham, the pastor of an English congregation in 
Amsterdam, thought that God's command demonstrated to Adam that he `should 
do Good in not eating of it; but hee should do Evill in eating of it', 130 while, the 
Brownist, Henry Ainsworth, specifically connected it with the law, in this case 
God's law, as the guide to good and evil. According to Ainsworth, the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil was 'so named, because Gods law which forbad man 
to eat of this tree, should teach what is good and evil; be a rule of obedience, 
shewing mans goodnes and righteousnes, if he did obey, (as Deut. 6.25. ) or his 
evil, if he did transgresse: for the knowledge ofsyn is by the law, Rom. 3.20'. 13' 
123 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 157. 
124 Cooper, A Brief Exposition, p. 95. 
125 Cooper, A Brief Exposition, p. 101. 
'26 Hall, Contemplations, p. 778. 
127 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 95-6. See also Ross, An Exposition, p. 42; and White, A 
Commentary, II, p. 68. As Almond, Adam and Eve, p. 192, has pointed out most commentators on 
Genesis thought that the effects of eating the fruit could not be natural, because otherwise they 
would have been forced to explain how something evil could have existed in paradise. 
128 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 229. 
129 Salkeld, A Treatise of Paradise, pp. 149-50. 
130 Clapham, A Briefe of the Bible, p. 19. 
131 Henry Ainsworth, Annotations upon the first book of Moses, called Genesis. Wherein the 
Hebrew words and sentences are compared with, and explayned by the ancient Greek and 
Chaldee versions: but chiefly, by conference with the holy Scriptures (Amsterdam, 1616), 
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God's command was also seen as a trial of obedience. 132 The presbyterian 
minister, Benjamin Needler claimed that God forbade Adam `the eating of 
something that is wholesome to the body, and delightful to the taste' as a real trial 
of obedience. And further, that the `forbidding to 'eat, was not from any sinne in 
the action, but from the will of the Law-giver'. 133 According to William 
Whateley, the puritan vicar of Banbury, Adam had 
in regard of naturall power... ability to Bate and not eate of that as any 
other, but God did take away from him the morall liberty of eating of it, 
and by his authority saw good to abridge his liberty, and this alone to 
make it appeare to Adam, that he was an absolute and a soveraigne Lord 
over him, and had full power and authority to forbid him what he saw 
good to forbid, and to command what he saw good to command. So the 
Lord did here call Adam to a profession of his absolute subjection to God 
his Maker, and of Gods absolute right to himselfe and all other 
creatures. 134 
Henry Ainsworth noted that besides `the law of nature, graven on Adam's hart, 
whereby he was bound to love, honour and obey his Creator: God here giveth him 
(for a trial of his love), a significative Law, concerning a thing of it self 
indifferent, but at the pleasure of God made unlawfull and evil for man to doe; 
that by observing this outward rite, he might testifie his willing obedience unto 
the Lord'. 135 
The majority of protestant commentators thought that God gave Adam 
and Eve this command so they would know they were subject to God, and owed 
him obedience. 136 According to Alexander Ross, God forbade Adam and Eve to 
Genesis, 11.9. This book has no pagination, references will therefore be made to chapter and verse 
of Genesis. 
132 See for example, Ross, An Exposition, p. 42; White, A Commentary, II, p. 68; and Salkeld, A 
Treatise of Paradise, p. 152. 
133 Benjamin Needler, Expository Notes with Practical Observations towards the opening of the 
five first Chapters of the first book of Moses called Genesis (London, 1654), p. 41. See also 
White, A Commentary, II, p. 69; and James Ussher, A Body of Divinitie (London, 1645), p. 132, 
who thought that Adam and Eve broke all ten commandments by eating the fruit - cited in 
Almond, Adam and Eve, p. 193, note 138. 
134 William Whateley, Prototypes, or, the Primary Presidents out of the Booke of Genesis. 
Sheiving, the Good and Bad things they did and had. Practically applied to our information and 
reformation (London, 1640), pp. 4-5. 
135 Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis 11.16. See also John Richardson, Choice Observations and 
Explanations upon the Old Testament (London, 1655), Genesis 11.17. This book has no 
pagination, references will be made to chapter and verse of Genesis. 
136 See for example, Gervase Babington, Certaine plaine, briefe and comfortable notes upon 
everie chapter of Genesis. Another edition... Perused by hint againe, and in sundry places 
enlarged with some additions (London, 1596); Clapham, A Briefe of the Bible, p. 19; and Salkeld, 
A Treatise of Paradise, p. 149. 
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eat from the tree `First, to let him know, that he was but a creature and servant 
and therefore had a Lord whom hee must serve and obey, Secondly, to let him 
see, that hee had free-will and power both to chuse and refuse any thing hee 
pleased. Thirdly, to exercise him in obedience'. 137 This was also the reason God 
gave Adam and Eve a positive command, as well as the law of nature, so that they 
would know that God was their sovereign and should be obeyed. For Benjamin 
Needler, God gave Adam a positive command, as well as natural law written in 
his heart, so that `God's dominion and power over man might be the more 
acknowledged'. Otherwise men may have simply submitted to God's command 
because it was in accordance with natural law. 138 Needler gave the example of 
heathens who `abstaine from many sinnes, not because forbidden by God, but as 
dissonant to their natural reason'. 139 Similarly John Salkeld noted that the law of 
nature, 
which God had infused into the nature of man... would not have beene a 
sufficient tryall of Adams obedience: because it is not altogether manifest 
by the law of nature that God is sole and supreme Lord over all mankinde: 
for some doe imagine that the law of nature is a propertie onely due unto a 
reasonable creature, as every species, or kinde of living creatures hath 
their particular propertie agreeing to their nature. 140 
On these interpretations, God himself thought that the law of nature was not a 
sufficient test of obedience. We will see in chapter four, on natural law, that 
Hobbes' own views were in agreement with a number of aspects of Reformed 
interpretations of natural law. 
For protestant commentators, the measure of good and evil in Eden was 
God's command, regardless of the content of that command. Similarly for 
Hobbes, there was `nothing simply and absolutely so [good or evil], nor any 
common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects 
themselves, but from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth), or 
(in a commonwealth) from the person that representeth it, or from an arbitrator or 
judge... '141 Hobbes described God's rule over Adam and Eve as both natural, and 
137 Ross, An Exposition, p. 46. 
138 Needler, Expository Notes, p. 40. 
139 Needler, Expository Notes, p. 41. But see Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis 11.16. - the law of 
nature obliged Adam to love, honour and obey God. 
140 Salkeld, A Treatise of Paradise, p. 150. 
14 1 Leviathan, VI, 7, p. 29. 
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by agreement. In other words, Adam and Eve were not in a state of nature, they 
had a sovereign, and were thus living in a commonwealth. Hobbes went on to 
note 
that by the precept not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil (whether it is judgement of Good and Evil that is forbidden here, or 
eating some fruit from a tree) God required utterly simple obedience to his 
precepts, without argument as to whether the precept was Good or Bad; 
for without the command, the fruit of the tree has nothing in its nature by 
which its eating could be morally bad, i. e. a sin. 142 
As we have seen above, Hobbes cited the seditious doctrine of the private 
judgement of good and evil actions as a cause of the disintegration of 
commonwealths. How did Hobbes' views on this compare with protestant 
interpretations of the cause of Adam and Eve's fall? For protestant commentators, 
unbelief came before pride as the cause of the Fall. According to Martin Luther, 
Adam and Eve doubted and abandoned God's word. 143 God gave them a 
command not to eat from the tree of knowledge, and although they had true 
knowledge of God, as well as sound reason, God's command was beyond their 
understanding and simply `had to be believed'. 144 But Eve desired a `different 
kind of wisdom, a wisdom apart from the word' - the knowledge of evil, and this 
knowledge was death. 145 Jean Calvin also cited unbelief as the cause of the Fall, 
and all sin. 146 God's command was a trial of their obedience, and `a token of their 
subjection'. 147 Whilst Eve had faith in God, she could look at the tree and have no 
desire to eat from it. But once she lost her faith and `obedience to the word, she 
corrupted herself. Then she judged the tree to be good and persuaded herself it 
was `desirable for the sake of acquiring wisdom'. But Eve made a mistake in `not 
regulating the measure of her knowledge by the will of God'. 148 Adam and Eve 
desired `to know more than was lawful, in order that they might become equal 
142 De Cive, XVI, 2, p. 188 
143 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 147,149 & 162. 
144 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 94,109 & 154. See also Ross, An Exposition, pp. 61-2. 
145 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 154 & 160-1. 
146 See Calvin, Commentaries, p. 153. 
147 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 125-6. 
148 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 150-1. 
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with God'. 149 Now since the Fall, all human beings `desire to know more than is 
right, and more than God allows'. '50 
Most English commentators followed Luther's and Calvin's 
interpretations of the cause of the Fall. For John White, Satan's `main endeavour 
was to take off and sever mans heart from God, and cutting in sunder those two 
bands of faith and obedience by which he adhered unto God, to draw him away to 
infidelity and rebellion against his own Lord and Master'. '5' According to John 
Greene, `when the devil `chargeth God with falsehood, and hatred, and the like 
we read not of any reply to cleare God, made by them, but rather a full 
entertaining of his discourse... ' Although Adam and Eve were created with 
perfect knowledge, they lost their knowledge and strength the moment the 
temptation began. Then they did not debate whether what the devil said was good 
or evil, right or wrong. Often `the act of evil, and the act of good is performed 
with equal delight, although the consequence prove various'. While they sinned, 
they did not know they had sinned, it was only after the event that `the guilt and 
shame which followed caused them to know'. 152 
Although unbelief was the cause of the Fall, it was the devil who 
persuaded Eve to doubt the word of God. For Jean Calvin, the devil re-interpreted 
God's command, and told Eve that God gave them the command not to eat from 
the tree, because God did not want them to become equal with him. '53 The devil 
equated `equality with God', with `the perfect knowledge of good and evil', and 
told them that once they had eaten from the tree, and become as gods, God 
himself would not be able to punish them. '54 Martin Luther described the devil's 
questioning of Eve as an attempt to `draw men away from the Word or to corrupt 
it'. '55 It was as if the devil had said, why would God who created you, and gave 
you dominion over everything, give you a command not to eat from this tree? The 
devil tried to persuade Eve that God did not in fact command this, and that God 
149 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 153. 
150 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 150-1. 
151 White, A Commentary, III, p. 11. 
152 Greene, The First Man, p. 8. 
153 See Calvin, Commentaries, p. 150. See also Trapp, A Claris to the Bible, pp. 30-1, who noted 
that the devil charged God with envy. 
154 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 150-1. 
155 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 146 
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wanted them to have the knowledge of good and evil. 156 This attempt to induce 
doubt in Eve's mind was successful, and she re-phrased God's threat that they 
would surely die, with the words, `Lest perchance shall we die'. 157 Now since the 
Fall, this `slyness and villainy of Satan is imitated by all heretics. Under the 
appearance of something good, they rob men of God and of His Word before their 
very eyes... ' 158 For Luther, this distortion of God's word by the papists and other 
sects had led people astray. '59 
For protestant commentators, unbelief was the cause of Adam and Eve's 
Fall, and indeed of all sin. Adam and Eve were persuaded to doubt God's word by 
the devil's paradiastolic redescription of God's command, which made evil 
appear good. Hobbes was also worried by the redescription of virtue as vice, and 
vice as virtue. This was the problem with a moral philosophy based on passions. 
In Hobbes' state of nature, each individual was his own judge of good and evil, 
but in the commonwealth the sovereign was judge. In Eden, God's command was 
the measure of good and evil, regardless of what he commanded, and regardless 
of what Adam and Eve judged to be good and evil. What was true for God in 
Eden, was also true for Hobbes' civil sovereign, or `mortal god'. 160 The 
consequence of Adam and Eve's disobedience was their expulsion from paradise, 
and their punishment with death. The consequence of the Hobbesian individual's 
disobedience was the disintegration of the commonwealth, and the return of the 
state of nature, or a state of war, where it was unlikely that individuals would live 
to attain old age. 
5. The State of Nature as an account of the Fall? 
This chapter has demonstrated that for those of Hobbes' seventeenth century 
readers who subscribed to the protestant interpretations of Genesis outlined 
above, there were important parallels to be seen between Hobbes' account of the 
role of private judgement of good and evil in the disintegration of 
156 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 152 & 158. 
157 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 154-5. 
158 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 148. 
159 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 150. 
160 Leviathan, XVII, 13, p 109. 
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commonwealths, and the account of the Fall. As we have also seen, Hobbes 
himself was aware of these parallels, and used the account of scripture as rhetoric 
to support his own view of the dangers of individuals exercising their private 
judgement against the command of the civil sovereign. In doing so, Hobbes used 
arguably the most important and catastrophic event in Biblical history to 
demonstrate to his audience that they themselves had the potential to recreate this 
event, if they too disobeyed the command of their civil sovereign. 161 The Fall had 
brought death into the world, and the disobedience of members of a 
commonwealth would result in a similar catastrophe for human beings, that is the 
dissolution of the commonwealth, and their fall into a state of nature, where it 
was unlikely that they would live to see their old age. Pat Moloney has argued 
that Hobbes did not need the story of paradise. 162 Although the story of paradise 
was not essential for Hobbes' argument, it added rhetorical weight, by illustrating 
that even in Eden, God himself was not sufficient to keep human beings in 
obedience. This was even more the case now since the corruption of human 
beings by the Fall. In agreement with the Christian view, that the state had come 
into existence as a result of the Fall, human beings now needed a visible, human, 
coercive power to maintain order. 
Hobbes' contemporary critics were horrified by Hobbes' state of nature, 
because they could not contemplate the possibility that human beings could ever 
have been placed in such a condition by God. They had a number of objections to 
Hobbes' views on good and evil. Firstly, his argument that the civil sovereign was 
the measure of good and evil implied that, before commonwealths came into 
existence, there was no such thing as good and evil. It also implied that God had 
not given the laws of nature to human beings. For Hobbes' critics this quite 
plainly contradicted the account of scripture, which clearly stated that Adam (and 
Eve) were created in the image of God, and thus had perfect knowledge of good 
and evil, although the scriptural account was silent on exactly when they were 
given the laws of nature. 163 Secondly, these writers also thought that even in the 
natural condition human beings had been ruled by God, who had given them both 
161 See Hood, The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes, pp. 175-6; Halliday et al, `Hobbes' Belief 
in God', p. 427; and Reik, The Golden Lands, p. 150. 
162 See Moloney, `Leaving the Garden of Eden', p. 266. 
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a positive command, as well as the laws of nature engraved on their hearts. Thus, 
their understanding of the natural condition was completely at odds with Hobbes' 
view that it was a condition without government. Their valuation of the natural 
condition, as an ideal condition, was also in complete opposition to that of 
Hobbes. 
But we have to ask the question, if Adam and Eve had perfect knowledge 
of good and evil, then why did they disobey God? The interpretations of Genesis 
outlined above indicate that although Adam and Eve were created in the image of 
God, God did not want them to have knowledge of good and evil. We have also 
seen that a number of protestant commentators thought that Adam and Eve's 
knowledge was theoretical, scientific, or speculative, and it was only after the Fall 
that they acquired experience of good and evil. Adam and Eve's disobedience 
indicates that even in Eden they were unable correctly to apply this theoretical 
knowledge. On the voluntarist account, whereby something was good simply 
because God commanded it, it was almost irrelevant whether there was another 
way to discern good and evil, because human beings should obey without 
question. The views of protestant commentators on Genesis, outlined in this 
chapter, also demonstrated that although God had given the laws of nature to the 
first human beings, he had also given them a positive command, because natural 
law was not a sufficient test of obedience. Natural law was difficult to discover, 
interpret and apply in particular circumstances. The disobedience of the first 
human beings demonstrated that even in the Edenic condition, God, his positive 
command, and the laws of nature failed to prevent Adam and Eve's disobedience. 
If this was so in Eden, then it must be even more so now since the Fall. 
Hobbes' critics failed to understand that on his account Adam and Eve 
were not in the natural condition until after the Fall. Before that they were subject 
to a common power, who gave them a positive command, as well as the laws of 
nature engraved on their hearts. For Hobbes, God was a common power in Eden, 
and yet Adam and Eve still disobeyed him. 164 The account of the Fall 
demonstrated that God himself was not sufficient to maintain order in the 
163 See the discussion in chapter four on natural law. 
164 Hobbes also thought that God could have afflicted Adam with death, regardless of whether he 
had sinned, or not - see Leviathan, XXXI, 6, p. 237. 
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apparently perfect condition of Eden. Thus `fallen' human beings needed a 
visible, human, coercive power. Hobbes' contemporary critics failed to see his 
state of nature as a fallen condition for two main reasons. Firstly, because of a 
difference in their method of argument these writers were interested in origins, 
and viewed the natural condition as an original condition, before commonwealths 
came into existence. In this way it was also understood as the condition of the 
first human beings in Eden. Secondly, because of their mainly Aristotelian 
understanding of the term `nature', the natural condition was seen as both the end 
and perfection of human existence. And again in this way it was also understood 
as the beginning of human existence in Eden. On both understandings, nature was 
an ideal condition. Hobbes, on the other hand, thought that nature was far from an 
ideal condition. Indeed, if nature was so perfect, then why did human beings ever 
leave it, and create commonwealths? For Hobbes, it was the commonwealth 
which was the better condition, and in his version of events individuals fell from 
the civil or artificial condition, which Hobbes thought was good, into the state of 
nature, which Hobbes thought was evil. The account of Genesis, on the other 
hand, described the Fall from the natural and perfect condition of Eden, into a 
condition in which God permitted the creation of the state. Thus, for those of 
Hobbes' readers who understood the natural condition as Eden, Hobbes had 
completely reversed the valuation of the scriptural account. 
But for those of Hobbes' readers who subscribed to Augustinian, Calvinist 
and Lutheran interpretations of Genesis, there were a number of important 
parallels to be seen between Hobbes' state of nature and the scriptural account of 
the Fall. In fact Hobbes' use of the scriptural account suggests his own 
knowledge of Reformed interpretations of Genesis. Hobbes thought that good and 
evil were names applied by individuals to objects, actions and events which either 
pleased or displeased them. Many protestant commentators on Genesis thought 
that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil got its name from the event. Once 
Adam and Eve had eaten from the tree of knowledge, they knew good and evil by 
experience. When they were banished from paradise, they came to know good by 
its absence, and evil by its presence. Similarly, when the Hobbesian individual 
found himself in the natural condition, he knew that this condition was evil, and 
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that peace in civil society was good. This was the future good demonstrated by 
reason. 
For both Hobbes and voluntarist protestant commentators on Genesis, 
God's command was the measure of good and evil in Eden. The fruit of the tree 
of knowledge was not evil by nature, but because of God's command. The 
rationalist view of morality, subscribed to by Hobbes' contemporary critics, 
whereby good and evil existed in nature independently of God's command, was 
denied by the majority of protestant commentators. 165 God's command was also a 
trial of obedience, and demonstrated to Adam and Eve that they had a lord whom 
they were subject to. This was also the reason God gave Adam and Eve a positive 
command, as well as the laws of nature, otherwise they would only have obeyed 
God because it was in accordance with natural reason. Further, for John Salkeld 
the laws of nature were not a sufficient trial of obedience, because they did not 
necessarily demonstrate that God was their sovereign. On these interpretations, 
God himself thought that the laws of nature were insufficient by themselves. We 
will see in chapter four, on natural law, that Hobbes' views were not in 
opposition to Reformed interpretations. Hobbes himself thought that human 
beings easily broke the laws of nature, because of their desire to be superior to 
others, and their desire to have what seemed good to them immediately. We have 
also seen above that Hobbes had described inexperienced individuals who 
imagined the consequences of their actions, but were not able to do so far enough 
into the future, and thus did not see the evil annexed to what they thought was 
good. Hobbes' seventeenth century readers could have seen in Adam and Eve a 
good example of those individuals - they desired to have what seemed good to 
them immediately, and to be superior to others. They failed to consider the 
consequences of their actions for others, and they failed to see the evil which 
came with what they believed to be an apparent good. Quite simply, they desired 
to be as gods, knowing good and evil. 
For protestant commentators, God's command also showed man the 
knowledge he should not desire to have. As a result of the disobedience, since the 
Fall the reasoning faculty had become corrupted, and law had become necessary 
165 See also Rauch, `Secular Fall', pp. 100-101 - there were no moral values in Eden. 
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because of man's inability to distinguish between good and evil. Both the light of 
nature, and conscience, although not corrupt in themselves, were corrupt in 
human beings. Similarly for Hobbes, human beings were now unable correctly to 
distinguish between good and evil, and this was why they must take their civil 
sovereign's command as the rule of their actions. Finally for protestant 
commentators, the cause of the Fall was unbelief. The devil persuaded Eve to 
doubt the word of God, by redescribing his command to make evil appear good. 
For Hobbes, when individuals took it upon themselves to judge good and evil, 
they questioned or doubted the commands of their sovereign, and in doing so they 
fell into a state of nature. Exacerbating this problem was the redescription of 
virtue as vice, and vice as virtue. If Hobbes' readers failed to understand that their 
sovereign's command was the measure of good and evil in the commonwealth, 
then they could be led into disobedience by clever orators, just as Adam and Eve 
were led into disobedience in Eden by the serpent's redescription of God's 
command. Hobbes' political theory was designed to show the importance of 
obedience to civil sovereigns, and this was why he chose the most important 
event in Biblical history to support his view. 
In his work on Hobbes' theory of the will, Jürgen Overhoff has 
demonstrated that Hobbes' contemporary critics interpreted Lutheran and 
Calvinist doctrines `in line with the standard interpretation of Reformation 
theology as adopted and preached by the Laudian Church', but that in doing so 
they showed how far they had moved away from the doctrines of Luther and 
Calvin themselves. Hobbes, on the other hand, was a more accurate interpreter of 
orthodox Reformed doctrines. 166 This chapter has shown that Hobbes' use of the 
account of the Fall, in his political theory, could have been understood by his 
seventeenth century readers to be in agreement with Reformed interpretations of 
Genesis. We have also seen above, that for at least one protestant commentator, 
John Downame, there was a distinction to be made between nature before and 
after the Fall. 167 This might have been the crux of the matter between those 
seventeenth century readers who subscribed to Reformed interpretations, and 
could perhaps see parallels between Hobbes' account and scripture; and Hobbes' 
166 Overhofff, Hobbes' Theory of Volition, pp. 193 & 189. 
167 This will be discussed in relation to natural law in chapter four. 
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contemporary critics, who had moved away from the doctrines of Luther and 
Calvin, and thought that Hobbes' account completely contradicted scripture. We 
will see throughout this dissertation that Hobbes' description of human nature 
could be understood to have taken account of the effects of the Fall, and 
particularly the corruption of reason, and the division of mankind into the elect 
and reprobate. Hobbes' state of nature could be understood as an account of what 
we might call the fall of `fallen' human beings, both regenerate and unregenerate, 
from the commonwealth. The account of Genesis described the fall of apparently 
perfect human beings from the apparently perfect condition of Eden. Although 
Hobbes' account shared parallels with the scriptural account, Hobbes could be 
understood to have questioned whether the Edenic condition itself was perfect. 
Even in Eden, God himself was not enough to prevent Adam and Eve's 
disobedience. 
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Chapter Two: Equality and Unsociability. 
`And the LORD God formned man of the dust of the ground... ' (Genesis H. 7) 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the majority of Hobbes' contemporary 
critics understood nature as the end and perfection of human existence, but also 
as the beginning of human existence in Eden. In this chapter I want to assess two 
particular aspects of Hobbes' description of human beings - their natural equality 
and unsociability - against the criticisms of his contemporaries, and against 
protestant interpretations of the account of the creation. 
1. Hobbes and Natural Equality. 
The state of nature was a condition in which human beings were equal in the 
sense that they had roughly equal powers. ' This applied to all adult men and 
women living in the natural condition. 2 Hobbes admitted that there were 
differences of strength and intellect, but these were `not so considerable as that 
one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not 
pretend as well as he'. Differences in physical strength did not affect this equality 
- one human being might be physically weaker than another, but he still had the 
ability to kill the stronger individual, `either by secret machinations, or by 
confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself. 3 Hobbes 
claimed that little force was necessary in order to kill another human being. 4 And 
even if an individual had the utmost confidence in his own ability, he could not 
believe that he was naturally superior to others. Thus, those `who have equal 
power against each other, are equal; and those who have the greatest power, the 
5 power to kill, in fact have equal power'. Differences in intellectual ability also 
1 See Elements, XIV, 2, p. 78; De Cive, I, 4, p. 26; and Leviathan, XIII, 1, p. 74. They also had 
equal rights - see chapter four on the right of nature, and also Leviathan, XIII, 13 & XIV, 4; 
Elements, XIV, 6-14; and De Cive, 1,7-15. 
2 See De Cive, IX, 3, p. 108; and Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 128. In the Elements, XXIII, 2, p. 131, 
Hobbes claimed men had more strength than women, but this still did not entitle them to dominion 
over children. This will be discussed in further detail in chapter five on the creation of society. 
3 Leviathan, XIII, 1, p. 74. 
4 See Elements, XIV, 2, p. 78; and De Cive, I, 3, p. 26. 
5 De Cive, I, 3, p. 26. 
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did not affect this equality. In fact according to Hobbes, if we ignored taught 
intellectual ability, such as rhetoric and science, and also intellectual ability, 
which was attained by experience, such as prudence, we found that human beings 
were equal in `the faculties of the mind'. In other words, human beings were 
equal in those faculties of mind which they had from birth. The reason for this 
was that each human being thought he was wiser than others, and this, according 
to Hobbes, was proof of their equality - they were equal in being contented with 
their share of wisdom, which they thought was greater than anyone else's share. 6 
Hobbes' argument for natural equality was particularly directed against 
Aristotle, and his followers. Hobbes criticised Aristotle's claim that naturally 
some human beings were made to serve, because of their physical strength; while 
others were made to rule, because of their intellectual ability. According to 
Hobbes, it went against both reason and experience that the relationship of master 
and servant was introduced by `difference of wit'. Any inequalities between 
human beings had been introduced by civil laws, and by the consent of human 
beings themselves. Hobbes' main argument against Aristotle was that human 
beings themselves thought they were equal, and would `rather govern themselves 
than be governed by others'. 7 He used the example of a battle between the wise 
and the strong, and claimed that men of intellectual ability rarely won in battle 
against men of strength. 8 He also admitted that even if it was the case that nature 
had made men unequal, men `think themselves equal'. 9 According to Hobbes, 
Aristotle's foundation of natural inequality not only weakened `the whole frame 
of his politics', but also gave `men colour and pretences, whereby to disturb and 
hinder the peace of one another'. As `long as men arrogate to themselves more 
honour than they give to others, it cannot be imagined how they can possibly live 
in peace'. 1° For Hobbes, problems were caused when certain human beings 
6 Leviathan, XIII, 2, p. 74-5. 
7 Leviathan, XV, 21, p. 96. See also Elements, XVII, 1, p. 93, where Hobbes claimed that human 
beings could never agree on those people who were so stupid that they could not govern 
themselves; but also that men generally thought themselves as capable of governing other men, as 
of being governed by others. 
8 See Leviathan, XV, 21, pp. 96-7. 
9 Leviathan, XV, 21, pp. 96-7; and De Cive, III, 13, pp. 49-50. 
10 Elements, XVII, 1, p. 93. In De Cive, I, 15, p. 31, Hobbes claimed that because of equality of 
strength and other faculties, human beings could not expect to live long in the state of nature. 
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assumed superiority over others, against both reason and nature. ' Even if 
individuals thought that they were better than others, they must act as if they were 
equal. 
2. The Contemporary Reaction. 
Hobbes' view that all men were equal by nature was not shared by a number of 
his contemporaries. These writers thought that Hobbes' argument contradicted the 
evidence of experience, and particularly objected to his equation of natural 
equality with equality of ability in killing. According to John Bramhall, this 
meant that if `the son have as strong an arme, and as good a cudgell as his father, 
he is as good a man as his father'. 12 James Tyrrell also disagreed with Hobbes' 
claim that the weaker could kill the stronger, and thought that this could happen 
by chance but `this will not make the match to be equal'. 13 Hobbes' argument 
reduced men to the level of beasts, if a weak insect could sometimes destroy a 
man by force or surprise. Tyrrell used the example of `a Pope who was choaked 
by swallowing of a Fly in his Drink, which if it could be supposed to be done by 
the Fly on purpose, would make the Fly and the Pope to be equal by Nature'. 14 He 
agreed with Hobbes that civil inequality had been introduced by civil laws, and 
that men were by nature equal, in the sense that they should allow other human 
beings the same liberties that they allowed themselves. But Tyrrell also thought 
that there was a `natural unequality of strength and power amongst men, both in 
body and mind... ', and all we had to do was to observe men to see that this was 
the case. 15 
Hobbes' views on natural equality were also thought to contradict the 
ideas of Aristotle. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, accepted Hobbes' law of 
11 See Elements, XVI, 5, p. 89. In both the Elements and De Cive, although not in Leviathan, 
Hobbes cited scriptural proof for his argument that human beings should `content themselves with 
equality' - see Elements, XVIII, 6, p. 100, where Hobbes cited Mattheºv XXII. 39-40; and De Cive, 
IV, 11, p. 62, where he cited Matthew V. 3, Proverbs VI. 16-19, XVI. 5, XI. 2, and Isaiah XL. 3. 
12 Brainhall, Castigation, p. 156. 
'3 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 268. 
14 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, pp. 269-70. For the use of similar examples see also Lowde, A 
Discourse, p. 153; and William Lucy, Observations, Censures and Confutation of notorious 
errors in Mr. Hobbes His Leviathan, and his other book-es (London, 1663), p. 138. Hereafter cited 
as Lucy, Observations 1663. 
15 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 267. 
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nature, `that every man must acknowledge every other man for his equal by 
nature', and agreed with Hobbes that this was `true as to the essentials of human 
nature'. But Clarendon also thought that some human beings were fitter to govern 
than others. Hobbes' reasoning that most men would rather govern themselves 
did not contradict Aristotle, as he had claimed it did. According to Clarendon, the 
question was `Whether Nature hath made some men worthier, not whether it hath 
made all others so modest as to confess it'. He used the example of animals, of 
which some `by nature are fitter for nobler uses, and others for vile, and to be 
only Beasts of burden'. 16 Similarly for human beings, `Nature it self hath a 
bounty which she extends to some men in a much superior degree than she doth 
to others'. Every human being had experience of people, who although they had 
been given the same education and other advantages, had different faculties and 
intellects, `which can proceed from no other cause, but the distinction that Nature 
her self made between them'. 17 
Hobbes' contemporary critics also thought that his ideas on natural 
equality contradicted the scriptural account of the creation. According to the 
political writer Roger Coke, Hobbes' view was not only false, but also 
`destructive to all faith, and truth of Sacred History'. God created Adam as a 
universal monarch over his wife and children, as well as other animals. Since 
Adam, God had not created men - the human species had continued itself by 
generation. As a result, it was now impossible that `any two Men in the world can 
be equal, where God does not make them so', for all human beings were born into 
subjection to their parents. '8 God gave Adam supreme power, but `not as Father, 
Husband, or Master of a Family', because at the time of God's pronouncement 
Eve had not been created, and therefore Adam was not a father, husband or 
master. But once Eve was created, Adam had dominion over her as both monarch 
16 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey of the dangerous and pernicious 
errors to Church and State in Mr. Hobbes's book, entitled Leviathan (1676), reproduced in 
Leviathan - Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, edited and 
introduced by G. A. J. Rogers (Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1995), pp 180-300, p. 198. On Clarendon 
and Hobbes, see Perez Zagorin, `Clarendon and Hobbes', Journal of Modern History, 57 (1985), 
pp. 593-616. 
17 Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey, p. 199. 
18 Roger Coke, A Survey of the Politicks of Thomas White, Mr. Thomas Hobbs, and Hugo Grotius 
(London, 1660), p. 26. 
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and husband. 19 William Lucy also thought that the example of Adam and Eve 
disproved Hobbes' description of the state of nature, because they `were made 
without question in no state of enmity, nor in an absolute equality, but such a 
difference as was necessary for two friends which might assist one another 
wishing each other good and the good of each other was the good of both, the 
hopes of each the hopes of both' . 
20 
In some ways Hobbes would not have disagreed with the views of Tyrrell 
and Clarendon. Hobbes admitted that experience demonstrated that there were 
differences between human beings, but he thought that these were not great 
enough for one individual to be so superior to others, that he could rule over 
them, for any length of time, in the natural condition. In such a condition, each 
individual only had his own power to protect himself. One human being might be 
physically weaker than another, but he might also have greater intellectual 
abilities, which meant that despite his lack of strength, he could kill the other. 
Hobbes was simply trying to say that the characteristics of one individual will 
often be balanced out, by other quite different characteristics in another 
individual; in such a way that neither could claim that under any imaginable 
circumstances, they were superior to the other. For Hobbes, human beings were 
equal, but this did not mean they were identical. William Lucy's understanding of 
Hobbesian equality, as absolute equality, is quite simply incorrect. Hobbes' 
natural individuals had roughly equal, but different powers? ' Hobbes' views on 
Aristotle also suggest that he thought it was human beings who had, at various 
times, artificially decided that brains were superior to brawn; and thus at other 
times, could just as easily have decided that strength was superior to intellectual 
ability. This could also be applied to the superiority of one gender over another; 
or indeed to the superiority of any single group over any other group. How then 
did Hobbes' account compare to the scriptural account of the creation? For his 
contemporary critics it plainly contradicted scripture, but was this the case for all 
of Hobbes' seventeenth century readers? 
19 Roger Coke, Elements of Power and Subjection (London, 1660), p. 35. 
20 Lucy, Observations 1657, p. 80. 
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3. The Scriptural Account. 
In De Cive Hobbes imagined human beings in a condition in which they had 
`emerged from the earth like mushrooms and grown up without any obligation to 
each other'. 22 Similarly in the seventh verse of the second chapter of Genesis, 
`God formed man of the dust of the ground'. Most protestant commentators 
interpreted this verse as demonstrating the equality, frailty and humility of human 
beings. According to the poet and divine John Donne, `in being earth we are 
equall', both in life and even more so in death, `where there is no means to 
distinguish royall from plebeian, nor catholick from hereticall dust'. 23 Jean Calvin 
thought that it was God's way of demonstrating man's humility, as a counter- 
balance to his creation of Adam in his own image, `lest men should use [the 
former] as an occasion of pride'. 24 The creation of man out of earth was also 
interpreted as demonstrating the frailty of human beings. 25 As Walter Raleigh so 
bluntly put it, 
Nature assureth us by never-failing experience, and Reason by infallible 
demonstration, that our times upon the earth have neither certaintie nor 
durabilitie, that our bodies are but the Andviles of paine and diseases, and 
our Mindes the Hives of unnumbred cares, sorrowes, and passions: and 
that (when we are most glorified) we are but those painted posts, against 
which Envie and Fortune direct their darts ... 
26 
21 We will see in chapter three that Hobbes described two different types of human beings living in 
the state of nature. 
22 De Cive, VIII, 1, p. 102. This replaced the passage in the Elements in which Hobbes echoed 
Genesis by asking us to consider human beings, as if they had just been created male and female - 
see below. 
23 John Donne, Two Sermons preached before King Charles, upon the xxvi verse of the first 
chapter of Genesis (Cambridge, 1634), Second Sermon, pp. 3-4. Hobbes may well have heard 
Donne preach A Sermon upon the viii. verse of the i. chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, preached 
to the Honourable Company of the Virginian Plantation, 13 Novemb. 1622 (London, 1623). Noel 
Malcolm, `Hobbes, Sandys and the Virginia Company', Historical Journal, 24 (1981), pp. 297- 
321, p. 303; Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography, p. 64; Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes, p. 11; and 
Patricia Springborg, `Leviathan, Mythic History, and National Historiography', in The Historical 
Imagination in Early Modern Britain - History, Rhetoric, and Fiction, 1500-1800 edited by D. R. 
Kelley & David Harris Sacks (Woodrow Wilson Center & Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997), pp. 267-97, p. 269, have all noted this. 
24 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 111. See also Cooper, A Brief Exposition, p. 94. 
25 See for example Ross, An Exposition, p. 35; Whateley, Prototypes, p. 3; and Babington, 
Comfortable Notes, p. 9. 
26 Raleigh, A History of the World, p. 28. 
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John Trapp added that man's creation out of dust also noted `our vility and 
impurity', 27 while Andrew Willet noted that man was created out of earth because 
he was to live on earth. 28 
At first glance, Hobbes' views on equality, and the frailty of the human 
body were supported by these interpretations. But Hobbes put a rather different 
slant on things with his argument that human beings were equal, because they 
were equally capable of killing each other, and that little force was necessary to 
kill a human being. This also demonstrated the frailty of the human body, but it 
did so in quite a different way from the interpretation of a writer like Raleigh, 
whose comment on human frailty referred rather to human susceptibility to 
diseases and emotional problems. Hobbes' description of human beings springing 
out of the ground as adults also subverted a number of important interpretations 
of Genesis. According to Jean Calvin, while other animals `arose out of the earth 
in a moment', God formed man gradually, because he wanted to distinguish man 
from other animals `by some mark of excellence'. God created the dead body of 
man out of dust, and then gave it a soul, which gave man life. `God did not 
command [Adam] immediately to spring alive out of the earth', because he 
wanted to show man he was superior to other animals. 29 Similarly, Martin Luther 
interpreted this verse of Genesis as God's demonstration of the superiority of 
human beings over other animals, `created by a unique counsel and wisdom and 
shaped by the finger of God'. Adam was `a dead and inactive clod before he is 
formed by the Lord'. For Luther, God was the potter, and man the clay, and this 
remained the case throughout man's life. 30 
On these interpretations, Hobbes' account of men springing out of the 
ground like mushrooms, without reference to a gradual creation, was more in line 
with God's creation of animals, than with God's creation of human beings. And 
yet these interpretations of Calvin and Luther did not contradict Hobbes' idea of 
natural equality, because for Calvin and Luther this verse of Genesis 
27 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 22. 
28 See Willet, Hexapla on Genesis, pp. 31-2. 
29 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 111-2. See also Hampton, The Threefold State of Man, p. 7; and 
Willet, Hexapla on Genesis, p. 32. 
30 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 83-5. See also Hobbes' similar language in his discussion of 
God's justice - `God has an obligation to His creatures no more than a potter to his clay' - see 
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demonstrated man's superiority over irrational creatures, not over other men. 
Here Hobbes' rhetoric directed his readers towards the scriptural account, and 
even resembled it superficially. But when they looked more closely, all was not 
what it seemed. Hobbes' views on natural equality were, to a certain extent, 
supported by the interpretations of Genesis mentioned above. But crucially, 
Hobbes interpreted equality and frailty rather differently. For Hobbes, human 
beings were equally capable of killing, and all human beings could easily be 
killed by others. Similarly, Hobbes' description of human beings emerging from 
the earth as adults, although superficially resembling God's creation of man out 
of the dust of the ground, must, if his readers followed the interpretations of 
Calvin and Luther, be either animals, or human beings without souls. 
Hobbes also alluded to Genesis in the Elements, when he asked his 
readers to `consider men... without covenants or subjection, one to another, as if 
they were but even now all at once created male and female'. 31 With this 
statement, Hobbes directed his readers to the first reference of the account of the 
creation in Genesis I. 27.32 This verse described God's creation of male and 
female, although as a number of commentators noted, both were given the same 
name - `man' - to teach them that they were one. 
33 This interpretation was 
supported by a later verse in Genesis chapter five, `Male and female created he 
them; and blessed them, and called their name Adam, in the day when they were 
created'. 34 Jean Calvin thought that in this verse Moses assigned `a common 
name indiscriminately to both, in order that posterity might learn more sacredly to 
Thomas Hobbes, Thomas White's De Mundo Examined, translated by Harold Whitmore Jones, 
(Bradford University Press, London, 1976), chapter XXXVIII, section 2, p. 461. 
31 Elements, XXII, 2, p. 126. In De Cive this statement was replaced by the famous men springing 
out of the ground like mushrooms description - see above. 32 The controversial Biblical commentator Isaac La Peyrere used the two different accounts of the 
creation from Genesis chapter one, where male and female were created; and chapter two, where a 
particular male (Adam) and female (Eve) were created, to demonstrate that there had been men 
created before Adam - see Isaac La Peyrere, A Theological Systeme upon that presupposition that 
Men were before Adam (London, 1655); and A Discourse upon the twelfth, thirteenth, and 
fourteenth verses of the fifth chapter of the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romans (London, 1655). On 
La Peyrere himself, and his friendship with Hobbes, see Popkin, Isaac La Peyrere, p. 5. 
33 See for example Clapham, A Briefe of the Bible, p. 18. 
3; See Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis 11.17; and Richardson, Choice Observations, Genesis 
111.20. 
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cherish this connection between each other, when they saw that their first parents 
were denominated as one person'. 35 
The exact nature of the relationship between Adam and Eve, before the 
Fall, was interpreted in a variety of ways by protestant commentators. For Martin 
Luther, Eve was created as Adam's equal in all respects. 36 Before the Fall, Eve 
`was very free and, as the sharer of all the gifts of God, was in no respect inferior 
to her husband'. Before the disobedience, `she would not only not have been 
subjected to the rule of her husband, but she herself would also have been a 
partner in the rule which is now entirely the concern of males'. 37 According to 
Luther's interpretation of Genesis 11.23, `she shall be called Woman, because she 
was taken out of Man', Eve must be called "she-man" or "virago" because she 
performed `similar activities in the home'. 38 Luther described marriage as a 
partnership, in which `the husband differs from the wife in no other respect than 
in sex; otherwise the woman is altogether a man'. 39 Similarly for Andrew Willet, 
Eve was not created to be either against Adam, or a servant to him, but 
shee was made like unto man, as well as in proportion of bodie, as in 
qualities of the mind, being created according to the image of God: as also 
for that shee was meete for man, necessarie for the procreation and 
education of children, and profitable for the disposing of household 
affairs... This maketh a manifest difference betweene woman, which is 
alwaies before man, cohabiting and conversing with him, and other 
females which after their copulation, forsake their males. 40 
Eve's equality was also demonstrated, for a number of commentators, by 
her creation from the body of Adam. According to Joseph Hall, Eve was created 
out of man, rather than from the earth or the inferior creatures, to show her 
equality. God created Eve from Adam while he was sleeping, so that Eve would 
have no reason to be dependent on Adam. If `the Woman should have been made, 
35 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 228. For Calvin, this demonstrated natural sociability - see the 
discussion below. 
36 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 115. But see below for Luther's rather contradictory 
remarks on Eve's equality and inferiority. 
37 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 203. 
38 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 138. 
39 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 137. 
40 Willet, Hexapla on Genesis, p. 36, although \'Villet was also prone to contradictory remarks 
regarding Eve's equality or inferiority - see below. Here Willet cited Luther, but did not tell us 
which particular work he was referring to. The similarity to Hobbes' comments on the Amazons is 
interesting - see chapter five on the creation of society. 
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not without the paine, or Will of the Man, she might have been upbraided with 
her dependance, and obligation. Now shee owes nothing but to her Creator'. 4' 
Similarly for John Trapp, Eve was created from a rib from Adam's side, 
not of the head; (the wife must not usurp authority over her husband) nor 
yet of the foot; she is not a slave, but a fellow-helper. A bone, not of any 
anterior part, she is not pralata, preferred before the man: neither yet of 
any hinder part, she is not post-posita, set behind the man; but a bone of 
the side, of the middle and indifferent part; to shew, that she is a 
companion, and the wife of thy covenant, MaL2.14. A bone she is from 
under the arm, to put man in mind of protection and defence to the 
woman. A bone not far from his heart, to put him in mind of dilection and 
love to the woman. A bone from the left side (as many think likely) where 
the heart is, to teach, that hearty love ought to be betwixt married 
couples. 2 
Alexander Ross thought that man and woman were one flesh for a number of 
reasons, including the fact that a husband had `right and power... over the body of 
his Wife, and the Wife over her husband, 1. Cor. 7' 43 
The creation of Eve was also interpreted as the creation of another, or a 
`second-self' for Adam, by a number of commentators following Calvin. 44 
According to Calvin, when God created Eve from Adam, Adam was then 
complete, he beheld `another self. And he gives to his wife a name taken from 
that of man' - manness 
45 God's pronouncement of `I will make him an help' in 
the creation of Eve, as opposed to the pronouncement of `Let us make' in the 
creation of Adam, had been interpreted by some as marking `the distinction 
between the two sexes', and has shown `how much the man excels the woman'. 
Calvin admitted that although his interpretation was not contrary to this, it was 
different. For Calvin, God created the human race `in the person of the man... 
[thus] the common dignity of our whole nature was without distinction, honoured 
with one eulogy, when it was said, "Let us make man"... ' And it was not 
necessary for God to repeat this when he created woman. Calvin interpreted the 
creation of Eve from Adam as God's intention `that both male and females should 
spring from one and the same origin'. According to Calvin, this explained 
41 Hall, Contemplations, p. 776. 
42 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 27. 
43 Ross, An Exposition, p. 58. 
44 See for example Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 25. 
45 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 135. See also Haak, Dutch Annotations, Genesis 11.23. 
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Genesis 1.27, `God created man... male and female created he them'. In this way 
`Adam was taught to recognise himself in his wife, as in a mirror; and Eve, in her 
turn, to submit herself willingly to her husband as being taken out of him'. 46 if 
men and women had been created from different sources `there would have been 
occasion either of mutual contempt, or envy, or contentions'. 47 Calvin noted that 
Moses used the word `built' when referring to the creation of the woman, `to 
teach us that in the person of the woman the human race was at length complete, 
which had before been like a building just begun', and also to tell us that 
`legitimate family order was then instituted' 48 
As we have seen above, Hobbes thought that adult individuals were equal 
by nature, because they had roughly equal powers, and were all equally capable of 
killing. In the natural condition, this applied to both men and women. As Hobbes 
put it, `whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely, as being of 
the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not alwayes that 
difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the 
right can be determined without War'. 9 Hobbes also referred to natural 
individuals using the terms `man', or `men'. Gabriella Slomp has argued that 
Hobbes used the term `man' as a universal name, which referred to an abstraction 
or mental image. One universal name was given to many things because they had 
similar qualities. For Hobbes, men (males) might have had roughly equal power 
in the state of nature, but they also had different desires and aversions. Therefore 
the only qualities that all men shared were their vital and voluntary motions - the 
power in each individual to feel, think, deliberate, desire and act. As women also 
shared these qualities, Slomp concludes that Hobbes' definition of man was 
gender-free. 50 Although there were instances when Hobbes specifically used the 
term `women', in the state of nature Hobbesian individuals, regardless of gender, 
were equal. They were all equally capable of killing, and they all had equal rights. 
46 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 132-3. 
47 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 133-4. See also Salkeld, A Treatise of Paradise, p. 172. 
49 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 133-4. 
49 Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 128. Elsewhere, whilst discussing succession to a monarchy, Hobbes 
admitted that generally men `are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger' - 
see Leviathan, XIX, 22, p. 126. In a similar discussion in the Elements, XXIII, 14, p. 134, Hobbes 
claimed that women have governed wisely in places all over the world, but they `are not so apt 
thereto in general as men'. 
50 See Slomp, `Hobbes and the Equality of Women', pp. 441-4. 
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Hobbes made this particularly clear for women, as well as men, when he 
discussed rights over children . 
51 All inequalities between human beings were 
introduced in civil society, by the consent of human beings themselves - this 
included women's subjection to men. 52 
Protestant interpretations of the relationship between Adam and Eve, 
before the disobedience, generally supported Hobbes' views on the equality of 
human beings. God created two human beings, and regardless of gender they 
were equal in all respects. When Adam and Eve were first created, they were both 
called man. Gender was a difference, but not a reason for the inferiority of one to 
another. Eve was created as another or a `second self for Adam, and both were 
created in the image of God. Eve's creation from a rib from Adam's side 
demonstrated that she should be neither above or below the man, but his equal, 
although for Calvin this equality did not contradict the fact that Eve should 
willingly submit to her husband. 53 For Alexander Ross, Adam and Eve even had 
rights over each other's bodies. Luther's views, although implying that there was 
government in paradise, also stated that this government was to be shared 
between male and female. Hobbes' views on natural equality were not in 
opposition to these interpretations of Genesis, but for these commentators the 
relationship between Adam and Eve also demonstrated natural sociability. Eve 
was created to be Adam's companion, for the procreation of the human race, and 
to help in the government of the family. According to Calvin, Adam and Eve 
were created from the same source to note their equality, but also their natural 
sociability. If they had been created from different sources, then they would have 
quarrelled with each other. Hobbes' views on natural equality may well have been 
supported by the scriptural account, but what about his views on natural 
(un)sociability? 
51 See chapter four on the right of nature; chapter five on the creation of society; and also Hobbes' 
chapters on paternal dominion in Elements XXIII, De Cive IX, and Leviathan XX. 
52 This in itself has implications for God's punishment of Eve after the Fall -I will discuss this in 
chapter five on the creation of society. 
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4. Hobbes on Natural Unsociability. 
`And the LORD God said, It is not good that the man should be alone... ' (Genesis 
II. 18) 
Hobbes thought that the society of irrational creatures, such as bees and ants, was 
natural, but the society of human beings was not, because it was difficult for 
human beings to live together peacefully in society for any length of time, without 
a common power over them. 54 According to Hobbes, amongst bees and ants there 
was a `natural concord... [which] is the work of God by the way of nature; but 
concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of covenant'. 55 Hobbes thought 
that human beings were not naturally sociable, they were not born fit for society. 
Previous writers (particularly Aristotle) who had assumed this, had done so 
wrongly, because of their `superficial view of human nature'. 56 Hobbes admitted 
that human beings sought each other's company for a variety of reasons - for 
instance, from birth children needed others to look after them. 57 But civil 
societies were `Alliances, which essentially require good faith and agreement'. 
Children and the uneducated were ignorant of the force of alliances, and `those 
who do not know what would be lost by the absence of Society are unaware of 
their usefulness'. Because all men were born as children, all were born unfit for 
society, and the majority remained so throughout their lives, because of lack of 
training. Further, `even if man were born in a condition to desire society, it does 
not follow that he was born suitably equipped to enter society... even those who 
arrogantly reject the equal conditions without which society is not possible, still 
want it'. 58 So Hobbes admitted the possibility that human beings were born 
desiring society, but even so this did not necessarily mean that they had the 
required qualities to live in society. Human beings had to be educated to live in 
53 See the discussion below of the views of those commentators who described Eve as both equal 
and subject to Adam. 
54 See Elements, XIX, 5, p. 105; Leviathan, XVII, 6- 12, pp. 108-9; and De Cive, V, 5, pp. 71-2. 
55 Elements, XIX, 5, p. 106. See also De Cive, V, 5, p. 72; and Leviathan, XVII, 12, p. 109, where 
there was no mention of natural accord being the work of God, only nature. 
56 DeCive, I, 1, p. 21. 
57 Almond, Adam and Eve, p. 38, cites man's defenceless at birth as a result of the Fall. 
58 De Cive, footnote to I, 2, pp. 24-5. 
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society. From this it followed that they were not born fit for society, and thus 
were not naturally sociable. 
Hobbes was worried that his claim that human beings were naturally 
unsociable would imply that he also thought they were all evil. He admitted that 
this was probably true, as it was clearly stated in scripture, but he nevertheless 
thought that human beings were not evil by nature, i. e. from birth. 59 The reason 
for this was that even though from birth men desired to have whatever pleased 
them, and to avoid whatever might bring them harm, these passions in themselves 
were not evil. But the actions that proceeded from them could be evil, if they 
were contrary to duty. Hobbes used the example of children, who lacked reason, 
and did not have the ability to do harm, thus they were not evil. But if these same 
children grew to adulthood, still lacking reason, but now having the ability to do 
harm, then they were to be accounted evil. 60 But Hobbes also claimed that we 
could not tell good and bad men apart, `and even if there were fewer evil men 
than good men, good, decent people' would still have to be on their guard, and 
even `get the better of others... to protect themselves by all possible means'. 61 
Hobbes described the natural condition of human beings as a state of 
solitude. Hobbes' imaginary `mushroom men' were solitary in the sense that they 
had grown to adulthood without any obligations to one another, but they were not 
actually alone. 62 Although Hobbes thought that human beings were naturally 
unsociable, he also thought they sought out each other's company, and experience 
could tell us that the reason was because they wanted to acquire `honour or 
advantage from them'. 63 This was confirmed by observing what men did when 
they met each other - they compared themselves with others, and hoped that in 
doing so they would have a better idea of themselves. It was glory that they 
enjoyed, not society. It was clear from experience that `every voluntary encounter 
is a product either of mutual need or of the pursuit of glory', and reason also 
confirmed this. `All society, therefore exists for the sake of either advantage or of 
59 See De Cive, preface to the readers, 11-12, pp. 10-11. Hobbes did not give exact scriptural 
references for this statement, but presumably he was referring to the doctrine of original sin. 
60 See De Cive, preface to the readers, 12-13, p. 11. 
61 De Cive, preface to the readers, 11-12, pp. 10-11. See also chapter three for Hobbes' discussion 
of two types of individuals in the state of nature. 
62 See De Cive, VIII, 1, p. 102; and Leviathan, XIII, 13, p. 78. 
63 De Cive, 1,2, p. 22. 
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glory, i. e. it is a product of love of self, not love of friends'. But according to 
Hobbes, `no large or lasting society, can be based upon the passion for glory', 
because `glorying, like honour is nothing if everybody has it'. 64 Human beings 
sought out other people, and could increase the advantages of this life by doing 
so, but `this is much more effectively achieved by Dominion than by their help'. 
Quite simply, it was the desire for dominion, or in Augustine's phrase, the lust for 
domination or libido dominandi, 65 which was natural, as opposed to sociability. 
Individuals would rather seek dominion over others, than alliance or friendship 
with them. 
So Hobbes' state of nature was populated by solitary, adult individuals. 
They were solitary in the sense that they had no obligations to each other, 
although they were not actually alone. When Hobbes claimed that human beings 
were not naturally sociable, he did so because he thought that they were not 
sociable from birth - they become sociable through living in society. Human 
beings, because they were born as children, were not born fit for society. They 
had to be educated to it, because society was an alliance, which required 
agreement between many individuals. Human beings were not born with the 
qualities necessary for them to enter society, although they could learn how to 
make agreements. But although Hobbes thought that individuals were naturally 
unsociable, he also thought they sought out each other's company. They did this 
for a variety of mainly selfish reasons. Some individuals, such as children, needed 
other human beings to look after them. Some human beings sought out others to 
compare themselves with, in order to feel superior - either intellectually or 
physically. But for Hobbes, this was not society, but dominion and subjection. 
Human beings sought power over others, rather than the equal relationship of 
friends or allies. At best, they sought society for mutual need. They did not seek 
society for love of friends, but for love of self. Human beings were not naturally 
sociable, because it was the desire for dominion, rather than society, which 
originated in nature. Hobbes' contemporary critics were horrified by his 
argument, because again as far as they were concerned, it contradicted 
experience, Aristotle, and scripture. 
64 De Cive, 1,2, pp. 23-4. 
65 See for example Augustine, City of God, XIX, 14-15, pp. 874-5. 
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5. The Contemporary Reaction. 
The main area of disagreement between Hobbes and his contemporary critics was 
the meaning of the term `by nature'. For many of Hobbes' contemporary critics 
the phrase `by nature' was understood in the Aristotelian sense - man was by 
nature a political animal, because the end of human existence was to live in the 
polis or state. Richard Cumberland cited Aristotle's statement that `we ought to 
judge of Nature from her Intention or perfect State'. Cumberland admitted that 
the word nature was derived from nascor (to be born), but when we referred to 
human nature, `we mean that Force of Reason, whose first Rudiments only are to 
be found in new-born I, fants'. This meant that we could say man is by nature 
`fitted for propagating his Species', even though the man in question might be a 
child, or impotent, or without a woman to help conceive the child. Cumberland 
also used the example of plants, which had the potential to provide nourishment, 
but could only do so once they had grown with the help of sun and rain. 66 In other 
words, it was the potential for society that made human beings naturally sociable. 
As James Lowde put it, if children were considered reasonable creatures in the 
sense that they could attain reason, then men must be naturally sociable in the 
sense that they could become fit for society. Both nature and necessity also 
proved that man was a sociable creature. Firstly, from the nature of human 
beings, because 
the very fundamental Laws of Nature suppose either a Society, or 
something answerable to it... Do to others, as we desire others should do 
to its, and we are generally as much oblig'd to the duties of Justice and 
Honesty to others, as of Prudence and Caution to our selves; and this 
necessarily supposes a Society, or something like it, a state of Friendship. 
And secondly, from necessity we must be sociable creatures, since our 
`subsistence necessarily requires the aid and assistance of others, otherwise the 
very Birth of a Child would be the certain exposing of it to destruction'. 67 
Hobbes thought that previous writers, in describing human behaviour, had 
included in their description characteristics which themselves had been created by 
life in society. In other words, their description included human behaviour which 
66 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 96. 
67 Lowde, A Discourse, pp. 164-5. 
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had been taught, or learnt. Hobbes' version stripped human behaviour down to its 
bare essentials, and for many of his contemporary critics this meant that his 
description only seemed to take into account our `animal' qualities. 68 James 
Tyrrell claimed that Hobbes 
only takes the measure of Humane Nature, from those Passions which 
precede the use of Reason, Experience and Discipline... Whereas 
according to the Opinion of the best Philosophers, we suppose the truer 
nature of man, ought rather to be taken from his utmost Perfection, viz. his 
Reasons, or the power of deducing Effects from their Causes; by which 
alone, he is distinguished from Brutes... 
Tyrrell accused Hobbes of opposing experience and discipline to nature, and 
argued that `whatever men learn by either of these, they must still attain to it by 
the force of their Rational Natures, and those Faculties of Reason and Speech, 
which Brutes are not capable of. And therefore the nature of a Creature is best 
judged of from the utmost Perfection it attains to... '69 Most philosophers had 
realised that human beings, because they were born as children, were born unfit 
for society, but these philosophers argued that men were born fit for society, 
because of the end of human existence, rather than its origin. 70 For Tyrrell, `by 
nature' meant `something that is by Nature inseparably proper to its subject, as to 
a Fish to swim... '71 
Hobbes' statement that the concord of human beings was artificial, 
whereas the concord of irrational creatures was natural, also provoked criticism 
from some of his contemporaries. James Tyrrell thought that `the true natural 
Causes intrinsical to Men as they are Animals, and which can bring them to 
consent to the exercise of Peace, and mutual Benevolence amongst themselves, 
are alike with those that are found in other Animals, even the fiercest, and 
cruellest... '72 Agreements, or covenants, between human beings were made by the 
power of human beings' rational and animal natures, and human beings, like 
other animals, had a natural propensity to concord with those of their own kind. 73 
68 For example, Lowvde, A Discourse, pp. 151-2, who claimed that this must be what Hobbes 
meant by `nature', when he argued in De Cive that men were not wicked by nature, that is from 
birth. 
69 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 256-7. 
70 See Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 258. 
71 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 265. 
72 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 345. 
73 See Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 346. 
87 
Tyrrell admitted that there were some men who, led by their passions, were more 
cruel than wolves, bears and serpents, but he strongly objected to Hobbes tarring 
all human beings with the same brush. 74 Samuel Parker thought that the natural 
sociability of human beings was demonstrated, in part, by the differences between 
men and animals. He cited the fact that for men, unlike animals, procreation 
could and did take place at any time, and was not confined to a specific mating 
season. This led human beings to marry and live in family groups. 75 
Hobbes had also argued that human beings were not naturally sociable, 
because they sought society for selfish reasons. A number of Hobbes' critics 
agreed with him up to a point, that fear, personal advantage and glory played their 
part in leading human beings to society; but they did not agree that this meant 
human beings were not naturally sociable. According to James Tyrrell, 
tho' it be granted, that men either from a peculiar agreement of 
dispositions, or that they suppose they can sooner obtain some particular 
end or advantage, in some mens Conversation than others; and do 
therefore prefer such mens Company before others; yet does not this 
prove, That man is not naturally a Sociable Creature: Since he himself 
grants, That men can neither live comfortably, nor be so much as bred up, 
or preserved, without the help and society of others. Therefore as he is 
determined to the end, viz. happiness, and self-preservation, he is likewise 
as necessarily determined to the means, (viz. ) Society. 76 
Self-interest did not contradict natural sociability, `provided the Common Bonds 
of Society be not broken and disturbed, by any mans more particular Interests or 
Inclinations'. Tyrrell thought that Hobbes had confused `natural society, which is 
absolutely necessary for man's preservation, with these particular Clubs or 
Companies which men keep for their greater pleasure or advantage'. 77 
The main area for disagreement between Hobbes and his contemporary 
critics, on the reasons men sought society, were their differing views on private 
and common good. Hobbes thought that in nature individuals had a tendency to 
seek their own private good, rather than the common good. His critics thought 
74 See Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 349. Here Tyrrell referred to Hobbes' statement in De 
Homine, X, 3, p. 40, `so man surpasseth in rapacity and cruelty the wolves, bears, and snakes, that 
are not rapacious unless hungry... ' 
75 See Samuel Parker, A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature and the 
Christian Religion (London, 1681), p. 51. 
76 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 259. 
77 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 260. 
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that individuals realised that their own private good was best achieved through 
the common good. While agreeing with Hobbes that fear was a strong motive for 
human beings creating commonwealths, John Shafte thought that human beings 
were naturally sociable, and that, 
each man's private happiness... [was] linked together with, knit and united 
to the happiness and felicity of the rest of his Fellows, as to this life; the 
greatest pleasures whereof are found to consist in society, and the benefits 
we have by the mutual commerce, company and injoyment of one 
another... 
78 
Similarly for James Tyrrell, `God has not so designed us to good for others, as 
that we should neglect all care of our selves... ' Tyrrell used the example of 
marriage which was good for the individual, but also good for society, in that its 
end was the propagation of mankind. 79 According to Tyrrell, it was possible that 
in 
Civil Societies or Commonwealths, a man may propose to himself his 
own Security, Profit, or Honour, as a reason why he bestows his time and 
labour, or ventures his life in the service of the Publick: And yet he may 
farther propose to himself the love of his Countrey, or the good of the 
Commonwealth, as the great End of his Actions. 80 
To summarise the views of Hobbes' contemporary critics, we can first of 
all say that the main disagreement between these writers and Hobbes was their 
understanding of the term `by nature'. The majority of Hobbes' critics understood 
this term in the Aristotelian sense - man was by nature a social animal because of 
the end of human existence, and its perfection. They criticised Hobbes for basing 
his account on man's animal-like qualities, instead of describing the perfection of 
man. They accepted that because human beings were born as children, they were 
not born fit for society, but they thought that human beings were naturally 
sociable because they had the potential for society. Hobbes' account was also 
thought to contradict experience, which demonstrated the necessity of society for 
an individual's preservation. Hobbes' critics agreed with him up to a point that 
private interest could lead human beings into society, but for these writers the 
private good was best achieved within the common good, and it was quite 
78 Shafte, The Great Law of Nature, pp. 3 6-7. 
79 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 260. 
80 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 262. 
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possible for individuals to act according to both types of good. They also 
admitted that there were some cruel men who behaved badly, and there were 
some men who wanted superiority, but this did not necessarily apply to all human 
beings. 
Hobbes' understanding of the term `by nature' was in complete contrast to 
the understanding of his critics. Hobbes' objection to the work of previous 
writers, on the subject of human nature, was that they had included in their 
description characteristics which themselves had been formed by life in society. 
For Hobbes, `by nature' meant according to those faculties we had from birth. For 
this reason, when we tried to find the essentials of human nature, we needed to 
discard all the characteristics created by life in society. We needed to look at 
human beings in the raw, uncivilised by the advantages of society. We needed to 
look at human characteristics untouched by education. This was why Hobbes 
imagined adult human beings having grown up without society. These individuals 
had no learnt behaviour, only what came completely naturally to them. It is 
almost as if these individuals were adults, but with the minds of children. Apart 
from these individuals imagined by Hobbes, there was another example of 
individuals created as adults available to both Hobbes and his contemporaries - 
the example of Adam and Eve. 
Hobbes' description of human beings springing out of the earth as adults 
directed his readers to the Biblical account, but his contemporary critics thought 
that his description completely contradicted scripture. John Bramhall claimed that 
this description of human beings in the state of nature was a `drowsie dream of 
[Hobbes'] own feigning', that it was dishonourable to God, and should be called 
`the state of degenerated nature', rather than mere nature. 81 According to 
Bramhall, Hobbes' supposition was `both false and Atheistical'. Human beings 
were `created by God, not many suddenly, but one to whom all his posterity were 
obliged as to their father and ruler'. 82 For Samuel Parker, if we believed Hobbes' 
account of men springing out of the earth as mushrooms, then we must believe 
that `there never was any Author of Humane Nature', and that human beings `out 
of Diffidence and Jealousie one of another for want of acquaintance shun'd 
81 Bramhall, Castigations, p. 155. 
82 Bramhall, Castigations, pp. 176-7. See also Filmer, Obsenvations, p. 187. 
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Society, and withdrew like all other Beasts of Prey into Dens and secret 
Retirements, where they lived poor and solitary as Bats and Owls, and subsisted 
like Vermine by robbing and filching from one another... ' Then if we found this 
ridiculous, we must believe that `there was a first Author and Creator of 
Mankind' who, according to Hobbes' description of the state of nature, `contrived 
things so ill'. 83 Either way it was dishonourable to God. When God created 
human beings, he had man's welfare and happiness in mind. Human beings had a 
`common Right and Title to Happiness... [which] cannot be obtain'd without 
Society, nor Society subsist without mutual Aids of Love and Friendship, because 
we are not self-sufficient, but stand in need of mutual assistances'. 84 
Hobbes' description of human beings springing out of the ground like 
mushrooms, with no obligations to each other, was also thought to contradict 
experience, because all human beings were born of parents. James Lowde could 
not `willingly think, that Mr. Hobbs did really believe, that once upon a time men 
started out of the Earth, like Mole-hills... '85 Human beings were born into 
subjection to their parents. They `came into the World, by the ordinary methods 
of Generation, by way of Father and Son, therefore there must needs be a 
subordination and inferiority among `em, a dependance upon one another in 
respect of Causality, and an Obligation in respect of Duty and Obedience'. 86 
Similarly according to Thomas Tenison, Archbishop of Canterbury, `to talk of 
such a state of nature as supposeth an Independency of one person upon another, 
is to lay aside not only the History of Moses, but also of Experience, which 
teacheth that we are born Infants, (of Parents, for that reason, to be obey'd)... '87 
The scriptural account of the creation proved the natural sociability of 
human beings. As Richard Cumberland put it, Adam and Eve 
were so far from entring into a State of Enmity, that we read, "They 
contracted a Friendship at first sight, " which could not subsist without 
Fidelity and Gratitude, limiting their Self-love; and presently follows, "A 
83 Parker, A Discourse, pp. 125-6. 
84 Parker, A Discourse, pp. 121-2. See also Parker's similar argument for natural sociability in his 
A Demonstration, pp. 25-30. 
85 Lowde, A Discourse, p. 168. 
86 Lowde, A Discourse,, p. 155. 
87 Tenison, The creed of Mr. Hobbes, p. 132. See also Parker, A Discourse, p. 123. Thomas 
Tenison was the `Hobbist', Daniel Scargill's tutor - see Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography, p. 329; 
and Parkin, `Hobbism in the Later 1660s', p. 88. On Tenison see E. F. Carpenter, Thomas Tenison, 
Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Times (SPCK, London, 1948). 
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Desire of propagating their Species, and consequently of preserving it. " 
But seeing, according to this History, our first Parents had only 
themselves and their Children, to consider as Parts of human kind, it is 
manifest, "That in the singular friendly intercourse between themselves as 
Husband and Wife, and Natural Affection toward the Children to be born 
of them, is contained Humanity towards all, as the less is contained in the 
greater". 88 
Similarly for the former Catholic, and former deist, Charles Gildon, if we allowed 
`that Mankind had a Progressive Beginning, that we were born of our Parents, 
they of theirs, and so on till we come to some first Parents, made immediately by 
the Hand of God, out of Nothing, or out of the Earth... ', then we must also realise 
that there were: 
Ties of Relation, the Mutual Love of Children, and Parents, Brothers, and 
Sisters, Wives, and Husbands, with the Consaguinities, and Friendships 
contracted by those Conjunctions, united Men into Families first, and then 
spread to larger Extent in common Interest, and Reciprocal Kindness, 
which could never be so in a Moment dissolved... 89 
As we will see in chapter three, on the war of all against all, both Gildon and 
Tyrrell appear to have forgotten the fratricide described in the fourth chapter of 
Genesis. 
6. The Scriptural Account. 
Hobbes claimed that there was nothing in God's word that was contrary to 
reason. 90 Thus according to Hobbes, the account of scripture should have been in 
line with the findings of reason, as set out in his political philosophy. If we return 
to Genesis, in the eighteenth verse of the second chapter, `the LORD God said, It 
is not good that the man should be alone'. For protestant commentators, this 
implied that Adam was created as a solitary individual. As John Salkeld pointed 
out, `there was some time betweene the creation of the man, and the womans 
production', but it was not a simple task to determine exactly how long, other 
88 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 34. 
89 Charles Gildon, The Deists Manual: or, a Rational Enquiry into the Christian Religion. With 
some considerations on Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza, the Oracles of Reason, Second 77: oughts, etc. 
(London, 1705), p. 198. 
90 See Leviathan, XXXII, 2, p. 246. 
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than that it did not exceed six days. 91 A number of commentators thought that 
God's pronouncement, regarding Adam's solitude, implied that up to that point, 
Adam was alone because God thought it expedient for him to be alone. According 
to Joseph Hall, when Adam was first created he did not need a helper. `If Man 
had craved an helper he had grudged at the condition of his Creation, and had 
questioned that which he had; perfection of being'. But God saw that Adam 
would be comforted by a helper. God `sees our wants, and fore-casts our reliefe, 
when we think ourselves too happy to complaine'. 92 Similarly according to 
Benjamin Needler, `God created man alone, and Moses saith that all that God 
made was very good'. This verse did not mean that it was an evil or a sin for man 
to be alone, but instead it meant it was not expedient for man to be alone. 
Solitude 
was not onely good for man, when he was first created, but also expedient, 
so long as it pleased God he should be in such a condition, although it was 
not expedient he should continue in it, because of the propagation of 
mankind, and of the Church of God, which God had determined from 
eternity, for the advancement of his own glory. 93 
Alexander Ross thought that God created Adam in solitude, to allow him to live 
`a private life a while', so that he might appreciate `the comforts of the married 
life', and also that he might love God more for providing him with those 
comforts. 94 
But for many commentators on Genesis, God's pronouncement, that it 
was not good for man to be alone demonstrated the natural sociability of human 
beings. Jean Calvin thought that God's pronouncement proved `that man was 
formed to be a social animal'. This pronouncement was not directed to Adam 
alone, but was `a common law of man's vocation', which all should regard except 
those whom God had specially exempted. 95 Similarly, Martin Luther interpreted 
this verse of Genesis as God `speaking of the common good of the species, not of 
personal good', because Adam already had innocence, which was personal good. 
Before the creation of Eve, Adam `was not yet in possession of the common good 
91 Salkeld, A Treatise of Paradise, p. 167. 
92 Hall, Contemplations, p. 776. See also Babington, Comfortable Notes, pp. 10-11. 
93 Needler, Expository Notes, pp. 49-50. 
94 Ross, An Exposition, p. 57. 
95 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 128. 
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which the rest of the living beings who propagated their kind through procreation 
had'. 96 Adam was alone, without a partner to help him procreate and preserve the 
human race. For many commentators, God made Adam and all other creatures for 
one end - to increase and multiply. 
97 If Adam had remained alone, this would not 
have been possible - Christ himself would not have been born, and the members 
of God's Church would not have increased in number. 98 
God's subsequent creation of Eve also proved the natural sociability of 
human beings. For Andrew Willet, Eve was created `for mutuall societie and 
comfort', `for the propagation of the world', `for the generation and encrease of 
the Church of God', and `because of the promised seede of the woman, of whome 
came our Saviour Christ after the flesh'. 99 Thomas Cooper added that Eve was 
also created to help govern the family. 1°° John Salkeld could think of no reason 
for God's creation of two different sexes, other than `for generations sake'. 
According to Salkeld, considering that the man was more perfect than the woman, 
then this must have been the case, otherwise God would only have created 
males. 101 Generally, God's creation of Eve was seen as marking the institution of 
marriage, as well as demonstrating its importance. 102 For Benjamin Needler, 
Eve's creation from Adam's rib demonstrated `the cordiall affection, and 
intimacy of Communion that there should be between man and wife... ' 103 These 
interpretations were a complete contradiction of Hobbes' account. 104 
Although protestant commentators thought that the creation of Eve, as a 
companion for Adam, proved natural sociability, they also had no problems in 
describing the relationship between Adam and Eve as one of dominion and 
subjection, even before the Fall. Gervase Babington, successively Bishop of 
Llandaff, Exeter and Worcester, implied Eve's equality when he claimed that Eve 
was created from Adam's side, rather than `of the head of man, lest shee should 
96 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 115-6. 
97 See for example Cooper, A Brief Exposition, p. 95; and Joannes Thaddeus, The Reconciler of 
the Bible (London, 1655), p. 6. 
98 See Ross, An Exposition, pp. 48-9. 
99 Willet, Hexapla on Genesis, p. 35. 
100 See Cooper, A Brief Exposition, p. 95. 
101 Salkeld, A Treatise of Paradise, p. 181. 
102 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 115-36. 
103 Needler, Expository Notes, p. 54. 
104 We will see in chapter five that there were pairs and families in Hobbes' state of nature, and 
their concord `dependeth on natural lust' - see also Leviathan, XIII, 11-12, pp. 77-8. 
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be proud and look for superiority. Not of the foot of man, lest shee should be 
contemned and used as farre his inferiour; but of his side, that shee might be used 
as his fellow, cleaving to his side as an inseparable companion of all his haps 
whilst they two live'. And yet Babington also thought that the companion God 
created for Adam was also his subject. As Babington put it, 
as the ribbe receiveth strength from the brest of man, so doth the woman 
from her husband: his counsell is her strength, his brest should she 
account of to be ruled and governed by in all her wayes, and seeke to 
please him and ease him from all griefes as she any way can, knowing 
ever that shee is most weake without her husbands brest, from which 
commeth all strength and good comfort at all times. 105 
Both Adam and Eve were created in the image of God, but there were a 
variety of views on what exactly constituted the image of God in human beings, 
and whether it was equal in both male and female. For a number of protestant 
commentators, the moment Eve was created she was subjected to Adam. 
According to John Downame, the `soveraigntie of the man over the woman, is 
declared in the Scriptures by divers arguments'. These included: the creation of 
the woman for the man, and out of the man; the order of creation; and Adam's 
naming of Eve. Man was `the head and chiefe; Woman the comfort and 
companion of his life'. Adam's sovereignty was honourable, partly because he 
had `such an excellent Creature subject to him'. 106 For Jean Calvin, Eve was 
created in God's image, but `the order of nature implies that the woman should be 
the helper of man'. 107 Calvin claimed that `Moses intended to note some equality' 
between man and woman, with his use of the phrase `meet for him'. But the 
`obligation of both sexes is mutual, and on this condition is the woman assigned 
as a help to the man, that he may fill the place of her head and leader'. 108 Even 
Martin Luther, contradicting the view I have ascribed to him above, while 
commenting on Genesis 1.28, `male and female created he them', argued that Eve 
was different from Adam, `having different members and a much weaker nature'. 
Although Eve shared in justice, wisdom and happiness, and `was a most beautiful 
work of God, nevertheless [she] was not the equal of the male in glory and 
105 Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 11. 
106 Downame, The Summe of Sacred Divinitie, pp. 71-2. 
107 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 129. 
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prestige'. But Eve, like Adam, was created in God's image and, along with 
Adam, had rule over everything. Luther compared Adam and Eve to the sun and 
the moon, respectively, but stressed that the female sex was inferior to the male 
sex. 109 For Benjamin Needler, if we considered Adam and Eve as rational 
creatures, they were both created after the image of God, but considered 
according to sex, the male was superior to the female. l 10 Similarly for 
Christopher Hampton, `the woman was partaker as well as the man' in `the 
integretie and rightness of the inner man', because `in the Lord there is neyther 
male nor female'. But the image of God in man was `to be placed in authoritie 
and government' - `ecclesiastical and oeconomicall power was given to the man, 
and denyed to the woman'. ' 11 
These interpretations of Genesis saw Eve as roughly equal to Adam, in the 
sense that she too had been created in the image of God. But if Eve was 
considered by sex, rather than as a rational creature, she was also weaker, inferior 
or even subject to Adam. '12 The order of the creation also demonstrated Eve's 
inferiority. For Andrew Willet, both Adam and Eve were created in the image of 
God, although Adam was the first and principal creation. 113 Eve was created from 
Adam's body to show `the pre-eminence that man hath over woman', but Willet 
also noted the other arguments for Eve's creation from Adam, including the bond 
of love between the two. 114 Similarly, Henry Ainsworth thought that Eve's 
creation from Adam demonstrated her subjection to him. But she was also created 
as `his second self, like him in nature, knit unto him in love, needfull for 
procreation of seed, helpful in all duties, present alwayes with him, and so very 
meet and commodious for him'. 115 For Joannes Thaddeus, following St. Paul, 
`man came nearer to the Image of God in respect of his dominion, and the end, 
108 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 130-1. 
109 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 68-9. But see above, for various statements from Luther 
which contradict the views expressed here. 
110 See Needler, Expository Notes, pp 24-5. 
111 Hampton, The Threefold State of Man, p. 13. 
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because the woman was made out of the man, and for the man'. 116 William 
Whateley described Eve as `a reasonable soul', although she was also created 
subject to Adam. She was made from Adam's bone `to instruct her and him both 
of their duty, that shee should acknowledge her subjection unto him... and to 
instruct him that he should account her deare unto him and make precious 
reckoning of her, using her as in a manner his equall... ' 17 
Eve's creation out of man, as well as for man, was also interpreted as 
demonstrating her inferiority. 118 For John Salkeld, Eve was created from Adam's 
side `to signifie the mediocritie of her condition', as well as the love and respect 
she should have had for Adam. Eve was at least `equall in stature with man, or 
not farre inferiour in greatnes unto him'. 119 But Salkeld also thought that man was 
more perfect than woman, `for the most part... [although] not alwaies, because the 
female also was necessary for the naturall propagation of mankinde', and he also 
described the woman as `a declining from perfection'. 120 Similarly for Alexander 
Ross, although Eve was `of equall dignitie with the man', she was made from 
Adam's left side, closest to the heart, and as the left side was the weaker, `so is 
the woman the weaker vessell'. Further, Eve was made from Adam, rather than 
the earth, `to shew that Adam is the beginning of the woman, and of all 
mankinde'. 12 1 Eve was Adam's companion, and was created for Adam, but both 
were reasonable souls, both were given the same command by God, and both 
could hope for salvation. Adam and Eve both `have the same definition and 
essential properties... male and female make no essentiall difference'. 122 But 
although Adam and Eve were created equally in the image of God, `yet the image 
of God is seene in man more perfectly, in respect that man is both the beginning 
and end of the woman'. 123 
116 Thaddeus, The Reconciler of the Bible, p. 3. I have been unable to find any biographical 
information on Joannes Thaddeus. 
117 Whateley, Prototypes, pp. 3-4. 
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120 Salkeld, A Treatise of Paradise, pp. 182-3. 
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122 Ross, An Exposition, pp. 56-7. 
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Finally, Adam's naming of Eve, even before the Fall, demonstrated her 
inferiority. For John Trapp it marked `her infirmity, and duty of submitting to her 
husband'. 124 According to Andrew Willet, before the Fall Eve 
should have been obedient to man, but of a loving societie to be made 
partaker of all his counsells, not of an urging necessities as now [since the 
Fall]; whereby the woman in respect of her weakness both with her will 
dependeth of her husband, for her direction and provision of things 
necessarie, and against her will shee often indureth the hard yoke of an 
unequall commander. 125 
Similarly, both William Whateley and Alexander Ross claimed that Eve was 
content to be subject to Adam before the Fall, but after the disobedience her 
subjection became unwilling and troublesome. 126 These interpretations of the 
relationship between Adam and Eve contradicted Hobbes' views on natural 
unsociability. And yet they also demonstrated that Adam and Eve's relationship 
was one of dominion, and subjection, thus confirming Hobbes' view that it was 
dominion, and not society, that originated in nature. 
7. State of Nature as Eden? 
Hobbes' state of nature was a condition, in which human beings had roughly 
equal abilities, both physical and intellectual. This applied to all adult men and 
women in the natural condition. All individuals were equally capable of killing, 
or of being killed by others. All were equal in the state of nature, because no one 
individual was strong enough, or clever enough, to obtain dominion over the rest 
for any length of time. Hobbes' state of nature was not a sociable condition - he 
saw nature as the complete opposite of society, which was artificial and had to be 
created by agreement. Hobbes accused previous writers of including in their 
description of human nature, characteristics which had themselves been created 
by living in society. Hobbes wanted to look at human beings who had no 
experience of society, and that is why he imagined adults having grown up 
immediately, without any obligations to each other. These adults had no taught or 
124 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 28. See also Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 31; 
and Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis 11.19. 125 Willet, Hexapla on Genesis, pp. 51-2. 
126 See Whateley, Prototypes, pp. 7&9; and Ross, An Exposition, p. 58. 
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learnt behaviour, only what came completely naturally to them. But although 
Hobbes thought that human beings were not naturally sociable, he also admitted 
that they sought out others, so why then was their society not natural? The answer 
was two-fold. Firstly, human beings were not naturally sociable because they 
were born as children, and were thus born unfit for society. They could learn to be 
sociable, but could only do so by living in society. Secondly, the reason 
individuals looked for company was self-love, rather than love of their fellows. 
Hobbes thought that in nature, equal human beings found it easier to seek 
dominion over others, rather than friendship or alliance with them. It was a desire 
for dominion which originated in nature, whereas society originated in agreement, 
or contract. 
We have seen in chapter one that due to both their understanding of nature 
as perfection, and their method of argument from origins, Hobbes' contemporary 
critics understood the natural condition as Eden. For these writers, the account of 
the creation demonstrated that there had always been a natural hierarchy - Adam 
and Eve were not equals, but friends; and Adam had dominion over Eve from the 
creation. Both Aristotle and experience confirmed this natural hierarchy - nature 
had given human beings different talents and abilities, which fitted them for 
different activities. The scriptural account was also thought to demonstrate 
natural sociability. God did not create many human beings suddenly, as 
mushrooms springing from the ground, but rather one man and one woman, who 
loved each other at first sight, and from whom all human beings were descended. 
All human beings were born of parents, and these families loved and cared for 
one another, and also had obligations to one another. Although the critics granted 
that men had selfish motives for seeking out others, this did not mean that they 
were not naturally sociable. They also admitted that there were also some men 
who were cruel and violent, but this did not apply to all human beings. Quite 
simply, society was necessary for preservation, and all human beings realised that 
their own private good was best achieved within the common good. 
For Hobbes' contemporary critics, nature was to be judged from her 
intention or perfection. Human beings were naturally sociable because of their 
potential to live in society. For these writers, Hobbes' `mushroom men', born as 
adults with no obligations to each other, must have been in a state of degenerated 
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nature, not mere nature. But it is this view which might well have separated those 
of Hobbes' contemporary readers who subscribed to Reformed interpretations of 
Genesis, and perhaps could see parallels between his state of nature and the fallen 
condition; from his contemporary critics, whose understanding of nature as 
perfection, or the Edenic condition, led them to the conclusion that Hobbes' 
account contradicted scripture. Hobbes' description of the state of nature could be 
read as closer to an Augustinian account, according to which since the Fall, there 
had come into being two groups of human beings - the elect and the reprobate - 
but only God could distinguish between them. In complete contrast to his critics, 
Hobbes thought that it was safer to assume that all human beings had the 
potential to be hostile, rather than to assume that they all had the potential to be 
sociable. 
Hobbes' critics understood the natural condition as Eden, but we have 
seen in chapter one that Hobbes thought that Adam and Eve were not in the 
natural condition until after the Fall. And yet this chapter has demonstrated that 
Hobbes' account of the state of nature shared some similarities to protestant 
interpretations of the pre-lapsarian condition. Hobbes' readers could have noted 
that a number of aspects of his account were confirmed by scripture, although on 
some points he could have been understood to have subverted the scriptural 
account. The second account of the creation in Genesis described God's creation 
of human beings from the earth. This was thought to demonstrate both the 
equality and frailty of human beings, and was a counter-balance to the first 
account of the creation, in which human beings had been created in the image of 
God. Male and female were created, but both were given the same name - `man'. 
Hobbes' view, that human beings were equal, was supported by scripture, but his 
argument that individuals were equally capable of killing, or of being killed, was 
a subversion of the scriptural account, which for protestant commentators 
demonstrated human susceptibility to physical and mental ailments. Further, 
Hobbes' account of adults springing out of the ground also subverted the Biblical 
account of God's creation of human beings, which was thought to have been a 
gradual creation. The `mushroom men' described by Hobbes must have been 
either animals, or human beings without souls. 
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Hobbes' seventeenth century readers could also have noted that his 
description of natural solitude was supported by the interpretations of God's 
pronouncement, that it was not good for man to be alone, which implied that 
before that pronouncement God created Adam alone, because he thought it was 
expedient for man to be alone. God created Adam in a perfect condition, and in 
solitude. Adam did not desire society, and he would have questioned the will of 
his creator if he had wished for a companion. God created Adam alone, so that he 
would appreciate the benefits of society. But Adam, like individuals in Hobbes' 
state of nature, did not remain alone for long. God's pronouncement, that it was 
not good for man to be alone, changed everything. God now thought that it was 
necessary for Adam to have a companion, for the procreation of the human race. 
This pronouncement, along with the creation of Eve, proved natural sociability. 
God created Eve to be Adam's companion, she was created as another, or a 
second-self for Adam. Both Adam and Eve were created in the image of God, and 
considered as reasonable creatures, Eve was Adam's equal. But if considered by 
sex, Eve was weaker, inferior or subject to Adam, although before the Fall she 
was content to be subject to Adam, whereas after the Fall her subjection became 
unwilling and troublesome. This account of the original, perfect condition appears 
far removed from Hobbes' state of nature. 
And yet the account of Adam and Eve could be understood to support 
Hobbes' view that it was the desire for dominion, and not society, which 
originated in nature. In Hobbes' account of the natural condition, he imagined 
many individuals like Adam, with no experience of society. These individuals 
were unaware of the benefits of society. They were not born fit for society, but 
had to be educated to it. They were not naturally sociable because they were not 
sociable from birth. For Hobbes, human beings were equal by creation - either at 
birth, or as created by God or imagined by Hobbes as adults. But the moment 
human beings came into contact with one another in the natural condition, they 
sought dominion over their fellows. Hobbes claimed that problems were caused 
when individuals assumed superiority over others, against reason and nature. He 
argued that individuals sought society through love of self, rather than love of 
friends, but by doing so, what they actually sought was dominion. In nature, the 
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help of other human beings was much more effectively achieved by subjecting 
them, than by making an alliance with them. 
Hobbes chose to describe his natural condition, at least in part, with 
allusions to the scriptural account of the creation. We have seen that there were 
two main protestant interpretations of the creation. On one account, God created 
equal human beings (perfect nature), and Eve's subjection was a punishment for 
the disobedience (corrupted nature). On the other account, Eve was from the 
beginning, although created as Adam's equal in some respects, was also created 
subject to him, although this was a willing subjection (perfect nature), and her 
further subjection after the Fall was unwilling (corrupted nature). If Hobbes' state 
of nature was equated with Eden, then his account was in agreement with the first 
interpretation that saw Eve as Adam's equal before the Fall, and her subjection to 
him was a punishment for her disobedience. But if Hobbes' state of nature was 
equated with the fallen condition, then his argument for natural equality 
contradicted both interpretations, because both stated that Eve was subjected to 
Adam after the Fall, although this was an unwilling and troublesome subjection. 
Having said that, it could be argued that Hobbes' commonwealth shared 
similarities with the second account, where roughly equal human beings 
consented to a sovereign willingly, just as Eve willingly submitted to Adam 
before the Fall. Was Hobbes trying to recreate the type of subjection that had 
existed in Eden -a willing, and therefore lasting subjection? 
In chapter one it was argued that Hobbes' views on the role of the private 
judgement of good and evil, as the cause of the disintegration of the 
commonwealth into a state of nature, shared important parallels with the 
scriptural account of the Fall. This chapter has demonstrated that Hobbes' state of 
nature could be understood to contain elements of both the Edenic and the fallen 
conditions. So was Hobbes' state of nature an account of the Edenic condition, 
the process of the Fall, or the fallen condition? It seems likely that it was 
recognisable to his readers, because it could be understood to have been built 
from fragments of all three of these conditions. For Hobbes' seventeenth century 
readers, his description of human nature could be understood to have taken into 
account aspects of what we might call both perfect human nature, as well as 
fallen human nature. Since the Fall there had come into being two types of human 
102 
beings - the elect and the reprobate. Because we could not distinguish between 
these two types of human beings from their actions, it was safer to assume that all 
men fell into the category of the reprobate. We will see this in more detail in the 
next chapter, which discusses Hobbes' own citation of the account of Cain 
murdering Abel. 
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Chapter Three: The War of All against All. 
`Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him... ' (Genesis IV 8) 
Hobbes thought that human beings who lived in the state of nature, or a condition 
which lacked a common power to arbitrate their disputes, would naturally be in a 
condition of war. In the Latin edition of Leviathan he cited the example of Cain 
and Abel in defence of this claim, with the following statement: `But someone 
may say: there has never been a war of all against all. What! Did not Cain out of 
envy kill his brother Abel, a crime so great he would not have dared it if there had 
at that time been a common power which could have punished him? " But as 
Edwin Curley has noted, most seventeenth century English men would have 
understood that Cain was living under a power able to punish him - that power 
was God; 2 and further that God did punish Cain immediately by cursing him from 
the earth, by making him a vagabond, and by marking him, so that he would not 
be killed by others. 3 
This use of the account of the murder of Abel by Cain did not appear in 
the English edition of Leviathan, where Hobbes instead referred to `the savage 
people in many places of America'. Nor did it appear in the earlier versions of 
Hobbes' political theory. So why did Hobbes refer to it in the Latin Leviathan? 
Quentin Skinner may provide the answer to this question, with his suggestion that 
Hobbes changed the presentation of his political theory, as he began to doubt the 
power of reason alone to persuade. According to Skinner, beginning with the 
1647 edition of De Cive, Hobbes moved further towards the realisation that 
reason needed to be combined with rhetoric, for his argument to have any power 
over the minds of his readers. For Skinner, this culminated in the Latin version of 
Leviathan, which Skinner has described as `arguably the most rhetorical of 
1 Leviathan, Latin edition, XIII, 11, p. 77, footnote 7. Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, pp. 
56,58 & 82-3, has stated that Hobbes' description of the war of all against all was indebted to 
Augustine, who used the example of Cain and Abel to prove the idea of universal hostility, 
although Oakeshott appears to have been unaware of Hobbes' own use of Cain and Abel. 
2 Leviathan, XIII, 11, p. 77, footnote 7. 
3 See Genesis IV. 11-14. 
4 Leviathan, XIII, 11, p. 77. 
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Hobbes's works'. 5 But if Skinner's claim is correct, and Hobbes' citation of Cain 
and Abel was an example of such rhetoric, then what purpose did this example 
serve, especially as many of Hobbes' readers would not have believed that there 
was no power able to punish Cain? The example of Cain also seems inappropriate 
in light of Hobbes' claim that a son could never be in the state of nature, although 
at the time of Abel's murder, Cain was an adult, and thus for Hobbes no longer 
under the authority of his parents. 6 Would Hobbes' seventeenth century readers 
have been convinced by his assertion that the example of Cain and Abel was 
evidence for a natural war-like condition? 
1. Hobbes' War of All against All. 
Hobbes described the condition of human beings, `before they came together into 
society [as] a war of every man against every man'. 7 But although the state of 
nature was a state of war, it was not necessarily a condition of actual fighting. 
Hobbes defined war as `a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is 
sufficiently known'. 8 Thus the natural condition was not necessarily a condition 
in which each individual was fighting every other individual, but it was a 
condition in which all had the intention or disposition to fight, if at some point it 
became necessary. In the Elements Hobbes defined war as `that time wherein the 
will and intention of contending by force is either by words or actions, 
sufficiently declared'. 9 Although this could mean a physical attack on another 
individual, it could also mean a drawn sword, a word, a thought, or a look of 
hatred. 
The war of all against all was caused by disputes over good and evil, 
natural equality, natural unsociability, and all individuals having a right to all. 10 
5 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 427. Hobbes' use of Cain and Abel might also have been in 
response to contemporary criticisms that his account contradicted scripture. 
6 See De Cive, footnote to I, 10, pp. 28-9. See also the discussion on paternal dominion in chapter 
five. 
7 De Cive, I, 12, p. 29. See also Elements, XIV, 11, p. 80; and Leviathan, XIII, 8, p. 76, which has 
`during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe'. 
8 Leviathan, XIII, 8, p. 76. 
9 Elements, XIV, 11, p. 80. 
10 Hobbes' views on good and evil, natural equality and unsociability have already been discussed 
in chapters one and two. Hobbes' theory of natural rights will be discussed in chapter four. 
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Although human beings were equal by nature, there were some differences, which 
proceeded from `the diversity of their passions'. There were some human beings, 
who were `vainly glorious, and hope for precedency and superiority above their 
fellows, not only when they are equal in power, but also when they are inferior'. 
These individuals, even when they were subject to another in civil society, would 
seek to rebel against authority. There were other human beings, `who are 
moderate, and look for no more but equality of nature'. In the Elements Hobbes 
described the vain-glorious individuals as the `greatest part of men', who 
provoked the modest men through `vanity, or comparison, or appetite', until 
eventually, `they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of 
body'. " These human beings had assumed superiority over others, against both 
reason and nature. In De Cive Hobbes argued that `there is in all men a will to do 
harm, but not for the same reason or with equal culpability'. In the case of the 
vain-glorious individual, who thought he was superior to others, and `wants to be 
allowed everything', the `will to do harm is derived from vain glory and over- 
valuation of his own strength'; and in the case of the modest individual it was 
derived `from the need to defend his property and liberty' against the vain- 
glorious individual. '2 In the state of nature, even if the majority of individuals 
were modest men and there were only a few vain-glorious men, those men who 
allowed others equality would `be obnoxious to the force of others, that will 
attempt to subdue them', and from this proceeded diffidence and mutual fear. 13 
The differences between these two groups of individuals had all but disappeared 
by the time Hobbes came to write Leviathan. Here Hobbes claimed that the 
attempts at invasion by the individuals I have called vain-glorious, would force 
the modest men to attempt to increase their power. For Hobbes, these modest 
individuals had to do this, simply in order to survive. 14 In the account of 
Leviathan, even those individuals who were content with natural equality, had to 
behave as vain-glorious individuals. 
11 Elements, XIV, 4-5, p. 78. See also the similar discussions in De Cive, I, 4, p. 26; and 
Leviathan, XIII, 4, p. 75. 
12 De Cive, I, 4, p. 26. 
13 Elements, XIV, 3, p. 78. 
14 See Leviathan, XIII, 4, p. 75. 
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Hobbes described three main causes of quarrel between human beings in 
the natural condition. These led individuals to fear and distrust one another, and 
ultimately to war with one another. 15 The first cause of quarrel was competition, 
whereby men invaded for gain, to acquire dominion over other men's persons and 
property. The second cause was diffidence (distrust), whereby men invaded for 
safety, to defend their persons and property against the invasion of others; and the 
third was glory, whereby men invaded for reputation, `for trifles, as a word, a 
smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their 
persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their 
profession, or their name'. 16 In De Cive Hobbes described a variety of this final 
cause of conflict, which he called `Intellectual dissension', where in disagreeing 
with another individual, we either accused him of error, or even worse we called 
him a fool. Hobbes thought that the `bitterest wars are those between different 
sects of the same religion and different factions in the same country, when they 
clash over doctrines or public policy %17 
Although Hobbes thought that the bitterest wars were fought over 
intellectual disagreements, he claimed the most frequent cause of men hurting 
each other was competition, when individuals attempted to acquire dominion over 
the property and persons of other individuals. 18 Competition between individuals 
was a consequence of natural equality, because `from the equality of ability 
ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends'. 19 Although human beings 
had different passions, the end of their passions was sometimes the same. If two 
or more individuals had a passion for a thing which could not be enjoyed in 
common, or divided, then the stronger must have it alone. This could only be 
decided by fighting, and ultimately the death or subjection of one. 20 But why 
15 Jonathan H. Scott, `The Peace of Silence: Thucydides and the English Civil War', in The 
Certainty of Doubt - Tribute to Peter Munz, edited by M. Fairburn & W. H. Oliver (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1996), pp. 90-116, pp. 100-1, has noted that Hobbes' three causes 
of quarrel between human beings in the state of nature were similar to Thucydides' account of the 
causes of the Peloponnesian War. 
16 Leviathan, XIII, 6&7, p. 76. 
17 De Cive, I, 5, p. 26. See also Leviathan, XIII, 2, p. 75, for men's `vain conceit of their own 
wisdom'; and Elements, XIV, 4, p. 78. Human beings were equal, but each individual thought that 
he was wiser than others. 
18 See De Cive, 1,6, p. 27; and also Elements, XIV, 4, p. 78. 
19 Leviathan, XIII, 3, p. 75. It was also a consequence of the right of all to all - see chapter four. 20 See De Cive, I, 6, p. 27; Elements, XIV, 4, p. 78; and Leviathan, XIII, 3, p. 75. 
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couldn't they agree that one of them would have it, or they would take it in turns 
to have it? Hobbes thought that such an agreement was highly unlikely in a 
condition which lacked a common power to arbitrate in disputes. In such a 
condition, each individual only had the `single power' of another individual to 
fear. 21 This meant that if individual A decided he wanted a piece of land, which 
individual B was already living on, and if A decided to take B's land, then the 
only consequence A had to fear was that B would attempt to defend himself. If A 
was a vain-glorious individual and thought himself superior to B, then A would 
have nothing to fear by invading B, but everything to gain. But once A had gained 
this land from B, A himself would have to remain constantly on guard, in case 
another individual tried to take the land from him. In the Elements, and De Cive 
Hobbes presented this kind of dispute as a result of the right of nature. One man 
invaded with right and the other resisted with right, and the result was perpetual 
war. 22 
The second cause of quarrel in the state of nature was diffidence, or 
distrust, when individuals attempted to defend their persons and property against 
the invasion of others. This cause of quarrel involved one individual defending 
himself against the invasion of another individual, who had been acting on the 
first cause of quarrel - competition. A number of Hobbes' contemporary critics 
linked diffidence with Hobbes' separate argument that individuals should 
anticipate danger by invading others, in order to prevent any future attack. 23 
According to Hobbes, although individuals were roughly equal in the natural 
condition, dominion should be allowed to those that could achieve it, as it was 
necessary for `a man's conservation'. 4 In the Elements and De Cive Hobbes 
argued that because our right of nature, or our right of self-preservation, 
proceeded from danger, and danger proceeded from equality, we should prevent 
equality before the danger arrived. If a man in the state of nature had managed to 
get another into his power, either because the other was a child, or weaker, then 
it was in his interest to make sure that this `subdued person' did not become an 
21 Leviathan, XIII, 3, p. 75. 
22 See De Cive, I, 12, p. 29; Elements, XIV, 11, p. 80; and Leviathan, XIII, 3, p. 75. The right of 
nature will be discussed in chapter four. 
23 Both Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 85, and Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 333, equated 
diffidence and anticipation - see the discussion below on the contemporary reaction to Hobbes. 
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enemy in the future. 25 But in Leviathan Hobbes went much further, and claimed 
that for preservation's sake an individual should anticipate danger, and `by force 
or wiles... master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power 
great enough to endanger him'. 26 It seems to me that there is a huge difference 
between preventing those who are already in your power from becoming enemies 
in the future (the earlier versions); and actively attempting to subdue as many 
other individuals as possible (Leviathan's account). It might be possible to 
explain this change by the context. The civil war made it imperative for Hobbes 
to demonstrate the sheer horror of this condition of war of every individual 
against every other individual. This could also explain why in the account of 
Leviathan, Hobbes seems to have assumed that there would be many more vain- 
glorious men than modest men, because even modest individuals were now 
behaving as vain-glorious individuals. 27 
The third cause* of quarrel described by Hobbes was glory, when 
individuals came into conflict with others because they felt undervalued by them, 
or they had different opinions. It was this cause of quarrel which led to the 
bitterest wars. Hobbes thought that human beings generally had a high opinion of 
themselves, and hated `to see the same in others'. 28 Further, `since all the heart's 
joy and pleasure lies in being able to compare oneself favourably with others and 
form a high opinion of oneself, men cannot avoid sometimes showing hatred and 
contempt for each other, by laughter or words or a gesture or other sign'. 29 Those 
on the receiving end of the contempt of others often reacted very badly, because 
they too had a `vain conceit of [their] own wisdom'. 30 In the natural condition, the 
individual that felt he was being undervalued by another individual would attempt 
`to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage, and from others, by 
the example'. 31 
24 Leviathan, XIII, 4, p. 75. 
25 De Cive, I, 14, p. 31. See also Elements, XIV, 13, pp. 80-1. 
26 Leviathan, XIII, 4, p. 75. 
27 Also, because we could not tell good and bad men apart, we had to act as if all were evil, or at 
least capable of behaving badly - see the discussion below. 
28 Elements, XIV, 4, p. 78. 
29 De Cive, I, 5, p. 26. See also Hobbes' law of nature against hatred and contempt in Elements, 
XVI, 11, p. 92; De Cive, III, 12, p. 49; and Leviathan, XV, 20, p. 96. 
30 Leviathan, XIII, 2, p. 75. 
31 Leviathan, XIII, 5, p. 76. 
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The three causes of quarrel, between the two types of human beings in the 
state of nature, led to a war of all against all. This war was perpetual because of 
the natural equality of human beings. No single individual was powerful enough 
to put a stop to the war, either by force, or arbitration. Also no single individual 
was strong enough, or clever enough, that he could feel confident in preserving 
himself in this condition. Thus the natural condition was contrary to the good of 
men, because in this war of all against all, the ultimate outcome was death. 32 
Nature itself was destroyed by this state of war, 33 and Hobbes thought it would be 
a miracle if `even the strongest survive[d] to die of years and old age'. 34 But 
although Hobbes argued that the natural condition of human beings was a 
condition of war, he also claimed that this condition `was never generally so, all 
over the world'. But at the same time, he gave a number of contemporary 
examples as evidence for the state of war. Firstly, `the savage people in many 
places of America (except the government of small families, the concord whereof 
dependeth on natural lust) have no government at all, and live at this day in that 
brutish manner as I said before'. 35 Secondly, if we looked at peaceful societies, 
which had disintegrated because of civil war, we would also see how human 
beings lived in a condition which lacked a common power. And thirdly, after 
claiming `there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a 
condition of war one against another', Hobbes noted that at all times kings and 
princes of different states have been in this condition of war, each against the 
other. 36 For Hobbes, the state of nature existed wherever human beings lived 
without a common power to arbitrate in their disputes. 
As we have seen, Hobbes' natural condition was a war of all against all. 
Although this did not necessarily entail each individual fighting every other 
individual, it did entail all individuals having the intention to fight, in order either 
to dominate others, to defend themselves against others, or to secure their 
reputation. This war was caused by the differences between human beings, 
32 See Elements, XIV, 12, p. 80, and De Cive, I, 13, p. 30. 
33 See Elements, XIV, 12, p. 80. 
34 De Cive, I, 13, p. 30. 
35 Hobbes' views on the family will be discussed in chapter five. 
36 Leviathan, XIII, 11-12, pp. 77-8. See also Elements, XIV, 12, p. 80, where Hobbes claimed the 
state of nature was confirmed `both by the experience of savage nations that live at this day, and 
by the histories of our ancestors... where we find the people few and short lived'. 
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derived from their different passions, which gave some men a desire to dominate, 
while others were content with natural equality. But it was also caused by the 
similarities between human beings - their natural equality gave similar ends to 
those different passions, leading to competition over the same piece of property, 
or person. When one individual invaded another, the other individual was forced 
to defend himself. The right of all to all meant that both parties acted by right. 
Another cause of quarrel in the state of nature was a consequence of the high 
opinion individuals had of themselves. This caused conflict when one individual 
felt undervalued by another. Although there was no settled or permanent 
dominion in the natural condition, if an individual could achieve temporary power 
or dominion over another, he should be allowed it, for preservation's sake. This 
led individuals to take pre-emptive action - to invade others, before they 
themselves were invaded. In chapter two it was argued that Hobbes thought that 
the desire for dominion, rather than society, was natural, because individuals 
sought dominion over others, rather than friendship with them. But this desire for 
dominion did not result in permanent or settled dominion, because of natural 
equality - no single individual was powerful enough to subdue all others. For 
Hobbes, dominion was power, and in the natural condition human beings had 
roughly equal power. As a result the war was perpetual. 
2. The Contemporary Reaction. 
Hobbes' contemporary critics were generally horrified by his description of the 
natural condition of human beings as a war of all against all. These writers 
understood the natural condition as the original condition of human beings, 
created by God. As a result, Hobbes' description was thought to contradict the 
account of scripture completely, and was also seen as dishonourable to God. 37 As 
Samuel Parker commented, it was impossible to imagine that God would have 
sent his Creatures into... such a Condition as should oblige them to seek 
their own mutual Ruine and Destruction; so that had they continued in 
that state of War he left them in, they must have lived and died like 
37 An example was `The Judgement and Decree of the University of Oxford', pp. 121 & 123, 
which cited Hobbes' state of war as a doctrine `repugnant to the Holy Scriptures... ' 
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Gladiators, and have unavoidably perish'd at one time or other by one 
anothers Swords. 38 
For Parker, we denied God's goodness if we believed, like Hobbes, that `he 
would frame a Creation to destroy it self'. This could only be the case if, we 
believed that, God's `Design was to sport himself in the folly and madness of his 
Creatures', which could not possibly have been true. Thus if we believed `the 
Creation of Man were a Product of the Divine Wisdom or Goodness, his natural 
State must have been a condition of Peace, and not such a State of War, that 
should naturally tend to his Misery, Ruine, and utter Destruction'. 39 Similarly for 
William Lucy, Hobbes' state of war could never have been, because human 
beings had always lived under God, who `keeps all men in awe from perpetrating 
things against that law which is written in their hearts'. 40 
Hobbes' state of war also contradicted experience. Samuel Parker 
described Hobbes' natural condition as `repugnant to the Real State of things', an 
`unwarrantable Liberty of Invention', and a `lamentable Fiction'. It was `infinitely 
false and absurd', and `so far from being suitable to the Natural Frame of things, 
that 'tis absolutely inconsistent with it'. 1 For Thomas Tenison, Hobbes' state of 
nature had `no firmer support than the contrivance of [his] own fancy'. 2 History 
taught us that human beings were not barbarous. 3 Similarly, Charles Gildon 
claimed that the history of mankind disproved Hobbes' state of war. Human 
beings had always lived in families, in which they had obligations to each other, 
as well as love for each other. This `Reciprocal Kindness... could never be so in a 
Moment dissolved, but by some Frantick Disease, that running like an Irresistible 
Plague over all Mankind, should, I will not say persuade, but compel them to quit 
their safety, and Peace, for Insecurity, Danger and Disquiet'. 4 Gildon admitted 
that there may be some war-like human beings, but not `all men are so fond of 
38 Parker, A Discourse, p. 126. See also Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, pp. 352-3, who cited Parker 
almost word for word. 
39 Parker, A Discourse, pp. 127-8. 
40 Lucy, Observations 1663, p. 148. 
41 Parker, A Discourse, pp. 119-20. 
42 Tenison, The creed of Mr. Hobbes, p. 131. 
43 See Tenison, the creed of Mr. Hobbes, p. 133. 
4' Gildon, The Deists Manual, pp. 198-9. See also Lucy, Observations 1663, pp. 148-9, who cited 
the natural disposition of human beings to marry, have children and care for their children to 
disprove Hobbes' state of war. 
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fighting'. Hobbes 'must suppose all Mankind mad, to suppose, that any such 
State of Nature ever was'. 45 Similarly for William Lucy, a `universal war between 
all individuals of mankind [had] never yet [been] experienced'. 46 If, like Hobbes, 
we imagined adult individuals with no obligations to each other, for instance as if 
they were shipwrecked on an `uninhabited coast', these individuals `would be in a 
state of peace rather than warne'. They would not attempt to destroy each other, 
but would take care of each other, because of their `common interest... in 
humanity... [which] is writ in every mans heart', and they would secure their 
`owne condition more against misfortunes' by doing so. 47 
Hobbes' description of the natural condition as a state of war made human 
beings no better than animals. 8 According to the Cambridge Platonist, Ralph 
Cudworth, Hobbes' principles `slander[ed] Humane Nature, and ma[d]e a Villain 
of it'. 49 William Lucy thought that Hobbes' argument, that natural equality 
caused men to become enemies, made `Men to be beasts, or if they have more wit 
than beasts, to be by that only enabled to be more barbarous and beastly than 
Beasts themselves'. 50 Similarly, Bishop Bramhall claimed that `the Hobbian 
nature of man, is worse than the nature of Bears, or Wolves, or the most savage 
wild beasts'. 51 Bramhall imagined a group of men, who through war, or 
persecution, or crimes committed by themselves, were forced to leave 
civilisation, or were shipwrecked, and `. by long conversing with savage beasts, 
lions, beares, wolves, and tygers, should in time become more bruitish... than the 
bruites themselves'. But this was not `the universal condition of mankind', but 
`an accidentall degeneration'. 52 Hobbes' principle that it was lawful `to suppresse 
as Gildon, The Deists Manual, pp. 196-7. 
46 Lucy, Observations 1663, p. 153. 
47 Lucy, Observations 1663, pp. 148-9. 
48 See for example Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 320-1 
49 Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe: the First Part; wherein all the 
reason and philosophy of Atheism is confuted; and its impossibility demonstrated (London, 
1678), p. 891. On Cudworth see: R. L. Colie, Light and Enlightenment: A Study of the Cambridge 
Platonists and the Dutch Arminian (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1957); C. A. 
Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists (Arnold, London, 1969); and Perez Zagorin, `Cudworth and 
Hobbes on Is and Ought', in Philosophy, Science and Religion in England 1640-1700, edited by 
R. Kroll, R. Ashcraft & P. Zagorin (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992), pp. 128-48. 
Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography, p. 330, has noted that Cudworth was one of the signatories to 
the order to expel the `Hobbist' Daniel Scargill from Cambridge. 
so Lucy, Observations 1663, p. 142. 
51 Bramhall, Castigation, p. 142. 
52 Bramhall, Castigations, p. 176. 
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[others] and cut their throats without warning' was destructive `to the public 
peace and tranquility of the World, but much more pernicious to the Common- 
wealth itself... '53 
Many of Hobbes' contemporary critics failed to understand that his 
natural condition was not necessarily a condition of actual fighting, but a 
description of the disposition of human beings to fight, if it became necessary. 
But those critics who noted his definition of war as intention were generally 
unconvinced by it. James Tyrrell granted that Hobbes' comparison of `the state of 
War to the nature of Foul-weather' was correct, but Tyrrell also thought that `the 
bare inclination to hurt' was not `an actual War, till there hath been some signs or 
tokens of hostility expressed'. 54 William Lucy objected to both Hobbes' 
definition of war as `a tract of time', and his comparison of war to `the nature of 
foule weather'. He denied Hobbes' claim that `the weather [is] foule if there be 
onely an inclination to fouleness', and as a result thought that `a disposition to 
war makes no war'. It was quite possible for an individual to hate another, and yet 
not go to war with him. Lucy further accused Hobbes of `impropriety of speech', 
because although one can say `single men hate one another, contend one with 
another, fight one with another, are at enmity one with the other, but [they are] 
not at war, [because] that is proper to publique persons, or Nations, only'. 55 
It is interesting to note that these writers denied Hobbes' argument that the 
natural condition was a state of war, because of the disposition of individuals to 
war. And yet as we have seen in chapter two, on equality and unsociability, their 
arguments against Hobbes' views on natural unsociability were stated in rather 
similar terms - human beings were naturally sociable, because they had the 
potential to be sociable. The terms `disposition' and `potential' do not have 
exactly the same meaning: disposition is an inclination or tendency to something; 
whereas potential means possible, or capable of being or becoming something, 
but both terms refer to the future. Hobbes' critics failed to understand his 
argument for the natural condition as a state of war, grounded on the intentions of 
individuals, and not necessarily their actions. And yet they also failed to 
53 Bramhall, Castigation, p. 143. 
54 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 327. 
55 Lucy, Observations 1663, pp. 150-1. 
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understand Hobbes' argument that human beings could not be described as 
naturally sociable, or sociable from birth, simply because they had the potential to 
be sociable. In fact Hobbes seems to have completely turned the Aristotelian 
argument on its head, with his description of man's potential to be hostile, either 
before the institution of commonwealths, or once the structure of civil society had 
been removed. It is almost as if Hobbes' natural condition was a demonstration of 
how ridiculous Aristotelian ideas were - that the Schoolmen could say in all 
seriousness that human beings were naturally sociable, because they had the 
potential to be sociable, whereas for Hobbes we could just as easily say human 
beings were naturally hostile, because they had the potential to go to war. 
Although history and experience gave us examples of the capacity of human 
beings to care for one another, it also gave us examples of their capacity to hurt 
one another. Perhaps a combination of both views of human nature would provide 
a more accurate picture. 
As we have seen in chapter two, Hobbes' contemporary critics generally 
denied his views on natural equality, because they contradicted the accounts of 
scripture, experience and Aristotle. But those critics that granted Hobbes' natural 
equality, found it difficult to imagine that it could possibly have caused conflict in 
the state of nature. According to James Tyrrell, equality `rather perswades to 
amity and concord'. 56 Similarly for Samuel Parker, the natural equality of human 
beings should `persuade and force men to Friendship, and to assist and oblige 
each other by all the Offices of love and kindness'. Because of the great 
difference in power between one single individual, and all individuals, it was 
natural for human beings to seek the assistance of others. 57 According to John 
Shafte, natural equality made it unreasonable for one human being to attempt to 
kill another, as the other individual would also attempt to kill him. In this case, he 
would be acting against both the law of nature, and the interests of self- 
preservation. 58 
It was quite simply unreasonable for naturally equal human beings to fight 
one another. For this reason, Hobbes' contemporary critics also denied his claim 
56 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 267. See also Lowde, A Discourse, p. 157. 
57 Parker, A Demonstration, p. 31. 
58 See Shafte, The Great Law of Nature, p. 8. 
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that human beings had a desire to hurt one another. According to James Tyrrell, 
`none but a Fool, a Wicked man, or a Mad-man can have any desire to hurt 
another, who hath given him no provocation for it... ' Tyrrell admitted that there 
were some men who tried to take more than they `deserve, or really need', but 
even these men did not have a will to hurt anyone, only those that got in their 
way, `and whose Goods, or other things, they may think may be useful for 
themselves'. Tyrrell also commented on Hobbes' admission, that there were some 
modest men who will allow equality to others. For Tyrrell, if 
this modest man judges according to right reason... [then the] violent or 
proud man... cannot acquire any right to the liberty or goods of others, 
from his own unreasonable judgment, and false estimation of his own 
strength or merit: Nor is this self-defence, of the modest or honest man, 
properly a desire to hurt the other, but only a necessity to defend himself 
against his assaults, since he had no intention to hurt him, before this 
violent man gave him a just provocation. 59 
James Lowde agreed with Hobbes that there may be some individuals who want 
superiority over others, and also had a desire to harm others. But Lowde also 
thought that there were `some more modestly vertuous, who out of consciousness 
of their own inabilities, and out of due respect to other Mens Merits above their 
own, who would quit their pretences to Empire, and willingly live in obedience to 
others'. Those individuals that aimed at superiority did so through `inordinate 
Pride and Ambition', rather than `the dictates of nature and right reason'. 60 
Similarly Thomas Tenison noted that `if one shall intrude into the possession of 
another who is contented with a modest share, being moved only by ambition and 
wantonness of mind; he seemeth to be no other than an unrighteous aggressor'. 61 
Tenison thought that `if any person endeavours, by such unnatural practices, as I 
have mention'd, to encrease his outward safety, or brutish delight, he, in truth, 
destroyeth by his iniquity more of himself than he can preserve by his ambition 
and lust'. 62 
As the views expressed above demonstrate, many of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics objected to his description of the natural condition of human 
59 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 272-3. 
60 Lowde, A Discourse, p. 156. 
61 Tenison, The creed ofMr. Hobbes, p. 138. 
62 Tenison, The creed ofMr. Hobbes, p. 139. 
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beings, because it only seemed to take into account the passions, and failed to 
consider reason and experience. 63 For William Lucy, this made all men monsters, 
and made `Nature her self a Monster'. Lucy admitted that `the passions of men 
are extreamly unruly things, when they get the dominion, and carry men to all 
manner of wickedness', but human beings have reason, `by which they can, and 
doe governe their Passions to act what is fit, not what is delightful'. 64 Lucy also 
agreed with Hobbes up to a point that `Feares urge men to a thousand desperate 
actions', and admitted that if human beings did not have reason, `they could not 
be secured from feares, without either destruction of other men, or subduing 
them'. 65 But human beings were reasonable and sociable creatures, and this 
meant that they knew `if they should have such feare, there could be no peace to 
men'. Lucy further argued that `there is in the heart of every man, a thought of a 
GOD who... hath punitive justice; to whom vengeance belongs... ' It is this 
thought of God which `keeps the universal kind of man in some awe from 
perpetuating such barbarous acts... '66 James Tyrrell described reason as the 
`principal part of Man', which governed all other faculties. Men were `not 
necessarily impelled by these Passions, as meer Machines are driven or moved by 
the Wind, or Weights', but they are `governed, and restrained by Reason, or fear 
of future evil', which meant that individuals did not hurry into war. Tyrrell 
pointed out that in De Cive Hobbes himself admitted that individuals could not 
agree on present good, because of the variety of passions, but could agree on 
future good through reason. 67 
If Hobbes had taken reason as well as passion into account, the three 
causes of quarrel he had described would not lead to war between human beings. 
In the case of Hobbes' first cause of quarrel, competition, reason would restrain 
the two individuals who desired the same thing, and the result would not have to 
be decided by fighting, and ultimately the death of one. As William Lucy noted, 
`although men may like, and approve what another hath; yet the violence of few 
mens affections runs to such a height in malice, as to do mischiefe in so high a 
63 See for example Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 320-1. 
64 Lucy, Observations 1663, pp. 143-4. 
65 Lucy, Observations 1663, p. 145. 
66 Lucy, Observations 1663, p. 146. 
67 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, pp. 320-1, following Cumberland, A Treatise, pp. 84-5. 
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nature, for their content, as to destroy a man'. An individual in possession of a 
piece of land would not fear a neighbour, as the probability of his neighbour 
invading him was small. Even in a condition which lacked a common power, the 
conscience would be `enough to keep men in awe', and thus prevent them from 
invading others. For Lucy, when two men had equal title to the same place, `they 
will either debate it by reason, or else fight it out, and the strongest arme will get 
possession'. But it was not conquest which gave the victor the right, but 
occupancy. And once an individual had occupancy, `it will be unjust for any to 
meddle with it whilest it is in his possession'. This `title of Occupancy is a most 
sacred and just title, and gives dominion to the possessor, such as all men, in all 
Ages, have reverenced'. 68 Lucy cited the example of Genesis chapter thirteen, 
which described an agreement between Abraham and Lot, in which they had 
decided to live apart because the land could not support both their families, and 
this had previously caused conflict between them. According to Lucy, `Abraham 
was more potent than Lot, and could have compelled him to go whither he 
pleased', and yet Abraham gave Lot a choice of which land to occupy. 69 
As the example of Abraham and Lot demonstrated, human beings were 
capable of settling such a dispute reasonably. Richard Cumberland agreed with 
Hobbes that when one individual invaded another individual's property, this had a 
tendency to lead to war, but for Cumberland, 
right Reason dictates... that greater damage is to be apprehended from this 
open'd Sluice of all Evils, than can be compensated by the hope of the 
trifling Advantage, which can be procur'd by the Injury, especially in that 
State, where no Civil Government is suppos'd, which might restrain 
Anger and Revenge within some bounds; and where one Contention may 
breed others without end; and the least Strife may bring Life in danger. 70 
Similarly, James Tyrrell granted that `this may be true amongst Brutes; as also 
amongst brutish and unreasonable men'; but God has given human beings reason, 
which means they can either divide the property where this can be done, or agree 
68 Lucy, Observations 1663, pp. 145-6. 
69 Lucy, Observations 1663, p. 143. Hobbes himself had cited this example in De Cive, IV, 4, 
p. 60, in the chapter entitled `Natural Law is Divine Law', as evidence for his claim that common 
ownership caused conflict. It was also evidence that human beings themselves had distributed the 
community of things - see chapter four on the right of nature. 70 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 253. 
118 
to use it in turns, or allow the first possessor to have it. 71 Further, God had not 
`made so niggardly a distribution of things', that human beings had to compete 
for those things necessary for life, such as the fruits of the earth. 72 For Tyrrell, 
like Lucy, the `Rules of Reason, and Equity' gave possession to the first 
occupant, who according to these rules thought it `reasonable that he should be... 
permitted to enjoy it'. Similarly, other individuals who had a desire for the same 
thing would, according to the rules of reason and equity, allow the first possessor 
to enjoy it. 73 
When Hobbes' contemporary critics moved on to discuss his second cause 
of quarrel, diffidence, they specifically linked it with Hobbes' further claim that 
individuals in the natural condition should anticipate danger by invading others, 
and should subdue as many individuals as possible until there was no power great 
enough to threaten them. Again, most of Hobbes' critics thought that this would 
be acting against reason. For James Lowde, natural equality made it unreasonable 
for an individual to attempt to subject all other individuals, until there was no 
other great enough to oppose him. 74 Similarly, James Tyrrell thought that it was 
highly unlikely that any individual would think he was able `by his own single 
strength' to `master and subdue all those he will be afraid of, until there is no one 
left to threaten him. On this account `a man (like a Game-Cock) would be forced 
to fight a Battel, or two, every day whilst he lived'. In the case of fighting cocks, 
we find that they live to fight about twelve or thirteen battles, and Tyrrell thought 
that this would be about the same for individuals in Hobbes' state of nature. 75 
Diffidence did not give an individual the right to kill another, simply 
because at some point in the future that other individual may pose a threat to him. 
There must be `some sufficient signs' of intention to harm, without which, an 
individual could kill `any of his Children, or Servants, or even his Wife her self, 
if he did but fancy they went about to murther, or rob him'. 76 Even if, as Hobbes 
71 Tyrrell, 
.4 BriefDisquisition, pp. 275-6. 72 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 276. Filmer, Observations, p. 188, also made this point, and 
claimed that Hobbes' description of men attempting to destroy one other might be true if food was 
in short supply. 
73 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 321-2. 
74 See Lowde, A Discourse, p. 157. See also Shafte, The Great Law of Nature, p. 23, where an 
attempt to subdue others in the state of nature would result in death, rather than preservation. 
75 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 323-5. 
76 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, pp. 326-7. 
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claimed, there were some individuals who took `pleasure in contemplating their 
own Power in Acts of Conquest', a single individual had never been powerful 
enough to subdue the rest. Men have always combined together, and chosen one 
man as their leader, because they respected him for his `Integrity, or Courage'. 
Even 
Nimrod himself, (who is supposed the first Tyrant, or Conqueror, ) ever 
have enlarged the Bounds of his Empire by his own single strength, or that 
of his particular Family, without such a Combination which requires 
Compacts between the Persons that make it; and when they once do this, 
they are then no longer in the meer state of Nature, having set up and 
acknowledged a common Power over them to keep them in awe... 77 
If Hobbes' third cause of quarrel, glory, was governed by fear and reason, 
it would also not lead to war. James Tyrrell noted that `even among those that 
labour under this Passion of Vain-glory, there are many in whom fear of others is 
a much more predominate passion, and such will rather take an affront, than 
venture to beat or kill another to revenge it'. If the passion of vainglory could be 
`mastered by another stronger Passion; why may it not also be overpowered by 
Reason? '78 Tyrrell thought that a rational individual would realise that he could 
not force others to value him, simply by fighting every one who did not value 
him. He also commented on Hobbes' claim in De Cive that intellectual 
disagreement caused the bitterest wars, and admitted that differences of opinion 
could cause strife between men, but this did not imply that all men had a desire to 
hurt others. There were many men of an `equal and reasonable disposition', who 
did not want to hurt others, and `though they often differ from them in opinion', 
but `they must take all others for fools, if they prefer their own Judgment before 
another Man's'. 79 Tyrrell denied Hobbes' claim that the worst wars were those 
fought between different religious groups, or different factions within a country. 
This could not be the case in the state of nature, because according to Hobbes 
these groups only came into existence in the commonwealth. 80 Both Tyrrell and 
77 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 323-5. See also p. 264, where Tyrrell claimed that if a man did 
increase his natural power, it was by other men choosing him as leader because of his bravery or 
virtue, or because he was their father. 
78 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 332. 
79 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 273. 
80 See Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, pp. 273-4. See also Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 137. In chapter 
two on equality and unsociability, I noted that Hobbes objected to those philosophers who had 
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Richard Cumberland also denied Hobbes' observation that human beings liked to 
compare themselves with others, in order to think highly of themselves, and this 
led them to show hatred and contempt. For Tyrrell, this did `not proceed from 
Nature, or Reason, but from foolish Customs, and bad Education'. Individuals 
often did have different opinions, `without giving one another the lie, or any just 
occasion of offence'. 81 Cumberland thought that Hobbes had simply given all 
men his own characteristics. He admitted that there were some such `foolish and 
envious' men, but that `the Reason or Force of wiser Men may easily restrain 
[them] from hurting All'. 82 For Cumberland, it was our desire for honour, which 
led us to virtuous actions and thus to peace. 83 
The passions Hobbes had argued led to war, would, when guided by 
reason lead to peace. As Richard Cumberland noted, a comparison of the causes 
(i. e. the passions) of these effects demonstrated that when governed by reason, 
they `seem more powerfully to persuade to universal Benevolence, and that 
Peace, which may reasonably be expected from the Exercise thereof, than that 
War of all against all... '84 James Tyrrell agreed with Hobbes that `mens Lusts and 
Passions do often encline them to War and contention', but he also thought that 
`God hath given Man Reason to foresee, as also to prevent the evils of War'; and 
had also `endued them with as strong Passions (as Mr. H. acknowledges) to 
incline them to peace'. 85 He granted that the `same Passions may in some men 
produce different effects', but overall if the passions that tend to peace `are more 
strong and powerful than those that excite them to War, then certainly Peace will 
included in their descriptions of natural human behaviour, characteristics which themselves had 
been formed by society. Hobbes wanted to look at human beings before they had become civilised 
by society. Here it appears that Hobbes himself found it difficult to exclude all civilised 
characteristics from his description of human beings. Hobbes' view that the bitterest wars were 
caused by disagreements over religion and politics was given in the first chapter of De Cive, `Man 
without civil society'. It seems likely that Hobbes made this claim to demonstrate the parallels 
between the causes of quarrel in the natural condition, and the causes of the civil war in England, 
i. e. disagreements over religion and politics. See also Thomas S. Schrock, `King David and Uriah 
the Hittite in the Political Thought of Thomas Hobbes', Jewish Political Studies Review, 4 (1992), 
pp. 59-114, p. 107, note 72, for intellectual vain glory as the main cause of the civil war. 
81 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 275. 
82 Cumberland, A Treatise, pp. 137-8. See also Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 337. 
83 See Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 137, who cited Cicero's claim that the `praise of good men' is 
`true glory, or such Honour as can be attain'd out of civil Society'. See also Tyrrell, A Brief 
Disquisition, p. 335. 
84 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 85. 
85 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 276. See also pp. 332-3. 
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be their more constant and Natural State'. 86 Tyrrell thought that Hobbes had 
failed to stress this enough. For Tyrrell, it was fear of death, and other miseries, 
which was the strongest influence on men's actions. And reason `can never 
prompt considering men to believe themselves naturally in so dangerous and 
miserable a State, as this which Mr. H. supposes; much less to fall into it on 
purpose, without just cause given'. 87 
As the above arguments demonstrate, Hobbes' contemporary critics 
objected to his war of all against all for a number of reasons. Hobbes' account 
contradicted the account of scripture - human beings had always lived under God, 
whose laws of nature, engraved in their hearts, prevented them from killing each 
other. Hobbes' account was also dishonourable to God, because God did not 
create human beings in a condition of war. And finally, Hobbes' account also 
contradicted experience - human beings had parents, who had a natural 
disposition to love their children. Hobbes' views made human beings no better 
than animals. The critics particularly objected to his description of human nature, 
which only seemed to take into account the passions, and failed to take into 
account reason and experience. For Hobbes' contemporary critics, human beings 
had reason, and it was this faculty which guided their passions, and proved that 
the natural condition was a state of peace, rather than war. Reason, the laws of 
nature, the conscience and God were sufficient to maintain peace amongst human 
beings in the natural condition. 
But in some ways Hobbes would not have disagreed with some of these 
apparent criticisms of his ideas. For instance, to John Shafte's claim that natural 
equality made it unreasonable for individuals to kill others, Hobbes would have 
argued yes, but in nature where there was no common judge, who decided what 
was reasonable or unreasonable in particular circumstances? Some individuals 
thought that it was reasonable to kill others. Some individuals thought that it was 
reasonable to want more than others. But in nature who decided on this? Hobbes' 
answer was that human beings decided for themselves. William Lucy's argument 
that Abraham and Lot divided land between them simply proved Hobbes' point 
that it was human beings themselves who had agreed to distribute property, 
86 Tyrrell, .4 BriefDisquisition, p. 
333. 
87 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 334. 
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because it had caused conflict. 88 Similarly, James Tyrrell's claims, that passion 
when guided by fear and reason would lead to peace, and that fear of death was 
the strongest influence on human actions, were in agreement with Hobbes' own 
views. Again, Hobbes' contemporary critics misunderstood him because of their 
understanding of `nature' as perfection, or a description of how human beings 
ought to behave. This perfection of human existence was understood to be the 
original condition of human beings at the creation. The critics assumed that 
Hobbes' state of nature was a description of how he thought human beings ought 
to behave, and as a result were horrified by his description of a condition of 
hostility. 
Hobbes' contemporary critics were also mistaken in their claim that his 
description of natural human behaviour only took the passions into account. 
Hobbes' state of nature, as a condition of war, was caused as much by natural 
reason, as by passion. As we will see in chapter four, on the laws of nature, 
Hobbes thought that reason in the state of nature was each individual's own 
reason, and it could be fallible. Right reason did not exist in the natural condition, 
where each individual took his own passions for right reason. For Hobbes, it was 
the laws of nature, which should be the guide to the actions of individuals. These 
laws were discoverable by natural reason, but the problem was that passions often 
prevented this discovery, and even if individuals discovered the laws of nature, 
they needed help in interpreting them. Further, individuals often violated those 
laws, because in their interpretation they failed to consider the consequences for 
other individuals. They failed to put themselves in the place of others. Thus, 
Hobbes' natural condition was a condition of war, not only because of human 
passion, but also because the only rule of action each individual had in the natural 
condition was his own natural reason. In the natural condition, each individual 
had the liberty to act on what his own reason and judgement dictated to him. 
Natural individuals took courses of action in order to satisfy their immediate 
desires, and these courses of action were dictated by their own natural reason. It 
was both reason and passion which therefore created the state of war. Hobbes' 
contemporary critics thought that reason was potentially perfect, and also 
88 See chapter four on the right of nature. 
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sufficient to prevent men from committing violent actions. Hobbes' views, on the 
other hand, could be understood to suggest that he thought that the Schoolmen 
had failed to take into account the effects of the Fall. Reason had been corrupted 
by the disobedience of the first human beings, and as a result God, the laws of 
nature, and the individual conscience were no longer sufficient to maintain peace 
amongst human beings, without a human, coercive authority. 
Hobbes' account of the natural condition was a description of the 
consequences for human beings, of judging good and evil according to their own 
individual passions. The disintegration of the commonwealth into the state of 
nature was a consequence of individuals following the moral philosophy of the 
Schoolmen. As we have seen in chapter one, Hobbes thought that the 
Schoolmen's rules of good and evil were simply according to their own passions, 
and he also accused them of a number of seditious doctrines which led to the 
dissolution of the commonwealth, all of which involved the private judgement of 
good and evil. Hobbes' natural condition demonstrated that a moral philosophy, 
in which each individual took his own passions for right reason, created a state of 
war, rather than a state of peace. His argument that the natural condition was a 
condition of war, because of the intention or disposition of human beings, was 
also an attack on the Schoolmen, who had argued that human beings were 
naturally sociable, because of their disposition to society. Hobbes wanted to show 
how ridiculous such a claim was, because it could equally be argued that the 
disposition of human beings was to invade, hurt and kill others. For Hobbes, it all 
came down to a matter of intention. In the natural condition it was not possible to 
distinguish between good and bad men from their actions, because in such a 
condition even good men were forced to commit wicked actions. A. P. Martinich 
has dubbed this `the great ignorance and fear argument' - because we do not 
know who is good and who is evil, it is safer to assume that all human beings are 
evil. 89 As we will see below, Hobbes' views on intention demonstrated the 
protestant character of his thought, and in particular his allegiance to the theory of 
the Two Cities, which argued that since the Fall, God had arbitrarily predestined 
two groups of human beings (the elect and the reprobate), who lived on earth 
89 Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography, p. 206. 
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mixed up together, and only God could distinguish between them. 90 Hobbes' 
political theory could be understood to take both these groups into account. 
But for many of Hobbes' critics, not only was his description of the 
natural condition contrary to the original, perfect condition of human beings at the 
creation, it was also an inaccurate description of the condition of fallen human 
beings. A number of Hobbes' critics cited the account of Cain and Abel as 
evidence for this. 91 Firstly, the example of Cain and Abel demonstrated that the 
right of nature did not give one individual a right to kill or invade another. 92 
Secondly, God's immediate punishment of Cain proved that human beings did 
not have a right to do what they wanted with other individuals, but had their right 
confined by the law of nature. 93 God showed his disapproval of murder with his 
immediate punishment of Cain. As James Tyrrell put it, although 
after the Fall of Adam, man's Nature was degenerated into that state we 
now find it, wherein mens Passions, I own, do too often domineer over 
their Reason; and that Cain, through Malice and Envy, slew his Brother, 
as we read in Genesis. Of this state of War, as it is the first Example of 
man's Degeneracy, so it is also of God's dislike, and punishment of this 
cruel Sin of Murther, which is indeed but the effect of this Author's state 
of War. 94 
For Roger Coke, if as Hobbes claimed, `God made Man in the state of pure 
nature... in such a cut-throatly condition, and so much worse than other creatures, 
that men might jure naturali everlastingly kill one another, and commit no 
offence, if the King or Civitas does not restrain it', then how could God `injustice 
have punished Cain for killing Abel', unless Cain and Abel made Adam their 
king by pact, and Adam gave them `a Law not to kill one another', which 
according to Coke, Hobbes nowhere claimed. 95 For both Tyrrell and Coke, 
Hobbes' views contradicted scripture, which told us that God punished Cain 
immediately. 
90 Hobbes seems to have subscribed to the theory of the Two Cities - see for example: De Cive, 
XVII, 5, p. 207, & 22, p. 222; and Leviathan XLI, 3-5, pp. 328-30, & XLIV, 27-29, pp. 426-8. 
91 Most of Hobbes' critics wrote their response to his ideas in the form of critiques of the English 
Leviathan. As a result, we cannot be sure that they were responding directly to his own citation of 
Cain and Abel in the Latin version, although as I have mentioned elsewhere Richard Cumberland 
had read the Latin edition. 
92 See Whitehall, The Leviathan Found Out, p. 37. Hobbes' right of nature will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter four. 
93 See Lucy, Observations 1663, pp. 182-3. 
94 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 357. 
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A number of Hobbes' contemporary critics also cited Cain and Abel to 
disprove Hobbes' theory of common ownership in the natural condition. For 
William Lucy Cain and Abel's sacrifices to God demonstrated that human beings 
had property from the beginning, given to them by God, and that they had no right 
to do what they pleased. 96 Similarly for John Whitehall, `Cain and Abel had their 
distinct properties, and offered accordingly, when there was no Commonwealth 
formed, that we know of; and in all probability there was none'. 97 Hobbes' critics 
appear to have agreed that Cain and Abel lived in the natural condition, 98 or a 
condition before commonwealths came into existence, but this condition was not 
as Hobbes described it. In this natural condition, Cain and Abel had property, did 
not have a right to kill other individuals, and lived under a common power with 
the ability to punish them. How did their views compare with the interpretations 
of sixteenth and seventeenth century commentators on Genesis? 
3. The Scriptural Account. 
Although Hobbes' contemporary critics have noted a number of areas of 
disagreement between his description of the state of war, and the scriptural 
account of Cain's murder of Abel, for any of Hobbes' seventeenth century readers 
who were familiar with the various interpretations of the fourth chapter of 
Genesis, there were important parallels to be seen between Hobbes' account, and 
that of scripture. Firstly, according to one influential protestant commentator, 
Heinrich Bullinger, the account of Cain and Abel demonstrated that there were 
two types of people on earth, who would always be in disagreement with one 
another. Abel was `an example of God's seed, and of a regenerate true faithfull 
Christian man'; whereas Cain was `a seed of the Serpent, a childe of the Devill... ' 
The example of Cain and Abel demonstrated what God meant when he said: `I 
will put enmitie between the seed of the woman and thy seed'. It was as if God 
were saying, `There shall be two manner of people, the one shall cleave unto 
95 Coke, A Survey of the Politicks, pp. 32-3. 
96 See Lucy, Observations 1663, pp. 175-6. See also Coke, Elements, pp. 34-5. 
97 Whitehall, The Leviathan Found Out, p. 44. 
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Christ, the blessed seed, the other shall cleave unto the Devill. And these two 
generations shall in no wise agree, but be at variance in faith and religion'. 99 
These two brothers `have set forth before us, the whole battell and strife, which 
the world, the citie of the devill... shall make against the citie and citizens in 
whom Christ is the head, unto the end of the world'. 100 Joseph Hall wondered `at 
the contrary dispositions and estates' of the first two brothers. If `the priviledges 
of Nature had been worth anything, the first borne Child should not have been a 
Reprobate'. But even good men produce bad children, and `even good breeding 
cannot alter destinie'. Hall described Cain as the butcher of his brother, and 
asked, `Who could wonder at dissentions amongst thousands of brethren, when he 
sees so deadly opposition betwixt two, the first roots of brotherhood? who can 
hope to live plausibly, & securely amongst so many Cains, when he sees one Cain 
the death of one Abel? ' It was the devil that caused enmity between Cain and 
Abel, and it was the devil who caused quarrels now between one man and 
another. ' 01 
The account of Cain and Abel demonstrated for many commentators that 
the first quarrel between human beings was over religion. As Joseph Hall put it, 
`the first man that dyed, dyed for Religion', 102 while John Trapp noted that these 
Theological hatreds... are most bitter hatreds, and are carried on for most 
part, with Cain-like rage, and bloody oppression. No fire sooner breaks 
forth, none goes out more slowly, then that which is kindled about matters 
of Religion: and the nearer any come to other, the more deadly are their 
differences, and the more desperate their designes, one `gainst another. 
The Persians and Turks are both Mahometans, and yet disagreeing about 
some small points in the Interpretation of their Alchoran; the Persians 
bum whatever Books they find of the Turkish Sect. And the Turks hold it 
more meritorious to kill one Persian, then seventy Christians. The Jew 
can better brook a Heathen then a Christian... The Pope will dispense 
98 We have seen in previous chapters that the critics also thought Adam and Eve were in the 
natural condition before the Fall. Thus the critics made no distinction between the pre-lapsarian 
and the post-lapsarian conditions. 
99 Heinrich Bullinger, Looke from Adam, and behold the Protestants Faith and Religion (London, 
1624), pp. 22-3. See also Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 22. 
10° Bullinger, Looke from Adam, p. 24. 
101 Hall, Contemplations, p. 779. 
102 Hall, Contemplations, p. 780. See also Bullinger, Looke from Adam, p. 24. For these 
commentators Abel was the first martyr. 
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with Jews, but not with Protestants. Lutherans will sooner joyn hands 
with a Papist then a Calvinist... 103 
As we have seen above, Hobbes also thought that the bitterest quarrels 
were between different religious and political groups over doctrine. He also 
described two types of human beings: those who desired to dominate others, and 
those who were content with natural equality -I have called them vain-glorious 
and modest men. I have also noted in chapter two that in De Cive Hobbes had 
made a separate reference to good and bad men. It seems likely that these were 
the same types of human beings, that Hobbes had described in the natural 
condition as vain-glorious and modest, but that in this condition he did not refer 
to them as good and bad, because in the state of nature there was apparently no 
good and evil, and even good men were forced to commit wicked actions. 
Hobbes' argument, that there were two types of human beings, bore at least a 
superficial resemblance to these interpretations of Genesis, although Hobbes did 
not describe human beings as children of God, or children of the devil. Neither 
did he mention the devil as the cause of conflict between them. Hobbes also did 
not describe the vain-glorious and modest individuals as either good or bad men. 
By saying nothing, he left it for his readers to make an assumption one way or the 
other. Hobbes' seventeenth century readers might have assumed that the vain- 
glorious individuals were evil, and the modest men good; but in Leviathan's 
account of the natural condition even those individuals who were content with 
natural equality were forced to behave as vain-glorious individuals in order to 
survive. Did this therefore mean that all individuals were evil in the natural 
condition? Hobbes admitted that the scripture clearly stated that all men were 
evil, but he thought that it was not possible to distinguish between good and bad 
men. 104 The reason for this was that in the state of nature individuals were judged 
by their intentions, and not their actions. '°5 Only the individual himself, and God 
could know what those intentions were. 106 
103 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 48. See also Needler, Expository Notes, pp. 156-7, who used 
the same examples of Persians versus Turks; Jews versus Christians; and Lutherans versus 
Calvinists. 
104 See De Cive, preface to the readers, 11-12, pp. 10-11. 
105 See De Cive, III, 27, p. 54; and Leviathan, XXVII, 3, p. 191. In civil society the morality of 
individuals was judged by their actions. I owe this reference to my supervisor, Glenn Burgess - see 
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For protestant commentators, the account of Cain and Abel demonstrated 
that it was not possible to tell good and bad men apart, on the basis of their 
outward works. Both Cain and Abel offered sacrifices to God, but God chose to 
honour one, and not the other. For Benjamin Needler, the scripture made it clear 
that the difference between the sacrifices of Cain and Abel `consisted in the 
persons who offered, and not in the offering... By faith Abel offered unto God a 
more excellent sacrifice than Cain'. 107 Further, Cain `did that which was good, 
when he brought an offering to the Lord, but he did not do well'. The reason for 
this is that a `work that is good, as to the matter of it, may by reason of a defect in 
the principle, or end, become starke naught'. 108 It was the intention that was 
important, or as Joseph Hall put it, `God, which (in good) accepts the will for the 
deed, condemnes the will for the deed in evill. If there be an evill heart, there will 
be an evill eye; and if both these, there will be an evill hand'. 109 Outwardly both 
Cain and Abel appeared to be good men, they both offered sacrifices to God. But 
God honoured their sacrifices according to their intentions. 
God's regard for Abel's offering, but not for the offering of Cain, proved 
the protestant stress on faith over works. According to Jean Calvin, `God looks 
into the hearts... [and] estimates works not otherwise than as they proceed from 
the heart'. 11° For Martin Luther, Abel's sacrifice was offered in faith, whereas 
Cain put `his trust in the prestige of his primogeniture... he despises his brother as 
an insignificant and worthless being'. "' According to Luther, `a person rather 
than his work is accepted by God and [further] that a person does not become 
righteous as a result of a righteous work, but that a work becomes righteous and 
good as a result of a righteous and good person... ' 112 Heinrich Bullinger described 
Abel as 
his `On Hobbesian Resistance Theory', Political Studies, 42 (1994), pp. 62-83, p. 82. Leo Strauss 
has noted that although Hobbes was in agreement with the Christian tradition in believing that 
intention was more important than action, he differed from that tradition because he thought it was 
not possible to distinguish between just and unjust actions in the natural condition, or in other 
words independently of civil law - see Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Yhomas Hobbes, p. 23. 106 See for example Leviathan, XXX, 30, p. 233 & XLl 1,79, p. 373. 
107 Needler, Expository Notes, pp. 138 & 143. See also Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, 
p. 49. 
108 Needler, Expository Notes, pp. 149-50. 
109 Hall, Contemplations, p. 780. 
110 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 194. 
111 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 251. See also p. 267. 
112 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 257. 
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simple, godly, and of a constant faith in God... And for this faiths sake did 
his sacrifice please God: but Cains pleased him not, for his heart was not 
right with God: he was a dissembler, greedie, and unfaithful person, which 
set his heart and minde upon earthly things, alway despising Gods word, 
and following his own tentation. 113 
For many commentators, who followed Calvin, Cain was a hypocrite. 114 
William Whateley noted that Cain performed 
the outward work of religion, but performed it not out of faith and with a 
desire thereby to do true honour to God, and give himselfe unto God, and 
to get grace from God to make him his, but barely out of custome or 
respect to his Fathers authority who had so trained him up, or out of a 
kinde of imperfect naturall devotion, that he might seem to himselfe good, 
and nourish in himselfe good hopes of escaping Hell and getting 
Heaven ... 
115 
Cain quite simply served God outwardly, but was `a bad man and lived not 
well'. ' 16 Similarly, Gervase Babington thought that the sacrifices of Cain and 
Abel demonstrated `the difference betwixt a true heart and a false, a true godly 
man or woman and a sinner'. Both brought sacrifices, but `one thinketh anything 
good enough, and the other in the zeale of his soule, and the fulnesse of his Lord, 
thinketh nothing good enough'. God showed his contempt for `so unwilling 
worship, so cold love and grudged gifts'. God respected Abel's sacrifice, but not 
Cain's, because he `respecteth first the person, and then the gift', whereas `men 
regard chiefly the gifts, and then the persons according to their gifts... ' 117 
Contrary to this, John Trapp argued that God did not regard Cain's sacrifice 
because it was `of the fruit of the earth; as he loved the possession of this world, 
and the service of the body (which yet can have no continuance) and followed 
after bodily lusts... ' 118 
Hobbes' argument that it was not possible to distinguish between good 
and bad men in the natural condition, on the basis of their actions was in 
113 Bullinger, Looke from Adam, p. 23. 
114 See Calvin, Commentaries, p. 196. See also Eusebius Pagit, The Historie of the Bible (London, 
1627), p. 4; Richardson, Choice Observations, Genesis IV. 4; and Ross, An Exposition, p. 75. 
115 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 18. See also Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis IV. 7; Anon., 
(erroneously attributed to Thomas Hayne), A Briefe Discourse of the Scriptures (London, 1614), 
p. 18; Anon., The Doctrine of the Bible, or The May to True Happiness (London, 1613), p. 3; and 
Clapham, A Briefe of the Bible, p. 24. 
116 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 20. 
117 Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 21. 
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agreement with the protestant stress on faith over works, as demonstrated by the 
account of Cain and Abel. ' 19 The doctrine of justification by faith was central to 
protestantism, both Lutheranism and Calvinism. Since the Fall, God had 
arbitrarily predestined the elect and the reprobate, and only God knew who truly 
believed, and thus whether they would be saved or damned. Human beings could 
not contribute to their salvation through the performance of good works, or aided 
by the sacraments of the Church. It was this doctrine which separated the 
orthodox Reformed view from Arminianism, which believed in God's universal 
grace, and the free will of all human beings to attain salvation. 
Most English commentators on Genesis followed both Luther and Calvin, 
in noting the meanings of the names Cain and Abel. Cain meant obtained, 
acquired, gotten, or a possession; and Abel meant vanity, unprofitable, useless, 
worthless, or a soon vanishing vapour. 120 For Gervase Babington, this `diversity 
of names' signified `a diversity of affection in the namers'. Babington took two 
lessons from this: firstly, `the prepostorous love that is, in many parents' often 
means they think more highly of the worst children, and less well of the better. 
Secondly, `it teacheth the lot of the godly in this world many times, even from 
their cradle, to bee held in lesse regard than the wicked'. 121 Here Babington 
followed Martin Luther, who had argued that when Adam and Eve named their 
sons, they showed that they preferred one above the other. This also seemed to be 
confirmed for Luther by Adam giving Cain an occupation which was concerned 
with government, whereas Abel's occupation was domestic. Luther thought that, 
in showing their preference, Adam and Eve were partly responsible for Cain's 
sin. 122 These interpretations supported Hobbes' view that it was not possible to 
tell good and bad men apart - Adam and Eve demonstrated this when they named 
1 ý8 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 46. 
119 Hobbes thought that both faith and obedience were necessary for salvation, where obedience 
was `the will or effort to obey' - see De Cive, XVIII, 3, p. 236. See also Elements, XXV, 10, pp. 
151-2; and Leviathan, XLIII, 3-5, pp. 398-400, & 19-23, pp. 407-10. 
120 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 242-3; Calvin, Commentaries, p. 191; Ainsworth, 
Annotations, Genesis IV. 1-2; Richardson, Choice Observations, Genesis IV. 2; Ross, An 
Exposition, p. 74; Whateley, Prototypes, p. 15; and Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 
49. 
121 Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 20. 
122 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 245-6. 
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their sons. They also confirmed Hobbes' view that natural individuals named 
good and evil according to their passions. 123 
This interpretation of the meanings of the names of Cain and Abel was 
subscribed to by those commentators who followed both Augustine and Luther in 
describing Cain and Abel as the origins of the earthly and heavenly cities. 124 
According to Alexander Ross, `in the persons' of Cain and Abel we see `the 
wicked and the Church of God'. Cain's name (possession) was an apt name for 
the wicked, for they seeke nothing else but Possessions and Honours in this 
world; and therefore Caine built a Citie: so the wicked laboureth to be secure, to 
have rest and ease in this world'. Abel's name meant `Vanitie and Sorrow: so is 
the estate of the godly, their life heere is but vanitie, and they account all things 
but vanitie; their life is sorrow, they weepe for their sinnes, and for the vanities of 
this world, and because they are persecuted by the posteritie of Caine'. '25 
John Trapp also took this view, and cited another divine, Hugh 
Broughton, who saw in Cain and Abel's names `advertisements for matter of true 
continuance and corruption. Cain betokeneth possession in this world: And Abel 
betokeneth one humbled in minde, and holding such possession vain'. 126 As we 
have seen above, a number of Hobbes' critics cited the account of Cain and Abel 
as evidence that property had existed from the creation, thus disproving Hobbes' 
theory of an original common ownership. But as we will see in chapter four, 
Hobbes' view demonstrated his agreement with Augustine's and Luther's theories 
123 See Elements, VII, 3, p. 44; and Leviathan, VI, 8, p. 29. See also chapter one on good and evil. 
124 See Augustine, City of God, XV, 2, p. 596; and Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 252-4, who 
also claimed that the Papists were the Church of the wicked, whereas he and his followers were 
the true Church. 
125 Ross, An Exposition, p. 74. See also Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 45; and Hall, 
Contemplations, p. 780. 
126 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 45. While discussing Cain's conception, and particularly which 
qualities or defects Cain received from God, and which from his parents, Trapp compared Cain's 
creation to the work of a watchmaker. According to Trapp, a `skilful Artificer makes a clock of all 
his essential parts most accurately, onely he leaves the putting of all parts together to his unskilful 
apprentice; who so jumbles together the several joynts that all falls to jarring, and can keep no 
time at all, every wheel running backward-way. So God most artificially still perfects both body 
and soul: but our sacred parents put all out of frame, and set every part in a contrary course to 
Gods will' - see Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 46. Here Trapp cited another English divine, John 
Yates (d. c. 1660), minister of St. Andrew's, Norwich, who wrote A Modell of Divinitie 
catechistically composed (London, 1622). Hobbes used a similar analogy in De Cive, preface, 9, 
p. 10; and Leviathan, Introduction, 1, p. 3. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 387, has argued that 
Hobbes' use of the machine metaphor was designed to demonstrate that the commonwealth was 
not God-given. But the use of a similar metaphor by both John Trapp and John Yates appears to 
deny, or at least qualify, Skinner's statement. 
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of the Two Cities, which argued that private property only came into existence 
after the Fall, with the creation of the earthly city built by Cain. 
At first sight the account of Cain and Abel also appears to be evidence for 
Hobbes' argument, that it was natural equality that was at least partly responsible 
for causing conflict in the natural condition. Who could be more equal than two 
brothers? Further, according to both Luther and Calvin, although not explicitly 
stated in Genesis, it was probable that Cain and Abel were twins. But having said 
this, both Luther and Calvin thought that Abel was subject to Cain by birth. 127 
God made this clear when he saw how angry Cain was, because God had more 
regard for Abel's sacrifice, than for Cain's offering. According to Heinrich 
Bullinger, God told Cain that he should not be angry with his brother, because 
he shall doe thee no hurt nor harme: he shall also not be Lord over thee, 
nor minish thy right: Yea he shall have respect unto thee, and thou shalt 
have dominion over him, and so keepe thy birth-right, and still remaine 
the first borne, although his sacrifice be acceptable unto mee and not 
thine. 128 
Similarly, William Whateley thought that God wanted Cain to know that he did 
not intend `to take away the superiority which... age gives'. Abel would be Cain's 
inferior `in respect of governement', although Abel was Cain's superior `in 
vertues'. 129 For the anonymous author of A Briefe Discourse of the Scriptures, 
Adam named his first son Cain because `he had gained a goodly Possession'. He 
then named his second son Abel, `that is Vanitie, to shew that if a man have never 
so large Kingdomes or Possessions, or be never so nobly borne, as Kaine was... it 
is all but Vanitie, and vexation of rninde. 130 Andrew Willet described Abel's 
subjection to Cain as `both by the law of nature, and his owne ready 
disposition'. 131 
These interpretations contradicted Hobbes' argument for natural equality. 
And yet Hobbesian equality was a rather strange concept. It was not an absolute 
equality, but a rough equality where differences in strength and intellect were not 
127 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 243; and Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 189 & 203. See also 
Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis IV. 7. 
128 Bullinger, Looke from Adam, p. 25. See also Ross, An Exposition, p. 76; and Haak, Dutch 
Annotations, Genesis IV. 7. 
129 Whateley, Prototypes, pp. 19 & 20. 
130 Anon., A Briefe Discourse of the Scriptures, p. 19. 
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so great that one single individual would always have the advantage. Hobbes' 
argument was in agreement with William Whateley's view that one individual 
could be superior in one faculty, but not in another. Hobbesian equality also did 
not prevent the existence of dominion, even if that dominion was only insecure 
and temporary. 132 We have also seen in chapter two, on equality and 
unsociability, that Hobbes thought problems were caused when individuals 
assumed superiority over others against both reason and nature. Hobbes' 
seventeenth century readers could have seen in Cain a scriptural example of why 
we could not say that one human being was naturally superior to another. Cain 
might have been the elder, but this did not make him the better man. And for one 
influential Biblical commentator, Martin Luther, although from the beginning `by 
divine right the first-born enjoyed the prerogative of rule and priesthood, 
nevertheless they lost it, and those who were born later were given preference 
over them'. Elder sons `were deprived of their right', because `they despised and 
lorded it over their brothers'. For Luther, Cain was the prime example of an elder 
brother who had lost his right. '33 
For a number of commentators, Cain was also an example of an individual 
who thought highly of himself. William Whateley noted that Cain's anger at God, 
for not regarding his sacrifice, shows `a predominancy of pride and blindnesse, 
that out of an high opinion of himselfe hath his mind mufled as it were from 
seeing his owne faults... ' 134 Similarly, Gervase Babington called Cain a hypocrite, 
and noted `how hypocrites, though they be hypocrites, yet can they not abide to be 
served like hypocrites, no they will not give God himselfe (much lesse man) leave 
to deale with them as they deserve'. 135 We have seen above, that Hobbes also 
131 Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 49, which supports Hobbes' view that authority 
involved consent. 
132 As we will see in chapter four, dominion was allowed for preservation's sake. In chapter five, 
we will also see that dominion within families existed in Hobbes' state of nature. 
133 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 243-4. See also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 
edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988), Ist Treatise, section 112, 
p. 223, `it could not be, that Cain as Elder, had a natural Dominion over Abel; for the words are 
conditional: If thou doest ivell and so personal to Cain, and whatever was signified by them, did 
depend on his Carriage and not follow his Birth-right, and therefore could by no means be an 
Establishment of Dominion in the First-born in general'; and 1st Treatise, section 111, p. 222, 
`God or Nature has not anywhere, that I know, placed such Jurisdiction in the First-born, nor can 
Reason find any such Superiority amongst Brethren'. 
134 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 19. 
135 Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 21. 
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thought every individual thought highly of himself, and hated to see similar 
qualities in others. And further, if an individual felt he was being undervalued by 
others, he could not help but show his feelings either by words or other signs. 136 
The account of Genesis tells us that when God showed that he valued Abel's 
sacrifice more highly than Cain's, `Cain was very wroth and his countenance 
fell'. 137 Cain, as Abel's superior by birth, was angry that God did not value his 
offering, as highly as God valued the offering of his apparently inferior brother. 
Cain first of all showed his anger on his face, and then by his action in killing 
Abel. 
For commentators on Genesis, the cause of Cain's murder of Abel was 
envy. According to Alexander Ross, Cain killed Abel for two reasons, the first of 
which was `Envie, because God accepted his sacrifice; and therefore he thought 
that Abel should have obtained his birth-right'. 139 Joseph Hall described envy as 
`the corrosive of all ill minds, and the roote of all desperate actions'. Cain should 
have felt joy that his brother's sacrifice had been accepted, and `his Brothers 
example should have excited, and directed him'. But Cain was not the only 
human being to suffer from envy. There 
was never any nature without envie; Every man is borne a Cain; hating 
that goodnesse in another, which he neglecteth in himselfe. There was 
never envie that was not bloody; for if it eate not anothers hearte, it will 
eate our owne: but unless it be restrained, it will surely seed it seife with 
the blood of others, oft-times in act, all-wayes in affection... 139 
Similarly for William Whateley, `wee have the same nature that Caine, the same 
corruptions, full of pride, full of hypocrisie, full of ignorance of God, and apt to 
be bold to any evil if wee may conceale it from men'. But if God has preserved us 
from those corruptions, let us not assume superiority over others, but give thanks 
to God. 140 
Envy was also described as unreasonable and unjust. William Whateley 
argued that envy was `one of the most unreasonable faults, that is, as hating a man 
because hee is not as miserable as himselfe, or at least because he is more happie 
136 See Elements, XIV, 4, p. 78. 
137 Genesis IV. 5. See also Leviathan, VI, 56, p. 34, `the best signs of passions present are in the 
countenance... ' 
138 Ross, An Exposition, p. 76. Cain's killing of Abel was also instigated by Satan. 
139 Hall, Contemplations, p. 780. 
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than himselfe'. 141 According to Benjamin Needler, the sin of envy `opposeth the 
Providence of God, grieving that God should dispose of his blessings, as he doth'. 
Envy is also `a most unjust sinne, for it is offended with nothing but that which is 
good'. An `envious man is more unhappy then other sinners, others are troubled 
for their own evils, the envious man for other mens good'. 142 Cain was angry that 
Abel's sacrifice was regarded, and `in his passion seems to be void of reason'. 
When `a man is intemperate, unjust, passionate, he acts not onely against 
Scripture, but against principles of reason, and ingenuity'. 143 Needler went on to 
claim that Cain did not kill Abel in passion, but `maliciously, and with 
premeditation'. He killed Abel `for righteousnesse sake'. 144 
If we recall Hobbes' three causes of quarrel between individuals in the 
natural condition, it was possible for Hobbes' readers to see some parallels 
between the account of Cain's murder of Abel, and Hobbes' third cause of 
quarrel, glory. 145 This cause of quarrel caused individuals to invade others when 
they felt undervalued, or had a difference of opinion. They invaded in order to 
secure their reputation. Cain was an individual who thought highly of himself, 
and hated to see similar qualities in others. Cain envied Abel, because God valued 
his brother's sacrifice more highly than his own. Cain felt undervalued and 
reacted accordingly. And yet the account of Cain and Abel could also be 
interpreted so as to support Hobbes' claim that individuals in the natural 
condition should anticipate danger. As we have seen above, a number of Hobbes' 
critics specifically linked anticipation with his second cause of quarrel, 
diffidence. On this account, Cain feared that his younger brother would take his 
birthright, and in order to prevent this, he murdered him. Cain's murder of Abel 
could also be explained with reference to Hobbes' first cause of quarrel, 
competition. Cain already had dominion over Abel's person, as first born. Now 
he wanted to acquire Abel's property, and in doing so God's honour. 146 Hobbes' 
140 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 25. 
141 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 19. 
142 Needier, Expository Notes, p. 142. See also Anon., A Briefe Discourse of the Scriptures, p. 18. 
143 Needier, Expository Notes, pp. 145-6. 
144 Needier, Expository Notes, p. 155. 
145 We have already seen that Hobbes' claim, that disputes over religion caused the bitterest wars, 
was supported by the quarrel between Cain and Abel. 
146 Hobbes' views on the peaceful society of bees and ants are relevant here - there was no 
competition for dignity and honour among them, which in men created hatred and envy, and led to 
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readers may well have been able to apply all three causes of quarrel to explain 
Cain's murder of Abel, but Hobbes' theory could also be understood to support 
an interpretation of scripture, in which it was Abel who provoked his brother. On 
Hobbes' account, Abel might have attacked his brother through diffidence, 
because he saw that Cain was angry with him, and he feared that Cain would kill 
him. Abel might also have attacked his brother, through competition, in order to 
obtain Cain's birthright. Finally, Abel might have felt undervalued because his 
parents named him `vanity' or `useless'; whereas they had shown their preference 
for Cain by naming him `possession'. This led Abel to attack Cain in pursuit of 
`glory'. Either way, Abel was unsuccessful, and the outcome was his own death. 
If the scriptural account was interpreted in this way, then Abel could be held 
equally responsible for his own death. This would also mean that Hobbes' theory 
denied that Abel was a good man, and Cain an evil man. For Hobbes' seventeenth 
century readers this would have been an unpalatable conclusion. 
As we have seen above, Hobbes himself thought that envy was the reason 
that Cain had killed Abel. Only God could have judged Cain's intention in killing 
Abel. God had judged Cain, and punished him immediately. What then of 
Hobbes' claim that Cain dared to kill Abel because there was no common power 
with the ability to punish him? For a number of commentators, God's questioning 
of Cain after Abel's murder, and his response to God, demonstrated that he did 
not recognise the obligation of the laws of nature, or that there was any power 
over him. Martin Luther thought that Cain's reply to God, that he was not his 
brother's keeper, demonstrated `that the care of his brother [was] a matter of no 
concern to him'. 147 In doing this, he also admitted that `the Law... "Love your 
neighbour as yourself' was of no concern to him; and likewise the command... 
"What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to another. " This Law was not 
promulgated for the first time in the Decalog but is written in the hearts of all 
men'. 148 Luther also claimed that Cain thought that he could murder Abel `by 
right, as it were, because he is the first-born'. 149 What is interesting about these 
war - see Elements, XIX, 5, p. 105; Leviathan, XVII, 6- 12, pp. 108-9; and De Cive, V, 5, pp. 71- 
2. 
147 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 275. 
148 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 277-8. 
149 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 282. 
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statements is firstly, Luther, like Hobbes, has used the negative formulation of the 
Golden Rule. '50 Secondly, Luther's interpretation also seems to support Hobbes' 
claim that human beings in the state of nature had no obligations to each other, or 
at least they thought that they did not. And finally, for individuals in Hobbes' 
state of nature, the right of nature gave them a right to kill other human beings, if 
they thought it necessary for their own preservation. ' 5' 
A number of other protestant commentators argued that Cain did not 
recognise a power over him. For William Whateley, when Cain lied to God about 
his brother's murder, he denied `in his heart that God was present in all places 
and saw all things'. Cain also accused God of being unjust, when he told God that 
his punishment was greater than he could bear. 152 While commenting on Genesis 
IV. 8, where Cain spoke to Abel to persuade him to go into the field, where he 
would kill him, Andrew Willet noted `the paraphrase of Hierusalem... that Cain 
affirmed, there was no Judge, that governed the world, not no other life but this, 
nor reward for the righteous, or punishment for the wicked, because his oblation 
was not accepted, as well as his brothers: Abel did hold the contrary'. 153 On these 
interpretations, Cain could be seen as an example of the individuals Hobbes had 
described in the natural condition, whose only guide to action was their own 
natural reason. Hobbes thought that natural individuals took their own passions as 
right reason, as the reason for their actions. For Hobbes, although the laws of 
nature were the guide to actions, and were easily discoverable by those 
individuals who used their natural reason, many individuals were unable to 
discover them, because of their passions. Further, even if through natural reason, 
they were able to discover the laws of nature, they needed help in interpreting 
those laws. For Hobbes, human beings violated the laws of nature when they 
failed to realise those duties to other human beings, which were necessary for 
their own preservation. On Hobbes' account, Cain violated the laws of nature, 
when he declared that his brother was of no concern to him. Cain knew the laws 
of nature by natural reason, but followed his own interpretation of those laws. 
Cain did not act against reason, but in line with what his own natural reason 
150 See Matthew VII. 12 
. s' See chapter four on the right of nature. 
152 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 21. 
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dictated to him. His own interpretation of the laws of nature led him to kill his 
brother. 
The interpretations of Whateley and Willet also implied that Cain was an 
atheist. Hobbes defined an atheist as an individual who denied the existence of 
God. According to Hobbes, most individuals knew God existed by the light of 
reason. But God's existence was not known by all men, because some were 
`constantly in pursuit of pleasure, wealth or honour', others did `not have the 
habit, the ability or the concern to reason correctly', and others were quite simply 
fools. Atheists fell into the category of fools, and Hobbes cited `The fool hath 
said in his heart, There is no God', as evidence for this. '54 Hobbes therefore 
classed atheism as a sin of imprudence, rather than injustice; and claimed that 
atheists were punished by God, and civil sovereigns as enemies. 155 And yet Cain 
cannot be an atheist, because in a number of ways he showed that he knew God 
existed. Cain offered a sacrifice to God, and felt undervalued when God accepted 
his brother's offering, but not his. He also lied to God about his brother, and then 
cried out to God that his punishment was greater than he could bear. 
Although as we have seen, a number of commentators thought that Cain 
did not recognise God's power, this did not prevent God from punishing Cain. 
Why then did Hobbes claim that Cain would not have dared to kill Abel, if there 
had been a common power with the ability to punish him? Hobbes must have 
been aware that the eleventh to the fifteenth verses of the fourth chapter of 
Genesis described God's immediate punishment of Cain. As Gervase Babington 
put it, we should `marke the wrath, sharpe is his hand upon this offender, and yet 
most just'. 156 Cain was cursed from the earth - the ground would not provide him 
with crops. He was also made a fugitive and vagabond. God's punishment of 
Cain was a `two-fold disquiet, one bodily, he being to wander from one Country 
to another; the other spiritual, his conscience, which ever followed him, not 
suffering him to enjoy any rest, but keeping him in perpetual fear of 
153 `, fillet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 50. 
154 De Cive, XIV, footnote to 19, p. 164. Here, Hobbes cited Psalm LIII. 1. On the position of the 
atheist in Hobbes' theory, see Richard Woodfield, `Hobbes on the Laws of Nature and the 
Atheist', Renaissance and Modern Studies, 15 (1971), pp. 34-43. 
155 See De Cive, XIV, 19, pp. 163-4. 
156 Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 22. 
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vengeance'. 157 Similarly according to John Richardson, Bishop of Ardagh, and 
contributor to the Westminster Assembly's Annotations on the Bible, Cain `was 
cast out from society with [his] kindred and acquaintance; from God's presence, 
and the communion of his Church, and pursued still with a guilty conscience'. 158 
For a number of commentators, Cain was actually more a fugitive from his own 
conscience than a fugitive on earth. '59 Joseph Hall described the conscience as 
God's deputy. For Hall, the `troubled conscience projecteth fearfull things', and 
Cain who `feared not to kill his brother', now fears `that whosoever meets him 
will kill him'. The consequence for Cain, of God's punishment, was that `Cain 
finds that he killed himselfe more than his brother'. According to Hall, we 
`should never sin, if our fore-sight were but as good as our sense; The issue of sin 
would appear a thousand times more horrible than the act is pleasant'. 160 
But most commentators also noted that God mitigated Cain's punishment, 
when he cried out that it was greater than he could bear. 161 God marked Cain and 
decreed a punishment for anyone that tried to kill him. A number of 
commentators addressed the question of why God did not punish Cain with death, 
and they came up with a variety of answers. According to Benjamin Needler, God 
prescribed earthly punishments for Cain, because `wicked men are not so greatly 
feared with the punishments of the life to come, as careful to avoid calamities for 
the present, and indeed herein man becomes like the beasts that perish, which are 
carried with an hurry to things present, and sensible'. 162 God also kept Cain alive 
for the propagation of mankind. He did not make an example of Cain, because 
due to `the scarcity of persons then living... there was then less feare of doing hurt 
by example'. 163 For John Richardson, God `would have [Cain] preserved alive, 
(though a life likely worse then death) as a monument of his justice against 
157 Haak, Dutch Annotations, Genesis IV. 12. 
158 Richardson, Choice Observations, Genesis IV. 12. 
159 See Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 50; Ross, An Exposition, p. 77; and Whateley, Prototypes, 
p. 23. 
160 Hall, Contemplations, pp. 780-1. See also Anon., A Briefe Discourse of the Scriptures, p. 18. 
161 Andrew Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 50, thought the reason that Cain thought 
his punishment was greater than he could bear was because he feared that `every man might have 
liberty to kill him'. 
162 Needier, Expository Notes, p. 164. 
163 Needier, Expository Notes, pp. 171-2. See also Thaddeus, The Reconciler of the Bible, p. 9. 
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murder and fratricide... Not for love to Cain, but to prevent future murder'. 164 
William Whateley noted that the law punishing murder with death was not yet in 
existence. 165 And Alexander Ross argued that God did not punish Cain with death 
for a number of reasons. `Firstly, to shew that he abhorres murther: secondly, hee 
would have him to live long in feare and torment: thirdly, that by him being so 
long in torment and miserie, others might be warned to abhorre murther; fourthly 
that hee might have the longer time to repent his sinne'. 166 For many 
commentators, Cain's earthly punishment was far worse than death. For John 
Trapp it meant `that he might every day be dying: having a hell in his conscience, 
and standing in fear of every man he met with'. 167 
These interpretations contradicted Hobbes' claim that there was no 
common power with the ability to punish Cain. But interestingly, a number of 
commentators noted that God's punishment actually appeared to be a benefit, and 
this taught us a valuable lesson. According to William Whateley, God gave Cain 
health, children, and prosperity, in the hope that Cain could be drawn away from 
sin. 168 The lesson we learnt from Cain's benefits concerns `the bounty of God 
which gives great outward benefits to the worst men, thereby assuring your selves 
that hee will provide well enough for you that are his owne people'. 169 For 
Andrew Willet, following Ambrose, we learnt 
that we are not to measure Gods favour by the accidents of this life... 
Abel... a just, innocent, devout man in his young yeares is taken away: 
whereas wicked Cain liveth long, begetteth children, buildeth Cities: 
which is an evident demonstration of another life after this ... 
170 
Similarly Joseph Hall asked, `who dare measure God's love from outward events, 
when he sees wicked Cain standing over bleeding Abel, whose sacrifice was first 
accepted, and now himselfe is sacrificed? i171 Quite simply, the account of Cain 
and Abel, like the account of Job, taught us that good men often suffered, while 
164 Richardson, Choice Observations, Genesis IV. 15. See also Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and 
Exodus, p. 50; and Ross, An Exposition, p. 79. 
165 See Whateley, Prototypes, p. 22. Presumably Whateley was referring to the commandment 
`thou shalt not kill'. 
166 Ross, An Exposition, p. 79. With his third and fourth reasons, Ross followed Luther, Lectures 
on Genesis, pp. 301 & 307. 
167 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 52. 
168 See Whateley, Prototypes, p. 22. 
169 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 26. 
170 Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 53. 
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evil men prospered, and that we could not question God's purposes in this. A 
number of commentators also noted that God's punishment did not change Cain's 
behaviour. For Heinrich Bullinger, Cain became `more wicked, dealt altogether 
ungodly, set first his minde upon earthly things, thought to exalt his name upon 
earth, and builded the first citie... he begat sonnes and daughters, but little feare of 
God was before their eyes... ' 172 Similarly Andrew Willet, following Josephus, 
thought that `Cain was not amended by this punishment, but waxed worse and 
worse, giving himselfe to rapine, robbery, oppression, deceit'. 173 
Hobbes had argued that Cain would not have dared to kill Abel if there 
had been a common power with the ability to punish him. The scriptural 
interpretations outlined above suggest that Cain killed his brother, because he 
thought he could literally get away with murder. Cain thought that there was no 
power that could punish him, and in a sense his punishment, or rather the benefits 
he received, confirmed this. Hobbes' views indicate that he thought God's 
punishment of Cain, like God's punishment of Cain's parents, was simply not 
punishment enough. On Hobbes' account Cain's punishment could even be 
interpreted as a natural punishment - in Cain's case he suffered unbearable guilt 
after murdering his own brother. Cain's conscience might have accused him after 
the event, but it did not prevent him from killing Abel. Hobbes' view that 
individuals needed a common human power to fear, and that in the natural 
condition, although God was the greater power, the fear of men was usually the 
greater fear was confirmed by the account of Cain and Abel. 174 The fear of God 
did not prevent Cain from killing Abel, but after the fratricide, Cain feared that 
other men would kill him. 175 
4. State of Nature as fallen condition? 
Hobbes' contemporary critics cited the account of Cain's murder of Abel as 
evidence against Hobbes' description of the state of nature as a condition of war. 
171 Hall, Contemplations, p. 780. 
172 Bullinger, Looke from Adam, p. 25. 
173 Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 51. 
174 See Leviathan, XIV, 31, p. 88. 
175 This will be discussed in more detail in chapter five on the creation of society. 
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They appear to have agreed with Hobbes that Cain and Abel lived in the natural 
condition, or a condition before commonwealths came into existence. 176 But the 
critics thought that the scriptural account demonstrated that human beings did not 
have a right to hurt, kill, or invade others. God's immediate punishment of Cain 
proved that his right was confined by the law of nature. The account of Cain and 
Abel also demonstrated that there had been private property from the 
beginning. '77 Hobbes' critics thought that scripture, history and experience taught 
us that generally human beings were not barbarous, but loved and cared for one 
another, and this was especially true for members of families. Hobbes' 
description of the state of nature, as a condition of war, was quite simply 
dishonourable to God. The critics had also argued that Hobbes had only taken the 
passions into account, and had failed to consider reason. For these writers, natural 
reason was sufficient to control the passions, and prevent human beings from 
perpetrating wanton violence against others in the natural condition. Naturally 
equal individuals would realise that it was not reasonable to fight with one 
another, or to attempt to subdue one another. The fear of God, the laws of nature, 
and the individual conscience were all capable of maintaining peace in the natural 
condition. 
And yet the interpretations of Genesis outlined above tend to prove 
Hobbes right, and his contemporary critics wrong, and in doing so have 
demonstrated that Hobbes' account of human nature was closer to orthodox 
Reformed views, than were the arguments of his contemporary critics. Having 
said that, there were some aspects of Hobbes' description which could have been 
seen as a subversion of scripture. Firstly, although his argument bore a superficial 
resemblance to the theory of the Two Cities, with his description of two types of 
human beings, and the quarrels between them, Hobbes failed to mention whether 
these human beings were good or bad men; or children of God or children of the 
devil. He also did not mention the devil as the cause of conflict between 
individuals. And although his readers could apply Hobbes' three causes of quarrel 
to Cain, it was also possible to apply them to Abel, and on the latter interpretation 
176 We have seen in previous chapters that the critics also understood the natural condition as 
Eden. Thus, they appear to have made no distinction between the pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian 
conditions. 
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Abel was as responsible as Cain for the quarrel between them. This would also 
imply that it was not necessarily the case that Cain was an evil man, and Abel a 
good man. But we have also seen, that for protestant commentators it was not 
possible to tell good and bad men apart from their outward works. Only God 
could look into men's hearts and see their true intentions, and thus judge whether 
they were good or evil. Hobbes also shared this view, and in doing so subscribed 
to the central doctrine of protestantism, that is justification by faith, rather than 
works. 
Secondly, according to scripture, Cain was Abel's superior by birth, thus 
denying Hobbes' argument for natural equality. And yet the account of Cain and 
Abel demonstrated that the privileges of nature were not really worth very much - 
Cain might have been the elder, but this did not make him the better man. For 
Hobbes' readers, Cain was a good example of why we could not say that one 
individual was naturally superior to another. Finally, and most importantly, the 
scriptural account also seemed to contradict Hobbes' argument that there was no 
common power with the ability to punish Cain. The fourth chapter of Genesis 
outlined God's immediate punishment of Cain. But Hobbes had never denied that 
God did not punish Cain immediately - he did not refer to this at all. Instead he 
simply stated that Cain would not have dared to kill Abel, if there had been a 
common power that could have punished him. On Hobbes' account, Cain did not 
recognise God's power over him, and thought he could literally get away with 
murder. Hobbes thought Cain killed Abel through envy, not because he believed 
Abel's death was necessary for his own preservation. His action was therefore a 
wrong against God and natural law, and God punished him immediately. 178 
But for those of Hobbes' seventeenth century readers, who subscribed to 
the views of the protestant commentators outlined above, there were important 
parallels to be seen between Hobbes' account of the war of all against all, and the 
murder of Abel by Cain. The idea that Cain killed Abel through envy, after God 
had shown that he valued Abel's sacrifice more highly than his own, was in 
agreement with Hobbes' claims that human beings had a high opinion of 
themselves, hated to see similar qualities in others, and were capable of reacting 
177 I will return to this in chapter four on the right of nature. 
178 This will be discussed in more detail in chapter four on the right of nature. 
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violently if they felt undervalued by others. In fact Cain was a prime example of 
such an individual. Hobbes' argument that there was no common power with the 
ability to punish Cain also seems to be in agreement with the theory of the Two 
Cities. Cain as a child of the devil did not recognise God's power - he 
demonstrated this by his intention in sacrificing to God, and also by his action in 
killing Abel. Further, on Luther's interpretation, Cain showed that both his 
brother, and the laws of nature were of no concern to him, and also that he could 
kill his brother by right, as first-born. For Andrew Willet and William Whateley, 
Cain's words to God demonstrated that he did not recognise God's power. On 
these interpretations the example of Cain and Abel supported Hobbes' view that 
individuals had no obligations to each other, and did not recognise either the laws 
of nature, or a common power with the ability to punish them. This was also 
confirmed by the interpretations of God's punishment of Cain as a benefit, and 
those which noted that Cain's behaviour was not changed by his punishment. On 
Hobbes' account, Cain's punishment, i. e. a guilty conscience, was simply a 
natural consequence of his action. The fear of God's punishment, the laws of 
nature, and his own conscience were not enough to prevent Cain from killing his 
brother. Thus human beings needed a visible, human power to fear. For one 
commentator, Benjamin Needler, the scriptural account also implied that in 
killing his brother, Cain acted on his passions, against both reason and scripture, 
and yet Needler also thought that Cain acted with premeditation. On Hobbes' 
account, Cain could have been seen as an example of an individual who mistook 
his own passions for right reason, or for the reason of his action. Thus Cain killed 
his brother, according to his own natural reason. It seems, that Hobbes' war of all 
against all, was not that dissimilar to the interpretations of the fourth chapter of 
Genesis which I have outlined above. 
Why then did Hobbes' critics cite Cain and Abel to disprove Hobbes' 
state of nature, or war of all against all? They did so in order to demonstrate that 
even in the fallen condition the laws of God and nature were obligatory. Thus, 
although in the fallen condition Cain murdered his brother, he did not have a right 
to do so, his right was confined by the law of nature, and his crime was punished 
immediately by God. Hobbes' critics believed that reason, the laws of nature, the 
conscience and the fear of God were sufficient to either prevent the majority of 
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men, in the natural condition, from perpetrating violence, or to punish them after 
the event. But as we have seen in this chapter, the account of Cain and Abel was 
interpreted in a rather different way by Reformed commentators. On these 
interpretations, the laws of nature, the conscience and the fear of God were 
insufficient to prevent Cain from killing his own brother. In doing so they tend to 
confirm Hobbes' account. Hobbes' use of the account of Cain and Abel indicates 
his own knowledge of scripture, and also that he could be read as being closer 
than his contemporary critics to the Reformed commentary tradition. 
Hobbes' contemporary critics thought that human beings were sociable 
because of their potential for society, and that this was demonstrated by nature. 
But Hobbes thought that it was just as likely that nature demonstrated man's 
potential to be hostile. The account of Cain and Abel was an excellent example to 
use in support of this view. According to the theory of the Two Cities, beginning 
with Cain and Abel, there had come into existence two groups of people - the 
elect and the reprobate, who lived on earth mixed up together. It was not possible 
for human beings to distinguish between them from outward works. Only God 
could look into their hearts and see their intentions. Judging from outward works, 
both Cain and Abel appeared to be good men, because they both offered sacrifices 
to God. Similarly, if we examined Cain's life after the killing, and imagined 
having no knowledge of his crime, we might think that Cain was and had been a 
good man. After all, he was `rewarded' with a family, long life, and a kingdom; 
while Abel was `punished' with death. For protestant commentators, the account 
of Cain and Abel demonstrated that good men often suffered while evil men 
prospered. 179 It also demonstrated that God's will was beyond our understanding, 
and that his intentions and purposes were not made manifest in nature. As John 
Trapp put it, `God most artificially still perfects both body and soul: but our 
sacred parents put all out of frame, and set every part in a contrary course to Gods 
will'. 180 Hobbes was loath to admit any reliance on authorities, but by citing the 
example of Cain and Abel, he indicated his own knowledge of Augustinian and 
Reformed interpretations of the scriptural account. For those of Hobbes' readers, 
179 Hobbes discussed this question in relation to the account of Job in De Cive, XV, 6, p. 174; and 
Leviathan, XXXI, 6, p. 236, and argued that God's power meant that he could have afflicted Job, 
regardless of whether Job had sinned, or not. 
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who also subscribed to these interpretations of Genesis, there were important 
parallels to be seen between Hobbes' state of war, and Cain's murder of Abel. 
1 ß° Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, p. 46. 
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Chapter Four: The Right and Law of Nature. 
`And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden 
thou mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou 
shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die'. 
(Genesis 11.16-17) 
1. Hobbes and Natural Right. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Hobbes thought that the natural 
condition of human beings was a state of war. This was caused by disagreement 
over good and evil, natural equality, and natural unsociability, but it was also a 
result of the right of all men to all things. ' Hobbes began his inquiry into natural 
justice with a theological assumption, namely that God had given the earth to 
human beings in common. In the Epistle Dedicatory of De Cive Hobbes informed 
his readers, that when he began to think about natural justice he was 
alerted by the very name of justice (by which is meant a constant will to 
give every man his right) to ask first how it is that anyone ever spoke of 
something as his own rather than another's; and when it was clear that it 
did not originate in nature but in human agreement (for human beings 
have distributed what nature had placed in common), I was led from there 
to another question, namely for whose benefit and under what necessity, 
when all things belonged to all men, they preferred that each man should 
have things that belonged to himself alone. And I saw that war and every 
kind of calamity must necessarily follow from community in things, as 
men came into violent conflict over their use; a thing all seek by nature to 
avoid. 
Hobbes went on to say that it was for this reason, that he obtained `two absolutely 
certain postulates of human nature: one, the postulate of human greed, by which 
each man insists upon his own private use of common property; the other, the 
postulate of natural reason, by which each man strives to avoid violent death as 
the supreme evil in nature'. Hobbes' description of the right of nature was a 
combination of these two postulates of human nature - passion and reason. 
1 See De Cive, I, 12, p. 29; and Elements, XIV, 11, p. 80. In Leviathan Hobbes at one point 
argued that the right of all was a consequence of the war of all, and at another point changed his 
mind and claimed that the right to all caused the war of all - see Leviathan, XIII, p. 78 & XVIII, 
10, p. 114. Two of Hobbes' contemporaries noticed this change - see Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 
83; and Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 317. 
2 De Cive, Ep. Ded., 9-10, pp. 5-6. 
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In Leviathan Hobbes claimed that previous authors had confused right 
with law, so he set out exact definitions of both terms. The right of nature was 
defined as: 
the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the 
preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life, and 
consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, 
he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto... RIGHT consisteth in 
liberty to do or to forbear. 
Hobbes defined liberty as `the absence of external impediments'; and went on to 
say that although these external impediments could remove part of an individual's 
power to do what he liked, they could not stop him from using any power he had 
left, depending on what his own judgement and reason dictated to him. 3 In other 
words, the right of nature was the liberty to do, or not to do, any action which an 
individual judged to be conducive to his own preservation. How much liberty an 
individual had, depended on how many external impediments were present. The 
right of nature was a right for an individual to act on his own reason, with the aim 
of preserving his life. For Hobbes, right was to law, as liberty was to obligation. 
Hobbes stressed that right was not created by law, but a natural liberty left by the 
law - right covered the area of human existence where law did not reach. 
5 Laws 
`are those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge one another's liberty', 
and the laws of God and nature allowed individuals a greater liberty than that 
allowed by civil law. 6 Presumably because in the state of nature, the laws of 
nature only obliged the conscience. 7 
The right of nature allowed an individual to preserve his life, by whatever 
means seemed necessary to him. By definition, this meant that the right of nature 
involved the individual in the private judgement of good and evil. In the state of 
3 Leviathan, XIV, 1-3, p. 79. 
4 See Leviathan, XIV, 3, p. 80. In De Cive, VII, 18, p. 101, Hobbes claimed that `the state of 
nature has the same relation to the civil state, i. e., liberty has the same relation to subjection, as 
desire has to reason or a beast to a Man'. 
5 See Elements, XXIX, 5, p. 179; and De Cive, XIV, 3, p. 156. 
6 Elements, XXIX, 5, p. 179. But civil law and natural law contain one another - see Leviathan, 
XXVI, 8, p. 174. On Hobbes' discussion of liberty in response to classical republican theories, see 
Quentin Skinner, `Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty', Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society (1990), pp. 121-51. On p. 130, Skinner notes that the laws of nature do 
not restrict our liberty. 
7 In the state of nature, where the laws of nature only obliged conscience (judgement), the laws of 
nature were not a great enough impediment to an individual's liberty. This will be discussed in 
further detail below in the section on the laws of nature. 
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nature every man, by right of nature, could do whatever he liked to whomever he 
liked. He could possess, use and enjoy anything, even another's body. 8 Nature 
made men desire what was good for them, and avoid what was evil. Death, and 
the pain that accompanied it, was the greatest enemy of nature, so it was not 
against reason for an individual to do everything he could to preserve himself. 
That `which is not against reason, men call RIGHT'. 9 Thus it was a right of 
nature for men to preserve their lives. A right to an end also entailed a right to the 
means to that end. Therefore it was also a right that men preserve themselves by 
whatever means necessary, and further that they were sole judges of both the 
prospective danger, and the means to avoid it. 10 Every thing a man willed must, 
according to his own judgement, be good for him, and his own preservation must 
be the end he desired. Therefore, `every man by nature hath right to all things', 
and right and profit were the same thing. " But Hobbes stressed that this only 
applied to men in the purely natural state. Here nothing done against any man was 
wrong, although it was possible `to sin against God, or to violate the Natural 
laws... if [an individual] claims that something contributes to his self- 
preservation, but does not believe that it does so'. 12 
According to Hobbes, `natural right does not accept that anything that 
arises from the need for self-preservation is a vice'. 13 In the state of nature, every 
individual had a right to preserve himself by any means, which he himself judged 
necessary. This meant that in `the judgement of the person actually doing it, what 
was done was rightly done, even if it was a wrong, and so was rightly done'. '4 
How could a wrong be rightly done? There were wrongs in the state of nature, but 
they were not wrong if, according to the judgement of the individual, their aim 
was his own preservation, and in this case they were wrongs rightly done. Hobbes 
used the example of a son who killed his father - this killing would not be a 
wrong against his father if, in the son's judgement, the death of his father would 
8 See Elements, XIV, 10, p. 79; Leviathan, XIV, 4, p. 80; and De Cive, I, 10, p. 28. 
9 Elements, XIV, 6, p. 79. 
10 See Elements, XIV, 6-9, pp. 78-9. See also De Cive, I, 7-9, pp. 27-8. The corresponding 
paragraph is in chapter XIV of Leviathan - `Of the First and Second Natural Laws and of 
Contracts'. 
11 Elements, XIV, 10, pp. 79-80. Also see De Cive, I, 10, p. 28. 
'2 De Cive, footnote to I, 10, pp. 28-9. 
13 De Cive, Ep. Ded. p. 4. 
14 De Cive, footnote to I, 10, pp. 28-9. 
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contribute to the son's preservation. In this case it would be a wrong, rightly 
done. But, if the son killed his father, and did not believe that in doing so it would 
aid his own preservation, but killed for some other reason, then this was a wrong 
against God and natural law. Hobbes thought that natural punishments followed 
breaches of natural law. 15 In this case the son would find out just how necessary 
his father was for his own preservation, and thus whether the killing of his father 
was really right. The natural punishment of such an action might be the son's own 
death, or unbearable guilt. 
As we have seen, Hobbes thought that in the natural condition individuals 
were judged according to their intentions, not their actions, 16 and only God could 
judge those intentions. 17 According to Hobbes, when justice and injustice were 
attributed to individuals, `they signify proneness and affection, and inclination of 
nature, that is to say, passions of the mind apt to produce just and unjust 
actions'. 18 This meant that we could call a man just, not because of his action, but 
because of his `aptitude to do such action'. As a result, a man could be called just, 
even if he had committed an unjust action; and a man could be called unjust, even 
if he had committed just actions. Both types of men hated to sin, but for different 
reasons. The unjust man, who abstained from injuries, `declareth plainly that the 
justice of his actions dependeth on civil constitution, from whence punishments 
proceed; which otherwise in the estate of nature be unjust, according to the 
fountain from whence they proceed'. 19 An individual `is to be called just, who 
does just things because the law so instructs, and unjust things only because of 
weakness'. The just or righteous man `delights in doing justice'. The unjust or 
unrighteous man `does just things because of the penalty attached to the law, and 
unjust things from the wickedness of his heart'. He disregards justice, or thinks 
that `the measure of it is present advantage, not a man's agreement'. ° Hobbes 
thought that in the natural condition `nothing can be unjust'. Right and wrong, 
15 See Leviathan, XXVIII, 8, pp. 204-5; and XXXI, 40, p. 243. 
16 See De Cive, III, 27, p. 54; and Leviathan, XXVII, 3, p. 191. 
17 See for example Leviathan, XXX, 30, p. 233 & XL11,79, p. 373. 
18 Elements, XVI, 4, p. 89. David Boonin-Vail, Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), pp. 109 & 144, has argued that Hobbes' moral 
philosophy was intended to demonstrate what made just people, rather than what made just 
actions. 
19 Elements, XVI, 4, p. 89. 
151 
justice and injustice `are qualities which relate to men in society, not in 
solitude'. 21 In the state of nature, or outside the commonwealth, where there was 
no law, it was ridiculous to talk about just and unjust actions. In a condition 
where individuals were judged by their intentions, who could say whether a 
particular action was right or wrong, except the individual concerned, and God? 
For Hobbes, it was in civil society that human beings had decided that it was 
wrong to kill others, and also under what particular circumstances. 
The right of nature also gave a right of temporary and insecure dominion, 
if again an individual judged it necessary to his own preservation. In Leviathan 
Hobbes stressed that the state of nature was a state of equality, and that there was 
no dominion of persons before civil government. 22 Because everyone had a right 
to everything in the state of nature, it was not possible to invade someone else's 
right, because where all had a right, it was as if no one had a right. 23 But although 
all adults were to be accounted equal in the natural condition, if an individual 
could achieve power over another, he should be allowed it. 24 In the Elements and 
De Cive Hobbes explained this in the following way. Because the right of self- 
preservation proceeded from danger, and danger proceeded from equality, 
individuals might think it best to destroy equality before the danger arrived. If an 
individual in the state of nature had managed to get another into his power, either 
because the other was a child, or because he was weaker, then it was in his 
interest to make sure that this `subdued person' did not become an enemy in the 
future. 25 
The right of nature, or the right of all to all, also meant that there was no 
permanent, private property in the state of nature, `no mine and thine distinct, but 
only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it'. 26 
The right of nature, or the right of self-preservation, whereby each individual was 
his own judge of the means to his own preservation, was a right of all to all. But 
20 De Cive, III, 5, p. 46. See also Leviathan XV, 10, p. 93, where Hobbes noted that just and 
unjust men were often referred to as righteous and unrighteous. 
21 Leviathan, XIII, 13, p. 78. 
22 See Leviathan, XIII, 1, p. 74; and XVI, 10, p. 103. Hobbes' views on natural equality have been 
discussed in chapter two, where it was also noted that the desire for dominion was natural. 
23 See De Cive, XIV, 9, p. 158. 
24 See Leviathan, XIII, 4, p. 75; De Cive, I, 14, pp. 30-1; and Elements, XIV, 13, pp. 80-1. 
25 De Cive, I, 14, p. 31. See also Elements, XIV, 13, pp. 80-1. 
152 
this right of all men to all things was useless, because if all had it, then it was as if 
there was no right at all. I could say this is mine, but you would have an equal 
right to it, so neither of us could enjoy it. 27 Where each individual was his own 
judge, there was no judge; and where each individual `carveth out his own right, 
it hath the same effect, as if there were no right at all'. 28 For Hobbes, when two 
individuals desired the same thing, which could not be divided, the result was a 
battle to decide who would have it. One man invaded with right, and the other 
resisted with right, and the result was perpetual war. 29 The consequence of the 
right of all to all was that the natural state of men, `before they came together into 
society was... a war of every man against every man'. 30 
To summarise Hobbes' right of nature, it was a right which all individuals 
had, and in the natural condition it was a right to all. But because all had this right 
to all, it was actually useless - where all had a right it was as if no one had a right. 
It was a right which allowed one human being to dominate another, if that human 
being considered it necessary for his own preservation. It was a right for one 
human being to kill another, in order to preserve his own life. It was a right, 
which meant that there could be no wrong in the state of nature - everything an 
individual did, in the state of nature, with the intention of preserving his life was 
rightly done. It was a right which had to be given up in order to create a 
commonwealth, and yet human beings could not give up that part of it which 
related to self-defence. 31 
2. The Contemporary Reaction. 
Hobbes' contemporary critics found his description of the right of nature 
particularly objectionable for a number of reasons. Firstly, for these writers the 
sole end of the right of nature was not self-preservation. As Richard Cumberland 
26 Leviathan, XIII, 13, p. 78. See also Leviathan, XVI, 10, p. 103, for no dominion of persons 
before civil society. 
27 See De Cive, I, 11, p. 29. 
2S Elements, XVII, 6, p. 95. 
29 See De Cive, I, 12, p. 29; Elements, XIV, 11, p. 80; and Leviathan, XIII, 3, p. 75. 
30 De Cive, I, 12, p. 29. See also Elements, XIV, 11, p. 80; and Leviathan, XIII, 8, p. 76, which 
has `during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe'. 
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put it, the preservation of an individual's life was not the most important thing 
because `Life it self is to be parted with for a greater good, such as the Salvation 
of a Man's Soul, the Glory of God, and the common Good of Men. These are not 
to be given up, altho it were necessary to the Preservation of Life'. 32 For James 
Tyrrell, `the bare preservation of... Life and Members, as the only end of living... 
may be enjoyed by those who are really very miserable... ' 33 William Lucy agreed 
with Hobbes that the right of nature included a right of self-preservation, but Lucy 
thought that `the life of man is not the principall thing of mans happiness... ', 
because the end of man was to glorify God. 34 Hobbes' argument that because 
preserving our life was not against reason, this made it a right, was false. 35 
Experience demonstrated that `many men throw and take away their owne 
lives... ', and it was not the case that death brought with it the loss of all power, 
and the greatest bodily pain. 36 
Although Hobbes' contemporary critics might have agreed that at least 
part of the right of nature included the right of self-preservation, they did not 
agree that this gave all a right to all. James Tyrrell thought that a right to all was 
unnecessary for the preservation of life, `since such an unlimited Right, or rather 
Licence, can be so far from conducing to any man's preservation, that if any men 
should ever have gone about to put it in practice, it would have long since 
produced not only their own destruction, but that of all Mankind'. 37 For John 
Whitehall, Hobbes' right of all to all meant that: 
a Man may by nature do that to another that he would not have another do 
to him. He may take his Neighbours goods or life by deceit or violence, 
though he would not have an other take his; for would any Man have an 
other take his goods or life by fraud or violence? Tis impossible to 
humane nature to suppose it. 
It also meant that `Cain's killing Abel was lawful; and that Oliver's Army might 
in the Year 1651 take all the propriety of the people of England, as they had taken 
31 Hobbes' views on laying down rights will be discussed below in the section on the laws of 
nature. The transfer of rights from mothers to fathers will be discussed in the final chapter on the 
creation of society. 
32 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 77. 
33 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 279. 
3; Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 138,195 & 142-3. 
35 See Lucy, Observations 1657, p. 160. 
36 Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 140,144 & 147. 
37 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 280-1. 
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the King's... '38 John Shafte agreed with Hobbes, that human beings in the state of 
nature had a right to everything, but according to Shafte if there were competitors, 
then the right was to `a just and equal portion of it'. It was from this equality that, 
ShafIe thought, we could deduce the rules for living in the state of nature. 39 For 
Sir Robert Filmer, Hobbes actually contradicted himself by arguing that human 
beings had a right to all, even to one another's bodies, and at the same time 
claiming that originally fathers were sovereigns, with the power of life and death 
over their children 40 
The right of nature, that is the right of self-preservation, did not give 
human beings a right to invade, hurt or kill others. As John Shafte put it, `what 
rational man will pretend, that because he hath a right and liberty granted him by 
God or Nature, to preserve his own life, or another mans, will conclude, that 
hereby is intended to him a Grant of a Right and Liberty to destroy himself or 
another? Al William Lucy again agreed with Hobbes that a right to the end (i. e. 
self-preservation) also entailed a right to the means to that end, but `though a man 
have right to his body or life, yet hee hath no right to preserve it by unlawfull 
actions... ' Neither was `this right... of such a transcendent power', that he should 
kill other human beings in the pursuit of his own preservation. 2 According to 
Lucy, the right of nature, given by God at the creation, did not give men a right 
over other men, only over those creatures specified. All right that any man had 
must either come from nature as a parent, or from a covenant. 43 Lucy also agreed 
with Hobbes that an individual could use his own strength, for his own 
38 Whitehall, The Leviathan Found Out, p. 37. We have seen in chapter three, on the war of all 
against all, that God's punishment, which actually appeared as a benefit, could be understood to 
suggest that Cain's murder of his brother was not necessarily unlawful. 
39 Shafte, The Great Law of Nature, p. 13. 
40 See Filmer, Observations, p. 187. On Filmer see: Peter Laslett, `Sir Robert Filmer: The Man 
versus the Whig Myth', The William and Mary Quarterly, 5 (1948), pp. 523-46; and Laslett, `The 
Gentry of Kent in 1640', The Cambridge Historical Journal, 9 (1948), pp. 148-64. On Filmer's 
political thought see: J. W. Allen, `Sir Robert Filmer', in The Social and Political Ideas of some 
English Thinkers of the Augustan Age, A. D. 1650-1750, edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw (George C. 
Harrap & Co Ltd, London, 1928), pp. 27-46; James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political 
Thought (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1979); R. W. K. Hinton, `Husbands, Fathers and 
Conquerors', Political Studies, 15 (1967), pp. 291-300; Schochet, Patriarchalisnt in Political 
Thought; J. P. Sommerville, `From Suarez to Filmer: A Reappraisal', Historical Journal, 25 
(1982), pp. 525-40; and Politics and Ideology in England 1603-1640 (Longman Group Ltd, 
Harlow, Essex, 1986), chapter 1. 
41 Shafte, The Great Lcnv of Nature, p. 4. 
42 Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 163-4. 
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preservation, but `when some greater good shall be proposed to him of the good 
of his family, his Nation, the glory of God in his vertuous death, then this life is to 
be neglected and contemned, as a limb is to be lost rather then a life, the lesse 
good rather then the greater, so a private life rather then that of a Nation'. 44 
Hobbes' contemporary critics were particularly worried by the distinction 
he made between right and law, which implied to them that right conflicted with 
law. 5 For William Lucy, `there is no right to anything but by law' 46 Human 
beings could not have a right of nature, unless that right had been permitted by 
the law of nature, which was given at the creation. The right of nature was the 
authority granted by that law to use or do anything, as described in Genesis I. 28- 
9.47 But this right of nature was not to be used by human beings as they pleased, 
and Lucy cited the example of Cain and Abel as evidence of this. According to 
Lucy, 
Cain and Abell brought Oblations to GOD of those things over which they 
had a most peculiar dominion, they pay'd God as it were a tribute out of 
those things hee gave them a right to by that law of nature which he gave 
them at their creation, from whence it appeares that man hath not such 
right to any thing, much lesse to all things to doe what he pleaseth with or 
to them, for then they had had no right to have neglected that duty of 
Oblation, and then they could have done nothing by which God should 
have put a difference betwixt Cain and his Oblation and Abell and his 
Oblation as he did. 8 
It was the law of nature which created and confined right. According to 
William Lucy, `where there is no positive law of God's or mans prohibiting them, 
only the law of nature is of force to restraine mens actions and to give right to 
every thing; and without doubt God can be displeased with nothing that is 
right ... '49 Lucy cited the nineteenth chapter of Genesis, which described the 
Sodomites, who attempted `an unjust act against two strangers'. He asked the 
question, if they acted by right, why was God so angry with them that he burnt 
down the city? According to Lucy, `Mr. Hobs would have told [God] there is no 
43 See Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 176-7. In De Cive, XV, 5, p. 173, Hobbes himself had argued 
that `all right over others is either from Nature or Agreement'. 
44 Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. I68-9. 
45 For example see Coke, A Survey of the Politichs, To the Reader & p. 31. 
46 Lucy, Observations 1657, p. 172. 
47 See Lucy, Observations 1657, p. 174. 
48 Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 175-6. 
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positive law forbidding it and that lust given all things to all men by Nature, and 
it is lawful for any man to doe any thing to any man'. 50 Lucy also used the 
example of Cain and Abel, and argued that if Hobbes had been Cain when God 
questioned him, he `would have told God thou hast given him to me and I had a 
right to doe what I would with him, by thy Commission... and now I have taken 
him away by that naturall right which thou hast given men'. As far as Lucy was 
concerned, Hobbes had `out Cained Cain himself in his justification of these 
horrid acts by his Principles'. 51 God's punishment of these two acts demonstrated 
that the `Sodomites and Cain had transgressed some Law (which could be none 
but the law of Nature), it must needs shew that these men had no right to doe 
what they would with any thing that is with other persons, but had their right 
confined in many acts by the law of nature... '52 
For many of these writers, right without law was actually useless. 
According to John Whitehall, there was `nothing... more apparent, that Right is 
worth nothing, except there be Law to recover it, and therefore they must get 
together; and in having of Law to recover Men's rights, lies the grand foundation 
of peace, which is the greatest worldly happiness of mankind; and so are clearly 
consistent in the same matter'. 53 James Tyrrell noted that Hobbes himself 
admitted that this right to all was of no use, because all individuals possessed it. 54 
According to Tyrrell, the right of nature did not conflict with the law of nature, 
and thus it was possible to commit a wrong against another person in the state of 
nature. If the right of nature gave one individual a right to something, then 
another individual could not take it away, without committing a wrong against 
that person. 55 
The right of nature was a right permitted by the law of nature. Thus, it did 
not give an individual the right to judge what conduced to his own preservation, 
49 Lucy, Observations 1657, p. 180. 
so Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 181-2 
51 Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 182-3. 
52 Lucy, Observations 1657, p. 183. 
53 Whitehall, The Leviathan Found Out, p. 40. 
54 See Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 296. 
ss See Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, pp. 294 & 298. Although Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 300, 
also noted that Hobbes thought it was possible to injure another out of civil government - the case 
of a son who killed his father, but did not believe that his action was necessary for his own 
preservation. For Hobbes this was a wrong against God and natural law, but not against the person 
concerned. 
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as the laws of nature guided human judgement in this matter. For James Tyrrell, if 
this was not the case, then a man `may give a false Sentence, and suppose those 
things to be necessary for his preservation which really are not... ' In a state of 
nature, `a man's own judgment can confer no Right upon him, when he quits the 
only true Rules of his Judgment, which in this State can only be the Laws of 
Nature, or right Reason, and the nature of things, and Mankind, from whence only 
they are drawn'. 56 William Lucy agreed with Hobbes that each individual was his 
own judge in the state of nature, but like Tyrrell, Lucy thought that judgement 
should be guided by the laws of nature. 57 For Sir Robert Filmer, the right of 
nature prescribed for `every man to live in peace... so he may tend to the 
preservation of his life'. If, as Hobbes claimed, by right of nature an individual 
was at liberty to do whatever he thought necessary for his own preservation, `then 
in the first place nature must teach him that life is to be preserved'. This meant 
that the right of nature and the law of nature should be the same thing. 58 
Hobbes' views on the right of all to all were quite simply an insult to God; 
and they also reduced human beings to the level of animals. As Clarendon put it, 
Nor can anything be said more contrary to the Honor and Dignity of God 
Almighty, then that he should leave his master workmanship, Man, in a 
condition of War of every man against every man, in such a condition of 
confusion, That Every man hath a right to every thing, even to one 
anothers body; inclin'd to all the malice, force and fraud that may promote 
his profit or his pleasure, and without any notions of, or instinct towards 
justice, honor, or good nature, which only makes man-kind superior to the 
Beasts of the Wilderness. 59 
Similarly for Sir Robert Filmer, Hobbes' right of nature implied that God created 
human beings `in a condition worse than any beasts, as if he made men to no 
other end by nature but to destroy one another', or even eat one another. Filmer 
admitted that if resources had been scarce, then lack of food might have been a 
cause of men fighting each other, but `God was no such niggard in the creation', 
and as a result there was plenty to go around, and no need for human beings to 
fight each other. 60 
56 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 284-5. See also Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 77. 
57 See Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 165-6. 
58 Filmer, Observations, pp. 188-9. 
59 Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey, pp. 195-6. 
60 Filmer, Observations, p. 188. 
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Hobbes' description of the right of nature was thought to contradict the 
scriptural account, which demonstrated that there never was such a condition, 
where all had a right to all, because God made Adam a universal monarch, and 
this included giving him property rights. 61 According to Sir Robert Filmer, God 
created Adam and Eve and gave Adam dominion over Eve, and their children; as 
well as over the whole earth, and all creatures on it. While Adam was alive, this 
meant that no one could have a right to anything, except with Adam's 
permission. 62 Richard Cumberland thought that Hobbes' right of all to all could 
not be proved from, `an original holding all things in common'. Cumberland cited 
John Selden, who had proved from Genesis 1.28 that "`private Dominion was a 
most acknowledg'd Right from the days of Adam, " as you may see in his Mare 
Clausum, I. 8. c. 4... '63 Further, Genesis did not tell us, 
"That Adam and Eve had such a Right to all things, as made it lawful for 
them" (if they had thro' a mistake imagined it conducive to their own 
Preservation, ) "to wage War with GOD, and with one another, without the 
Provocation of Injury: and so mutually deprive one another of Food and 
Life. " On the contrary, there are Intimations, That they knew, and 
acknowledged, the obligation of all those things, that were then requisite 
to the common Good of the KINGDOM OF GOD in its yet infant-state. " 
The Exercise of the divine Dominion in giving Laws, and the Derivation 
of human Property from the Gift of God both there spoken of, oblige us to 
acknowledge such a Division of Property, as we have affirmed to be 
necessary. Nay, without violating the Donation of God, neither of our first 
Parents could rob the other of the Necessities of Life, much less of Life it 
self. 64 
On the other hand, William Lucy agreed that nature had given all things to all 
men, and cited the same verse - Genesis 1.28. Lucy claimed that this `guilt was 
made by the law of nature at the first Creation', and that God re-gave this gift to 
Noah after the flood, and then this right was given in common to Noah's sons. 65 
To summarise, Hobbes' contemporary critics agreed that at least part of 
the right of nature was a right of self-preservation, although they also thought that 
61 See Coke, A Survey of the Politicks, p. 26. 
62 See Filmer, Observations, p. 188. See also Coke, Elements, pp. 34-5, for Cain and Abel holding 
property given to them by Adam, as monarch of the world. 
63 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 80. Gordon Schochet has noted that Selden thought that Adam had 
dominion over the world, but he also implied there had been common property - see Schochet, 
Patriarchalism in Political Thought, p. 97. 
64 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 33. 
65 Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 184,185 & 187. 
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human beings should give up their lives for a greater good, such as their 
salvation. But they disagreed with Hobbes that the right of nature, or the right of 
self-preservation, meant that all had a right to all, because this was simply not 
necessary, and was likely to lead to destruction. The right to all could only mean a 
right to a fair and equal portion. The scriptural account proved that there had 
never been such a right of all to all, or an original common ownership. The critics 
also disagreed with Hobbes' claim that the right of nature gave one individual a 
right over another, a right to kill another, or to commit unlawful actions. Finally 
and most importantly, they disagreed with Hobbes' argument that, by right of 
nature, each man was his own judge in the state of nature, and the implication that 
the right of nature conflicted with the law of nature. This could not be the case, 
because the laws of nature were given by God at the creation, and the right of 
nature was a right prescribed by those laws, which in turn should guide men's 
judgement. 
But in many ways Hobbes would not have disagreed with some of these 
views. Hobbes wanted to find out how and why individual human beings came to 
call things their own. In other words, how and why the community of things was 
distributed amongst individuals. Hobbes wanted to show that it was human 
beings alone that had distributed property amongst themselves. Thus, rights over 
property, women, and children in civil society were all artificial. Hobbes would 
have agreed with James Tyrrell that if the right of all to all had ever been 
practised by human beings, it would have resulted in their destruction. This was 
exactly Hobbes' point. This is why human beings gave up their absolute liberty 
and distributed the community of things. Hobbes would also have agreed with 
Tyrrell's comment that, the individual judgement involved in, the exercise of the 
right of nature might lead some human beings to take courses of action, which 
were not really necessary for their own preservation. But Hobbes' point was that 
where there was no common judge, as in the state of nature, there was also no one 
to judge what was, or was not, necessary for an individual's preservation, except 
God and the individual concerned. In a condition where private appetite was the 
measure of good and evil, and each individual was his own judge, a condition 
which lacked government, or a common power recognised by all living there, 
who could say whether an individual's action was lawful or not? Who decided 
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what was a fair and equal portion? And who decided that a right to all was, or 
was not, necessary for an individual's ability to preserve himself? Hobbes' 
answer was that each individual decided for himself, and the result was conflict. 
This is why human beings created the commonwealth, and replaced many private 
judgements with one public judgement. Finally, Hobbes would also have agreed 
with John Whitehall that right without law was useless. The right to all, or the 
absolute liberty of the state of nature, was no liberty at all. True liberty could only 
be had with obligation, in other words in the commonwealth, under civil law. 
The main area for disagreement between Hobbes and his contemporary 
critics over his discussion of the right of nature was the definition of the term 
`right'. For Hobbes, right was a liberty from law, although laws restricted the 
scope of rights. The right of nature was a liberty for an individual to act on his 
own reason, to do that which he judged necessary for preservation. Noel Malcolm 
has equated Hobbes' right of nature, with what the American jurist Hohfeld has 
described as a `privilege right', which does not involve any duty on the part of 
others to help one individual to exercise his right. Hobbes' natural rights did not 
come with corresponding duties on the part of other individuals. This is in 
contrast to Hohfeld's definition of a `claim right', which involves a duty on the 
part of other individuals not to interfere with the exercise of one individual's 
right. 66 For Hobbes' contemporary critics, rights were created by law, and 
involved acting in accordance with law. The right of nature was thus a right for an 
individual to act in accordance with the law of nature, and natural rights came 
with corresponding duties. The critics' views on natural rights suggest they fall 
into Hohfeld's category of `claim rights'. Hobbes stated that previous authors had 
confused right with law - his contemporary critics appear to have been an 
example of those authors he had referred to. Hobbes had also claimed that 
Leviathan was a defence of God's laws, against claims that the civil war in 
England was commanded by God? 67 Hobbes' definition of right as liberty from 
law was designed to deny the argument that the laws of God, or nature, had given 
Englishmen a right to disobey their king. Because right was liberty from law, it 
could not have been the case that God's laws, or the laws of nature, had permitted 
66 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Vohintarist Theology, pp. 174-6. 
67 See Hobbes ' Prose Autobiography, p. 4. 
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disobedience. Instead Charles I's subjects had disobeyed him by taking a liberty 
for themselves. 
3. Hobbes and Natural Law. 
As we have seen, Hobbes' contemporary critics thought that his description of the 
right of nature implied that right conflicted with law. In the Elements and De Cive 
Hobbes accused previous authors of using the term `natural law', without 
defining it. 68 Hobbes equated the law of nature with right reason, and he defined 
right reason `in men's natural state', not as `an infallible Faculty, but the act of 
reasoning, that is, a man's own true Reasoning about actions of his which may 
conduce to his advantage or other men's loss'. 69 It was reason, rather than 
passion, because men's passions differed, whereas reason `is the same in all men, 
because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that 
which they desire to attain, namely their own good, which is the work of 
reason'. 70 A law of nature was defined as `a precept or general rule, found out by 
reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or 
taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he 
thinketh it may be best preserved... LAW determineth and bindeth to one of 
them'. 71 The law of nature was a rule found out by reason, whose specific aim 
was the preservation of an individual. The law of nature forbade individuals to 
carry out actions, the consequence of which would be the destruction of their 
lives, or the consequence of which would be relinquishing the means to preserve 
their lives. Law, according to Hobbes, `was brought into the world for nothing 
else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men, in such manner as they 
might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a common 
enemy'. 72 For Hobbes, right was a liberty for individuals to act on their own 
68 See De Cive, II, 1. p. 33; and Elements, XV, 1, p. 82. 
69 De Cive, II, 1. p. 33. This was a change from Elements, XV, 1, p. 82, where it was simply 
equated with reason, rather than right reason; and also Leviathan, XIV, 3, p. 79, where it was 
`found out by reason'. 
70 Elements, XV, 1, p. 82. 
71 Leviathan, XIV, I-3, p. 79. 
72 Leviathan, XXVI, 8, p. 175. 
162 
natural reason. The laws of nature limited the scope of natural rights (or liberties) 
in the natural condition, and led individuals to come together into society. 
The first law of nature, and the foundation of all others, was `to seek 
peace when it can be had; when it cannot, to look for aid in war'. 73 The first part 
of this rule (to seek peace) was the fundamental law of nature, and this was an 
obligation for an individual to use his own power, to act in accordance with what, 
in his own judgement, would further his preservation, i. e. peace. The second part 
(to look for help in war) was `the sum of the right of nature, which is by all means 
we can, to defend ourselves', and this was a liberty for an individual to use his 
own power, to act in accordance with what, in his own judgement, would further 
his preservation, i. e. defence. All other laws of nature were derived from this 
fundamental law, `by which men are commanded to endeavour peace'. 74 The first 
law of nature, derived from the fundamental law, was that `every man divest 
himself of the right he hath to all things by nature'. 75 When human beings 
retained the right to all things, and to each other's persons, then war was the 
result, and war was against the law of nature, `the sum whereof consisteth in 
making peace'. 76 This seemed immediately to cancel out the second part of the 
fundamental law, for an individual must give up his liberty (or at least some of it), 
to use his own power to act in accordance with what he judged to be conducive to 
his own preservation. But there was an important qualification, which Hobbes did 
not add immediately in the Elements or De Cive, but did add immediately in 
Leviathan. That qualification was that the law of nature, which obliged 
individuals to lay down rights, only did so if others were willing to do the same. 
According to Hobbes, this laying down of rights when others did the same, was 
also the law of the Gospel: `whatsoever you require that others should do to you, 
that do ye to them'. 77 But as Edwin Curley has pointed out, although both Luther 
and Aquinas thought that the law of nature prescribed the Golden Rule, Hobbes 
used it out of context, because when it was used in the Bible, for example Luke 
73 De Cive, II, 2, p. 34. See also Elements, XV, 1, p. 82, for the same argument in a slightly 
different presentation. 
74 Leviathan, XIV, 4-5, p. 80. 
75 Elements, XV, 2, p. 82; and see also De Cive, II, 3, p. 34, where this was described as the first 
law of nature. But in Leviathan, XIV, 5, p. 80, it became the second law of nature. 
76 Elements, XV, 2, p. 82. But see also Elements, XVII, 15, p. 99, where the sum of the law of 
nature `is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and formidable to them that will not'. 
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6: 27-31, it was a command to love our enemies and be good to them. Hobbes' 
condition that others must also be willing to lay down their rights was not present 
in the Biblical account. 78 
It was a law of nature that every man should be willing to lay down his 
rights, when others were willing to do the same. This was achieved through a 
contract or covenant, but this was of no use, unless it was also a law of nature that 
`every man is obliged to stand to, and perform, those covenants which he 
maketh'. 79 In De Cive this was described as keeping faith, and Hobbes stressed 
that we must keep faith with everyone we made agreements with, regardless of 
whether they kept faith with others, or did not believe in keeping faith. 80 This 
statement qualifies Edwin Curley's objection, and puts Hobbes in agreement with 
the Biblical application of the Golden Rule. Hobbes went on to say that without 
this law of nature, agreements would be pointless, and we would in fact 
contradict ourselves, if we made an agreement, and then did not believe we were 
obliged to keep it. We should either make agreements and keep to them, or not 
make agreements at all. This law of nature, to keep agreements even when others 
did not, seems to contradict Hobbes' earlier statement that individuals only gave 
up rights, when others were willing to do the same. And yet it does not contradict 
the earlier statement, if we understand that when Hobbes said that other men must 
be willing to do the same, he did not mean that individuals actually had to 
perform the action of laying down rights, but that they must have the intention to 
lay down rights. The problem was how did one individual know another 
individual's intention, except by their actions? According to Hobbes, we could 
know `the thoughts and passions of other men', by knowing our own in similar 
circumstances. 81 Also, Hobbes probably imagined a situation in which individuals 
simultaneously laid down rights, and created a sovereign power to enforce the 
terms of their covenant. This would create a condition of security, in which 
individuals could feel reasonably certain that others would also give up their right 
to all. 
77 Leviathan, XIV, 5, p. 80. 
78 See Curley's footnote 6 to Leviathan, XIV, 5, pp. 80-1. 
79 Elements, XVI, 1, p. 88. See also De Cive, III, 1, p. 43; and Leviathan, XV, 1, p. 89. 
80 See De Cive, III, 1-2, pp. 43-4. 
81 Leviathan, The Introduction, 3, p. 4. 
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Hobbes claimed that the `laws of nature are immutable and eternal; what 
they forbid can never be lawful; what they command, never unlawful'. 82 
Leviathan added that `it can never be that war shall preserve life and peace 
destroy it'. 83 The ends (peace and defence), and the means (virtues of character) 
of reason never changed, and they could not be changed by custom or civil laws. 84 
Having said that the laws of nature were `immutable and eternal', Hobbes went 
on to argue that they were not always obligatory. According to Hobbes, the 
`force... of the law of nature is not inforo externo, till there be security for men to 
obey it; but is always in foro interno, wherein the action of obedience being 
unsafe, the will and readiness to perform is taken for the performance'. 85 In other 
words, the laws of nature always obliged in conscience, but only obliged the 
actions of individuals where there was security. Because the laws of nature 
concerned the conscience, it was possible to break them by any action contrary to 
them. But it was also possible to break them by any action in conformity with 
them, if the conscience itself was not directed towards observation of the laws. 86 
Considered as `dispositions of mind', then only in the conscience were they laws 
and thus obligatory. Actions, on the other hand, differed according to 
circumstances and civil law - what was rational and fair at one time, might be 
considered irrational and unfair at another time. 87 The laws of nature themselves 
were unchangeable, but their application in particular circumstances did change. 
The laws of nature prescribed what was reasonable under the 
circumstances - what was reasonable in a time of peace was different from what 
was reasonable in a condition of war. Individuals were not `obliged by nature, i. e. 
by reason, to keep all the laws in a state of mankind in which they are not 
practised by others'. In fact, to observe some natural laws in this situation would 
actually be a violation of natural law. For instance, individuals would violate the 
fundamental law of nature, by endeavouring peace when it could not be had. 88 
Hobbes claimed that it was reasonable, i. e. in conformity with the law of nature, 
82 De Cive, III, 29, p. 54. 
83 Leviathan, XV, 38, p. 100. 
84 See De Cive, III, 29, pp. 54-5. 
85 Elements, XVII, 10, p. 97. See also Leviathan, XV, 36, p. 99. 
86 See Elements, XVII, 13, p. 98; De Cive, III, 28, p. 54; and Leviathan, XV, 37, p. 99. 
87 De Cive, III, 29, p. 54. 
88 Elements, XVII, 13, p. 98. See also De Cive, III, 28, p. 54; and Leviathan, XV, 37, p. 99. 
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to steal from thieves, and to do everything we could against those who would stop 
at nothing against us. In a time of war, it was unreasonable to behave as a modest 
man would behave in a time of peace, for the simple reason that it would 
probably result in our death, and thus was against reason, i. e. natural law. But 
there were some natural laws which did not cease even during war - Hobbes 
specified the law against weakening the reasoning faculty. 89 
In the Elements, although not in De Cive or Leviathan, Hobbes claimed 
that the laws of nature `are made only for the protection and defence of them that 
keep them'. 90 For this reason, it was a general law of nature that `those particular 
laws be so far observed, as they subject us not to any incommodity, that in our 
own judgements may arise, by the neglect thereof in those towards whom we 
observe them'. 91 This meant that the laws of nature only required a readiness to 
observe them, when other men did not observe them. Individuals `are obliged to 
keep them, whenever keeping them seems likely to achieve the end for which 
they were made'. 92 The laws of nature were easy to observe because `they require 
only an effort (but a real, sustained effort)'. 93 In the state of nature what `is done 
of necessity, or in pursuit of peace, or for self-preservation is done rightly. Apart 
from this, all infliction of harm on men is a violation of natural Law and a wrong 
against God'. 94 Violation of the laws of nature `consists in false reasoning or in 
stupidity, when men fail to see what duties towards other men are necessary for 
their own preservation'. 95 Hobbes realised that it was possible that human beings 
would find it difficult to observe the laws of nature, because of their passions, but 
he thought that in calmer moments there was a simple test to find out if their 
actions would be against the natural laws or not. That test was for a person `to 
think himself into the other person's place'. This maxim was expressed even 
89 See footnote to De Cive, III, 27, p. 53. This particular law of nature was not present in the 
Elements, and in Leviathan, XV, 34, p. 99, Hobbes claimed it only applied to particular men, not 
to men as a whole. 
90 Elements, XVII, 10, p. 97. 
91 Elements, XVII, 10, p. 97. This is the qualification that Hobbes added immediately in 
Leviathan. 
92 De Cive, III, 27, p. 54. 
93 De Cive, III, 30, p. 55. 
94 De Cive, III, 27, p. 54. 
95 De Cive, II, 1, pp. 33-34. 
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more simply in the negative formulation of the Golden Rule, `Do not do to 
another what you would not have done to you'. 96 
The `practice of natural law is necessary for the preservation of peace, and 
security is necessary for the practice of natural law'. As long as the individual 
thought he was insecure, his right to preserve his own life by whatever means 
necessary remained. But `he will satisfy the requirements of natural law if he is 
ready to welcome peace when it can be had'. The problem was that the laws of 
nature `do not guarantee their own observance as soon as they are known'. All 
laws were silent among arms, and in the case of natural law this was true `if it is 
applied to actions rather than to state of mind'. 97 The laws of nature obliged in 
conscience in times of insecurity, but did not oblige as far as actions were 
concerned. In a time of insecurity, the first law of nature told individuals to rely 
on their right of nature. Individuals must then use their liberty to do what, 
according to their own natural reason, they judged necessary to preserve 
themselves. In a condition of war, it was simply unreasonable to behave 
peacefully, because it might result in death. The question then, for Hobbes, was 
how to create a situation where individuals would have the security to enable 
them to put natural law into practice. The answer, for Hobbes, was to create a 
commonwealth, ruled by a civil sovereign, who would enforce one interpretation 
of natural law, which just happened to be civil law. This was how Hobbes dealt 
with the problem of the moral philosophy of the Schoolmen, which had failed to 
consider the disagreement over which actions did or did not constitute the virtues. 
If there were laws of nature in the state of nature, then why was it a 
condition of war? Why were the laws of nature ineffective in preserving peace in 
the state of nature? According to Hobbes, the actions of individuals proceeded 
from their wills, and their wills proceeded from hope and fear. 98 Most 
individual's wills were governed by fear, but where there was no coercive power, 
in other words in the state of nature, there was no fear, so there the will was 
96 De Cive, III, 26, p. 53. See also Leviathan, XV, 35, p. 99. This would also be in line with 
Hobbes' idea that if we know what our own thoughts and passions are in certain circumstances, 
then we can know what other men's thoughts and passions are. 
97 De Cive, V, 2-3, pp. 69-70. 
98 See De Cive, V, 1, p. 69. See also De Cive, VI, 11, p. 80, where the will was governed by the 
opinion each man had of good and evil. 
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governed by other passions, such as covetousness, lust and anger. 99 The 
individual `cannot govern his own will, though his will govern his actions; which 
dependence of the actions on the will, is that which properly and truly is called 
liberty'. Even Adam, who had the chance of immortality, could not govern his 
own will. 100 The laws of nature were `not enough to preserve Peace', because 
individuals `willingly break the law, whenever it seems that greater good or lesser 
evil will come to themselves from breaking it'. 101 In Leviathan Hobbes argued 
that the laws of nature `without the terror of some power to cause them to be 
observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, 
revenge and the like'. 102 
But it was not only passion which led human beings to break the laws of 
nature. Natural law was also ineffective in creating peace in the state of nature, 
because of human reason. Hobbes thought that human beings did not have reason 
from birth, neither did reason come with experience. Reason was `attained by 
industry'. 103 Hobbes also claimed that reason was not infallible, and that in the 
natural condition the `act of reasoning' was `a man's own true Reasoning about 
actions of his which may conduce to his advantage or other men's loss'. Although 
in the commonwealth all individuals regarded the civil law as right reason, in the 
natural condition it was not possible for an individual to `distinguish right reason 
from false except by making comparison with his own'. Thus in the natural 
condition, `each man's own reason must be regarded not only as the measure of 
his own actions... but also as the measure by which to judge the reasoning of 
others'. 104 In Leviathan Hobbes further claimed that because the natural 
condition lacked right reason, if individuals were involved in a dispute, they had 
to appoint an arbitrator, whose reason would be taken by every individual for 
right reason. Without an arbitrator in nature, individuals `will have every of their 
passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason'. 105 In 
99 See Elements, XX, 6, p. 112. But see Leviathan, XIV, 31, p. 88, where there were two possible 
fears to keep men to their covenants in the state of nature: the fear of other men, and the fear of 
God. Also individuals lived in constant fear of violent death in the natural condition. 
10° Hobbes, `The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance', pp. 10 1-2. 
101 De Cive, V, 1, p. 69. 
102 Leviathan, XVII, 2, p. 106. See also Elements, XIX, 1, p. 103. 
103 Leviathan, V, 17, p. 25. 
104 De Cive, II, footnote to 1, p. 33. 
105 Leviathan, V, 3, p. 23. 
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other words, in a condition which lacked a common power natural individuals 
thought their own individual passions should be taken for right reason. 
For Hobbes, it was the laws of nature which should be the guide to the 
actions of individuals. These laws were easily discoverable for those who 
`without partiality and passion' used their natural reason. But the problem was 
that most men were `blinded by self-love or some other passion', and although 
they were able to discover these laws, they needed help in interpreting them. 106 
This is why the laws of nature, or the moral virtues, although naturally 
reasonable, only became law over actions in a condition of security, or in other 
words in a commonwealth, when the sovereign made them civil law. 107 
According to Hobbes, in the natural condition it was `false reasoning or 
stupidity', which led human beings to violate the laws of nature, when they failed 
to see `what duties towards other men are necessary to their own preservation'. los 
In other words, although through natural reason they were able to discover the 
laws of nature, they often violated those laws, because in their interpretation they 
failed to consider the consequences for other individuals. They failed to put 
themselves in the place of others. Thus, Hobbes' natural condition was a 
condition of war, not only because of human passion, but also because the only 
rule of action each individual had in the natural condition was his own natural 
reason. 109 Hobbes equated this natural reason with private judgement, and also 
with conscience. 110 In the natural condition, each individual had the liberty to act 
on what his own reason and judgement dictated to him. " Natural individuals 
took courses of action in order to satisfy their immediate desires, and these 
courses of action were dictated by their own natural reason. It was both reason 
and passion which therefore created the state of war. And yet, for Hobbes, it was 
these two features of human nature - passion and reason, which could also lead 
106 Leviathan, XXVI, 21, p. 180. 
107 See Leviathan, XXVI, 22, pp. 180-1. 
108 De Cive, II, footnote to 1, pp. 33-4. 
109 See Leviathan, XXIX, 7, p. 212. 
110 See Leviathan, XXXVII, 13, p. 300. He also claimed that natural reason was `the undoubted 
word of God' - see Leviathan, XXXII, 2, p. 245. 111 Leviathan, XIV, 2, p. 79. 
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human beings to peace. 112 But in order to achieve this, individuals needed a 
condition of security provided by a civil sovereign. 
To summarise Hobbes' argument, the laws of nature were rules found out 
by reason, which aimed at the preservation of an individual. In the state of nature, 
or a condition of insecurity, the laws of nature always obliged the conscience, but 
did not oblige actions. Although the laws of nature were immutable and eternal, 
they were easily broken in a condition which lacked a common power to enforce 
them, and where each individual was his own interpreter of natural law. In the 
state of nature individuals had a tendency to act on their passions, and seek their 
own immediate good. In doing this, they failed to consider future evils which 
might be attached to this apparent good, and they also failed to consider the 
consequences for other individuals. But although the laws of nature were easily 
broken, Hobbes thought that there was a simple test whereby an individual could 
judge whether his action would be in accordance with natural law. That test was 
to imagine himself in the place of others. This was all well and good in a 
condition of security, but in the natural condition individuals did not trust others, 
but dreaded them. The answer, for Hobbes, was to create a condition of security, 
where human beings could agree on a future good demonstrated by reason, or in 
other words they could practice natural law. 
Hobbes described a number of other laws of nature, which were presented 
in three different versions in the Elements, De Cive and Leviathan. 113 The most 
important change for Hobbes' seventeenth century readers, as we will see below, 
related to the question of whether Hobbes thought that the laws of nature were 
obligatory because they were God's laws. According to Hobbes, because law was 
a command, `these dictates, as they proceed from nature, are not commands; they 
are not therefore called laws in respect of nature, but in respect of the author of 
nature, God Almighty'. ' 14 More specifically in De Cive, they were God's laws as 
set out in the scriptures, because `holy scripture is the utterance of God, who 
112 The incorporation of the right of nature into the fundamental law of nature meant that natural 
law prescribed both peace and war, when peace could not be had. 
113 See De Cive, III, 9-25, pp. 48-53; Elements, XVI, 8-13, pp. 90-92; & XVII, 1-8, pp. 93-96; and 
Leviathan, XIV, 4-5, p. 80 & XV, 1-34, pp. 89-99, for three slightly different accounts of the laws 
of nature. For a detailed account of the changes see Tricaud, 'Hobbes's Conception of the State of 
Nature'. 
114 Elements, XVII, 12, p. 97; & XVIII, 1, p. 99. 
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issues commands in all things with the highest right'. 115 Elsewhere though, 
Hobbes claimed that the laws of nature were simply `convenient articles of peace, 
upon which men may be drawn to agreement', 116 or `conclusions or theorems 
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves', 117 
and that `the force of the command, or law of nature, is no more than the force of 
the reasons inducing thereunto'. 118 Also, in the Elements, and De Cive the 
chapters on the laws of nature were immediately followed by chapters which gave 
scriptural support for these laws, but this was not the case in Leviathan. 119 Was it 
the case that by the time Hobbes came to write Leviathan, he did not believe the 
laws of nature were obligatory because they were God's laws? Howard 
Warrender has argued that Hobbes thought that the laws of nature obliged 
Christians, non-Christians and atheists in both the state of nature, and civil 
society. Christians could take the laws of nature as God's commands, and non- 
Christians and atheists could take them as rational principles of prudence. 120 As 
we will see below, on Warrender's interpretation Hobbes was in agreement with 
Reformed views. 
4. The Contemporary Reaction. 
Hobbes' contemporary critics had a number of objections to his description of the 
laws of nature. Firstly, his idea that the sole end of the laws of nature was self- 
preservation was quite simply wrong. These writers followed Aquinas, for whom 
natural law was an interpretation of human nature, and of the relation of human 
beings to God and the universe. On this account, there were three groups of 
15 De Cive, III, 33, pp. 56-7. 
116 Leviathan, XIII, 14, p. 78. 
"7 Leviathan, XV, 41, p. 100. 
18 Elements, XVI, 1, p. 87. 
119 See Elements, XVIII, entitled `A confirmation of the same out of the word of God'; and De 
Cive, IV, entitled `That the natural law is the divine law'. In Leviathan the chapters on the laws of 
nature were followed by chapter XVI, entitled `Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated'. 
120 See Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes - His Theory of Obligation 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957), pp. 83 & 99. On this question see also Warrender, `Hobbes' 
Conception of Morality', in Hobbes' Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism, edited by B. H. 
Baumrin (Wadsworth Pub. Co. Inc., Belmont, California, 1969), pp. 67-82; and in the same 
volume, A. E. Taylor, `The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes', pp. 35-48; and S. M. Brown, Jr., `Hobbes: 
the Taylor Thesis', pp. 49-66. See also B. T. Trainor, `Warrender and Skinner on Hobbes', 
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natural law which concerned self-preservation; specific ends such as sexual 
relationships; and God and society. 121 According to Charles Gildon, the laws of 
nature were threefold - they concerned our duty to ourselves, our neighbours and 
God, but `they all naturally proceed from that universal Maxim, or Principle, 
which God has implanted in all Mankind, Self-Love, or Self-Presenvation'. '22 
Although he admitted that the `general Defection of Mankind from these Laws, 
thus established by God, rendered their force too inefficacious to attain the end 
they were designed for', and it was necessary for Christ, to restore them, 
nonetheless for Gildon, the light of nature had not been totally extinguished. 
'23 
John Bramhall accused Hobbes of omitting laws of nature which concerned our 
duty to other men, and that Hobbes had also forgotten `the main and principal 
laws of nature, which contain a man's duty to his God, and the principal end of 
his creation'. 124 Hobbes' third law of nature, concerning gratitude, contained no 
mention of gratitude to our creator. God had written the laws of nature in our 
hearts, and these were more effective as a means to preserve society than Hobbes' 
laying down of rights in a covenant. 125 For James Tyrrell, it was from Hobbes' 
Ignorance, or Inconsideration of this great Principle of the Common Good 
of Rational Beings, that he first fell into those Errors, and made private 
Self-preservation not only the first motive (which had been true enough) 
but also the sole end of all Moral Actions, which is altogether false, and 
below the dignity, not only of a Philosopher, but a Man. 126 
Tyrrell claimed that Hobbes himself admitted that it was false reasoning, and 
failure to understand our duties towards other men that caused violation of the 
laws of nature. 127 
Hobbes' acknowledgement that there were laws of nature was thought to 
contradict his state of nature, because it meant that human beings had always 
lived under government. According to William Lucy, 
Political Studies, 36 (1988), pp. 680-91; and Brian Barry, `Warrender and his Critics', 
Philosophy, 43 (1968), pp. 117-37. 
121 See d'Entreves, Natural Law, p. 42. 
122 Gildon, The Deists Manual, p. 210. 
123 Gildon, The Deists Manual, pp. 218-20. 
124 Bramhall, Castigation, pp. 177 & 116. 
125 See Bramhall, Castigations, pp. 117 & 118. 
126 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, p. 252. 
127 See Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, p. 288. 
172 
there is no man horned in this world without a Law and a common Power 
over him and others, the Law is that writ in their hearts, and this is it 
which St. Paul speakes, Ronz. 2.15. Which shews the law written in their 
hearts that law of Nature, that practique law which is writ in the heart of 
every man and this common Power is GOD... 128 
God had given human beings the laws of nature, and men lived in `horror and 
dread' of breaking those laws. Although 
men may doe and act against those Lawes, yet untill a long custom of 
living hardned their hearts, or some such wicked principles as his have by 
degrees stollen an approbation in their understandings (by degree I say for 
I thinke it not possible to be done in an instant) untill then it is not 
possible for men to sin against these without an accusation of their 
Consciences ... 
129 
Similarly for John Bramhall, there had never been a time when human beings had 
lived without God and government, thus Hobbes' state of nature was a nonsense. 
According to Bramhall, 
The Image of God is not altogether defaced by the Fall of man, but that 
there will remaine some practical notions of God and goodnesse; which, 
when the mind is free from vagrant desires, and violent passions, do shine 
as clearly in the heart; as other speculative notions do in the head. 130 
For Bramhall, the condition of mere nature should be the state of innocence - the 
state Adam was in before his Fall. Even if we assumed Hobbes was describing 
Adam's corrupted nature, after the Fall, there was no such condition as that which 
he had described. 131 
The laws of nature also disproved Hobbes' state of nature, because they 
tended to peace. For Clarendon, if the laws of nature were immutable and eternal, 
and showed us how to accommodate ourselves to other human beings, and all 
human beings were bound by them, then the state of nature should have been a 
state of peace, and thus the covenants Hobbes had described were unnecessary. 
Further, if 
Nature hath thus providently provided for the Peace and Tranquillity of 
her Children, by Laws immutable & eternal, that are written in their 
128 Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 123-4. 
129 Lucy, Observations 1657, pp. 124-5. 
130 Bramhall, Castigations, p. 116. This is in agreement with Hobbes' idea that in quiet moments 
when individuals think, they will realise that their actions must be governed by the law of nature - 
'do unto others... ' 
131 See Bramhall, Castigations, p. 155. 
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hearts: how come they fall into that condition of war, as to be every one 
against every one, and to be without any other cardinal Virtues, but of 
force and fraud? 132 
For Samuel Parker, Hobbes' claim that the laws of nature were not God's laws, 
but `only so many Rules of Art', meant that the natural condition was one of his 
own creating, not God's. The actual natural condition created by God `must have 
been a condition of Peace, and not such a State of War that should naturally tend 
to his Misery, Ruine, and utter Destruction'. 133 
Hobbes' argument that there were laws of nature also contradicted his 
claim that there was no justice or injustice in the state of nature. As Ralph 
Cudworth put it, given `their main Fundamental Principle, that by Nature nothing 
is Unjust or Unlawvful... then can there be no Laws of Nature; and if there be Laws 
of Nature, then must there be something Naturally Unjust and Unlawful'. 134 If the 
aim of the laws of nature was peace and preservation, and yet the state of nature 
was a war of all against all, then were the laws of nature really laws, and thus 
obliging? Charles Gildon noted that Hobbes' ideas implied that the laws of nature 
were changeable, and he cited Hobbes' claim that the laws of nature were a 
convenient means to draw men to agreement, in order to escape the 
inconveniences of the state of nature. But according to Gildon, the law of nature 
was planted in man by God, and 
by consequence is of Eternal Original, and not Casual or by a Treaty of 
Peace, or Consent of People compell'd to the Agreement by the 
Inconveniences they had experienced in the contrary, and by consequence 
alterable, as often as each Party shall think it for his particular Benefit, 
which is a Principle, that justifies all the Dishonesty and Villany in the 
World. 135 
Hobbes' critics found it difficult to believe that his laws of nature were 
really laws. Ralph Cudworth called Hobbes' laws of nature `Jugling 
Equivocation, and a meer Mockery... ', because they say they are theorems, or they 
are not properly laws because they need someone to command them. 136 Bishop 
Bramhall also commented on this, and pointed out that Hobbes had argued that 
132 Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey, p. 202. See also Bramhall, Castigations, p. 156 
133 Parker, A Discourse, pp. 127-8. 
134 Cudworth, The True Intellectual System, p. 894. 
135 Gildon, The Deists Manual, p. 219. 
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the laws of nature were law because they were given by God in Scripture, but 
then claimed that it was the sovereign who gave scripture its authority. Bramhall 
also noted the contradiction in Hobbes' argument that the laws of nature were 
immutable and eternal, and yet they were silent in the war of all against all. 137 
James Lowde could not understand why the laws of nature did not 
lay as great an obligation upon us for Obedience, as those inordinate 
Passions of Nature? Especially if we consider, that obedience to these 
dictates of reason are more fit and proper means in order to self- 
preservation, than the prosecution of those mere rights of nature, as he 
calls them, violence and anticipation. 
Although acknowledging that history gave us examples of barbarous and 
inhumane actions, Lowde claimed that history also gave us examples `of Mercy 
and Compassion to others, of a generous condescension and self-denyal of our 
selves, and of an universal love and good will to Mankind, sufficient to confute 
the scandals cast upon humane nature upon this account'. 138 
Hobbes' contemporary critics had particular problems with his idea that 
the laws of nature only obliged actions where there was security. For John Shafte, 
the laws of nature obliged both in conscience and action, and that further `the 
actual performance of the Laws of Nature are always consistent with Self- 
preservation'. If this were not the case, then human beings would always be 
obliged `to desire Self-preservation but must not use the means to secure it'. 
Shafte completely disagreed with Hobbes' argument, that sometimes we would 
put ourselves in danger, by obeying the laws of nature. For Shafte, it was not 
against the law of nature, or reason, for human beings to be cautious in their 
dealings with others, especially if they did not know them well. But although it 
was lawful for a man `to defend and preserve his own right, he must not prejudice 
anothers; for that were to provoke and pull those dangers upon himself, against 
which he desires to secure himself'. The Golden Rule, `Do unto others... ' told us 
not to injure others. 139 According to James Tyrrell, 
unless the Laws of Nature regard the outward Actions of men, they cannot 
partake of the nature of laws, nor do they carry any obligations along with 
them, because it is impossible to seek Peace with others, or to depart from 
136 Cudworth, The True Intellectual System, pp. 894-5. 
137 See Bramhall, Castigation, pp. 163-4 & 177. 
138 Lowde, A Discourse, pp. 165-6. 
139 Shafte, The Great Law of Nature, pp. 20-1. 
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our natural Rights by any internal Act of the Mind alone, without outward 
Actions, and most of those Actions do in their own nature necessarily 
regard, and concern others besides our selves. 
For Tyrrell, if there were no natural laws in the state of nature, then there 
were no natural rights either - it was only possible to have a right, when that right 
was permitted by law. 140 To Hobbes' claim that in certain circumstances we 
would put ourselves in danger, if we acted according to the laws of nature, Tyrrell 
replied that we did not need perfect security to observe the laws of nature, 
for the Will of God, the first Cause, being known, whereby he establishes 
these Laws, there will arise a certain obligation to the performance of such 
external Actions; though some men may be so wicked, as to break, or 
neglect them, and to practice evil and violent Actions towards those that 
would observe them. 
Human beings were under a greater obligation to the laws of nature, than to civil 
law. The implication of Hobbes' argument that the practice of natural law 
depended on security, was that civil law, as well as natural law, was not 
obligatory - because even a civil state did not provide perfect security. 
'4' 
To summarise the views of Hobbes' critics, they had four main objections 
to his description of the laws of nature. Firstly, they objected to his claim that 
self-preservation was the sole end of the laws of nature. For the critics, the laws 
of nature told us of our duties not only to ourselves, but also to our neighbours, 
and to God. Secondly, the laws of nature actually contradicted Hobbes' 
description of the state of nature, because they tended to peace. Thirdly, the very 
existence of the laws of nature also contradicted Hobbes' state of nature. The fact 
that the laws of nature had been engraved on men's hearts by God from the 
beginning, meant that there had never been a time when human beings had lived 
without laws, thus Hobbes' state of nature could never have been. Even the Fall 
of mankind had not completely erased the laws of nature from human hearts. 
Finally, the critics were concerned by Hobbes' argument that natural law did not 
oblige both action and conscience, and they wondered whether Hobbes thought 
that it was actually obligatory at all? 
'40 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, pp. 375-6. 
141 Tyrrell, A BriefDisquisition, pp. 376-8. 
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It seems to be the implications of Hobbes' ideas which caused the most 
offence. Hobbes' claim that self-preservation was the sole end of the laws of 
nature, implied that his laws of nature did not concern men's duties to God, and 
other human beings. But Hobbes' critics were simply wrong when they argued his 
laws of nature did not concern relations with other human beings. The laws of 
nature were rules for individuals to follow in their dealings with other people, and 
human beings violated natural law when they failed to put themselves in the place 
of others. 142 As far as relations with God were concerned, Hobbes claimed we 
could know by natural reason that God existed, by reasoning back until we 
arrived at the first cause of everything, but other than this individuals had no 
natural knowledge of God. 143 Hobbes' critics also could not understand, if there 
were laws of nature in the state of nature, then how could it have been a condition 
of war, and also a condition which lacked a common power? The only way they 
could resolve this problem was by arguing that Hobbes' laws of nature could not 
really be laws, and thus obliging, especially when they considered his claim that 
they only obliged actions where there was security. 
For Hobbes' contemporary critics, although human beings had been 
corrupted by the Fall, reason, conscience, natural law, and the thought of God 
remained sufficient to maintain peace amongst them in the natural condition. 
Hobbes denied this, and thought that although natural law was obligatory, human 
beings had difficulty discovering the laws of nature, interpreting them and 
applying them in particular circumstances. Hobbes thought that reason, the 
individual conscience, the laws of nature, and the fear of God himself were not 
enough to keep human beings in peace in the state of nature. Natural law needed 
to be transformed into civil law, commanded and enforced by a human, coercive 
authority. Hobbes' views could be understood to suggest that even in Eden, God's 
positive command had failed to prevent Adam and Eve's disobedience. Now 
since the Fall, reason had been corrupted, and was no longer sufficient (if it ever 
had been) to keep human beings in peace. 
142 See also De Cive, III, 32, p. 56, where Hobbes made it explicit that he had only described laws 
of nature which were `relevant to our preservation against the dangers which arise from discord'. 
143 See Leviathan, XI, 25, p. 62. 
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5. The Scriptural Account. 
For many of Hobbes' critics it was impossible to reconcile his description of both 
the right and law of nature, with the account of scripture. As evidence against 
Hobbes' description of the right of all, these writers cited God's grant of 
dominion to Adam in the first chapter of Genesis. For many of these writers, the 
account of Genesis was the story of God giving rights to human beings. These 
rights were given by God in conjunction with law, and did not create the extreme 
condition of war which Hobbes had described. But Hobbes' contemporary critics 
appear to have been divided on whether Adam alone was given rights over the 
earth, or whether the earth was given to human beings in common. For writers 
such as Filmer and Cumberland, God's grant was to Adam alone, and it also 
included dominion over other human beings, while William Lucy agreed with 
Hobbes that the earth was given to men in common. Paul Cooke has recently 
argued that Hobbes reinterpreted the Bible, in order to get scripture to support his 
political theory. In this way the Bible became the story of God giving natural 
rights to human beings. 144 The views of Hobbes' critics appear to qualify Cooke's 
claim, for if Hobbes was guilty of this, then so were some of his contemporaries. 
Hobbes' theological assumption that God gave the earth to men in 
common, and that property and commonwealths came into existence together, 
was supported by those commentators, like Luther, who subscribed to Saint 
Augustine's theory of the Two Cities. For Augustine, and Luther, private property 
came into existence along with the earthly city, which was built by Cain, after the 
Fall. Both theologians thought that God's words, `Let them have dominion', was 
a grant of dominion over the creatures, not over other men; although for 
Augustine God's words were directed to Adam and his male posterity, whereas 
Luther thought that both male and female were given dominion. According to 
Augustine, God gave Adam everything he needed, and also one simple command 
to obey. In `paradise, before his sin, man could not, it is true, do everything; but 
he could do whatever he wished, just because he did not want to do whatever he 
144 See Cooke, Hobbes and Christianity, p. 2. 
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could not do'. '45 When Adam disobeyed God, God gave Adam control over 
himself, but that control put Adam at odds with himself. The punishment of 
Adam's disobedience was the disobedience itself. Now since the Fall, human 
beings desire to do what they cannot do. 146 For Martin Luther, both Adam and 
Eve became `the rulers of the earth, the sea, and the air', and this dominion was 
over other creatures. 147 According to Luther, as a result, man could `make use of 
all the creatures as he wishes, according to his will'. '48 
God gave Adam and his posterity the free use of all things, but with one 
restraint - Adam was given a positive command, by which he was forbidden to eat 
from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. According to Jean Calvin, with 
God's words to Adam that he should subdue the earth, Adam was put `in 
possession of his right'. God gave Adam and his posterity `authority over all 
living creatures. He appointed man... lord of the world'. But `God confine[d]... 
the food of mankind within certain limits'. 149 Similarly for Sir Walter Raleigh, 
God gave man `the liberall choice of all things, with one only prohibition, to trie 
his gratitude and obedience'. God `gave man to himselfe, to be his own guide, his 
owne workeman, and his owne painter, that he might frame or describe unto 
himselfe what hee pleased, and make election of his owne forme'. 150 Protestant 
interpretations of Genesis confirmed Hobbes' view that human beings were given 
liberty, and that liberty came before law. 151 But not surprisingly, scripture was 
silent on Hobbes' idea that the right of nature gave human beings a right to 
subject, kill, hurt, or invade others. 
145 Augustine, City of God, XIV, 15, pp. 574-5. In Leviathan (Latin version), Appendix, Chap. i, 
On the Nicene Creed, 62, p. 512, Hobbes made the following rather interesting comment: `In the 
generation of a human being from a human being [God] willed from eternity that only a man be 
produced, who cannot do whatever he wishes. But in the generation of man in a supernatural way, 
by the Holy Spirit, he willed from eternity to produce a man who could do whatever he wishes, 
i. e., a man who was also God'. Hobbes, or rather `B' was referring to Jesus Christ, but he could 
have been referring to Adam who was also created by the Holy Spirit. The similarity to 
Augustine's words is interesting. 
146 See Augustine, City of God, XIV, 15, pp. 574-5. 
147 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 66-7. See also Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis 1.26; 
Clapham, A Briefe of the Bible, p. 19; and Haak, Dutch Annotations, Genesis 1.26. 
148 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 73. 
149 Calvin, Commentaries, pp. 96-9. See also Anon., A Briefe Discourse of the Scriptures, pp. 13 
& 14. 
150 Raleigh, A History of the World, p. 32. 
151 God gave Adani (and Eve) complete liberty, and then a positive command to restrict that liberty 
- see for example Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis 1I. 16; Holland, The Historie ofAdam, pp. 4-5; 
and Willet, Hexapla upon Genesis, p. 16. 
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The scriptural account of the creation of Adam and Eve was also cited as 
evidence against Hobbes' account of natural law. We have already seen that 
although Hobbes thought that there were laws of nature, he also thought that in 
the natural condition individuals had problems discovering those laws, 
interpreting them, and then applying them in particular circumstances. Hobbes 
thought that reason, the laws of nature, the individual conscience and God 
himself were not sufficient to prevent men from committing violence. In chapter 
three we have seen that this view was confirmed by the account of Cain's murder 
of Abel. We have also seen in chapter one, on good and evil, that a number of 
protestant commentators thought that God gave Adam and Eve the laws of nature 
at their creation, but that he also gave them a positive command, so they would 
know God was their sovereign and should be obeyed. Without a positive 
command, Adam and Eve might have obeyed God simply because it was in 
accordance with natural reason. Further, the law of nature did not, by itself, 
demonstrate that God was their sovereign and should be obeyed. But it is 
interesting to note, as John White did in his commentary on the first three 
chapters of Genesis, that the laws of nature were not mentioned in the scriptural 
account of the creation. As White put it, the laws of nature were `written in all 
mens hearts by Nature, that is manifest to all men by Natural reason', but he 
admitted that they were not mentioned in `this brief history, as being sufficiently 
known without relation'. 152 
Although Hobbes never made it explicit that his account of the laws of 
nature referred to natural law since the Fall, as distinct from pre-lapsarian natural 
law, a brief survey of Reformed interpretations supports the idea that Hobbes' 
account was in agreement with the problems associated with natural law in the 
fallen condition. All of the Magisterial Reformers agreed that natural law was 
engraved in men's hearts by God. For Martin Luther, natural law was given by 
God, and was perfect and unchangeable. 153 Luther associated the natural law with 
equity, and the Golden Rule, which `teaches that I should do as I would be done 
152 White, A Commentary, II, pp. 118-119. 
153 See J. T. McNeill, `Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers', Journal of Religion, 26 
(1946), pp. 168-82, p. 169. I owe this and the following references on the Reformers and Natural 
Law to Johann Sommerville. 
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by'. 154 Jean Calvin agreed with Luther, and thought that `the law of God which 
we call the moral law is nothing else than a testimony of the natural law, that is, 
of the conscience, which has been engraven by God in the minds of men, the 
entire principle of this equity... has been prescribed in it. This alone must be the 
scope, the rule and the end of all laws'. 155 Philip Melanchthon described natural 
law as `a standard for judging morals', implanted in human beings by God. It was 
a knowledge of principles. 156 Similarly for Heinrich Bullinger, the law of nature 
was 
an instruction of the conscience, and, as it were, a certain direction placed 
by God himself in the minds and hearts of men, to teach them what they 
have to do and what to eschew. And the conscience, verily, is the 
knowledge, judgement, and reason of a man, whereby every man in 
himself, and in his own mind, being made privy to every thing that he 
either hath committed or not committed, doth either condemn or else 
acquit himself. And this reason proceedeth from God... '57 
Hobbes' contemporary critics had accused him of omitting laws of nature 
which concerned our duties to God. We have already seen above that some 
protestant commentators thought that the laws of nature did not necessarily 
demonstrate to the first human beings that God was their sovereign. Although the 
Reformers agreed that the law of nature was engraved on men's hearts by God, 
they were divided on whether natural law was of equal extent to the law of 
Moses. Melanchthon associated the natural law with the Ten Commandments, but 
he also thought that the law of Moses went beyond the requirements of natural 
law, with its commands regarding love and fear of God. 158 Luther thought that the 
commandments concerned with the Sabbath and images were ceremonial and 
judicial laws, and were thus not part of the moral law. In his own `catechetical 
versions of the Decalogue', Luther actually omitted the second commandment, 
regarding images. He also denied that Christians were bound by the letter of the 
law of Moses, because he believed when Christ came he would make new 
154 Luther, Treatise of Secular Power (1523), cited in McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 170. 
155 Calvin, Institutes, IV, xx, 14-16; Opera, II, 1164-67, cited in McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 181. 
156 McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 173. 
157 Heinrich Bullinger, The Decades of Heinrich Bullinger, cited in McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 
178. 
158 Melanchtoni opera, Corpus Reformatorum, XVI, 23f, cited in McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 
174. 
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commandments. 159 Christians were obliged by the commandments, but only 
because they mirrored the natural law, and not because they were the law of 
Moses. The Ten Commandments could not be Moses' law, because human beings 
lived under them, even before Moses had been born. But even if Moses had not 
lived, all human beings would have been ruled by the Ten Commandments, not 
because they were the law of Moses, but because they mirrored the law of nature. 
As Luther put it, 
in one law which runs through all ages, is known to all men, is written in 
the hearts of all people, and leaves no one from beginning to end with an 
excuse, although for the Jews ceremonies were added and the other 
nations had their own laws, which were not binding upon the whole 
world, but only this one, which the Holy Spirit dictates unceasingly in the 
hearts of all. 160 
Calvin and Bullinger, on the other hand, equated the natural law with all of the 
Ten Commandments, although for Calvin before natural law was written down, 
human beings easily forgot its requirements. 161 
Although the laws of nature were perfect and unchangeable, reason 
through which human beings discovered natural law had been corrupted by the 
Fall. Martin Luther thought that all human beings had natural laws engraved on 
their hearts, but human reason was `so corrupt and blind' that it `fails to 
understand the knowledge native to it', or it `knowingly neglects and despises 
it'. 162 John T. McNeill has shown that Luther was following Aquinas, who 
thought that natural law had not been obliterated, but `it is nevertheless blotted 
out in the case of a particular action insofar as reason is hindered because of 
concupiscence or some other passion, in applying a general principle to a 
particular action'. 163 Similarly for Melanchthon, since the Fall, the laws of nature, 
or the moral principles, were `not equally agreed upon', because the Fall had 
brought about `a certain dimness', which had lessened human ability to 
distinguish between good and evil. Natural law demonstrated that we should obey 
159 P. D. L. Avis, `Moses and the Magistrate: A Study in Protestant Legalism', Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 26 (1975), pp. 149-72, pp. 153-4. Avis also claims that Luther, unlike 
other Reformers, used an `a priori doctrine of natural law to distinguish different levels in the 
Bible'. 
160 Cited in Avis, `Moses and the Magistrate', p. 154. 
161 See McNeill, `Natural Law', pp. 182 & 178. 
162 Cited in McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 169. 
163 Aquinas, Sumnia Theologiae I, ii. 94.6, cited in McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 169. 
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God, but since the Fall unrighteousness had won out. 164 Although the law of 
nature was `really the law of God concerning those virtues which the reason 
understands, for the divine law has been imprinted on the minds of men: but in 
this enfeebled state of nature it has been obscured'. 165 
The Reformers thus made a distinction between natural law before and 
after the Fall. 166 According to Heinrich Bullinger, the law of nature enabled 
human beings to distinguish between good and evil. The `beginning of this law is 
not of the corrupt disposition of mankind, but of God himself, who with his finger 
writeth in our hearts, fasteneth in our nature, and planteth in us a rule to know 
justice, equity and goodness'. But since the Fall, 
the disposition of mankind being flatly corrupted by sin, as it is blind, so 
also is it in all points evil and naughty. It knoweth not God, neither doth it 
love the neighbour; but rather is affected with self-love toward itself, and 
seeketh still for its own advantage. For which cause the apostle said, "that 
we by nature are the children of wrath". Wherefore the law of nature [is so 
called only] because God hath imprinted or engraven in our minds some 
knowledge, and certain general principles of religion, justice, and 
goodness, which because they be grafted in us and born together with us, 
do therefore seem to be naturally in us. 167 
In other words, human beings still referred to the law of nature by the same name, 
but it was not the same law which they were given before the Fall. Human reason 
was corrupted by the Fall, and this according to McNeill implied `a defect in 
natural law when it is viewed as an aspect of actual human nature, that is, human 
nature not as it was created but as it exists since the Fall'. But when natural law 
was viewed as divine law it was immutable and eternal. 168 
Jean Calvin thought that human beings had lost their supernatural abilities 
as a result of the Fall, while their natural abilities, i. e. understanding and will, had 
been corrupted. 169 It was reason, or understanding, which distinguished objects, 
1('4 McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 173. 
165 Melanchtoni opera, Corpus Reformatorum, XVI, 23ff., cited in McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 
174. 
166 Both State, Thomas Hobbes, p. 153, and d'Entreves, Natural Law, p. 41, note the distinction 
between primary and secondary natural law. 
167 Heinrich Bullinger, The Decades of Heinrich Bullinger, cited in McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 
178. 
168 McNeill, `Natural Law', p. 175. 
169 See Peter J. Leithart, `Stoic Elements in Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life. Part 1: 
Original Corruption, Natural Law, and the Order of the Soul', Westminster Theological Journal, 
55 (1993), pp. 31-54, p. 37. 
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and either approved or disapproved of them. The will then followed what the 
understanding judged to be good, and avoided what the understanding judged to 
be evil. 170 Since the Fall, reason had become incapable of discerning the natural 
law, and unable to guide the will, which now followed the passions of our corrupt 
nature, rather than the dictates of reason. Man did not aim for what was truly 
good for him, but followed `the inclination of his nature, without reason or 
deliberation'. 171 Now since the Fall, unregenerate human beings could not reason 
correctly, and the fallen understanding had incomplete knowledge of heavenly 
things, such as `the knowledge of God, the knowledge of his will, and the rule of 
conduct for life'. 172 But all human beings had knowledge of natural law, through 
their `conscience', or `sense'. Calvin defined conscience in two ways: firstly in a 
spiritual sense as `the faculty within the soul that comforts men when they do 
good, and accuses them when they do evil'; and secondly as `the faculty in all 
men that perceives the law of nature'. The other method of perceiving natural law 
was `sense'. Moral sense, or natural sense, was agreeable to the natural law, as set 
out in the Mosaic law. 
All human beings, whether regenerate or unregenerate, had some 
knowledge of the natural law, and the ability to obey it to a certain extent. Even 
heathens had natural law, and their law was compatible with the Mosaic Law. 173 
But although human beings had knowledge of natural law, and thus knew what 
they ought to do, they were `unwilling and unable to do it'. 174 Natural law was 
violated through `passion, or a belief that it is unjust'. 175 The light of nature had 
been dimmed by the Fall, and was now useless in unregenerate human beings. 
The seeds of religion and morality themselves had been corrupted, and the 
conscience perverts `every decision, so as to confound vice and virtue'. 176 Man's 
natural moral sense became `illusory', when he attempted to apply its principles 
in particular circumstances. 177 Now since the Fall, the main purpose of natural 
law `is to render sinners inexcusable. This would not be a bad definition: natural 
170 See Leithart, `Stoic Elements', pp. 47-8. 
171 Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.26-27, cited in Leithart, `Stoic Elements', p. 45. 
172 Leithart, `Stoic Elements', pp. 37-8. 
173 Leithart, `Stoic Elements', pp. 38-41. 
174 Leithart, `Stoic Elements', p. 42. 
175 McNeill, `Natural Law', pp. 179-181. 
176 Calvin, Commentary on the Gospel of John, cited in Leithart, `Stoic Elements', p. 43. 
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law is that apprehension of the conscience which distinguishes sufficiently 
between just and unjust, and which deprives men of the excuse of ignorance, 
while it proves them guilty by their own testimony'. 178 
This brief examination of protestant interpretations of natural law, and the 
problems associated with it since the Fall, has demonstrated that Hobbes' own 
account put him closer to the views of Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon and 
Bullinger, than the views of his contemporary critics. Hobbes occasionally 
described the laws of nature as being engraved in human hearts by God, and he 
also equated them with equity, the Golden Rule, and the undoubted word of 
God. 179 Hobbes, along with Luther and Melanchthon, also thought that the laws 
of nature were not of equal extent to the Ten Commandments. 180 We have seen 
above that although Hobbes thought the laws of nature were immutable and 
eternal, he also thought that they were not effective in keeping peace in the state 
of nature. There were a number of problems caused by the passions, which meant 
that human beings had a tendency to reject future goods in favour of more 
immediate goods. Problems were also caused by the fallibility of natural reason. 
This meant that human beings had difficulty discovering natural law, and then 
interpreting it and applying it under particular circumstances. Hobbes had 
criticised the Schoolmen for this very reason - they had not dealt with the 
problems caused by disagreement over which actions did or did not constitute the 
virtues. Although he never made it explicit, Hobbes' account was also in 
agreement with the Reformed view that reason, through which human beings 
discovered the laws of nature, had been corrupted by the Fall, and now it was 
difficult to apply its principles in particular circumstances. 
The Reformers had made a distinction between natural law before and 
after the Fall. The majority Reformed view was that now, since the Fall, the 
purpose of natural law was to leave no one with an excuse - the conscience let 
177 Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.23, cited in Leithart, `Stoic Elements', p. 44. 
178 Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.22, cited in Leithart, `Stoic Elements', p. 43. 
179 On the laws of nature written in men's hearts by God see for example: De Honiine, XIV, 5, p. 
73; Elements, XXIX, 7, p. 180 & 10, p. 182; Leviathan, XXXVI, 6, p. 282; and XLII, 37, p. 351. 
On the law of nature as the word or law of God see for example Leviathan, XLII, 11, p. 339; 
XLII, 131, p. 395; XLIII, 5, p. 399; XLIII, 22-3, pp. 409-10. 
180 See Leviathan, XLII, 37-39, pp. 352-3, for Hobbes' argument that only the second table of the 
ten commandments was applicable to all human beings; whereas the first table was specifically 
directed at God's peculiar people, and that this also applied to the Judicial and Levitical Laws. 
185 
human beings know if they had done wrong. But for the Reformers, as for 
Hobbes, conscience was not enough by itself - it might accuse human beings after 
the event, but it did not prevent them from breaking laws. Only the threat of 
earthly punishment was a great enough deterrent, and even that did not prevent 
some human beings from breaking even civil laws. We have seen in chapter one 
that God gave Adam and Eve a positive command, as well as the law of nature, 
because natural law was thought to be an insufficient test of obedience. It was 
also thought that the law of nature did not make it apparent that God was their 
sovereign and should be obeyed. The account of the Fall demonstrated that even 
God's positive command was not enough to prevent Adam and Eve from 
disobeying him. Similarly, as we have seen in chapter three, the account of Cain's 
murder of Abel demonstrated that the laws of nature, the conscience, and the fear 
of God were not enough to prevent Cain from killing his own brother. 
The problem for Hobbes' seventeenth century readers was that he did not 
specifically attribute the corruption of reason to the Fall, although I have 
mentioned elsewhere that Hobbes had indicated that he was describing fallen 
human nature, when he stated that he was interested in human beings as they 
were, rather than as they should have been; and he also associated the state of 
nature with the pre-lapsarian condition, with his citation of Cain's murder of 
Abel. But there was no sense in Hobbes' political theory that at some point, i. e. 
before the Fall, human reason was perfect. From this we could assume one of two 
things: either Hobbes thought that human reason was never perfect; or, Hobbes 
failed to mention the Fall, because he was writing political philosophy, which he 
thought was separate from theology. 181 
6. Hobbes as Reformed Theologian? 
We have seen that Hobbes' contemporary critics objected to his description of the 
right of nature for a number of reasons, the most important being the implication 
that right conflicted with law. For these writers, the right of nature was permitted 
181 See Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore, reproduced in part, in The Elements of Lmv Natural and 
Politic, edited with an introduction by J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford University Press, Oxford & New 
York, 1994), chapter I, section 8, p. 191. 
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by the law of nature, which was given at the creation. It was not a right to all, and 
thus there was no original common ownership. Self-preservation was not the sole 
end of the right of nature, and thus it was not a right to hurt, kill, or invade others. 
The law of nature created and confined right, and also guided human judgement. 
Hobbes' views were thought to contradict scripture. God had created Adam and 
made him a universal monarch. As a result, no one had a right to anything except 
through Adam. But we have also seen above that the right of nature was not 
referred to by name in scripture, although Hobbes' argument that liberty came 
before law was confirmed by protestant interpretations of God's grant to Adam, 
and in some cases Eve. Having said that, unsurprisingly, there was no mention in 
Genesis of a right to hurt, kill, or invade others. This was a liberty that human 
beings had taken for themselves. 
We have also seen that Hobbes' contemporary critics cited the scriptural 
account of Cain's murder of Abel to deny his description of the right of nature. 
God's immediate punishment of Cain, for the murder of his brother, proved that 
human beings did not have a right to kill, and that in killing his brother Cain had 
broken the law of nature. The sacrifices that both brothers offered to God was 
evidence that there was private property from the beginning, and also that human 
beings did not have a right to do as they pleased. But we have seen in chapter 
three that a number of aspects of Hobbes' description were supported by the 
account of Cain and Abel. Firstly, Hobbes' theological assumption of an original 
common ownership was in agreement with Augustine's theory of the Two Cities, 
subscribed to by Luther, according to which private property came into existence 
along with the earthly city, built by Cain. Secondly, Hobbes' definition of the 
right of nature as a liberty from law was confirmed by Cain's answer to God's 
questioning, that he was not his brother's keeper. With this statement, Cain 
demonstrated that he did not recognise either any obligation to his brother, nor the 
laws of nature, nor God himself. Cain killed his brother because he thought he 
could get away with it, and the laws of nature, the fear of God, and his own 
conscience failed to prevent this. On Hobbes' account the laws of nature failed to 
restrict Cain's liberty or right. 
Hobbes had argued that the right of nature gave individuals a right to kill 
other individuals, if they judged it necessary to their own preservation. But if an 
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individual killed another individual for some other reason, without really 
believing it was necessary for his own preservation, then this action would be a 
wrong against God and natural law. Hobbes had used the example of a son killing 
his father, but his readers could have substituted this for a quarrel between two 
brothers. On Hobbes' account, if Cain really believed that the death of his brother 
was necessary for his own preservation, then he did not commit a wrong by 
killing Abel. But if Cain killed Abel for some other reason, for instance envy, 
then this was a wrong against both God and natural law. Hobbes himself thought 
that envy was the reason that Cain had killed Abel, and not because Cain believed 
Abel's death was necessary for his preservation. Thus on Hobbes' account Cain 
had committed a wrong. But if we looked at the consequences of Cain's action, 
we might wonder whether Cain had in fact committed a wrong. As we have seen 
in chapter three, although Cain was punished by God, God mitigated his 
punishment, so much so that it appeared as a benefit - Cain lived a long life, took 
a wife, had children, and built a city. ' 82 Hobbes' critics had argued that God's 
immediate punishment of Cain proved that he had broken the law of nature. But 
God's mitigation of Cain's punishment, so that it appeared as a benefit, might 
lead us to believe that Cain had not in fact been punished, and therefore had not 
committed a wrong. Quite simply, God's punishment, which appeared as a 
benefit, did not prove, as the critics had argued, that Cain had broken the law of 
nature. 
Hobbes' critics also objected to his account of the laws of nature. For 
these writers, self-preservation was not the sole end of natural law - Hobbes had 
omitted laws of nature which concerned relations with other men, and with God. 
Further, the very existence of the laws of nature contradicted Hobbes' argument 
that the state of nature was both a condition which lacked a common power, and a 
condition of war. The only way the critics were able to reconcile these apparent 
problems was by arguing that Hobbes' laws of nature could not really be law, and 
thus obligatory. But Hobbes' laws of nature were really laws and obliged the 
consciences of human beings in the state of nature. The problem, for Hobbes, was 
that their existence and their obligation over conscience, or as a command of 
God, was just not sufficient to keep men in peace. Hobbes thought that there were 
182 See the scriptural account in chapter three, pp. 141-2. 
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a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness of the laws of nature in the state of 
nature. Firstly, natural reason was fallible, and as a result there were problems in 
discovering the laws of nature, interpreting them, and applying them in particular 
circumstances. All of these problems were caused by the passions. A. P. 
d'Entreves has argued that different meanings of natural law were a consequence 
of different understandings of the term 'nature'. 183 The majority of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics understood nature in the Aristotelian sense, as the end and 
perfection of human existence. In this way, it was also understood as the original, 
perfect condition of Eden. The critics found Hobbes' description objectionable, 
because they thought that nature was an account of how human beings should 
have been, and this included the perfection of human reason. In such a condition, 
the conscience, and the fear of God were enough to keep most men from breaking 
the laws of nature, and thus ensure peace. But even if Hobbes was describing the 
lives of fallen human beings, the Fall had not erased the laws of nature, or the 
thought of God from human hearts. For Hobbes, if the laws of nature or reason 
had been enough, human beings would not have needed to live in 
commonwealths. We have seen in chapter one that this view was confirmed by 
those protestant commentators who thought that God had given Adam and Eve a 
positive command, as well as the laws of nature, because natural law was not 
enough by itself to ensure their obedience. Unfortunately even God's positive 
command had not prevented Adam and Eve from disobeying him. 
Chapter three has demonstrated that a number of aspects of Hobbes' 
account of the laws of nature, and their ineffectiveness in the natural condition, 
were confirmed by the scriptural account of God's punishment of Cain after the 
murder of Abel. This chapter has also demonstrated that Hobbes' account of the 
laws of nature was closer than the views of his critics to the Reformed view of the 
problems associated with natural law, and human reason since the Fall. Although 
natural law was immutable and eternal, reason, through which human beings 
discovered it, had been corrupted by the Fall. Since the Fall, human beings found 
it difficult to apply the principles of natural law, and the conscience had a 
tendency to confuse virtue and vice. Now, the conscience did not prevent human 
beings from committing a wrong, but simply accused them after the event. For 
183 See d'Entreves, Natural Law, p. 17. 
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Hobbes the Schoolmen had failed to deal with the problem of which actions 
constituted virtue or vice. Natural law was not only difficult to discover because 
of the passions, but it was also difficult to interpret and apply in particular 
circumstances. Hobbes' civil sovereign was designed to provide the solution to 
this problem, by giving natural law one interpretation, and setting out how it was 
to be applied in particular circumstances, thus converting natural law into civil 
law. Hobbes had argued that natural law only obliged actions where there was 
security. The laws of nature were only effective in creating peace in a condition of 
security, provided by a civil sovereign. In a condition of insecurity, where their 
application was open to interpretation, they simply contributed to the war of all 
against all. 
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Chapter Five: The Creation of Society. 
`And Cain went out from the presence of the LORD, and dwelt in the land of Nod, 
on the east of Eden. And Cain knew his wife; and she conceived, and bare Enoch: 
and he builded a city, and called the name of the city, after the narre of his son, 
Enoch'. (Genesis IV 16-17) 
1. Hobbes on the escape from the State of Nature. 
As we have seen in chapter two, Hobbes thought that human beings were not 
naturally sociable, but he also thought that they sought out the company of other 
individuals, and they did so for a number of mainly selfish reasons: to satisfy 
basic physical, sexual, or emotional need; or in order to have other individuals to 
compare themselves with. According to Hobbes, experience of what individuals 
did when they met each other demonstrated that `every voluntary encounter is a 
product either of mutual need or of the pursuit of glory'. And from this it 
followed that all `society, therefore exists for the sake of either advantage or of 
glory, i. e. it is a product of love of self, not love of friends'. But for Hobbes, `no 
large or lasting society, can be based upon the passion for glory', because 
`glorying, like honour is nothing if everybody has it'. 1 
If glory could not be the origin of lasting society, what was? According to 
Hobbes, human beings sought out other people, and could increase the 
advantages of this life by doing so, but `this is much more effectively achieved by 
Dominion than by their help'. It was the desire for dominion which was natural, 
rather than society. Individuals would rather seek dominion over others, than ally 
with them. But there was one thing that led individuals to society, rather than 
dominion, and that was fear of the harm other men might do to them, particularly 
if that harm resulted in their death. In `the absence of fear, men would be more 
avidly attracted to domination than to society'. Therefore it was mutual fear 
which was the `origin of large and lasting societies'. 2 Again, experience could 
confirm this. According to Hobbes, by 
a Principle well known to all men by experience and which everyone 
admits, that men's natural Disposition is such that if they are not 
1 De Cive, I, 2, pp. 23-4. 
2 De Cive, I, 2, p. 24. 
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restrained by fear of a common power, they will distrust and fear each 
other, and each man rightly may, and necessarily will, look out for himself 
from his own resources. 3 
Even those who denied this in words, nevertheless admitted it as a truth by their 
actions - men locked their doors and armed themselves, even against their own 
children and servants; countries guarded their borders even in times of peace. 4 
And these were men who apparently lived in commonwealths. In order to counter 
the objection that if men feared each other that much, they would not have been 
able to come together in society, Hobbes defined fear as `any anticipation of 
future evil'. 5 In other words, the cause of society was fear of what the future 
might bring, rather than fear of what was already present. An individual might 
have been attacked today, and disposed of his opponent, but who knows if he 
would be able to do the same tomorrow, when another individual came to attack 
him. In the natural condition, human beings lived in constant fear of what the 
future might bring. It was this future evil which was demonstrated by reason. 
Eventually individuals realised that living in the constant fear that others 
would attempt to take away their property, or even worse, attempt to kill them, 
was no way to live. They realised that they must come together in a large enough 
group, so that they would rarely feel threatened. In order to do this, they must 
make agreements with one another. This was the formation of the 
commonwealth. Hobbes assumed that it was a basic characteristic of human 
nature that if individuals had nothing to fear, then they would attempt to dominate 
as many other individuals as possible. 6 It was fear which made individuals realise 
that although they might be able to dominate others today, that might not be the 
case tomorrow. For instance, if dominion was based on physical strength or 
intellect, then as human beings got older these faculties weakened. Thus, they 
became less able to dominate others, and less able to protect and preserve 
themselves. For Hobbes, `we are driven by mutual fear to believe that we must 
3 See De Cive, preface to the readers, 10, p. 10. 
4 De Cive, preface to the readers, 11, pp. 10-11. 
s De Cive, footnote to I, 2, p. 25. See also Leviathan, XIII, 10, p. 77 & 12, p. 78. 
6 As mentioned in earlier chapters, although Hobbes thought that there were two types of human 
beings (vain glorious and modest individuals), he also thought that in a condition of war even 
those individuals content with natural equality would be forced to behave as vain-glorious 
individuals. 
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emerge from such a state and seek allies; so that if we must have a war, it will not 
be a war against all men nor without aid'. 7 In Leviathan, the individual's escape 
from the state of war, consisted `partly in the passions, partly in his reason'. The 
`passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things 
necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And 
reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to 
agreement'. 8 Passions were the reason human beings created the commonwealth, 
and the laws of nature showed them how to achieve this aim. 
2. The Contemporary Reaction: Hobbes versus Divine Right. 
Chapter two has considered the objections of Hobbes' contemporary critics to his 
views on the natural equality and natural unsociability of human beings. There it 
was argued that their objections to Hobbes revolved around their different 
definition of the term `nature'. The majority of Hobbes' contemporary critics 
understood nature in three ways. Firstly, in an Aristotelian sense, they understood 
that human beings were naturally sociable because of their potential to live in 
society. Society was essential for human beings, and their potential remained 
unfulfilled without it. According to Aristotle, there was a natural inequality of 
human beings - some human beings were naturally suited to rule, while others 
were naturally suited to serve - this was confirmed by experience. But secondly, 
many of Hobbes' critics also understood nature as the original, perfect condition 
of human beings at the creation. God's creation of Eve demonstrated natural 
sociability; and Adam's dominion over Eve demonstrated a natural hierarchy. 
Because Hobbes' contemporary critics thought that the natural condition was one 
of sociability and inequality, they could not understand how it could possibly 
have been a condition of war. If the natural condition was not a condition of war, 
then fear could not be the reason for the emergence of commonwealths. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, for many of Hobbes' critics, society and 
government were natural, because they were created by God. Roger Coke denied 
7 De Cive, 1,13, p. 30. See also De Cive, I, 15, p. 31; and Elements, XIV, 14, p. 81, where it was a 
dictate of reason. 
8 Leviathan, XIII, 14, p. 78. The laws of nature have been discussed in chapter four. 
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Hobbes' claim that fear was both the beginning of civil society, and the cause of 
all religion and worship. 9 All rights and government of both kings and kingdoms 
`is from God immediately'. 1° Government had never been created by covenants, 
and monarchy was its original form. " Charles Gildon thought that `Humane 
Society, Propriety, Government and all Rules prescribed for the benefit and 
security of them are all divinely sanctioned'. 12 Similarly for George Lawson, 
`Civil Government derives its Being from Heaven: for it is part of Gods 
Government over mankind... ' God `reserves the supreme and universal Power in 
his own hands', and also had the ability to depose rulers, or transfer government, 
as he pleased. `To think that the sole or principal Cause of the constitution of a 
civil State is the consent of men, or that it aims at no further end then peace and 
plenty, is too mean a conceit of so noble an effect'. 13 Following Romans XIII, 
power `is alwayes derived from God... and he takes it from one, and gives to 
another, either in an extraordinary or an ordinary way of Providence: as by giving 
a finall victory, or inclining men's hearts... ' 14 But Lawson also claimed that 
`Commonwealths are by consent', and `there is no power which can govern 
without consent not only of man, but also and especially of God, who either in 
justice and severity, or in mercy doth change and alter the Kingdoms of the world 
at will and pleasure. For he alone doth rule in heaven and earth at all times'. '5 
Hobbes' argument, that it was fear which led human beings themselves to 
create the commonwealth, implied for some of his contemporary critics that 
subjects could resist their king. Samuel Parker thought that Hobbes' theory 
destroyed `the Safety of all Societies of Mankind in the World'. If individuals 
contracted to create society, solely for personal safety and private interest, then 
this meant that their contract could easily be broken. It also implied that anyone 
9 See Coke, A Survey of the Politicks, pp. 24-5. 
10 Coke, Elements, p. 39. See also William Sherlock, The Case of the Allegiance due to Soveraign 
Powers, stated and resolved, according to scripture and reason, and the principles of the Church 
of England, with a more particular respect to the oath lately enjoyned, of allegiance to their 
present Majesties (London, 1691), p. 15. 
" See Coke, A Survey of the Politicks, p. 34. 
12 Gildon, The Deists Manual, p. 224. 
13 Lawson, An Examination, p. 16. 
14 Lawson, An Examination, p. 23. 
15 Lawson, An Examination, pp. 24 & 47. 
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could rebel against the king, and take his title from him. 16 Similarly for John 
Dowel, if 
the fundamental law of Nature is self Preservation, and for fear that end 
should not be attained, pacts are entred into, but if after those pacts that 
design cannot be accomplished, then pacts are void: and therefore if 
people have a suspicion that the Prince will destroy them, they may take 
up Arms. And if the Prince be devested of his Government, the People are 
no longer obliged to obey him, and upon this account of Self- 
Preservation, they are to submit to those who can protect them. '7 
Dowel found it hard to believe `that the Book called Leviathan was writ in 
defence of the Kings Power, Temporal and Ecclesiastical; since it manifestly 
asserts the cause of Usurpers'. 18 According to Dowel, 
This Leviathan, if the Principles were admired, justified the Actions of his 
Enemies; he casts this Imputation of the Rtimp, that they were obeyed 
onely for fear... if Fear be the great inducement to Government, they 
according to his Principles are to be condemned who out of the same fear 
obeyed the Rump. 19 
Quite simply for Dowel, `No person that hath suckt in Hobs his Principles, can be 
a loyal Subject ... 
'20 
Dowel was not the only writer to notice that, in the context of the early 
1650s, Hobbes' views implied support for the engagement. Marchamont Nedham 
recommended his own treatise, and Hobbes' arguments, for submission `to all 
nonsubscribers, whether Royal or Presbyterian'. 21 Current Hobbes' scholars have 
also commented on this aspect of Hobbes' theory. Quentin Skinner has argued 
that Hobbes was contributing to the arguments for the engagement in Leviathan. 22 
More recently, Glenn Burgess has described Hobbes as `the most reluctant 
16 Parker, A Discourse, pp. 128-9. See also John Whitehall, Behemoth Arraign 'd: or a vindication 
of property against a fanatical pamphlet stiled Behemoth: or, the History of the Civil Mars of 
England, from 1640 to 1660 (London, 1680), pp. 2-3. 
17 Dowel, the Leviathan Heretical, pp. 135-6. 
1 Dowel, The Leviathan Heretical, p. 137. 
19 Dowel, The Leviathan Heretical, pp. 134-5. 
20 Dowel, The Leviathan Heretical, p. 142. On p. 137, Dowel claimed that `Oliver gaining the 
Protectorship, was so pleased with him on those accounts, that the great place of being Secretary 
was profered him'. 
21 Marchamont Nedham, The Case of the Commonwealth of England Stated, edited by Philip A. 
Knachel (Folger Documents of Tudor and Stuart Civilisation, University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, 1969), pp. 138-9. 
22 See Skinner, `Conquest and Consent'; and `Ideological Context', pp. 286-317. See also Collins, 
`Christian Ecclesiology', p. 222. 
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Engager imaginable', and `an Engager despite himself. 23 Burgess claims that 
Hobbes intended Leviathan to be a defence of monarchy, but that between its 
writing (c. 1647) and publication (1651), circumstances changed around him, so 
that when Hobbes finally published Leviathan, `he found himself with a book 
supporting a cause already lost'. 24 Burgess has pointed out that Hobbes himself 
later claimed that he had not intended Leviathan to be a defence of Cromwell's 
title, but he admitted that a couple of paragraphs in the review and conclusion 
were relevant to the engagement controversy. 25 It was in these paragraphs, where 
Hobbes added another law of nature, in which he unsuccessfully attempted to 
clarify his position, and as it were to disengage himself from the engagers, only to 
find himself justifying any successful rebellion. 26 It was, in other words, an 
accidental implication of Hobbes' general theory, which led to his contemporary 
critics believing he was a supporter of Cromwell. In De Cive Hobbes made his 
preference for monarchy over other forms of government clear, although he also 
admitted that it was the only part of his political theory which was stated with 
probability. 27 But if we understand Leviathan as the third version of a theory, 
originally put forward in the early 1640s in the Elements of Law, which was 
intended as a defence of the king against parliament, then can we really believe it 
was possible for Hobbes to have switched sides? As Glenn Burgess has 
suggested, Hobbes' contemporary critics misunderstood him, because they read 
Leviathan in the context of the 1650s, rather than the 1640s. 28 
3. The Scriptural Account of Cain building a City. 
Although, as we have seen in chapter three, on the war of all against all, many of 
Hobbes' contemporary critics subscribed to the Aristotelian view that human 
beings were naturally sociable, and thus were never in the condition of war that 
Hobbes had described, this view was not supported by the interpretations of 
23 Burgess, `Contexts', p. 681. Also against the view that Leviathan was written to contribute to 
the engagement controversy, see Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, p. 205. 
24 Burgess, `Contexts', p. 677. 
25 See Burgess, `Contexts', p. 678. 
26 See Burgess, `Contexts', pp. 680-1. 
27 See De Cive, preface to the readers, 22, p. 14. 
28 See Burgess, `Contexts', pp. 683 & 701. 
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protestant commentators on the fourth chapter of Genesis, which described Cain 
murdering his brother Abel. For those of Hobbes' readers who were familiar with 
the account of Cain and Abel, there were also parallels to be seen to Hobbes' 
views on the reasons individuals created the commonwealth. God's punishment 
of Cain, for the murder of his brother, led Cain to build a city. For sixteenth and 
seventeenth century commentators on Genesis, there were a variety of views on 
why Cain built a city. For a number of commentators, Cain built a city in order to 
oppress other people. Having noted that Cain's punishment `to be a wanderer... to 
find a permanent dwelling place nowhere - involves civil government', Martin 
Luther further argued that `Cain did not build the city on account of fear and for 
his defense but because of his sure hope of success and his pride and lust for 
ruling'. 29 Walter Raleigh noted that Cain either enclosed a city `for his owne 
defence, or (as Josephus writteth) to oppresse others thereby', 30 while Alexander 
Ross thought that Cain 
might the more securely tyrannize and prey upon other mens goods and 
lands: for he is the first King and Conquerour in the world: and therefore 
Kings should not delight in Conquering kingdomes without bloud, least 
they be counted the successours of Caine and Nimrod, that mighty 
Hunter... 31 
In the theory of the Two Cities put forward by Augustine, and subscribed 
to by Luther, Cain was the origin of the earthly city, or the city of man. 32 As 
Augustine put it, `the first founder of the earthly city was... a fratricide, for, 
overcome by envy, [Cain] slew his own brother, a citizen of the Eternal City, on 
pilgrimage in this world'. 33 According to Augustine, `the earthly city was created 
by self-love... the earthly city glories in itself... looks for glory from men... [and] 
lifts up its head in its own glory... '34 Cain's building of a city was also compared 
to the founding of Rome by Romulus and Remus, although in this case `both 
brothers were citizens of the earthly city', and both sought glory. Augustine 
29 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 294 & 315. See also p. 312, where Luther noted that `the 
descendants of Adam were discouraged by continuous warfare with the sons of men and 
succumbed with the exception of eight persons who were preserved'. 
30 Raleigh, A History of the World, p. 72. 
31 Ross, An Exposition, p. 80. 
32 See Augustine, City of God, XV, 5, p. 596; and Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 252-4. 
33 Augustine, City of God, XV, 2, pp. 600-1. 
34 Augustine, City of God, XIV, 28, p. 593. 
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thought that Romulus killed Remus because `his aim was to glory in the exercise 
of power', and as long as Remus remained alive, Romulus' `sovereignty was 
diminished... Therefore, in order that the sole power should be wielded by one 
person, the partner was eliminated... ' According to Augustine, the conflict 
between Romulus and Remus `demonstrated the division of the earthly city 
against itself . 35 
For a number of commentators, when Cain built a city he did so for love 
of wordly things, and from vain glory. According to Gervase Babington, in 
Cains building a Cittie and calling it after his sonnes name, we see the 
care of the wicked ever. More to desire to magnifie themselves, then to 
glorifie God, more to seeke after a name in earth, then a life in heaven, 
more to establish their seede with townes and towers, then with Gods 
favour. But such course is crooked and like Cains here. If we desire a 
name, the love of God and his word, the love of Christ and his trueth is 
the way. 36 
For Alexander Ross, Cain built a city because he `was worldly-minded, placing 
his happiness in the cities and forts of this world, and not looking for that city 
whose builder and maker is God... '37 William Whateley noted that although 
building a city is `for the replenishing of men with people, and the commodious 
habitation of men borne into the world... a good and commendable thing in it 
seife... [but] men may easily and often doe transgresse much in the manner of 
doing it'. 8 In Cain's case, it was `a piece of vaine-glory', and it was through 
boastfulness that he named it after his son. 39 John Trapp also thought that Cain 
named the city after his son, because this `is the ambition of worldly men; their 
names are not written in heaven; they will propagate them therefore upon earth, 
as Nimrod by his tower. Absolom by his pillar, Cain by his city... ' 
40 
Other commentators followed Calvin, in arguing that Cain built a city 
because of fear. For Calvin, Cain's action in building a city was `a sign of an 
agitated and guilty mind'. Adam and the others were able to live `dispersed 
through the fields', because they were less afraid. But Cain wanted to separate 
35 Augustine, City of God, XV, 2, pp. 600-1. 
36 Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 22. 
37 Ross, An Exposition, p. 80. 
38 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 17. 
39 Whateley, Prototypes, p. 22. 
40 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, pp. 53-4. 
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`himself from the rest of men'. Calvin thought that it was fear which drove Cain 
`within the walls of a city, that he may fortify himself in a manner before 
unknown'. Once the city had been built, `supercilious vanity breaks forth'. Thus, 
Cain named the city after his son because his `pride was mixed with his 
diffidence and anxiety'. 1 John Trapp thought that Cain built a city in order to 
relieve his guilty conscience, 42 while for Alexander Ross it was for `his better 
securitie, for hee was in continuall feare' 43 Andrew Willet denied that 
Cain neither built him a citie, to be defended against wild beastes, which 
was the first cause, as Plato thinketh, that mooved men to build cities: for 
this reason might as well have mooved the righteous seed to have done it: 
neither because man is a sociable creature and loveth companie, as 
Aristotle: for this reason might as well have caused Adam to build, as 
Cain: but it is most like because Cain was a fugitive and runnagat, he 
would build him a citie to stay in and to be a defence unto him, as though 
Gods curse should not have taken place ... 
44 
Benjamin Needler thought that Cain built a city for his security against beasts, 
and for his defence against those who might try to kill him. But that in doing so, 
Cain attempted to `evade the sentence God has pronounced against him, that he 
should be a runagate and a vagabond' 45 Cain might have built a city, but he was 
still in exile from his home, and from God. According to Needler, Adam's son 
Seth, and his descendants, did not need to build a city because `the Lord had 
given them the plenty of the earth, and this was a stronger defence to them then 
the walls of any City: but Cain, who was departed from the presence of the Lord, 
was compelled to build a City for his defence: not for pleasure, but for security' 46 
These interpretations, of the seventeenth verse of the fourth chapter of 
Genesis, demonstrated that Hobbes' seventeenth century readers could have seen 
important parallels between Hobbes' account, and the scriptural account of Cain 
building a city. In fact, Hobbes' own account seems to indicate that he was aware 
41 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 216. 
42 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, pp. 53-4. 
43 Ross, An Exposition, p. 80. See also Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis, IV. 17; and Haak, Dutch 
Annotations, Genesis IV. 17. 
44 Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 51. 
4s Needier, Expository Notes, pp. 173-4. Needier, pp. 175-6, also addressed the question of how 
Cain's construction of a city fitted with God's punishment that he should be a vagabond. 
According to Needier, God did not set a time limit for his punishment; and also God's 
pronouncement was a threat, which could `be mitigated', rather than a prophecy, `which is always 
fulfilled'. 
46 Needier, Expository Notes, pp. 175-6. 
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of the interpretations of Cain building a city, and had learnt the lessons of the 
scriptural account. It would have been possible for Hobbes' readers to see, in his 
account of the creation of the commonwealth, various aspects of the account of 
Cain building a city. Hobbes' views were in agreement with those of Calvin and 
others, who thought that Cain built a city because of his fear, although admittedly 
not always the same sort of fear. And yet Hobbes could be understood to have 
taken account of the other interpretations, which saw Cain building a city because 
he was wordly minded, in order to oppress others, and for security and defence. 
Hobbes' arguments that all society existed for the sake of love of self, and was a 
product of glory; but that no lasting society could be based on glory also appear to 
be supported by Augustine's theory of the Two Cities. According to Augustine, 
Rome fell because it was founded on glory. Similarly for Hobbes, if the earthly 
city was to be lasting, it could not be founded on glory, although it could be 
founded on fear of death, security in the knowledge that we would be preserved, 
and desire of those things necessary for a comfortable life. 
Why then did Hobbes' contemporary critics fail to see these parallels? 
C 
There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, due to their definition of the term 
`nature', they understood the natural condition as the original, perfect condition of 
Adam and Eve in Eden, rather than the condition of fallen human beings. Thus 
Adam's dominion was the model for monarchy. Even when they attempted to 
associate Hobbes' natural condition with fallen human nature, they appear to have 
had different views of the extent to which human beings were corrupted by the 
Fall. Hobbes' contemporary critics believed that natural hierarchy and sociability 
were retained after the Fall. Further, because nature was understood as perfection, 
they wanted to look at human beings, as if the Fall had never taken place. 
Hobbes, on the other hand, appears to have been closer to the views of Augustine, 
Luther and Calvin, that the Fall had subverted or inverted the order of nature, and 
that man had lost his dominion over the earth after the disobedience. 7 Secondly, 
and most importantly, for Hobbes' contemporary critics, Cain was the first tyrant, 
he was not the first monarch. Christopher Hill has shown that Cain (and Nimrod) 
were used by both royalist and parliamentarian political writers as a symbol of 
47 See Almond, Adam and Eve, p. 13. 
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corrupt monarchy, and oppressive rule. Milton, for instance, compared Charles I 
to Cain, as well as describing the war between England and Scotland as a 
fratricidal war. 48 The account of Cain and Abel had a democratic meaning for 
radicals such as Gerard Winstanley, and demonstrated that a hierarchy based on 
birth did not necessarily provide the best governors. Cain was a symbol for all 
exploitation, and the account of the two brothers demonstrated the arbitrariness of 
God's decrees - good men, like Abel, suffered, while evil men, like Cain, 
prospered. 49 Hobbes' contemporary critics appear to have been unaware of his 
own use of the account of Cain and Abel, but even so for these writers Cain 
represented degenerated nature, not perfect nature. But for any of Hobbes' readers 
who subscribed to Augustine's theory of the Two Cities, Cain, regardless of 
whether or not he was a tyrant, was the founder of the earthly city. 
4. Hobbes on the Creation of the Commonwealth. 
Although we have seen that Hobbes thought that the state of nature was a 
condition of equality, he also thought that by right of nature, for the sake of self- 
preservation, if an individual could achieve dominion, or power over another, he 
should be allowed it. But in the natural condition that dominion, if based on 
physical strength or superior intellect, was temporary and insecure, and at some 
point the subjected individual might break free. For instance, if he was a child, as 
he grew older, stronger, and wiser, he would find it easier to rebel against his 
parents. In order to make dominion, or power over another individual lasting, it 
had to be turned into authority, through the consent of the subjected individual. 
According to Hobbes, when one man acquired dominion over another a little 
kingdom was created. This marked the beginning of commonwealths. 
There was, for Hobbes, only one reason why men, `who naturally love 
liberty and dominion over others', would subject themselves to another, and that 
was for self-preservation. 50 But from this one cause of subjection, proceeded two 
48 See Hill, The English Bible, pp. 207,221,244,204 & 206. See also p. 220 - Cromwell himself 
was compared to Nimrod. 
49 See Hill, The English Bible, pp. 204-6 & 208. See also pp. 387-9, for John Bunyan's similar 
view of Cain and Abel. 
50 Leviathan, XVII, 1, p. 106; and see Elements, XIX, 11, p. 107 
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types of subjection. Firstly, subjection `to him that invadeth or may invade him 
for fear of him'. This produced a body politic, arising naturally by compulsion, 
through natural force, and from which proceeded paternal and despotic 
dominions' Of these two types of dominion, despotic dominion took place 
immediately, but paternal dominion took place in the future, upon the birth of 
children. 52 Secondly, `men may join amongst themselves to subject themselves to 
such as they shall agree upon for fear of others'. This produced a body politic, 
`which is like a creation out of nothing by human wit', and `for the most part is 
called a commonwealth in distinction from the former', although this was the 
general name for both. 53 For Hobbes, there were two kinds of commonwealth. In 
the natural commonwealth a `Lord acquires citizens for himself by his own will', 
and men subjected themselves to the one they feared; and in the commonwealth 
by design, which could also be called political, `the citizens impose a Lord upon 
themselves by their own decision, whether that be one man or one group of men 
with sovereign power', and men subjected themselves to the one they trusted, 
through fear of the rest. 54 In Leviathan these types of commonwealth were called 
the commonwealth by acquisition and the commonwealth by institution, and they 
were created in three ways: voluntary subjection, conquest in war, and the 
dominion of parents over children. 55 
The commonwealth by institution, or political commonwealth, was 
created when `men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or 
assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all 
others'. 56 In a commonwealth by institution men submitted to a sovereign power 
through fear of one another, and not through fear of the sovereign they 
instituted. 57 There were, for Hobbes, three types of instituted commonwealth: 
democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. In both the Elements and De Cive, while 
comparing monarchy and aristocracy, and in particular the inconveniences for 
51 Elements, XIX, 11, pp. 107-8; & XX, 1, p. 109. 
52 See Elements, XXII, 2, p. 126. This future aspect of paternal dominion was omitted from the 
accounts of De Cive and Leviathan. 
53 Elements, XIX, 11, pp. 107-8 & XX, 1, p. 109. 
54 De Cive, V, 12, p. 74. 
55 See Leviathan, XVII, 15, pp. 109-10. In Leviathan Hobbes seemed reluctant to describe the 
commonwealth by acquisition as natural, other than that it was created by natural force. 
56 Leviathan, XVII, 15, p. 110. 
57 See Leviathan, XX, 2, p. 127; De Cive, V, 12, p. 74 and Elements, XIX, 11, p. 108. 
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subjects in both, Hobbes stated that he would ignore arguments from example and 
testimony. These included the arguments: `that the world, as it was created, so 
also it is governed by one God', and `that paternal government, which is 
monarchy, was instituted in the beginning from the creation; and that other 
governments have proceeded from the dissolution thereof, caused by the 
rebellious nature of mankind, and be but pieces of broken monarchies cemented 
by human wit... '58 These statements were missing from the corresponding chapter 
in Leviathan. 
So why didn't Hobbes take the easy option, and use these arguments to 
demonstrate the superiority of monarchy - these would have been arguments that 
his readers were familiar with? Why, in fact, did he mention these arguments at 
all? Perhaps Hobbes thought that the mere mention of scriptural arguments might 
add weight to his case, without his having to subscribe to them. It seems more 
likely that the context provides the answer. At the time of writing the Elements 
and De Cive, the conflicts between parliament and Charles I had been intensifying 
since 1625, resulting in Charles' eleven year personal rule from 1629 to 1640. 
The Scots had rebelled in 1638, leading to more conflict with parliament, and 
eventually to civil war between 1642 and 1646.59 In this period of time, 
arguments from example or experience simply demonstrated that the people, or 
their representatives, could and indeed were opposing the king. Thus we can 
understand why, in the earlier works, Hobbes said he did not want to use the 
above arguments from example and testimony. Also, if we consider his view that 
the Civil War was at least in part caused by religion, then we can understand why 
Hobbes felt that he must provide a theory in support of monarchy, which ignored 
traditional scriptural arguments - scripture was open to interpretation. 
60 Hobbes 
must have thought that at this time any theoretical support for obedience to kings, 
could not be grounded either on scripture - both royalists and parliamentarians 
58 Elements, XXIV, 3, p. 138; and see also De Cive, X, 3, p. 117, which gave the additional 
example of God's people living under kings. 
59 The Elements of Law was completed in May 1640 and circulated in manuscript form. It was 
published in an unauthorised version in 1650. De Cive was written between 1637 and 1640. It was 
first published in Paris in April 1642; an enlarged edition was published in 1647; and finally an 
English translation, which was probably not by Hobbes, in 1651. 
60 See Hobbes, Behemoth, pp. 2-3. Behemoth was written in 1670, and was published unauthorised 
in 1679, and authorised in 1682. 
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believed that God was on their side - or on experience - the people of England 
had taken up arms against their king. 
Hobbes' commonwealth by acquisition was created in two ways, the first 
of which was despotic dominion, and which once enlarged became a despotical 
kingdom. In this case, dominion was `acquired by conquest or victory in war', 
when one man submitted to another through fear of death. 61 It involved `a 
covenant from him that is overcome, not to resist him that overcometh'. 62 The 
victor spared the life of the conquered, and in return the conquered now `owes the 
victor service and obedience, as absolute as may be, except what is contrary to 
divine laws'. 63 In this way, `a little body politic' was created consisting of master 
(sovereign) and servant (subject). Once the master had acquired dominion `over a 
number of servants so considerable that they cannot by their neighbours be 
securely invaded', then this became a kingdom despotical. 64 It was not the victory 
that gave the right of dominion, but the covenant, or agreement from the 
conquered that in return for his life being spared, he would not resist the 
conqueror. 65 But if a servant captured in war was kept in chains or prison, then it 
was to be assumed that no covenant had passed between him and his captor, 
because the natural bonds of imprisonment `have no need of strengthening by the 
verbal bonds of covenant'. In this case, the servant was actually a slave, and had 
no obligation to his master, and had the right to free himself by whatever means 
necessary. 66 Did the despotical kingdom mark the end of the state of nature, and 
the beginning of commonwealths? It did once it had become large enough to be 
able to defend itself, against any other group of individuals in the natural 
condition. 
Paternal dominion, which once enlarged became a patrimonial kingdom, 
was another variety of the commonwealth by acquisition. In the Elements Hobbes 
described paternal dominion as not taking place immediately, but in the future 
61 Leviathan, XX, 10, p. 130. 
62 Elements, XXII, 2, pp. 126-7. 
63 De Cive, VIII, 1, p. 103. 
64 Elements, XXII, 2, p. 127. See also Leviathan, XX, 15, p. 132. But this argument was omitted 
in De Cive. 
65 See Leviathan, XX, 11, p. 131. 
66 Elements, XXII, 3, p. 127. 
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when children were born. 67 The dominion of parents over children in the state of 
nature belonged first to the mother, and then by derivative right to the father. 
Hobbes asked the question, how was it possible for one individual to have the 
right of dominion over a child, which proceeded from the generation of two 
human beings? 68 The answer could not be that the right of dominion came from 
generation, for `God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be always two that 
are equally Parents'. 69 In other words, dominion attained by generation created 
divided authority. 70 For Hobbes, both parents could not have dominion, since no 
man could obey two masters. 7' So which parent was the child subject to? Hobbes 
returned to the state of nature, where there were `no laws of matrimony... no laws 
for the education of children, but the law of nature, and the natural inclination of 
the sexes, one to another, and to their children'. 72 Because all adults (including 
women) were accounted equal, the right of nature made the master victor over the 
conquered. Thus the right of nature gave dominion over the child to he, or she, 
who first had the child in his, or her, power. 73 Because the child was a part of the 
mother's body until she gave birth, the right of dominion belonged to the 
mother. 74 
The right of dominion was not derived from generation, but from 
preservation. 75 According to Hobbes, a child was subject to its mother not 
because the mother `begat him, but from the child's consent, either express, or by 
67 See Elements, XXII, 2, p. 126. This seems to indicate that at least in the Elements account of the 
natural condition, there were no children. Thus the birth of children must mark the beginning of 
commonwealths. It also might indicate that this account of the natural condition fits the model of 
the Edenic condition, where Adam and Eve lived alone, before the birth of their sons. 
68 See Elements, XXIII, 1, p. 130; and Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 128. 
69 Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 128. Pateman, `God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper', p. 453, cites this 
line of scripture as evidence that Hobbes thought that the father was the principal agent in 
generation. But if we consider the second part of this sentence, it seems more likely that Hobbes 
saw this as evidence of the equality of men and women. Pateman seems to have taken it for 
granted that helper implies inferior. As we have seen in chapter two, not all commentators on 
Genesis interpreted this verse as Pateman has done. 
70 John Locke was later to criticise Sir Robert Filmer's patriarchal theory on the grounds that 
Filmer had forgotten mothers. See Locke, Two Treatises, I, 55, p. 180, where Locke criticised 
Filmer's argument for Adam's authority as a father, on the grounds that both parents shared 
authority over children; and Two Treatises, I, 61, pp. 184-6, where he criticised Filmer for his 
failure to realise that the fifth commandment enjoined obedience to both parents - Filmer had 
conveniently forgotten the last three words of this commandment - `and thy mother'. 
71 See De Cive, IX, 1, p. 108; and Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 128. 
72 Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 129. 
73 See De Cive, IX, 2, p. 108. 
7; See Elements, XXIII, 1, p. 130. This is missing in De Cive. 
75 Man's defenceless at birth was an outcome of the Fall - see Almond, Adam and Eve, p. 38. 
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other sufficient arguments declared'. 76 In the state of nature, it was the mother 
who could choose either to nourish or abandon her child. If she preserved the 
child, she could reasonably expect that the child would not grow up to become 
her enemy, otherwise no one would preserve their children. 77 In De Cive and 
Leviathan Hobbes added that unless a woman declared a man to be the father of a 
child, it could not be known who was the father. 78 In `the state of nature every 
woman who gives birth becomes both a mother and a Mistress'. Those who 
claimed it was the father who had dominion, simply because of `the superiority of 
his sex', were wrong. Reason demonstrated that `the inequality of natural strength 
is too small to enable the male to acquire dominion over the female without 
war'. 79 And custom gave us the example of the Amazons, and women who had 
sovereign power, who made decisions about their children. 80 
In the state of nature, `the mother is originally the Mistress of the children, 
and the father or anyone else is their Master by derivative right'. 8' There were a 
number of ways in which one human being could acquire a right of dominion 
from another. A mother could relinquish her right over her child - she could 
abandon the child, and then whoever preserved the child acquired the right of 
dominion. In the state of nature, `where all things belong to all men', the mother 
could reclaim her child, or acquire dominion over any other child, by the same 
right as anyone else - if she preserved its life. 
82 Whoever had dominion over the 
child could do whatever he, or she, liked with the child - sell the child into slavery 
or adoption, or even kill it. 83 A parent was incapable of wronging a child, so long 
as that child was under the parent's authority. 84 A mother could become subject to 
another individual, and in so doing whoever became her master also acquired 
right over her children. This was accomplished in a number of ways. If the mother 
76 Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 128 
77 See Elements, XXIII, 3, pp. 130-1; De Cive, IX, 3, p. 108; and Leviathan, XX, 5, pp. 129-30. 
Hobbes seems to have had no concept of the unconditional love of parents for their children. 
78 See De Cive, IX, 3, p. 108; and Leviathan, XX, 5, p. 129. 
79 De Cive, IX, 3, p. 108. Although in Leviathan, XIX, 22, p. 126, Hobbes claimed that `men are 
naturally fitter than women for actions of labour and danger'; and in XXI, 16, p. 142, he referred 
to the `natural timorousness' of women. 
80 See Elements, XXIII, 5, p. 131; De Cive, IX, 3, p. 108; and Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 129. 
81 De Cive, IX, 7, p. 110. 
82 De Cive, IX, 4, p. 108. 
83 See Elements, XXIII, 8, p. 132. 
84 See De Cive, IX, 7, p. 110. In this case, if a child had given its consent to its parent, everything 
the parent did was authorised by the child. 
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became captive in war, then dominion over her children belonged to whoever had 
acquired dominion over her, whether that person was the biological father of the 
child, or not. 85 If the mother was a citizen of a commonwealth, then the sovereign 
of that commonwealth had dominion over both the mother and the child. If a 
woman `gives herself to a man to share her life with him', on the condition that 
he had power over her, then that man also had power over her children. But if the 
woman was the partner with power in this relationship, then she also had 
dominion over children. This was particularly important for sovereign queens, 
otherwise they would lose their power by marrying and having children. 
Generally, if the relationship of a man and a woman was a union in which one 
was subject to the power of the other, the children belonged to the partner with 
power. 86 Where there was no contract, dominion belonged to the mother. 87 If a 
man and woman entered into a partnership in the state of nature, in which neither 
was subject to the other, such as covenants of `cohabitation for society of bed 
only', and covenants of copulation, the covenant decided who would have 
dominion. 88 But because commonwealths had generally been established by 
fathers, it was men that now had dominion over children. 89 
When paternal dominion was enlarged, a patrimonial kingdom or 
monarchy by acquisition was created. 90 But for Hobbes, there was a difference 
between a family and a commonwealth. The family, consisting of father or 
85 See Elements, XXIII, 4, p. 131, where Hobbes described it as absolute subjection; and De Cive, 
IX, 5, p. 109. 
86 See De Cive, IX, 5, p. 109. See also Leviathan, XX, 6, p. 130. I cannot agree with Carole 
Pateman, who claims that women do not take part in the social contract - see Pateman, `God Hath 
Ordained to Man a Helper', p. 461. In the Latin Leviathan, XLII, 78a, p. 372 (a paragraph which 
did not appear in the English version), Hobbes stated that `authority does not take account of 
masculine and feminine'. See also Hobbes' similar statement, `though man be male and female, 
authority is not', in `Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners and Religion of 
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, written by himself, by way of letter to a learned person (John 
Wallis, D. D. )', in English Works, Volume IV, pp. 409-40, p. 434. This was written in 1662. 
Hobbes' language here is similar to the language of Galatians 111.28 - `there is neither male nor 
female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus'. We will see below that one of Hobbes' contemporary 
critics, William Lucy thought that because Hobbes had claimed individuals created civil society 
for peace and preservation, these aims applied to all individuals, including women. Thus women 
took part in the covenant. 
87 See Leviathan, XX, 5, p. 129. 
88 Elements, XXIII, 4-5, p. 131. In De Cive, IX, 6, pp. 109-10, once commonwealths had been 
created, if a man and woman entered into a relationship of concubinage, then the civil laws 
decided who had dominion over children. 
89 See De Cive, IX, 6, p. 110; and Leviathan, XX, 4, p. 129. 
90 See Elements, XXIII, 10, p. 133. 
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master, children and servants, was a sort of little monarchy, as long as it was not 
part of a larger commonwealth. But a family was only properly a commonwealth, 
when it became large enough to be able to defend itself. 91 Much earlier in 
Leviathan Hobbes had claimed that governing a family and a kingdom were 
different sorts of business, 92 although elsewhere he compared kings to fathers of 
families, and the sovereigns of the three different kinds of commonwealths to the 
three sorts of masters of families. 93 
Hobbes' description of dominion in families is confusing for a number of 
reasons. Hobbes claimed that there was no dominion in the state of nature, 94 but 
that mothers had dominion over children in the state of nature, and that a son was 
never in the state of nature. How do we explain these apparently contradictory 
statements? Firstly, Hobbes stressed that the state of nature was a state of 
equality, and that there was no dominion of persons before civil government. 95 
Because everyone had a right to everything in the state of nature, it was not 
possible to invade someone else's right, because where all had a right, no one had 
a right. This also meant that all sexual partnerships were permitted, honour due to 
parents was according to each man or child's own judgement, and killing was 
permitted. 96 But although all adults were to be accounted equal in the state of 
nature, if a man could achieve power over another, he should be allowed it. 97 
Indeed it was in any individual's interest to do so. But in a condition where all 
had a right to all, this dominion was not secure. The case of parent and child was 
a good example of insecure dominion, because children grew into adults, and thus 
became as capable as their parents of killing. 98 On this account, the family, as 
Hobbes thought of it (as a relationship of dominion and subjection), could not 
exist in his state of nature. But Hobbesian equality only applied to adults, so 
dominion over children, or the fact that children at least at birth subjected 
themselves to adults in order to survive, did not detract from this state of equality, 
91 See De Cive, IX, 10, p. 112; Elements, XXIII, 10, p. 133; and Leviathan, XX, 15, p. 132. 
92 See Leviathan, VIII, 12, p. 40. 
93 See Leviathan, XLII, 70, p. 368 & XLII, 82, p. 374. 
94 Although the desire for dominion was natural. 
95 See Leviathan, XIII, 1, p. 74 & XVI, 10, p. 103. 
96 See De Cive, XIV, 9, p. 158. 
97 See Leviathan, XIII, 4, p. 75; De Cive, I, 14, pp. 30-1; and Elements, XIV, 13, pp. 80-1. 
93 The patriarchal theory, which compared the king's power to the power of the father in the 
family, had not prevented Charles I's subjects from resisting him, and then executing him. 
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and as a result the family could exist there. Was the birth of children in the state 
of nature the beginning of dominion? Was it also the beginning of 
commonwealths? A passage from De Cive leads us to believe that it was. In this 
paragraph Hobbes discussed objections to his claim that `property and 
commonwealths came into being together'. Hobbes noted that objections to this 
idea, based on the fact that `property in things existed in fathers of families before 
the institution of commonwealths', did not hold, because he had already said that 
a family was a small commonwealth. `Fathers of different families who share no 
common father or master, have a common right to all things'. 99 So there were 
families, or little commonwealths, in a state of nature in relationship to each 
other. 100 
Having said that the state of nature was a state of equality (between 
adults), and that there was no dominion (over adult persons) before civil states 
come into existence, Hobbes went on to say that it was women who had dominion 
over children in the state of nature. But he also made the contradictory claims: 
that in the state of nature children were absolutely subject to fathers; 10' and that a 
son was never in the state of nature. 102 Elsewhere he claimed that before the 
formation of commonwealths, human beings lived in families, in which fathers 
were sovereign. 103 Further, these families were continually at war with one 
another, and enlarged their dominion to become kingdoms. 104 With the exception 
of the first reference to the Elements, where children were absolutely subject to 
fathers, the other references did not mention the state of nature, but described the 
time before commonwealths came into being. In A Dialogue between a 
Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, the philosopher 
made the following statement: `it is evident, that Dominion, Government, and 
Laws, are far more Ancient than History, or any other writing, and that the 
beginning of all Dominion amongst men was in Families; in which, first, the 
Father of the Family by the Law of nature was absolute Lord of his Wife and 
99 De Cive, VI, 15, p. 85. 
10° See Schochet, Patriarchalisni in Political Thought, chapter XII on Hobbes and the family. 
101 See Elements, XX, 16, p. 116. 
102 See De Cive, footnote to I, 10, pp. 28-9 
103 See De Cive, XIII, 14, p. 150; Leviathan, X, 51, p. 55; XXII, 26, p. 153; XXVII, 51, p. 203; 
and XXX, 11, p. 224. 
104 See Leviathan, XVII, 2, pp. 106-7; and XXII, 31, p. 154. 
209 
Children'. This was confirmed by history and scripture, but again there was no 
mention of the state of nature. '°5 
There are a number of possible explanations for Hobbes' apparent 
contradictions on exactly who had dominion over children in the natural 
condition. Firstly, Hobbes may have argued that it was women who had dominion 
over children, in order to demonstrate to his mainly male readership what an 
awful place the state of nature was, and thus to explain why human beings, 
particularly males, had to leave this condition and create civil society. Secondly, 
and more likely, there were two states of nature in Hobbes' political theory, and 
these were created by two methods of argument, which contradicted each other, 
and which Hobbes himself failed to distinguish sharply enough. 106 In one state of 
nature, which we might call philosophical, the use of reason demonstrated the 
natural equality (and unsociability) of all human beings, including women. It also 
demonstrated that because women gave birth to children, it was women who, at 
least initially, had dominion, or power, over children. But in order to demonstrate 
that all authority was based on consent, Hobbes first of all described why mothers 
had original dominion, and then described how this authority over children was 
transferred from mothers to fathers. A mother might well have acquired authority 
over a child, because she had given birth to that child, but the father or mother 
maintained authority through consent. Once this transfer of authority over 
children from mothers to fathers had been completed, the philosophical state of 
nature, arrived at by arguments from reason, became what we might call the 
historical state of nature, arrived at by arguments from history and experience. In 
this state of nature, Hobbes gave us an account of how societies actually 
developed, and this account, as many of his contemporary critics pointed out, 
10$ Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of 
England, edited with an introduction by J. Cropsey (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & 
London, 1971, paperback edition 1998), pp. 158-9. Cropsey notes that Hobbes never referred to 
the state of nature by name in this work. He dates its composition as some time between 1662 and 
1675. It was first published in 1681 (see A Dialogue..., introduction, pp. 13 & 3). Richard Tuck 
and Edwin Curley date its composition as 1666 (see De Cive, Principal Events in Hobbes' Life, p. 
xlvii; and Leviathan, Chronology, p. liii). 
106 See Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought, p. 236. 
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demonstrated that it was men who had dominion over both women, and 
children. 107 
Gordon Schochet has argued that it was the agreement of fathers of 
families which created the commonwealth by institution, although Schochet 
admitted that Hobbes himself did not state this directly. 108 But given Hobbes' 
views on the status of women in the natural condition, it could just as easily have 
been an agreement between mothers of families. Either way, families or 
commonwealths by acquisition came into being, with either parent at the head of 
each family. Then these families made an agreement, and submitted themselves to 
a common power, thereby creating the commonwealth by institution. 
Alternatively, these individual families warred with one another, and attempted to 
increase their power by subduing other families. This created what Hobbes 
referred to as despotic dominion. 
To summarise, in Hobbes' view society was not natural, it was artificial. 
Hobbes thought that it was human beings themselves who created the 
commonwealth, and they did so for self-preservation, in order to escape the 
horrors of the natural condition, where they lived in constant fear that they would 
either be killed by other individuals, or that their insecure property would be 
taken away from them. The desire for dominion existed in the natural condition, 
and in fact Hobbes thought that individuals should try to attain dominion for 
preservation's sake, but this dominion was insecure and temporary. For Hobbes, 
any dominion based on the qualities nature had given individuals could not be 
long lasting. Children grew into adults, became less dependent on their parents, 
and more capable of resisting them. As adults got older, their physical and mental 
faculties weakened, and they were thus less able to dominate their children. 
Individuals were roughly equal, in the sense that one individual might be 
physically stronger than others; but this advantage could be outweighed by 
another individual having greater intellect, so much so that neither could gain the 
advantage completely. Individuals could attain dominion naturally, by sheer 
107 See the discussion on the contemporary reaction below, and also Leo Strauss, The Political 
Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, p. 60, who argues that Hobbes thought that the historical origin of 
most commonwealths was patrimonial monarchy. 
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physical power, or by begetting children. But there was a difference between 
attaining this dominion and holding on to it. Dominion could only be lasting, if 
the subjected person gave his continuing consent to the victor, thereby turning 
dominion or power into authority. '09 
Hobbes wanted to provide a new theoretical justification for the 
maintenance of obedience. The theories of divine right and patriarchy had failed 
to prevent the people of England from resisting their king, and ultimately killing 
him. These theories had concentrated on the origins of authority, and not on how 
authority was to be maintained. For Hobbes, it was simply not good enough to 
claim that kings must be obeyed because their authority originated in God, or 
their authority originated in fatherly power. There must be a continuing reason for 
obedience. It might well have been the case that dominion had been acquired by 
begetting children, or conquest in war, but there was a huge difference between 
attaining such dominion, either by generation or force, and then holding on to it. 
It was agreement, or consent, which created lasting authority, and stable 
commonwealths. To some extent Hobbes kept the patriarchal idea that authority 
in the family and commonwealth were similar, but he destroyed the idea that 
either type of authority was natural, and argued that both kinds of authority were 
based on consent. Authority could not be based on the power of fathers, because 
there were two human beings involved in the generation of children, and this 
created divided authority. "" Hobbes also thought that authority could not be 
based on fatherly (or parental) power, for the simple reason that children grew 
into adults, and became capable of resisting, or even killing, their parents. Hobbes 
accomplished the complete destruction of patriarchal ideas by claiming it was 
women who originally had dominion over children. "' 
108 See Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought, p. 238. See also Tricaud, 'Hobbes's 
Conception of the State of Nature', p. 112, who has argued that in Leviathan's state of nature, war 
was waged between groups or families, rather than individuals. 
109 See also King, The-Ideology of Order, p. 188 - the contract did not explain the origins of civil 
society, but how it continued its existence. 
110 Divine right theory also created divided authority. 
111 Preston King thinks Hobbes was arguing against original paternal power, rather than in favour 
of original maternal power - see King, The Ideology of Order, p. 204. For Hobbes' destruction or 
subversion of patriarchalism see also Keith Thomas, `The Social Origins of Hobbes' Political 
Thought', in Hobbes Studies, edited by K. C. Brown (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965), pp. 185- 
230; and Chapman, `Leviathan Writ Small'. 
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5. The Contemporary Reaction: Hobbes versus the Patriarchalists. 
For many of Hobbes' critics, his views on the creation of the commonwealth 
contradicted contemporary experience, history and scripture, which all confirmed 
that the origin of authority was to be found in the family. Bishop Bramhall 
accused Hobbes of taking `a pride in removeing all ancient land-marks, between 
Prince and subject, Father and child, Husband and Wife, Master and servant, Man 
and Man'. Hobbes had caused as much confusion as `a hog in a garden of 
herbs'. 112 For Samuel Parker, to `be a Subject is as natural upon being born, as to 
be a Man'. All human beings, because they were born as children, were born 
under government, under the power of parents. 113 Richard Cumberland deduced 
the origin of civil society from the law of nature, which `commands the 
Settlement of Property', and the law of nature which `enjoins a peculiar 
Benevolence of Parents towards their Children'. It was as a `consequence of that 
Benevolence, our first Parents must have granted to their Children, when of Age, 
both a Patrimony of their own, out of that full Dominion, which they had over all 
things by the former of these Laws, and also a paternal Power over their own 
Offspring'. "4 For Cumberland, `Mankind, and consequently, all states and 
families, have descended from one Man and one Woman, and that, therefore all 
Authority derives its Original from that which is most Natural, the 
PATERNAL'. ' 15 
A number of writers described how commonwealths had developed, by 
tracing their origins to the first families, and even to Adam himself 116 According 
to Richard Cumberland, there was `no antierster Authority, under God, over 
Things and Persons, than is that of Fathers of Families over their Wives and 
Children, and after them, of their eldest Sons'. As human beings increased in 
numbers, the heads of families divided dominion between their sons, `by giving 
each an absolute Command over his own Family, or over many; whence many 
112 Bramhall, Castigations, p. 161. 
113 Parker, A Discourse, pp. 123-4. 
114 Cumberland, A Treatise, pp. 32-3. See also p. 80, private dominion had been in existence since 
the days of Adam. 
115 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 307. 
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Monarchies might arise... ' Other families created aristocracies and democracies 
in a similar way. 117 Charles Gildon noted that, 
while the world was in its infancy, the Fathers of Families might naturally 
have the Power of decision among their own Children. But when Families 
Multiplied, Disputes betwixt Families required a Third Person necessarily 
to decide Controversies, and to see Justice impartially done, and this was 
the Rise of Governments. 118 
Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon attempted to relate Hobbes' state of nature to 
the scriptural account of the earliest human beings. According to Clarendon, God 
gave 
Man, the dominion over the rest of his Creation, he gave him likewise 
natural strength and power to govern the World with peace and order: and 
how much soever he lost by his own integrity, by falling from obedience 
to his Creator, and how severe a punishment soever he under-went by that 
his disobedience, it do's not appear that his dominion over Man-kind was 
in any degree lessened or abated. 
During his own lifetime, Adam was `the sole Monarch of the World'. Further, his 
dominion was `over a very numerous People', and during that time government 
was not instituted by covenants or contracts. Adam's son Seth continued this 
dominion, and then Noah after him. After the Tower of Babel was built `the 
Generations of Noah... did divide the Nations in the Earth', but this division was 
performed `with method and order'. It was not `an irregular and confus'd 
dispersion, that every man went whither he listed, and setled himself where he 
liked best, from whence that Institution of Government might arise which Mr. 
Hobbes fancies'. 119 As human beings increased in numbers, but did not live as 
long as Adam, they did not have as many children. As a result, `they who had the 
Soveraign Powers exercis'd less of the Paternal Affection in their Government, 
and look'd upon those they govern'd as their mere subjects, not as their Allies'. 120 
116 See for example Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha, reproduced in Patriarcha and Other Writings, 
edited by J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991); and Raleigh, A 
History of the World. 
117 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 33. 
118 Gildon, The Deists Manual, p. 224. 
119 Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey, pp. 220-1. Francois Peleau, one of Hobbes' 
correspondents thought that the existence of families meant that Hobbes' state of nature could 
never have existed, although he also thought that after Noah's death, Shem, Japhet, and Ham 
could have waged war with one another - see Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol. 1, pp. 331-2. 120 Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey, p. 222. 
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But not all of Hobbes' contemporary critics thought that the authority of 
civil sovereigns originated in the power of fathers. George Lawson accused 
Hobbes of confounding `Oeconomical power with Political' . 
12' Lawson thought 
that Hobbes' arguments, that paternal dominion was acquired by generation, and 
despotic dominion by conquest, were wrong. According to Lawson, power in the 
family and the commonwealth were different types of power. In `a family there is 
a threefold power acquired; the power of an husband over his wife by marriage, 
covenant, or contract; the power of parents over their children, by generation; the 
power of Masters over their servants, acquired several waies; for some servants 
are slaves, some are free... ' A master had more power over those slaves, or 
servants, who were `born and bought', than the power he had over those who 
were hired. There was thus `a difference of Despotical power even in a Family; 
the one is more absolute, the other more limited'. As far as civil sovereignty was 
concerned, there were two ways in which it could be acquired - `either justly or 
unjustly'. Civil sovereignty was justly acquired either `in an extraordinary way, as 
by special unction and designation from God', or `in an ordinary manner, and that 
is either by the Law of Nature, or by institution'. 122 Lawson also stated that 
although he was `no enemy to Monarchy', he did not believe that it was 
necessarily the best form of government for all people, at all times, and under all 
circumstances. In scripture, we `do not read that God did ever immediately 
institute a form of Government to any people except to Israel; yet that was not 
Monarchical'. 123 
Hobbes' argument that paternal dominion was derived from consent, 
rather than generation, was thought to contradict scripture. John Whitehall 
commented that if paternal dominion was not derived from generation then `why 
should Children be bound to honour their Parents by the Law of God; or by the 
Law Civil why should Parents be bound to provide for their Children. It must be 
either upon the account of generation or no way; for there is no other reason to be 
given for the said Laws'. 124 According to Roger Coke, Hobbes' views on paternal 
dominion implied that Adam did not have `any power to restrain his Sons, or give 
121 Lawson, An Examination, p. 45. 
122 Lawson, An Examination, p. 46. 
123 Lawson, An Examination, p. 43. 
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them Law, as Father', because according to Hobbes paternal dominion was not 
from generation. 125 Although Adam was given `Dominion over all Creatures, yet 
it was not intended that he alone should so enjoy his Dominion, that others of his 
own kind should be wholly deprived of the use and benefit of them, without 
which they could not possibly subsist'. When Cain and Abel were born, although 
Adam's dominion over the creatures continued, Cain and Abel had `property in 
the Fruit of the Ground'. If we followed Hobbes' reasoning, `this property could 
not be given to them by Adam as Father; for the Fathers power arising from 
generation, and the person being only generated, the Fathers power extends no 
further'. Cain and Abel's property was given to them by Adam as monarch. 126 
The idea that paternal dominion was derived from consent, and not from 
generation, also contradicted experience. William Lucy thought that Hobbes' 
views on paternal dominion were simply inconsistent, because at one point he 
argued that paternal dominion was acquired by generation, and then contradicted 
himself by arguing it was based on consent. For Lucy, it was not possible for a 
child to give his consent to be governed by his parents. A child's consent was like 
that of `a Pig, or any Infant Beast; he can wish for a Teat, and cry for it when he 
lacks it, and be satisfied with any that is offered'. If Hobbes' doctrine was correct, 
the child would `chuse his Nurse who gave him suck, not the Mother who gave 
him being'. Further, children cannot tell their parents apart, and thus cannot give 
their consent to one or the other. Even as the child began to acquire reason, he 
still needed to be governed by his parents. And when the child reached the age of 
twenty one, `he is generally thought fit to govern his estate... yet even then, until 
his death, he owes obedience to his Parents, and they have dominion over him, 
whether he consents or not'. 127 Sir Robert Filmer thought that it was just not 
124 Whitehall, The Leviathan Found Out, p. 46 
125 Coke, A Survey of the Politicks, pp. 32-3. According to Henry Parker, Adam's failure to punish 
Cain for the murder of Abel demonstrated that Adam did not have political authority - `But we do 
not find that Adam did claim any such power, or sin, in not claiming it; We find rather that the 
whole stock of Mankinde them living, were the Judges that Cain feared' - see [Henry Parker], Jus 
Populi: or, A Discourse Wherein Clear Satisfaction is Given, (London, 1644), p. 3, cited in 
Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought, p. 105. 
126 Coke, Elements, pp. 34-5. 
127 William Lucy, An Answer to Mr. Hobbs His Leviathan: with Observations, Censures, and 
Confutation of Divers Errours, beginning at the seventeenth chapter of that book- (London, 
1673), pp. 65-6. 
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possible for a child to `express consent, or by other sufficient arguments declare it 
before it comes to the age of discretion'. 128 
Hobbes' contemporary critics were horrified by his argument that 
dominion over children in the natural condition belonged to whoever preserved 
the child. According to Bishop Bramhall, Hobbes `might as well tell us in plain 
termes, that all obligation which a child hath to his parent, is because he did not 
take him by the heeles and knock out his braines against the walls, so soon as he 
was born'. 129 William Lucy denied Hobbes' argument that the child owed 
obedience to whoever it was that preserved it, even if this individual was a 
complete stranger. According to Lucy, `preservation [was] not so great a benefit 
as being', and it was the parent who gave the child being. 130 Hobbes' argument 
that parents could choose whether to preserve or expose their children horrified 
his contemporary critics for one main reason. According to Hobbes, it was this 
power which gave mothers original dominion over children. William Lucy 
claimed that there had never been a law in any country which allowed parents to 
kill their children, neither was this permitted by the law of nature, `which dictates 
nothing more clearly than the Love of Parents to their children'. Even if this were 
the case, `the Husband hath power to restrain it'. If the woman had such a power, 
but chose not to exercise it, this did not give her dominion. 131 Because the mother 
was under the father's dominion, `she cannot act any considerable matter either to 
her self, or for her child, without the Fathers leave'. 132 Hobbes' view would 
actually have given the midwife, or nurse, dominion, as they could both be said to 
have had initial power over the child. 133 Quite simply, Hobbes' argument had 
turned all traditional arguments for authority upside down - Hobbes gave wives 
dominion over husbands, children over parents, servants over masters, and 
subjects over Kings. 134 
Hobbes' argument that it was women who originally had dominion over 
children also contradicted both the account of scripture, and the evidence of 
128 Filmer, Observations, pp. 191-2. 
129 Bramhall, Castigation, pp. 156-7. 
130 Lucy, An Answer, pp. 76-7. 
131 Lucy, An Answer, pp. 75-6. 
132 Lucy, An Answer, p. 75. 
133 See Lucy, An Answer, p. 74. Preston King has also made a similar claim - see King, The 
Ideology of Order, p. 206. 
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contemporary experience. Charles Gildon argued that men must have propriety 
over their wives, so that they knew who their children were, and it was also 
necessary for the conveyance of property. 135 According to Sir Robert Filmer, God 
gave Adam dominion over Eve `as being the nobler and principal agent in 
generation'. Hobbes' claim that only the mother knew who was the father of her 
child, and thus rights over the child belonged to her, was also against 
contemporary practice. As far as Filmer was concerned, if the woman did not 
have a husband, then the child did not have a father. If she did have a husband, 
then regardless of whether that man was the biological father or not, he was still 
considered to be the father of the child. `No child naturally and infallibly knows 
who are his true parents, yet he must obey those that in common reputation are 
so', otherwise God's commandment to honour parents would be of no use. 136 
Similarly for William Lucy, if the man and woman were married, then the child 
was the father's; if they weren't married, `the people must father it, and provide 
for it'. Lucy anticipated Hobbes' objection - that there was no marriage in the 
state of nature - but Lucy thought this was false, because there had always been 
marriage, or some other form of union. 137 Lucy also noted Hobbes' reasoning that 
paternal dominion over children could not arise from generation, because there 
were two parents, but Lucy thought that generation `exacts an obedience to them 
both, yet with subordination to the Father... because the woman her self must be 
obedient to the Father... ' This was plainly set out in Genesis III. 16.138 
Hobbes' views not only implied that women were equal to men, but also 
seemed to imply that women were superior to men, at least in their role as 
parents. This contradicted the subjection of women to men, which was prescribed 
by God's punishment of Eve for her disobedience in Genesis 111.16. According to 
Roger Coke, the scripture commanded `Wives to be subject to their Husbands', 
and the reasons for this were many: the end of the woman's creation; the fact that 
she was made from man, and for man; and that the man was created first, and 
134 See Lucy, An Answer, pp. 75-6. 
135 See Gildon, The Deists Manual, pp. 221-2. 
136 Filmer, Observations, p. 192. 
137 Lucy, An Answer, p. 74. 
138 Lucy, An Answer, p. 66. 
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given dominion before the woman was created. 139 Hobbes' claim that, in the state 
of nature, there were no laws of matrimony also contradicted the scriptural 
account. As Bishop Bramhall put it, `Doth this man believe in earnest that 
marriage was instituted by God in Paradice, and hath continued ever since the 
creation'? 140 Similarly, William Lucy noted that the third chapter of Genesis 
proved `there was never such a time or place, for God gave the Law of the Wives 
subjection to her Husband in Paradice'. It was the first law God gave to human 
beings after their disobedience. 141 Lucy anticipated Hobbes' possible retort, that 
God's command that women should be subject to their husbands was a positive 
law, and thus not universal. Lucy denied this, and claimed that the subjection of 
women to men was according to the law of nature, that `the rest of the body 
submits to the Head'. 142 
Hobbes' argument that women were to be accounted equal by nature, 
because there was not a great enough distinction in strength and prudence, 
between men and women, to make one superior to the other, was thought to be 
irrelevant. For William Lucy, it might be the case that some women were stronger 
or cleverer than their husbands, but because this was not generally so, then the 
`sacred Laws of governing and obeying must not be varied for such few particular 
instances'. 143 Hobbes' example of the Amazons was not appropriate for his 
argument, because they were `an instance from a Lawless Conjunction, where 
man and woman meet together, like beasts, to enjoy that carnal familiarity, but 
not like rational creatures to cohabit together in an Oeconomical Discipline'. 144 It 
was wisdom, not strength, which enabled certain individuals to govern. Lucy 
granted that some women might have greater prudence, or strength, than some 
men, but `if she have more wit, let her use it to the gaining and winning him to 
vertue; if she have more strength, let her use it to the assistance of her Husbands 
weakness: by that means her excellencies will be imployed to their right uses; she 
139 Coke, Elements, p. 34. 
140 Bramhall, Castigation, pp. 156-7. 
141 Lucy, An Answer, p. 73. 
142 Lucy, An Anstiver, p. 68. 
143 Lucy, An Anstiver, p. 67, where he also denied Hobbes' view that the differences between men 
and women had to be decided by war. For Lucy, only nations could be at war with one another - 
individuals fight or brawl. 
144 Lucy, An Anstiver, p. 72. 
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shall be a helper to him, not a Ruler over him'. This was confirmed by various 
places of Scripture, including the third chapter of Genesis. 145 
For at least one of Hobbes' critics, his argument for the natural equality of 
women was contradicted by his further claim that because commonwealths had 
generally been founded by men, the subjection of women had been decided by 
civil laws. William Lucy thought that Hobbes had contradicted himself, because 
he had also argued that individuals created the commonwealth for peace and 
preservation, and this meant that women and children, as well as men, had this 
interest. It seems that Lucy, unlike Carole Pateman, thought that Hobbes' theory 
implied that women, as well as men, took part in the social contract. 146 But Lucy 
thought that history demonstrated it was `the Fathers of Families, not the Rabble' 
who had created commonwealths, and this meant that Hobbes' claim that 
commonwealths were created by universal consent was false. 147 According to 
Lucy, single or widowed women were `free to dispose of themselves as they 
pleased', but married women had to submit to their husbands, `and be governed 
in their domestick affairs according to his discipline'. Wives must submit to their 
husbands, but this did not mean that every woman was subject to every man. 148 
Lucy also noted that Hobbes' argument, that dominion over children in the state 
of nature was decided between the man and woman by contract, was contradicted 
by his further claim that it was unlikely contracts would be kept in the natural 
condition, without the fear of a common power. For Lucy, in the natural 
condition, human beings should follow God's commands, which subjected 
women to their husbands, and made men superior. 149 
145 Lucy, An Answer, p. 68. 
146 Pateman's thesis is that classical contract theory creates a new, modem form of patriarchy, 
which originates in conjugal right or men's right of sexual access to women. Pateman admits that 
Hobbes, alone of all the classical theorists, thought that men and women were equal in the state of 
nature, but she still thinks Hobbes is a patriarchalist, although one who rejects paternal right. In 
Hobbes' state of nature naturally equal women became vulnerable while pregnant. They were then 
conquered by men and became servants. Mother right was destroyed, families were created, and it 
was the heads of these families, i. e. men, who took part in the social contract. Further, men ruled 
these families as masters, rather than fathers - in other words men's dominion over women took 
the form of despotic dominion - see Pateman, 'God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper', and The 
Sexual Contract. 
147 Gordon Schochet has pointed out that on his interpretation of the commonwealth by institution 
being created by fathers of families, Hobbes was not in disagreement with his contemporary critics 
- see Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought, p. 239. 148 Lucy, An Answer, pp. 69-70. 
149 See Lucy, An Answer, pp. 71-2. 
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The very existence of the family was thought to contradict Hobbes' state 
of nature. As James Lowde noted, `the government of small families is 
incompatible with the state of absolute independency... where everyone hath a 
right to everything, and every man an enemy each to other... 'lso Lowde was also 
critical of Hobbes' view that a great family could be a little commonwealth, but 
that this did not apply to a little family, in other words to a family which was 
unable to protect itself. For Lowde, the `Question here is not, whether the 
Families be small or great, or upon what their concord doth depend; but whether 
the notion and being of a Family, doth not destroy his supposed State of Nature'. 
Lowde also thought that natural lust would actually lead to war rather than 
concord. 151 Similarly, Thomas Tenison thought that Hobbes' inclusion of families 
in the state of nature, along with his comparison between the natural condition 
and native Americans, meant that Hobbes denied his own state of nature, because 
wherever there were families, there was also government. 152 For Tenison, 
Hobbes' view that a family could only be a commonwealth, if it had strength 
enough to defend itself, implied that Athens, Corinth and Lacedaemon were not 
commonwealths, as they were weaker members of a much larger commonwealth - 
the Greek Empire. 153 
It was simply not possible for the natural condition to be a state of war, if 
there were families within it. According to James Tyrrell, 
if we follow the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, it is then certain, 
That all Mankind being derived from one Man, and one Woman, their 
Children could never be in this state of war towards their Parents, by Mr. 
H's own confession; much less could the Parents ever be so unnatural 
towards their Children, who were made out of their own Substance; nor 
yet could the Brothers, or Sisters, who partake of the same Human Nature 
derived from their Common Parents, and who were bred up together from 
their Infancy in a state of Peace and Amity, be rationally supposed 
presently to have fallen together by the ears without any other cause, or 
provocation given, than Mr. H's Passions of mutual distrust, and desire of 
glory. '54 
150 Lowde, A Discourse, p. 158. 
151 Lowde, A Discourse, p. 159, where Lowde also had problems with Hobbes' idea of similar 
desires sometimes causing war and sometimes causing peace. 
152 See Tenison, The creed ofMr. Hobbes, pp. 133-4. 
153 See Tenison, The creed ofMr. Hobbes, p. 136. 
154 Tyrrell, A Brief Disquisition, pp. 356-7. 
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William Lucy thought that Hobbes' claim that, in the natural condition, the only 
laws, regarding marriage and the education of children, were the laws of nature, 
and the natural inclination of the sexes one to another, and to their children, 
contradicted the idea that the natural condition was a state of war. It was simply 
not possible for parents and children to be at war with one another. '55 As we have 
seen in chapter three, scripture provided Hobbes' readers with an example of one 
brother killing another. 
Hobbes' critics completely denied his ideas on women and the family, 
because they believed his views contradicted contemporary experience, history 
and scripture. For the majority of the critics, all authority originated in fatherly 
power - it was not based on consent, but on generation. They were particularly 
horrified by his argument that women had dominion over children, because this 
implied that women were not only equal to men, but superior to them, although 
Hobbes himself never argued for the latter. The very existence of families, in 
Hobbes' state of nature, disproved his argument that this state was a condition of 
war, because members of families loved and cared for one another. Also, 
wherever there were families, there was also government. Thus the state of nature 
was not a condition which lacked a common power. 
We have seen earlier that for two of Hobbes' contemporary critics, 
William Lucy and John Bramhall, Hobbes had turned all traditional arguments for 
authority upside down. It seems likely that this was exactly Hobbes' intention, 
and that his target was both the patriarchalists, and the Schoolmen, who had 
argued that some human beings were naturally superior to others. For Hobbes, if 
we actually thought about such a statement it was simply incorrect - the example 
of men and women proved this. Reason demonstrated that in the natural condition 
it was women, not men, who had dominion over children. Experience 
demonstrated that some women were stronger, or cleverer, than their husbands. 
Did this mean they should have dominion over their husbands? Both reason and 
experience also demonstrated that children grew into adults, and threw off the 
dominion of their parents. Hobbes was trying to demonstrate that all authority 
was artificial. Commonwealths had been founded by men, and it was men who 
155 See Lucy, An Answer, pp. 71-2. 
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had decided on the subjection of women. Charles Gildon's view that men must 
have propriety over their wives, so that they knew who their children were, 
proved Hobbes' argument that it was human beings themselves who had created 
authority. If commonwealths had been founded by women, it might well have 
been the case that men would have been considered inferior. For Hobbes, we 
could not say that authority was God-given, because God's decrees appeared 
arbitrary to human judgement. We have seen in chapter three that Cain killed his 
own brother, was punished by God, but this punishment appeared to be a benefit. 
In his critique of Thomas White's De Mundo, Hobbes had argued that God's 
intention for human beings to rule over other creatures could not be deduced 
naturally, because it could just as easily be deduced that it was God's intention 
that human beings should be eaten by animals. 156 Presumably, this could also be 
applied to men's rule over women, the rule of the elder over the younger, the 
wiser over the stronger; or the rule of any particular group, over any other group. 
But as we have seen above, on Gordon Schochet's interpretation of the 
commonwealth by institution, as an agreement between fathers of families, 
Hobbes' views were not so different from those of his contemporary critics, who 
thought that all authority originated in fatherly authority. 157 Schochet has 
distinguished three different types of patriarchalism. Firstly, anthropological 
patriarchalism (e. g. Cumberland and Clarendon), whereby the writer gave a 
historical account of the development of families into societies. Secondly, moral 
patriarchalism (e. g. Filmer), whereby political authority which originated in 
fatherly authority was used to justify obedience to the state. And finally, 
ideological patriarchalism (e. g. the fifth commandment and James I), in which a 
simple analogy was drawn between fatherly and political power, but without the 
use of historical and moral principles. 158 Schochet has argued that Hobbes, like 
the majority of his contemporary critics, identified paternal and political 
authority, but that his claim that both were based on consent was new. '59 On 
156 See Malcolm, Hobbes and Voltintarist Theology, p. 179, citing Hobbes' Thomas JVhite's De 
Mundo Examined, chp. XXXVII. See also Hobbes' comment in De Cive, VIII, 10, pp. 105-6, that 
dominion over animals had its origin in the right of nature, and not in divine positive right. 
157 Although as I have noted above, it could have been an agreement between mothers of families. 
158 See Schochet, Patriarchalisnt in Political 77tought, pp. 10-14. 
159 See Schochet, Patriarchalisnt in Political Thought, p 241. See also Ashcraft, 'Leviathan 
Triumphant', p. 161, for Hobbes' redefinition of patriarchy. 
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Schochet's account, Hobbes seems to have used elements of anthropological 
patriarchalism, as did his critics, Cumberland and Clarendon. 
For the most part, those of Hobbes' contemporary critics considered here, 
subscribed to the view that authority was both natural and God-given. 160 George 
Lawson seems to have been the exception in this particular group of writers, with 
his distinction between authority in the family and state; and also his claim that 
although authority in the state was God-given, it was also based on consent. The 
latter of Lawson's views indicates why Hobbes' contemporary critics 
misunderstood him. For Hobbes' critics, the argument that authority originated in 
God, or originated in fatherly power, was sufficient to keep human beings in 
peace. Hobbes, on the other hand, was less concerned with how authority 
originated, and more concerned with how it was to be maintained. For Hobbes, it 
was not enough to argue that human beings should obey their sovereign, because 
his authority originated in God, or in fatherly power. Subjects needed a 
continuing reason for obedience. Contemporary experience had demonstrated that 
the theories of divine right and patriarchalism had failed to prevent the people of 
England from disobeying their king. 
Hobbes' contemporary critics thought that human beings had always lived 
in society, and under some form of government, and that it was completely 
natural for them to do so. Hobbes, on the other hand, saw nature in complete 
contrast to society. Hobbes' state of nature was designed to present a picture of 
human existence, devoid of all characteristics of society, and government. This 
included the institutions of marriage and the family, which Hobbes thought only 
came into being with commonwealths. In Hobbes' state of nature, there were no 
laws of matrimony, and no laws regarding children. But there were men and 
women who came together for the sexual act, and then decided whether they 
would stay together or not. If children were conceived as a result, then adults and 
children might choose to live in family groups. But in a condition without laws 
concerning marriage and the family, they could also choose not to stay together. 
For Hobbes, it was human beings themselves who had created the institutions of 
marriage and the family. As far as Hobbes' critics were concerned, there had 
160 See also Goldie, `The Reception of Hobbes', p. 604. 
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never been such a condition. The scriptural account demonstrated that marriage 
was instituted by God at the creation; and that Eve was either always subject to 
Adam, or was made subject to her husband as a result of the Fall. 
6. The Scriptural Account of the relationship between Adam and Eve. 
If we return to scripture, although we can find an account of the relationship 
between men and women in Eden, there was no mention of children. There were 
no children in paradise. Cain and Abel were born after the disobedience, and 
scripture was silent on exactly which parent had dominion. But the creation of 
Eve was unanimously interpreted as the institution of marriage, and this was 
further confirmed by Adam's pronouncement in Genesis 11.24, `Therefore shall a 
man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife'. 
Commentators were of course keen to point out, that this particular verse should 
not also be interpreted to mean, that once children had grown up and married, 
they should no longer honour their parents. 161 But although Martin Luther agreed 
with these interpretations, he thought that this particular verse of Genesis was 
Adam's prophecy, `about the life of married people, about their own dwelling 
place, about the division of dominion over the entire world, so that individual 
families might live in their own little nest', at a time when there `were no fathers 
and mothers yet, and no children'. 162 
Chapter two has outlined the two main protestant interpretations of the 
relationship between Adam and Eve. On one account, God created equal human 
beings, and Eve's subjection was a punishment for her disobedience. On the other 
account, Eve was from the beginning created subject to Adam, although she was 
also his equal in certain respects. Eve's subjection before the Fall was willing, but 
her further subjection after the disobedience was unwilling. Martin Luther fell 
into the first category of protestant commentators, which was also the minority 
161 See for example Willet, Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 31-2; Ainsworth, Annotations, 
Genesis, 11.24; Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 12; Cooper, A Brief Exposition, p. 96; and 
Needler, Expository Notes, pp. 55-6. 
162 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 139. See also pp. 115-36, where Luther claimed the creation of 
Eve marked the institution of marriage, and also demonstrated its importance. 
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view. 163 For Luther, although Eve was Adam's equal before the Fall, since the 
Fall she was `placed under the power of her husband', and now bears this 
subjection unwillingly. The man `rules the home and the state, wages wars, 
defends his possessions, tills the soil, builds, plants, etc. ' 164 The woman stayed at 
home, and looked `after the affairs of the household, as one who has been 
deprived of the ability of administering those affairs that are outside and concern 
the state. She does not go beyond her most personal duties'. 165 Luther noted that 
in contemporary practice, the woman was `the mistress of the house just as [the 
man] was its master, except that the wife was made subject to the man by the Law 
which was given after sin'. Since the Fall, although women were subjected to 
their husbands, `even now the wife can be called "virago" because she has a share 
in the property'. 166 Her punishment of subjection to Adam was a result of her 
disobedience. 167 After the Fall, although women `cannot perform the functions of 
men, teach, rule, etc. In procreation and in feeding and nurturing their offspring 
they are masters'. 168 
The other interpretation of Genesis saw Eve created as roughly equal to 
Adam, but also subject; and then made further subject as a punishment for her 
disobedience. This was the view of Jean Calvin, who thought that after the Fall, 
Eve was `cast into servitude'. Before the Fall, she had also been subject to her 
husband, `but that was a liberal and gentle subjection'. 169 John Richardson 
compared Eve's subjection to Adam, after the Fall, to that of Abel to Cain, or in 
other words of younger son to first-born son. God's punishment of Eve was the 
imposition of a further rule over Eve, additional to that already possessed by 
Adam at the creation, and this rule was more troublesome to the woman. 170 John 
White noted that God himself had prescribed women's subjection, and it was 
163 See Margaret R. Sommerville, Sex and Subjection. Attitudes to Women in Early-Modern 
Society (Arnold, London & New York, 1995), p. 31. 
164 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 202. 
165 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 203. 
166 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, pp. 137-8. 
167 See Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 115. 
168 Luther, Lectures on Genesis, p. 203. 
169 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 172. See also Needler, Expository Notes, p. 106; and Willet, 
Hexapla on Genesis and Exodus, p. 43. All following Augustine's idea of a loving subordination - 
see for example, Augustine, City of God, XIX, 14, pp. 872-4. 
170 See Richardson, Choice Observations, Genesis 111.16. See also Haak, Dutch Annotations, 
Genesis 1I1.16; and Ainsworth, Annotations, Genesis, 111.16. 
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easier for women `to obey, then to prescribe and direct'. Women's subjection was 
for a short time, and would be rewarded in heaven. But White also pointed out 
that in `matters of duty she obeys only the command of God, and not of man'. 171 
Further, a wife's subjection to her husband required `not only an outward 
conformity to the husbands commands, but besides, an inward subjection of the 
heart to his Will'. This meant that she must lay `aside her own wisdome to 
receive directions from his mouth, as God requires his people to obey him, in 
doing not that which is right in their own eyes, but what he shall command'. It 
was important that the woman's subjection was not burdensome, but that she 
submitted, `not only out of necessity, but with all cheerfulnesse conscionably'. 
According to White, in the estate to come, there would be no subordination 
between husband and wife. 172 
Other commentators noted that Adam should exercise his rule over his 
wife with love. For John Trapp, Adam was not commanded to rule over Eve, but 
to love her, and `he must make her yoke as easie as may be'. ' 73 Similarly for 
Gervase Babington, Eve was made subject to Adam after the Fall as a 
punishment. But Babington stressed that 
this authority of the Man may not imbolden him any way to wrong his 
Wife, but teacheth him rather what manner of Man he ought to be: 
namely, such an one, as for gravity, wisedome, advise, and all 
government, is able to direct her in all things to a good course. And her 
subjection should admonish her of her weaknesse and need of direction, 
and so abate all pride and conceit of her selfe, and work true honour in her 
heart towards him, whom GOD hath made stronger than her seife, and 
given gifts to direct her by. This I say this authority in the Man and 
subjection in the Woman should effect. But alas, many men are rather to 
be ruled than to rule, and many Women fitter to rule, than to bee ruled of 
such unruly husbands. On the other side, many men for ability most fit 
and able to rule, yet for pride in the heart, where subjection should bee, 
shall have no leave to rule. 174 
Joannes Thaddeus commented that, after the Fall, the `woman is under the power 
of the man in oeconomicall government, whilst she obeyeth and is subject as the 
"' White, A Commentary, III, pp. 207-8. 
172 White, A Commentary, III, pp. 208. 
173 Trapp, A Clavis to the Bible, pp. 40-1. 
174 Babington, Comfortable Notes, p. 18. 
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body is to the head; but in conjugall union, the man hath not power over his own 
body' 
" 
175 
Hobbes' account of the relationships between: men and women; and 
parent and child; could be understood to have combined aspects of both the pre- 
lapsarian and post-lapsarian conditions. Hobbes demonstrated the Lutheranism of 
his thought, with his view that it was women who had dominion over children 
(since the Fall). But he also could be understood to have taken into account 
Calvin's view that Eve's subjection before the Fall was willing, and involved her 
consent. Gervase Babington's claim that although Eve was punished with 
subjection to her husband, it is sometimes the case that women are fitter to rule 
than men, seems to confirm Hobbes' view that we could not say that nature or 
experience demonstrated that one human being was superior to another. 
7. State of Nature as Eden, the process of the Fall, and the fallen condition? 
This chapter has examined Hobbes' ideas on how and why society came into 
existence. Hobbes, unlike his contemporary critics, saw nature and society in 
complete opposition to one another. The natural condition of human beings was a 
state of war, which was caused in part by natural equality and all individuals 
having a right to all. In such a condition, human beings lived in constant fear that 
they would either be killed by others, or their insecure property would be invaded, 
and taken away from them. Human beings were not naturally sociable, because 
they were not born fit for society. They became sociable by living in society. 
Having said that, Hobbes thought that human beings sought out others, but they 
did so for love of self rather than love of friends. It was the desire for dominion, 
rather than society, which originated in nature. All society existed either for 
advantage, or glory, but Hobbes thought that no large or lasting society could be 
founded on glory. It was fear which led human beings to create lasting society. 
But we have seen above, that Hobbes indicated his knowledge of Augustinian and 
Reformed interpretations of Genesis, with his ideas on the creation of society. His 
view that individuals created society through fear was supported by Calvin's 
175 Thaddeus, The Reconciler of the Bible, p. 7. Here Thaddeus followed Augustine - see for 
example, Augustine, City of God, XIV, 16-27, pp. 577-93. 
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interpretation of the fourth chapter of Genesis, which described Cain building a 
city. Andrew Willet also pointed out that if man was naturally sociable then 
Adam, and not Cain should have been the first to build a city. In Augustine's 
theory of the Two Cities, Cain was the founder of the earthly city, and this city 
was created through self-love and glory. Hobbes' views also suggest that he 
might have thought that the Schoolmen's superficial view of human nature could 
be attributed to their failure to account for the effects of the Fall on human beings. 
The majority of Hobbes' critics had a completely different understanding 
of nature. Human beings were naturally sociable, and had always lived in society, 
in a natural hierarchy, and under some form of government. For this reason, the 
natural condition was a peaceful condition, and thus fear could not be the origin 
of society. Further, all kings and governments derived their power from God. Due 
to both their Aristotelian understanding of nature as perfection, and their method 
of argument from origins, Hobbes' contemporary critics understood the natural 
condition as Eden. God created Adam and Eve, and Eve was subject to Adam 
from the very beginning. Adam was not only the first husband, and father, but he 
was also the first monarch. Thus society and government had existed from the 
creation. But for Hobbes' critics, even if his state of nature described the fallen 
condition, natural sociability and hierarchy were retained after the Fall. Adam's 
dominion was not lessened by his disobedience, and Cain was the first tyrant, not 
the first monarch. 176 Further, because of their understanding of nature as 
perfection, the critics wanted to examine nature, as if the Fall had never taken 
place. 
This chapter has also examined Hobbes' ideas on the creation of authority, 
specifically the authority of husband over wife, and parent over child. Hobbes' 
contemporary critics thought that his views on authority turned all traditional 
arguments upside down. They contradicted history, experience, and scripture. The 
origin of authority was to be found in the family. Adam, the first father and 
husband, was also the first monarch, and his dominion was not lessened by the 
Fall. 177 For the critics, paternal dominion was derived from generation, and it was 
176 Hobbes thought tyranny was simply monarchy misliked - see Leviathan, XIX, 2, pp. 118-9. 
177 John Locke was later to argue against Filmer, that it was highly unlikely that God's punishment 
of Adam after the disobedience would have made him both a `Universal Monarch over all 
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the father who was the principal agent in that generation. The idea that a parent 
could choose whether or not to preserve the child horrified many of his 
contemporary critics. This was particularly worrying, because it was this 
argument which gave women original dominion over children, and this implied 
not only women's equality to men, but even women's superiority over men, at 
least in their role as parents. It might have been the case that some women were 
stronger or cleverer than some men, but scripture told us that Eve was created as 
Adam's helper, and she was subject to Adam. Hobbes' argument that there was 
no marriage in the state of nature also contradicted scripture - Eve's creation 
marked the institution of marriage. If there were families in Hobbes' state of 
nature then it could not be a condition of war, because members of families loved 
each other. Neither could the state of nature be a condition without government, 
because wherever there were families there was also government. 
If Hobbes' seventeenth century readers understood the natural condition 
as the original, perfect condition, as many of his contemporary critics did, then 
his view that women were equal to men was in agreement with the interpretation 
of Luther that saw Eve as Adam's equal before the Fall, and her subjection to 
Adam as a punishment for her disobedience. The Fall could then explain the 
problems raised by a number of current Hobbes' scholars, most notably Carole 
Pateman, who have pointed out that although Hobbes argued that women were 
equal to men by nature, once the commonwealth had been created, it was men 
who had authority in families. For Hobbes, in the state of nature, there were no 
laws of matrimony. Thus there were no wives and no husbands, there were only 
individual men and women. Once commonwealths were created (after the Fall), 
wives were subjected to their husbands. But Hobbes could also be understood to 
have taken into account the interpretation of Calvin, and those that followed him, 
that Eve was both equal and willingly subject to Adam before the Fall, whereas 
after the Fall her subjection was unwilling. Indeed Hobbes' theory of consent 
could have been interpreted as recreating the type of subjection which existed in 
Eden -a willing, and therefore lasting subjection. Again, Hobbes could be 
Mankind', and at the same time `a day labourer for his Life' - see Locke, Two Treatises, I, 45, p. 
172. 
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understood to have combined elements of various Reformed interpretations of 
both the pre- and post-lapsarian conditions. 
But if, as I have argued elsewhere, Hobbes' readers understood his state of 
nature to be the fallen condition, then his views on women's equality seem to 
completely contradict the Biblical account, which for all commentators 
demonstrated that, after the Fall, Eve was punished with subjection to Adam, 
although this subjection was unwilling and troublesome to the woman. And yet, it 
could be argued that Hobbes' view, that the natural condition was one of equality, 
but dominion (if insecure and temporary) existed there, was in agreement with 
Eve's unwilling subjection, after the Fall. Interestingly, one of Hobbes' 
contemporary critics, William Lucy, raised two questions about Eve's subjection, 
which could be used to argue that Hobbes' account was in agreement even with 
the account of women's subjection after the Fall. Firstly, according to Lucy, 
God's punishment meant that wives were subject to their husbands, but it did not 
mean that all women were subject to all men. Thus, in Hobbes' state of nature, 
where there were no laws of matrimony, and thus no wives or husbands, there 
could be no subjection of wives to their husbands. There were only individual 
men and women, who were roughly equal to one another. But we are still faced 
with the problem that, for many protestant commentators, marriage was instituted 
in paradise, and continued after the Fall. Thus, as most of Hobbes' contemporary 
critics pointed out, there had never been a time without marriage. Having said 
that, Hobbes could be understood to be in agreement with Luther's view that 
Genesis 11.24 described Adam's prophecy about the future life of married people. 
Secondly, William Lucy also noted that Hobbes might have understood 
God's punishment of Eve as a positive command, directed to her alone, and 
therefore not universally applicable to all women. The view of John Richardson, 
that Eve's subjection to Adam could be compared to Abel's subjection to Cain, 
also seems to support Hobbes' idea that dominion could not be based on the 
qualities nature had given human beings. Cain might well have been the elder 
brother, and had dominion over Abel, but this did not make him the better man. 
The same could be true of Eve's subjection to Adam. As Gervase Babington 
pointed out, in some cases women were fitter to rule than men, thus proving 
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Hobbes' point that it was all completely artificial - human beings themselves had 
decided on the superiority of men over women. 
Hobbes' ideas on women having dominion over children were not 
supported by the scriptural account of the original, perfect condition, because 
Adam and Eve had not had children at that point, although God had commanded 
them to increase and multiply. The birth of children came after the Fall, and in the 
fourth chapter of Genesis there was no mention of which one of the two parents 
had dominion over Cain and Abel. This particular chapter of Genesis was also 
silent on the idea that dominion over the child belonged to whoever preserved it. 
But there are a number of examples, from later chapters of Genesis, of women 
(and men) abandoning their children, and women becoming mothers of children 
who they themselves had not conceived. Abraham's wife Sarah, who was barren, 
gave Abraham her slave Hagar to conceive a child (Genesis XVI. 3). Lot was 
prepared to give up his two daughters to the men of Sodom, as long as the angels 
remained safe. Lot's daughters later conceived children with their father (Genesis 
19). Hagar left her son to die, until God himself intervened (Genesis XXI. 15). 
God asked Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac (Genesis XXII. 2). Jacob's wife 
Rachel asked her husband to give her children through her maid Bilhah (Genesis 
XXX. 4). More famously Moses himself was `abandoned' by his biological 
mother, and preserved by Pharaoh's daughter, who became his mother (Exodus 
11.3-10). And God himself sacrificed his only son Jesus. 
Hobbes' contemporary critics assumed dominion belonged to the father, 
simply because they also believed that Adam had dominion over Eve. But Cain's 
murder of Abel seems to indicate, that neither parent was able to exercise his or 
her dominion over Cain, at least as an adult, because neither Adam or Eve were 
able to prevent him from killing his brother. Further, Cain was subsequently 
punished by God, and not by his parents. The account of Cain's murder of Abel 
also disproved the critics' claim that members of families loved and cared for one 
another. But as we have seen above, for one influential protestant commentator, 
the Fall had resulted in a division of authority. Martin Luther thought that since 
the Fall, it was Eve who was master over children. Women, who had previously 
shared in the power to teach and rule, become masters over children. Men became 
masters in the home and the state. So for Luther, it was possible for the male to be 
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lord over the household, and this was not affected in any way by the female being 
lord over children. Whereas for Hobbes' contemporary critics, his view that 
women had dominion over children, also implied that women had dominion over 
men. Hobbes' views appear to have been in agreement with Old Testament law 
which, according to Margaret Sommerville, gave women status only in their role 
as mothers. 178 Yet again, Hobbes' political theory suggested his own knowledge 
of Reformed interpretations of Genesis. 
Hobbes had stated that he would ignore the argument that the first form of 
instituted government was paternal monarchy, and that other forms of 
government had proceeded from its dissolution, because of the rebellious nature 
of human beings. Hobbes was concerned with how authority was to be 
maintained, and less concerned with how it originated. His theory was designed 
to demonstrate that dominion, based on the qualities nature had given human 
beings, could not be secure or long lasting. Women were as equally capable of 
killing as men. Children did not remain children forever. As they grew older, 
stronger, and wiser, they too became as capable of killing as their parents. Hobbes 
thought that it was a desire for dominion, or power over others, which originated 
in nature. But in order to make this dominion secure and long lasting it had to be 
turned into authority. This was achieved through an agreement, whereby one 
individual gave his or her consent to be ruled by another. It was agreement, and 
consent, which created lasting, and stable commonwealths. Could Hobbes have 
been understood as trying to recreate the willing subjection which had existed in 
Eden, in order to maintain obedience in his commonwealth? 
178 See Sommerville, Sex and Subjection, p. 254. 
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Conclusion 
1. Reading Hobbes. 
This dissertation has shown that Hobbes' seventeenth century readers brought 
their own reading of both the Bible, and scriptural commentaries, to their reading 
of Hobbes' political theory. ' It was their own views on the account of the creation 
and Fall, which determined their response to Hobbes' description of the state of 
nature, and that these views were in turn determined by the particular 
interpretations of Genesis, which the individual reader subscribed to. Tom Sorell 
has argued that Hobbes seems to have assumed a knowledge of the account of the 
Fall as common ground between-himself and his readers. 2 And yet as we have 
seen, the Fall, and its consequences were interpreted in a variety of ways. This 
dissertation has shown that Hobbes' contemporary critics thought that his account 
of the state of nature completely contradicted scripture. But the response of 
Hobbes' seventeenth century critics is not necessarily a good basis to judge his fit 
with the religious culture of the age. Hobbes was writing at a time of theological 
change. He had been educated in a Calvinist world, but was read by his 
contemporary critics in a world in which Calvinism was waning. This dissertation 
has shown that Hobbes seems to fit better into an Augustinian, Calvinist, and 
particularly Lutheran context. For those of Hobbes' readers who subscribed to 
Augustinian, and Reformed interpretations of the scriptural account of the 
creation and Fall, there were a number of important parallels to be seen, although 
on some aspects of the state of nature Hobbes could have been understood to have 
subverted scripture. Further, Hobbes' account of the state of nature appears to 
have combined elements of both the pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian conditions. 
This might have been because Hobbes' analysis of human nature could be 
understood to have taken into account aspects of both perfect human nature, as 
well as fallen human nature. Since the Fall there had come into existence two 
types of human beings - the elect and the reprobate. Further, because we could not 
distinguish between these two types of human beings from their actions, it was 
1 See also Sharpe, Reading Revohitions, pp. 34-6. 
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safer to assume that all men fell into the category of the reprobate. Alternatively, 
Hobbes might have thought, like Joseph Hall, that `even man's perfection is 
mistaken'. 3 Having said that, Hobbes indicated his own knowledge of protestant 
interpretations of Genesis, with his use of both scriptural allusions, and the 
accounts of Adam and Eve's disobedience, and Cain's murder of Abel. 
But although, as was noted in the introduction, many current Hobbes' 
scholars have commented on the resemblance between Hobbes' description of the 
state of nature and the account of the Fall, none of his contemporary readers did, 
or at least they did not go into print to argue that Hobbes' account was in 
agreement with a Reformed understanding of scripture. There are a number of 
possible explanations for this. Firstly, any of Hobbes' readers who read his 
account in agreement with Reformed understandings of Genesis may not have felt 
the need to publish their views. As I argued in the introduction it is a fact of 
human nature that we are more likely to voice our complaints or criticisms, than 
to voice our praise. It was also noted in the introduction that the printing history 
of Leviathan attested to its popularity, and that although the list of anti-Hobbes 
literature compiled by Samuel Mintz appears to be extensive, on closer 
examination only six books were mainly taken up with criticisms of Hobbes' 
political theory. Relatively speaking then, the attacks on the specifically political 
part of Hobbes' philosophy appear to have been few. This could also mean that 
for many of Hobbes' readers, his description of the state of nature was either not 
offensive, or alternatively was not read with the Biblical context in mind. 
Secondly, it was argued in chapter five that Hobbes' contemporary critics 
misunderstood the argument of Leviathan, because they read it in the context of 
the 1650s, when the theory presented there had originally been conceived in the 
1630s, and might well have been informed by earlier traditions. Both Phyllis 
Doyle and A. P. Martinich have shown the similarity of Hobbes' views to those of 
Elizabethan and Jacobean Calvinists. These views had become unpopular by the 
2 See Sorell, Hobbes, p. 34. 
3 Hall, Contemplations, p. 778. 
4 It was noted in chapters one and two that two of Hobbes' contemporary critics, George Lawson 
and John Bramhall, thought his description might have been an account of degenerated nature. 
Also, Francois Peleau wrote to Hobbes to tell him that he was being pressed for proofs of the state 
of nature's existence, and that Peleau had cited the time after Noah's death, when his sons Shem, 
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1640s. 5 As I have argued throughout this dissertation, those who read and 
criticised Hobbes from the 1650s onwards subscribed to different views of human 
nature (particularly on the extent of the Fall's corruption) to those Calvinists of 
the first three decades of the seventeenth century. Thirdly, with the publication of 
Leviathan, Hobbes acquired the reputation of atheism, immorality and 
libertinism. 6 Jon Parkin has suggested that those of Hobbes' contemporaries, like 
Richard Cumberland and Samuel Parker, who shared common ground with him 
in some areas, were forced to criticise him in order to distance themselves from 
his apparent atheism. 7 It might have been the case that many of Hobbes' readers 
who agreed with his account of the state of nature, did not feel able to go into 
print to support Hobbes for fear of being branded as atheists or libertines. 
Hobbes' state of nature could be understood in a number of ways. Firstly, 
it was an original condition from which individuals created a commonwealth, a 
condition which had existed at some point in either history, or pre-history. A 
number of Hobbes' contemporary critics, in this way, understood the state of 
nature as the condition of human beings at the creation in Eden. On this 
understanding of the natural condition as an original, perfect condition, Hobbes' 
description of a state of war clearly contradicted the scriptural account of a 
peaceful Eden. Secondly, the state of nature was also a philosophical condition, a 
logical account of how commonwealths were created, and an imagined condition 
from which Hobbes was able to draw consequences about human behaviour. 
Finally, the state of nature could be understood as a condition into which a 
commonwealth had the potential to dissolve, if its citizens rebelled and attempted 
to resist their sovereign. In this way, not only did it resemble the contemporary 
situation in England during the civil war, but it also resembled the condition 
following Adam and Eve's rebellion against God in Eden. The problem for 
Hobbes' seventeenth century readers, and his readers ever since, was that he 
never made it clear in which way it should be understood. Further, he managed - 
unlikely as this would seem to a modem audience - to leave his contemporary 
Japhet, and Ham could have waged a similar war - see Malcolm, Hobbes' Correspondence, Vol 1, 
p. 331. 
5 See Doyle, `The Contemporary Background'; and Martinich, Two Gods, p. 33. 
6 See Mintz, The Hunting ofLeviathan, especially chapter vii on libertinism. 
7 See Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics, p. 117. 
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readers uncertain as to whether he was describing the lives of fallen human 
beings, or human beings in their original condition, although he had commented 
that he was interested in human beings as they were, and not as they should have 
been. We have also seen that he associated his state of nature with the account of 
Cain and Abel, although admittedly this was not until the Latin version of 
Leviathan of 1668, and thus may have been in response to his critics. 
So why did Hobbes not explicitly mention the Fall in his account of the 
state of nature? Again, there are a number of possible explanations. Firstly, if we 
assume Hobbes was the atheist many of his contemporary critics believed him to 
be, then he would not have subscribed to the view of the original perfection of 
human beings, and their subsequent corruption by the Fall. Having said that an 
explicit mention of the Fall might have worked to hide his atheism. Secondly, and 
I think more likely, Hobbes failed to mention the Fall, because he was writing 
political philosophy, which he thought was separate from theology. 8 It was also 
argued in chapter five that Hobbes wanted to provide a purely secular justification 
for obedience to kings, and the new context of Leviathan's publication made this 
particularly important, because Hobbes thought that divine right and patriarchal 
theories, both grounded on scripture, had failed to prevent the people of England 
from disobeying and then executing their king. Hobbes felt that he must provide a 
theory in support of monarchy, which ignored traditional scriptural arguments - 
scripture was open to interpretation. Having said that Hobbes himself was not 
averse to using scripture, including the account of the Fall, to convince his 
audience of the validity of his own findings. Thirdly, it is possible that Hobbes 
knew he would not even need to refer to the account of the Fall explicitly, 
because he realised that his readers would be able to see the parallels. Finally, 
Hobbes wanted to look at human beings as they were - it was thus irrelevant to 
consider human beings as they should have been. His political theory was 
designed to address contemporary problems, and to show seventeenth century 
human beings the rights and duties of sovereigns and subjects. 
It was noted in the introduction, that a reader's response to a particular 
work could be influenced even before he had begun reading, by such things as the 
8 See De Corpore, I, 8, p. 191. 
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material condition of the book, the title, frontispiece and dedication. 9 Quentin 
Skinner has argued that the titles of Hobbes' trilogy of political philosophy were 
all rhetorical, and that Leviathan took its name from the `monster of the deep' 
described in the book of Job, because Hobbes thought that the commonwealth 
was created through our deepest fears. 1° But it seems more likely that Hobbes' 
seventeenth century readers would have taken the title Leviathan at face value, 
that is as a Biblical reference. So how was the word understood by Hobbes' 
contemporary readers? W. H. Greenleaf has demonstrated that `leviathan' could 
be understood in a variety of ways in the seventeenth century, including as a 
reference to Satan, Antichrist, or King of Babel. But the most common meaning 
was someone of `formidable power or enormous wealth', and in this sense it was 
used as an image of worldly power, particularly government. The word 
`leviathan' was translated as whale or sea monster. It is derived from the Hebrew 
`Lavah', which means joined or associated, and Greenleaf has noted the parallels 
between the Biblical creature's overlapping scales, and the illustration for 
Leviathan's title page. Another mythical sea monster, known as Rahab in 
Hebrew, symbolised the state of chaos, before God had imposed order. " Patricia 
Springborg has also commented on the meaning of the word and has argued that 
if interpreted literally, Leviathan was a demonstration of divine omnipotence; 
whereas interpreted allegorically, it referred to the devil, or a figure for tyrants. 12 
So before Hobbes' contemporaries even began to read his political theory, they 
might have had different preconceived ideas about what exactly the book would 
contain, based on their own understanding of its title. 
It was not only the title of Hobbes' Leviathan, which contained a 
scriptural reference, but also the illustration for the frontispiece, which was a 
graphic representation of his political theory, depicting the person of the 
sovereign, constructed from the persons of the people. Crowning the illustration 
was a verse from the book of Job, `Upon earth there is not his like', which 
directed his readers to a Biblical explanation of why good men offen suffered, 
9 See Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, pp. 40 & 44-55. 
10 See Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 388-9. Skinner, p. 298, argues that The Elements ofLaiv 
was named to associate that work with Euclid's The Elements of Geometry, and De Cive was 
named because in it Hobbes wanted to destroy the classical idea of the citizen. 
11 Greenleaf, `A Note on Hobbes', pp. 2I-8. 
238 
while evil men prospered. But for Hobbes' seventeenth century readers, this 
particular Biblical citation might have been as important for the lines of scripture 
it omitted, which referred to `the children of pride'. Did this verse direct Hobbes' 
readers not only to Job, but to the account of the Fall? 13 Similarly, the 
frontispiece of De Cive contained an illustration of the Last Judgement, with the 
damned descending to hell, and the saved ascending into heaven. 14 Did this 
indicate to Hobbes' readers that his work could be understood to have taken into 
account the division of human beings into the elect and the reprobate? If we 
assume that Hobbes himself instructed the artists of both title pages, then he 
might well have used these illustrations, along with the various scriptural 
accounts and allusions in the work itself, for rhetorical purposes, to direct his 
readers to an interpretation of his writing, which was in agreement with scripture. 
2. Anti-Aristotelianism. 4 
We have seen throughout this dissertation that Hobbes' contemporary critics 
found it impossible to reconcile his description of a natural war-like condition 
with the account of scripture. Those seventeenth century writers who went into 
print against Hobbes were, for the most part, Aristotelians. 15 For these writers, 
nature was both the end and perfection of human existence, and it was also 
unchanging. Human beings were naturally sociable, because of their potential, 
and their need, to live in society, and there was also a natural hierarchy amongst 
them. But not only was nature the end of human existence, it was also understood 
as the beginning of human existence, and specifically associated with the creation 
of the first human beings in Eden. Natural hierarchy was confirmed by the 
account of Genesis, which informed us that God gave Adam dominion over the 
earth, and this included dominion over other human beings. Eve's creation for 
Adam demonstrated both natural sociability and hierarchy. Thus for the critics, 
Hobbes' description of a natural hostile and equal condition could not have been 
12 See Springborg, 'Hobbes's Biblical Beasts', pp. 358-60. 
13 On the frontispiece of Leviathan see also Keith Brown, `The Artist of the Leviathan Title-page', 
British Library Journal, 4 (1978), pp. 24-36; and Martinich, Two Gods, pp. 362-7. 
14 See M. M. Goldsmith, 'Hobbes's Ambiguous Politics', History of Political T7iought, 11 (1990), 
pp. 639-73, p. 642. 
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an account of perfect nature, but must have been an account of degenerated 
nature. 
Hobbes had a number of objections to the philosophy of Aristotle and the 
Schoolmen. We have seen in chapter one that he described a number of doctrines, 
which he thought led to the dissolution of the commonwealth - all of which 
involved the private judgement of good and evil. For Hobbes, the Schoolmen's 
moral philosophy was simply 
4a 
description of their own passions, which were 
constantly changing, different in different individuals at different times, and thus 
could not provide common rules of good and evil. He also cited the mixing of 
scripture with Aristotle's philosophy as one of the four causes of what he referred 
to as `spiritual darkness'. 16 According to Hobbes, the Protestant Reformation had 
taken place because the introduction of Aristotle into Christianity had created `so 
many contradictions and absurdities as brought the clergy into a reputation both 
of ignorance and fraudulent intention, and inclined people to revolt from them, 
either against the will of their own princes, as in France and Holland, or with 
their will, as in England'. '? 
The `seditious doctrines' of the Schoolmen had permitted men to disobey 
their king, to think that laws rather than men govern, that monarchy was tyranny, 
and that only under democracy could men have liberty. 18 The Schoolmen's 
doctrine of separated essences had resulted in the separation of the spiritual and 
secular powers, and had made men frightened to obey their sovereign's 
commands. 19 Aristotle's philosophy, or `Aristotelity', as Hobbes called it, had 
become a `handmaid' to the Roman religion, and had given the Pope power over 
kings20 Because Aristotle was taught in the universities, his authority was great, 
and his philosophy was not questioned. As Hobbes put it, the `insignificant 
speech' of the Schoolmen had `a quality, not only to hide the truth, but also to 
make men think they have it, and desist from further search'. 21 Quite simply, 
Aristotle's philosophy had made each individual think he could decide for 
15 See Goldie, `The Reception of Hobbes', p. 594. 
16 Leviathan, XLIV, 3, p. 412. 
17 Leviathan, XII, 31, p. 73. 
18 See Leviathan, XLVI, 35-6, p. 465. See also De Cive, X, 8, pp. 121-2. 
19 See Leviathan, XLVI, 18, p. 460. 
20 Leviathan, XLVI, 13, p. 458. 
21 Leviathan, XLVI, 40, p. 467. 
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himself what was good and evil, and just and unjust. It had led to `a civil war in 
which many thousands of citizens were killed, and the king slaughtered in a most 
unworthy death'. 2 
According to Hobbes, Aristotle had derived the rights of a 
commonwealth, not from nature, but simply from the practice of his own polis. 23 
The Schoolmen had brought assumptions from their own societies into their 
philosophy, and Hobbes' contemporary critics were a prime example of this 
practice. These assumptions included: the dominion of fathers over children, the 
superiority of the wiser over the stronger, or the elder over the younger - none of 
which could be proved from nature. For Hobbes, dominion based on the qualities 
nature had given individuals, such as gender, age, strength, or intellect could 
never be secure and long lasting. Aristotle's argument for natural inequality was 
against both nature and experience. Nature was not unchanging, and it was the 
changeability of the natural condition, which made it such an insecure place to be. 
As people got older, their mental and physical faculties weakened, and they 
became less able to hold on to any dominion they had managed to obtain. For 
Hobbes, as long as human beings attempted to assume superiority over others, 
they could never live in peace. 
Hobbes also accused Aristotle and the Schoolmen of having a superficial 
view of human nature. They had included in their description of human nature, 
characteristics which themselves had been formed by life in society. Hobbes saw 
nature and society as complete opposites. He thought that we could not say that 
scripture, history and experience demonstrated that human beings were naturally 
sociable, because we could just as easily say that they demonstrated that men 
were naturally hostile. In fact the latter option seemed more likely, as it would 
explain why individuals had left the natural condition and created 
commonwealths. It was almost as if Hobbes were saying to the Schoolmen, if the 
natural condition was an ideal condition, then why did human beings ever leave 
it? If human beings could have ruled themselves, there would have been no need 
h 
22 Leviathan, XLVI (Latin edition), 23, p. 476. 
23 See Leviathan, XXI, 9, p. 140. 
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for the coercive power of the state. Hobbes' dislike of Aristotle and Aquinas put 
him completely in agreement with Martin Luther. 24 
3. Hobbes' Protestantism. 
Not only were the majority of Hobbes' contemporary critics Aristotelians, they 
were also Arminians, whereas Hobbes' voluntarism put him closer to orthodox 
Reformed views. 25 Hobbes' critics thought that when we used the term nature, we 
should be referring to nature's intention and perfection. They recognised that the 
Fall had corrupted human beings, but not to the extent implied by Hobbes' 
description. Natural sociability and hierarchy were retained after the Fall. Further, 
because they understood nature as perfection, they did not want to consider 
degenerated nature at all, but wanted to look at human beings, as if the Fall had 
never taken place. Human beings were still potentially perfect. Thus, the fear of 
God, the obligation of the laws of nature, and the individual conscience were 
sufficient to maintain peace amongst men in the natural condition. But an 
examination of Hobbes' state of nature, alongside protestant interpretations of the 
creation, the Fall, and the life of human beings immediately after the Fall, has 
suggested Hobbes' knowledge of Augustinian, Calvinist, and particularly 
Lutheran doctrines. In fact, Hobbes shows himself to be a more accurate 
interpreter of orthodox protestant doctrines, than his contemporary critics. 26 
Having said that I am not arguing that Hobbes was a protestant, neither am I 
arguing that he was a particular kind of protestant. Instead I am arguing that he 
used ideas that were informed by the protestant tradition, and that it was possible 
for his contemporary readers who subscribed to the scriptural interpretations 
outlined in this dissertation to see parallels to Hobbes' views. 
Hobbes demonstrated the protestant character of his thought in a number 
of areas. Firstly, in his views on the importance of intention. Central to 
24 See George Wright, `Hobbes and the Economic Trinity', British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, 7 (1999), ßp. 397-428, pp. 397-8. 
25 Thus confirming Noel Malcolm's view that ethical voluntarism was the issue between Hobbes 
and his contemporaries, and that Hobbes' voluntarist theology was a foundation, rather than a 
consequence of his philosophy - see his Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology. 26 Thus confirming Jürgen Overhoff's view - see his `The Lutheranism of Thomas Hobbes', and 
Hobbes's Theory of Volition. 
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protestantism was the doctrine of justification by faith alone. 27 This doctrine 
distinguished Calvinists and Lutherans, from Arminians, who believed in the free 
will of all individuals to attain salvation through God's universal grace, and the 
sacraments of the Church. For those protestants who subscribed to Augustine's 
theory of the Two Cities, since the Fall there had come into existence two groups 
of human beings - the elect and the reprobate, who lived on earth mixed up 
together. God had arbitrarily predestined these two groups, and only he knew who 
would be saved, and who would be damned. Human beings could not contribute 
to their own salvation in any way, except through faith. Similarly, Hobbes 
thought that it was not possible to tell good and bad men apart, on the basis of 
their outward works. Only God could look into their hearts and judge their true 
intentions. Because individuals in Hobbes' state of nature could not distinguish 
between good and bad men, it was safer to assume that all men were evil. In this 
way, Hobbes' political theory could be understood to have taken into account the 
effects of the Fall on human beings. 
Secondly, although Hobbes never specifically attributed the fallibility of 
reason to the Fall, his account of the laws of nature could be understood to be in 
agreement with Reformed interpretations of the problems associated with natural 
law since the disobedience. Even in Eden, God had given Adam and Eve a 
positive command, because natural law was not a sufficient test of obedience. 
Further, according to the Reformed view, although natural law was immutable 
and eternal, reason, through which human beings discovered it, had been 
corrupted by the disobedience. Since the Fall, human beings found it difficult to 
apply the principles of natural law, and the conscience had a tendency to confuse 
virtue and vice. Hobbes thought that the Schoolmen had failed to deal with the 
problem of disagreement over which actions constituted virtue or vice. Hobbes' 
civil sovereign, or `mortal god', was designed to provide the solution to this 
problem, by giving natural law one interpretation and setting out how it was to be 
applied in particular circumstances, thus converting natural law into civil law. 28 
27 Hobbes thought that both faith and obedience were necessary for salvation, where obedience 
was `the will or effort to obey' - see De Cive, XVIII, 3, p. 236. See also Elements, XXV, 10, pp. 
151-2; and Leviathan, XLIII, 3-5, pp. 398-400, & 19-23, pp. 407-10. 
28 According to Skinner, `Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', pp. 54-5, the appointment of 
a judge solved the problem ofparadiastale. 
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Finally, Hobbes was in agreement with the voluntarist view that God's 
will was beyond our understanding, and that his intentions and purposes were not 
made manifest in nature. The account of Cain and Abel demonstrated the 
arbitrariness of God's decrees. It demonstrated that good men often suffered, 
while evil men prospered. For instance, if we examined Cain's life after the 
killing of his brother, and imagined having no knowledge of Cain's crime, we 
might be led to believe that Cain was and had been a good man. After all, he was 
`rewarded' with a family, long life, and a kingdom; while Abel was `punished' 
with death. Hobbes seems to have taken the view that even in Eden, God was not 
enough to maintain order. God's positive command had not prevented Adam and 
Eve from disobeying him, and this was even more the case now, since the 
corruption of human beings by the Fall. God's rewards and punishments were not 
immediate enough, and also not obvious enough. The scriptural accounts of 
Adam and Eve, and Cain and Abel demonstrated this. The account of Cain and 
Abel also demonstrated why we could not say that authority was God-given. God 
sometimes allowed evil men, like Cain, to rule. 
One of Hobbes' contemporary critics pointed out that Hobbes had turned 
all traditional arguments for authority upside down. This dissertation has shown 
that Hobbes' description of the state of nature could be understood to have taken 
Calvin's idea that through the disobedience, `the order of nature, which God has 
appointed, has been inverted by us' to its extreme logical conclusion. 29 Thus, 
Hobbes' state of nature, a condition of unsociability, equality and war, was a 
complete inversion of God's creation of human beings in a sociable, hierarchical, 
and peaceful condition. This seems to be the crux of the argument between 
Hobbes and his contemporaries. The critics recognised that nature had been 
corrupted by the Fall, although not to the extent implied by Hobbes' description. 
But they also thought that nature should be judged by her intention or perfection, 
almost as if the Fall had never taken place. Hobbes, on the other hand, wanted to 
look at how human beings were, not how they should have been. His political 
theory indicates that he was closer to the Augustinian and Reformed view that 
nature had been completely inverted by the Fall. This dissertation has shown that 
29 Calvin, Commentaries, p. 129. 
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the contemporary reading of Hobbes' account of the state of nature owed much to 
the reader's own interpretation of the consequences of this catastrophic event. 
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